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Abstract
This dissertation examines a period around World War II when the prospect of widespread
destruction provoked a profound re-evaluation of Europe's landmarks, their material value, and their
ethical significance. Between 1932 and 1964, works once known as artistic and historic
monuments-from buildings to bridges, paintings to shrines, ruins to colossi-acquired a "cultural"
value as belonging to the "universal heritage of mankind." Promoted as didactic objects of
international understanding, they became subjects of a new brand of international law. I trace the
origins of this international valuation to a political movement, identified as Cultural Internationalism,
whose main tenet was that the transnational circulation of knowledge constitutes an antidote to war.
This ideal fueled the birth of organizations that brandished the autonomy of intellectual work as a
weapon against nationalisms: most visibly, the League of Nations' Institut International de Coop&ation
Intellectuelle (IICI, 1924-1941), its successor the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific
Organization (UNESCO, 1946-), and the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of
Artistic Monuments in War Area (Roberts Commission, 1943-46). Despite the continued role of this
institutional lineage in cultural production worldwide, there has not been a study of its contribution
to 20th-Century aesthetics. The dissertation explores the modernist aesthetics of monuments that
arose from this milieu and unfolded in three related fields: the bombed cities of the Allies' war, the
architecture of the European reconstruction, and the heritage missions of the decolonization. A broad
network of intellectuals, art historians, architects, and archaeologists was enlisted to show that
monuments gave iconic weight to cultural autonomy in a new world order. I follow these experts'
attempts to effect this autonomy: working in conferences and as field experts, spawning an intricate
network of civilian and military committees, caring for a growing collection of monuments, and
encountering the shifting winds of a massive geo-political realignment.
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Introduction
It is difficult, in these solemn milieux, to speak of these great works aloud. Yet it is done,
and with success.' -Henri Focillon, Report to the OIM, 1927
If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own
men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the
choice is not always so clear-cut as that.2
-Dwight Eisenhower, Letter to All Air Force Commanders, 1944
Why not face the truth? Life would be a good deal easier for many people if there were
no old buildings.3  -Editorial, The Unesco Courier, 1954
It is not easy to choose between temples and crops. I would be sorry for any man called
on to make a choice who could do so without a feeling of despair.4
-Vittorino Veronese, World Appeal to Member-States, 1960
A dual line of enquiry was forced upon mid-twentieth-century political agents-from
idealist intellectuals in the 1930s to international bureaucrats in the 1950s, from the Allied Air Forces
in 1944 to Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1960-as they faced the prospect of widespread destruction:
aesthetically, what is a monument worth saving, and ethically, when is it worth saving? Consistently,
these authorities sought to mitigate the choice between "famous buildings" and "men's lives;"
consistently, they argued that saved monuments should become emblems of lives spared. This
dissertation is about the collection of monuments and the network of experts that made this
mitigation possible. The monuments: a worldwide collection of landmarks once known as "artistic
and historic monuments," from building to bridges, paintings to shrines, ruins to colossi, that
acquired over the span of three decades a "cultural" value as belonging to the "universal heritage of
mankind." Promoted as objects of international understanding, they became subjects of a new brand
of international law. The experts: a broad network of thinkers concerned with aesthetic autonomy,
art historians, archaeologists, museum directors and architects who became involved in the political
Henri Focillon, cited in Institut International de CoopEration Intellectuelle, Cahiers des Relations Artistiques: La Coopiration
Intellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts (Paris : PUF, 1927), 8. This and all subsequent translations in the dissertation are by the
author, unless otherwise noted.
Z Dwight Eisenhower, Letter to All US Air Force Commanders, May 2 6th, 1944, cited in Final Report of the American Commission for the
Protection and Salvage of Monuments in War Areas (Washington: 1946).
3 Editorial, "To save our heritage in stone," The Unesco Courier VII/6 (Nov 1954), 3.
4 Vittorino Veronese, "Unesco Launches a World Appeal", reprinted in Unesco Courier (May 1960), 6.
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movement for "intellectual cooperation", creating an intricate series of committees within
international bureaucracies from the League of Nations, to the Allied Military Government (AMG),
and the United Nations Cultural, Educational and Scientific Organization (Unesco) s. Despite the
continuing role of this institutional lineage in cultural production worldwide, there has not been a
study of its contribution to 20th-Century aesthetics. The aim of the dissertation is therefore double:
historically, to chronicle the untold story of these monuments and the role they played in mid-20th-
Century international events; theoretically, to distill the theory of aesthetic value that was devised by
these experts, in the face of a growing ethical imbalance between the value of preserving civilizations
and the value of sparing lives. The dissertation argues a "modernist aesthetics of monuments"
emerged the projects and debates of this period, and provides a critical study of the underlying
relationship between politics and space. As such, it is intended as a contribution to aesthetic theory, to
international heritage discourse, to European cultural history, and to the historiography of art and
architecture.
The dissertation is meant to fill a gap in histories of international heritage and preservation,
wherein the 1932 Athens Conference (for the Conservation of Artistic and Historic Monuments) was a landmark of
internationalization, and the 1964 Venice Charter (for the Conservation and Preservation of Monuments and Sites)
marked a neat passage from the preservation of objects to the conservation of environments. I span
the projects and debates between these two events--decades when preservationist impulses are
usually described as wholly foiled by the destructive forces of modernism, war, and modernization,
not to be recovered until the postmodern historicism of later decades. Instead, I argue that it was
precisely in contact with the institutions of war, the discourses of modernism, and techniques of
modernization that monuments became modern international objects, because those institutions,
discourses, and techniques paradoxically granted their autonomy a political use-value within an
system of governance.
Frangoise Choay's 1992 L'Allegorie du Patrimoine, translated in 2001 as The Invention of the Historic
Monument, remains the most comprehensive intellectual history of the modern European monument,
notable for gathering conservation, preservation, urban and architectural discourses into one sweep.
The Getty Center's 1996 Historical and Philosophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage inaugurated a
wave of renewed interest on the part of art institutions, which has only intensified in light of recent
restitution controversies. On the architectural side, Wim Denslagen's 1992 Architectural Restoration in
s There are two naming conventions for the organization; for reasons of legibility I have adapted the more recent one
which treats it like a proper noun (Unesco) rather than an acronym (UNESCO).
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Western Europe surveyed the debates that led to the patrimonial policies of the 19' Century, but stopped
short of 20th Century developments. While this literature depicts the mid-century as a cohesive
period when monuments acquired an international value and "European architecture" emerged as a
single cultural referent, these remain abstract notions, without any historical reality.
The challenge in narrating this international phenomenon lies partly in reconciling the
prominence of French institutions (of which Unesco's Paris location is a reminder), the prevalence
of German theorizations (evidenced by the ubiquity of Alois Riegl's 1903 essay Moderne
Denkmalkultus), and Italy's dominance in the realm of technique (confirmed in recent translation of
Cesare Brandi's 1963 Teoria del Restauro.) I address these competing traditions as parallel strands in a
single institutional history, whose coexistence was facilitated both by the ideological vagueness of
"intellectual cooperation" and by the tendency of bureaucratic formations to adhere to existing
structures of expertise. For example, I show that the legal concept of "cultural heritage" was
designed not only to diffuse conflicts between nations but also to dissimulate tensions between
national and international interests, nesting them temporarily into one-other.6 Thus, rather than
seeing the postwar teleologically as the progressive enlargement of a single protective trend
culminating in the 1972 World Heritage convention, I show that international bureaucracies have
normalized standards of "protection" that were elaborated in exceptionalist terms.
The international charters and conventions that punctuate this history continue to be invoked
as if they belonged to a higher realm of history, detached from conservation practices yet valid as
expressions of international moral consensus.7 This pattern owes much to the way monuments
entered the international political order in the early decades of the century: through a scholarly
appeal to Geistesgechichte on the one hand, and an alliance with idealist League politics on the other. As
an intellectual history, the dissertation aims to restore these charters into the institutional history of
the so-called "bureaucratization of world politics,"8 recently described in a substantial theoretical
corpus on the growth of international organizations, throughout the century, as "providers of
norms." My basic historical argument vis-t-vis this "constructionist" approach to organizations is
that the role assigned to art and architecture within these institutions can only be understood in light
of the weight that was placed on idealist "representation" in the rhetoric of the "new diplomacy"
and its corollary, "total war." War served as a crucial catalyst for bringing aesthetic notions into
6 This confirms the hypothesis put forth in John Merryman's now seminal "Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural
Property," AmericanJournal of International Law, (Oct 1986), 831-953.
7 See the issue of the Getty Conservation Institute Newsletter, "On heritage charters and conventions," (2004), v. 19, n.2.
8 The phrase was coined by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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political representation. But even war is an international diplomatic event that belongs in a
continuum of cooperation. I take the material on monuments produced by these institutions between
1932 and 1964 as one continuous bureaucratic archive. My research strategy has been to treat pre-
war, wartime, and postwar material as one continuous and cohesive literature, which produced a
coherent aesthetic discourse. This strategy is certainly vindicated by the impressively long and diverse
roster of luminaries that can be found in these archives: from theorizers of conservation (Gustavo
Giovanoni, WG Constable, Pietro Gazzola) to original founders of modern architectural history
(Henri Focillon, Erwin Panofsky, Giulio Carlo Argan), from influential cultural figures (Julian
Huxley, Paul Sachs, Andre Malraux) to luminary intellectuals whose work marked the century
(Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Claude Levi-Strauss). All of these figures' contribution to intellectual
cooperation is usually treated as contingent to their main theoretical oeuvre. 9 In contrast I argue that
the aesthetics of this intellectual milieu resides not only in its declarative statements but also in the
collaborative network itself, which allowed competing philosophical ambitions to coexist in a single
institutional framework, creating a pattern of ethical slippages between disciplines.
What the dissertation does not offer is a genealogical picking-apart of the philosophical
origins of the concept of "the cultural heritage of mankind." Any conceptual clarity that was built
into this formulation in the late 1920s was completely undermined by the project of intellectual
cooperation, and its compulsion to separation of "concrete action" and "abstract agreement." In
order to conduct a history of the institution without inheriting its philosophical confusion, I confine
my intellectual history to art and architecture, recalling appeals to various philosophical traditions
only as I encounter them within these disciplinary boundaries. For example-and it is the crucial
one-the meaning of the word "culture" remained a source of heated disagreement and endless
debate even as it became the primary rallying point for Unesco to mobilize intellectuals against
nationalism. By the time "cultural internationalism" became a legitimate mode of international
political action in the 1960s, "culture" was no less in crisis than the "intellectual" had been during
the days of "intellectual cooperation" in the 1930s. But the crucial support for the notions of
autonomy, agreement, and dissemination that were needed to sustain this institutional formation had
shifted: from individuals to institutions, and from people to monuments. For this reason, I look at
"monuments" to find out what was meant by "culture," not the other way around.
9 For the philosophers, see H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975) and The Obstructed Path
1930-1960 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) and Frangois Dosse, Histoire du Structuralisme, (Paris: Seuil, 1992).
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The role played by modem institutions in shaping built environments and cultural canons has
been studied extensively in the national and colonial contexts of the long 19' h Century. Building on
this history, I trace the revival of this "World History" in the 20 th century, and the iconic role played
by art and architecture in shaping it. The dissertation describes how this canon was effected, in
spatial and historiographic terms. For example, saving Nubia's monuments required archaeologists
to re-inscribe Nubia into a proto-internationalist history of Africa, while architects constructed an
"aesthetic analogy" between the Egyptian desert and Western museum environments. The goal is to
show that apparently heterogeneous discourses were based on the same territorial paradigm, where
culture is a spatial value that can be "concentrated" and "disseminated" according to very specific
territorial, urban and architectural principles.
The primary disciplinary motive behind this work is to complicate the role played by World
War II in art- and architectural historiography. Architectural historians have only recently begun to
mitigate the traditional division of the 20h Century into the prewar (European) experiments of
modernism and the postwar (American) triumph of the International Style."1 No longer a simple
epistemological break, the mid-century period is now understood as a "crisis of representation" that
prefigured the "waning" of architecture's symbolic power in the postwar." Monuments, however,
remain conspicuously absent from this new historiography, despite its avowed goal of bridging
between the pre-war "Monumental Era" and the postwar "monumentalizations" of the modern
masters."2 By taking monuments as protagonists, the dissertation sheds light on their position as
disciplinary catalysts-for example, as the literal and figurative "elephants in the room" of the
European reconstruction, crucial anchors around which modernist urban schemes were composed.
More generally, I argue that their exclusion from modem architectural discourse did not actually
deprive monuments of their modernism. While architects were busy ignoring, rejecting, or
emulating them, the monuments of architectural history underwent their own modem movement,
at the hands of an entirely different set of international actors. Like its architectural counterpart, this
monumental modernism was made of manifestos, experiments, and polemical debates. While its
primary gesture was destructive, it was still conceived as a spatial imaginary produced through
10 Siegfried Giedion inaugurated this division in the 1943 Space, Time and Architecture.
" Kenneth Frampton's Modern Architecture was the first survey to span the war more than once. Its regionalist project was
taken up in Sarah Goldhagen's Anxious Modernisms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). See also the timid re-periodization of
Joan Ockman's Architecture Culture 1943-1968.
12 Franco Borsi, The Monumental Era: European Architecture and Design 1929-1939 (Paris: Hazan, 1986); and Frampton "Le
Corbusier and the Monumentalization of the Vernacular," and "Mies van der Rohe and the Monumentalization of
Technique," in Modem Architecture.
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legible aesthetic tropes: maintenance and removal, emptying and concentration, integration and
proportion. These tropes constitute what I call "the modernist aesthetics of monuments."
The dissertation is structured around four episodes when political authority and academic
expertise converged. Chapters 1 and 3 are fragments of institutional history; Chapters 2 and 4 are
case-studies. Chapter 1 chronicles the work of the committees devoted to "The Arts and Letter"
within the League of Nations' Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (CIC) between 1932 and 1941. This
discourse, and the collaborative networks inaugurated by art historians like Henri Focillon,
constructed a "politics of form" to relate the aesthetic autonomy of art (as moved by a "will to art")
into a politically useful international solidarity (to curtail the progress of the "will to war"). Chapter
2 examines how this project was taken up and transformed during the war, by looking at the
American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Monuments in War Areas (Roberts Commission). Formed
in late 1942 and dissolved in 1946, this group of American art historians staged a fortuitous
encounter between the aesthetics of art history and the ethics of psychological warfare, compiling
lists and maps of monuments "not to be bombed" by Allied Air Forces in what was eventually seen
as "an unwitting city planning program" over Europe. Chapter 3 examines the first ten years of
Unesco's work on Monuments by analyzing the urban, architectural and curatorial principles that
were disseminated through the Museums and Monuments manuals between 1949 and 1960, in an effort
to render all cultural institutions into active agents of international understanding. Echoed in the
collaborative design of UNESCO's Paris headquarters, these principles proved equally valid for
keepers of ancient monuments and builders of new ones. The last chapter looks at the massive
International Campaign to Salvage the Monuments of Nubia that was launched by Unesco in 1959 to salvage and
disperse the monuments threatened by the Soviet-funded Aswan High Dam. Under the guise of
creating a "purely cultural" category of inter-governmental action, Unesco revived colonial channels
of archaeological exchange, and helped to shape the Nubian desert into "the greatest open-air
museum in the world."
I have treated these chapters as discreet historical frames, traversed by a single institutional
lineage. This case-study method has allowed me to delimit research fields and isolate historical
questions: why did each convergence between politics and aesthetics occur; what allowed
disciplinary ambitions and mechanisms of power to intersect; how were conditions created, in each
context, for operating under "exceptional" collaborative measures? Yet in each case, my research has
led to the normative function of exception. "Monuments," in this dissertation, are objects that
transformed exceptional (catastrophic, sublime, unique, auratic, etc.) value into cultural norm.
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Chapter 1
Will to War, Will to Art
Intellectual Cooperation and the Autonomy of the Arts, 1932-1941
The failure of the League of Nations to prevent war, and the extent to which the United
Nations overcame or inherited this failure, constitutes one of the central problematics of 20f" century
international theory. The main participants in this debate have long shed the ideological labels that
were assigned to them in the 1930s, when "realists" warned that any attempt to supercede inter-
national anarchy with supra-national institutions was doomed to failure, while "idealists" argued
that the problem of the League was in its implementation, not in the principle, of permanent
international organizations devoted to "perpetuating peace."' The debate continues today, albeit in
revised terms.2 All, however, agree on one point of history: despite the differences in the structure,
covenants, and membership of the League and the UN, the style of diplomacy that was inaugurated in
1919 was largely validated in 1945, and this "new diplomacy" remains dominant today.3 Any
student of international theory would therefore have detected a familiar pattern in the rhetoric that
surrounded the recent unearthing of a five-hundred page tome, containing the proceedings of the
first international conference on "historic and artistic conservation of monuments," now known as
"The Athens Conference," which was organized by the League of Nations in 1931:
'The distinction was first made by EH Carr, who published Twenty Years' Crisis in 1939, in an attempt to constitute
"International Studies" as a new discipline, based on analyzing the interwar as a play between "Utopia and Reality."
Each side was assigned a distinguished lineage of precedents in moral and political philosophy. The realists were
essentially Hobbesian; the idealists were Benthamites. For a second-generation critical summary, including how
international theory became a social science in the postwar, see Hedley Bull's 1969 "The Theory of International Politics
1919-1969), in James Der Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York: NYU, 1995), 181-211. This
debate was recently rehearsed in Daedalus: The Challenge of Global Justice Now, V. 132, No. 1 (Winter 2003) with Jack
Goldsmith and Stephen D. Krasner expounding "The Limits of Idealism" against Stanley Hoffman's case for "World
Governance: Beyond Utopia." For two attempts to sort out the two theoretical camps, see David Long and Peter
Wilson, Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Re-Assessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
2 In Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005) David Long and Brian C.
Schmidt argue that the "first debate" of IR was a "myth" and that the stakes of the League are better understood by
reading them as concealed debates between a set of Oxford-trained thinkers whose concerns were really between
"imperialism" and "internationalism."
3 "The United Nations, in its essentials, was seen as an improved League, rather than a departure from it." For a
succinct account of why "the failure of the League did not doom the whole process of international organization" see
David Armstrong, The Rise of the International Organization: A Short History (New York: St Martin's, 1982), 48. For more
technical discussion of the actual passage of power from League of Nations to UN, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, "La
transition de la Soci&t6 des Nations i l'Organisation des Nations Unies," in The League of Nations In Retrospect (Berlin:
Waalter de Gruyter, 1983). For a war-time critique of the League that recommends modification into the UN, see Dell
Htichner, "The Failure of the League: Lesson in Public Relations." Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring 1944), 61-71.
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In 193 1, the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations organized the
first international conference on the "artistic and historic conservation of monuments" in
Athens. The following year, the conference's agenda and conclusions, the common
resolution of the 118 participants (from 16 countries, all European), as well as the
individual contributions of 51 speakers, were published in a single document.
This collection-now a rarity-is a landmark in the history of the conservation and
protection of built heritage. Direct source of the Venice Charter (19 64), it remains largely
unknown, even in professional circles where constant reference to it is nonetheless
made, with much approximation and under the name "Athens Charter."
The Athens Conference closed an era when the great monuments of art and history were
conserved museologically for the sake of an aristocratic European elite, and opened the
field to new lines of questioning. For the first time, historic monuments were evoked in
terms of the "artistic and archaeological heritage of mankind," a matter of concern to the
"community of states, keepers of civilization."
After the Athens Conference the world had to wait until 1964 ... for a new era to dawn.
In the span of a few years, international colloquia multiplied across the planet,
accumulating charters, recommendations and resolutions on the preservation,
restoration, and usage of historic monuments, old quarters, and traditional dwellings.4
Thus the Athens Conference was presented as the lost covenant of international heritage: a document
that inaugurated a new style of preservation, which had spread worldwide, after being "updated" in
1964 by the more doctrinaire Venice Charter. In other words, the Athens Conference is to the Venice Charter
what the League is to the UN: a direct antecedent, venerable yet flawed. This born-again narrative has
already been wielded for the advancement of preservation as a discipline; the impressive obscurity of
the League's "intellectual" arm seemingly grants a theoretical legitimacy and a genealogical depth to
a profession that has been plagued by accusations of amateurism and bureaucratism alike: once a
form of "scholarship in tennis shoes," preservation now has international gravitas. But if it is by
inaugurating a "multiplication of colloquia" and an "accumulation of charters" that the Athens
Conference led the discipline forward, the institutional sources of this conference model have yet to
be sought in the League itself. This chapter locates the origins of the international value of
monuments in the institutional history of the League. I argue that, if the newfound historical
pedigree of "intellectual cooperation" has helped preservationists overcome their image as
"academics in tennis shoes," it is largely because "intellectual cooperation" itself was theorized as a
type of "diplomacy-in-tennis-shoes."
4 Fransoise Choay, "Introduction," in La Conference d'Athenes sur la conservation artistique et historique des monuments (1931), (Paris:
Tranches des Villes, 2002), 7. Translation from French mine. All subsequent translations from French and Italian are
mine unless otherwise marked.
1. Will to War, Will to Art
In addressing this intersection between international preservation and international politics, I
intend to address-and, in some ways, bypass-another historical conjuncture that has been
suggested by the re-discovery of the Athens Conference: its connection with the international
architectural avant-garde, and in particular the Congris Intemationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). The
habit of preservation historians to confuse their own inaugural meeting (the Athens Conference)
with that of modernist urbanism (the Athens Charter) has been duly noted, and its revealing ironies
drawn out:
Speculations as to its contents have become as blurry as they are fantastical. In particular,
it has now earned the attribution of a so-called "charter" of Athens, in a confusion with
the charter that bears this name, which was elaborated two years later by the Congris
Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) and which-salient detail-limited all
heritage conservation to major monuments and directly contributed to the destruction of
historic city centers throughout the world.'
This reference to CIAM performs the double function, of borrowing modernism's fame and
identifying it as preservation's nemesis. The implication is that the Athens Conference failed to foil
modernism, much as the League of Nations failed to prevent war. It is true that the Athens Charter
marginalized monument conservation, and that this dissertation spans three decades when the
reciprocal animosity between modern architects and monuments-conservators grew to polemical
heights. 1964 is, after all, the year that Reyner Banham declared himself immune to "idiotic
preservationist panics" and Walter Gropius dismissed any "nostalgic wailing at the grave" of
centuries past as "unbecoming and sterile." 6 Yet to focus exclusively on these debates is to be
invested by the disciplinary myopias of both sides, ignoring more fundamental differences between
them and evading any discussion of the impact of World War II on each. If the "destruction of city
centers" is the main reason "the world had to wait" for international preservation to take hold, I
argue a more "direct" link with this destruction can be found by investigating the relationship
between international preservation and its institutional host, the League of Nations.
Athens Conference and Athens Charter belong to two distinct traditions of internationalism,
although both can be traced to the cosmopolitanism of Enlightenment philosophers. The early
s Choay, La Conference d'Athanes. 9. For a example of this confusion, (all the more blatant for its appearance in a textbook
series created by the institutions directly related to the Athens Conference), see "the Athens Meetings," in Jukka
Jokkilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Series in Conservation and
Museology, 1999) 284-285. Jokkilehto groups Athens Conference and Athens Charter into such a seamless sequence,
and summarizes their respective doctrines in such vague terms, that it is truly unclear whether these were separate
events.
6 Reyner Banham is cited by Daniel Bluestone in "Academics in Tennis Shoes: Historic Preservation and the Academy,"
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 1999/2000. (Sep., 1999), 300-307. Walter Gropius' infamous diatribe against
all things "traditional," is in "Tradition and Continuity in Architecture, Part II 136" The Architectural Record (May 1964).
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CIAMs were modeled on the model of a "revolutionary" internationalism where class solidarity
transcends national allegiances, as it was adapted by the artistic avant-gardes of the 20' century. In
contrast, the Athens Conference belongs squarely in the history of Wilsonian diplomacy which gave
birth to the League itself, where regular meetings are organized in order to normalize relations
between states. As we will see, the revolutionary Internationale was of little concern to those who
conceptualized intellectual cooperation within the League, especially since the League was
collaborating with the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1901-),explicitly to create a response
to this socialist movement of worker solidarity. The "intellectual" at the heart of the IICI was
conceptualized as an extension of the "worker" of the ILO. Thus, unlike communists and modern
architects who drew from international solidarity the strength to seek a functional unification of the
world, the preservationists that gathered at Athens in 1931 sought to create an international network
precisely to legitimate their continued autonomy as a functioning part of international political life.
As for the later transformation of the CIAMs into a professional association, bemoaned by
architectural historians as a cause of demise of the avant-garde and often associated with the rise of
organizations like the UN, this confrontation occurred under the aegis of professional
internationalism, which was, in the prewar, as foreign to intellectual cooperation as it was to the
avant-garde.7 As we will see in Charter 3, it is not until the postwar that the UN system cultivated a
class of professionalized experts in "cultural" fields. Interwar intellectual cooperation was interested
in professional groups only insofar as they could deliver entire institutional networks-literally,
networks of institutions-to the League's needs.
This brings me to the second myopia in the recent Athens Conference literature: the
treatment of "destruction" in preservation history. Although contemporary heritage discourse tends
to give modern architecture the agency in the mid-century destruction of cities, monuments actually
became a concern of the League of Nations through the filter of two disciplines where destruction
was a much less polemical concern: museum conservation and archaeology. Here, the first
rectification to be made in this recent historiography concerns the relative influence on the
Conference of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IICI), which hosted the Athens
Conference, and the Office International des Mus~es (OIM) which actually organized it. If the Athens
Proceedings attest to the "original historic, ideological and epistemological solidarity tying the
disciplines [of archaeology and museology] to the theory and practice of historical monuments,"8
7 For a chronicle of the growth of the CIAMs in the immediate postwar see Eric Mumford, "CIAM and the Postwar
World," in The CIAM discourse on Urbanism 1928-1960 (MIT Press, 2000), 131-200.
8 Choay, Ibid, 8.
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the way these disciplinary alliances turned monuments themselves into icons of solidarity remains
unclear. I argue that these disciplines introduced technical discussions and institutional practices into
a series of international debates that tended towards a humanistic abstraction and idealist
schematizations, and that within these structures monuments provided a way out of choosing sides
in the polarizing disciplinary, intellectual, and political debates of the "Twenty Years' Crisis."
The chapter begins in the late 1920s when "intellectual cooperation" was a vague
institutional ideal, promoted by political thinkers seeking an international morality. By the time war
broke out in 1939, the League's claim to this "morality" has been completely undermined, to the
point that Hitler's 1939 accusation--"some nations have first acquired a world by force only to
defend this robbery with moralizing theories" 9-was difficult to refute. Most of the League's work
had proved ineffective or corrupt. The project of Intellectual Cooperation was inextricably linked to
the political tragedy of the League the 1930s: its debates unfolded with growing pathos and
increasingly exalted tones, and the pace of institutional activity that animated the organs of
intellectual cooperation quickened undeniably in response to this mounting sense of urgency. In my
account of these debates, however, I sacrifice narrative continuity in order to draw out a structural
perspective instead. My goal is to chronicle the nested sequence of bureaucratic branching, and
filiations that allowed "monuments of art and history" to enter international intellectual cooperation.
I follow a small group of figures-and Paul Valery, Henri Focillon, Josef Strzygowski, Gustavo
Giovannoni foremost among them-and argue their efforts to turn monuments into legitimate
objects of international concern should be seen as a rare and unwitting success within a string of
decided institutional failures.
I begin with an overview of intellectual cooperation as it was institutionalized in the 1920s.
The failure of cooperation in scientific fields, I argue, provoked both a re-orientation of intellectual
cooperation towards literary themes, and an increasing focus on achieving agreement in "technical"
endeavors. In this context, I cover the creation of the International Museums Office (OIM) and the
International Monuments Committee, which were efforts to activate "ready-made" networks of
institutional cooperation. The political effectiveness of these networks was dependent upon the
transformation of theories of space and form into a liberal politics based on the "life" of museums
and monuments. The Athens Conference was a crucial step in the identification of a bureaucratic
model of "maintenance" suitable both to museum objects and monument conservation. The
Conference opened the door to the possibility for an international preservation ethic-but this ethic
was soon diverted by political events and the League's institutional response to them: a sudden
9 Carr, "The realist critique," in Twenty Years' Crisis, 77.
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forefronting of "war," and what I argue is a "cultural turn" in intellectual cooperation. In this
context I cover the creation the "League of Minds" and its art-historical offshoot the Office of
Institutes of Art History, which theorized a hypothetical "will to art" dialectically opposed to a
much-dramatized collective "will to war." In these idealist discourses, monuments increasingly
appeared as objects that would provoke concrete 'agreement,' nest national and international
allegiances, and blur the line between aesthetic and political realms. The result was not what the
pioneers of intellectual cooperation had imagined: instead of averting war by enacting an
international morality, international monuments entered war as icons of conflicts past. Insofar as
Athens leads to Venice, this chapter chronicles all the things-institutional formations, theoretical
baggage, aesthetic assumptions-that were shed along the way.
The CIC: Idealism and Intellectualism at the League
The critique that contemporary heritage discourse has leveled at the Athens Conference-that
it was "elitist", "ethnocentric" and "aristocratic"-is one that plagued Intellectual Cooperation from
the start. In the words of one postwar critic, "intellectual cooperation failed because it was divorced
from the masses of the world, restricted to a small number of politically ineffective individuals, and
because the nationalistic feeling that pervaded educational policy then, prevented it from entering the
field of education."' 0 This accusation of "intellectualism," in turn, is one that permeates the literature
on the League itself, beginning with EH Carr's 1939 characterization as "the most important of all
the institutions affected by the one-sided intellectualism of international politics, which was an
attempt to apply the principles of Lockeian liberalism to the building of a machinery of international
order."" As Hedley Bull pointed out, the political thinkers who defended the League of Nations were
designated as "idealists", but "it is not the case that these writers were specially insistent upon the
moral dimension of international relations, still less that they contributed anything important to our
understanding of it." 2 Instead what is meant by "intellectualism" is a utopian view of international
10 T.V. Sathyamurthy, "Changing Concepts of Intellectual Co-Operation, in International Review of Education Vol. 9, No. 4.
(1963 - 1964) 386-395.
" Carr, 29. Carr's account of the lineage of utopianism implicates too many political philosophers to recall here. A
synthesis can be gleaned from footnotes for his introduction to "The Utopian Background": Bentham, Mill, Comte,
Wilson.
12 Bull, International Theory Today, 185. In fact, recent scholarship on these League supporters has shown that while they
were self-professed liberal reformers, most saw the League as a compromise upon more radical transformations of the
existing imperial order. Alfred Zimmern, for instance, whom EH Carr accused of having launched an "international
moral crusade" to mask his poor grasp of economics, is also at the origins of the revision of Woodrow Wilson's
"Fourteen Points" from a proposal for a new type of World Government to a more gradual modification of the Concert
of Europe. ("Alfred Zimmern: Cautious Idealism," in Thinkers of the Twenty-Years' Crisis, 87.) More radical liberals like
Hobson, whose critique of empire was continuous with Lenin's, promoted the League as an imperfect but plausible
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institutions, where organizations are not to be seen merely as "diplomatic machinery ... but as the
first steps in the creation of a world state.""3 The League of Nations was not only designed to resolve
specific conflicts but also to provide an image of a world order, to which a hypothetical "world
citizen" might conceive of belonging. The "new diplomacy" was a crucial part of this image:
regular conferences, held in bucolic circumstances, and publicized to the "world court of public
opinion," would help to promote the idea that an "international outlook" existed. In this sense, the
mere image of cooperation contributed to the goals of internationalism.' 4
What, then, was the relation between the "intellectuals" of Intellectual Cooperation and the
"intellectualism" of League politics? League advocates were not content to let "international
morality" be a by-product of its other activities; instead they insisted on devoting specific
international work to it, under the name "intellectual cooperation." One of the most vocal
proponents of separating "intellectual cooperation" from the League's other activities was British
political theorist Alfred Zimmern (1879-195 1), who held the first chair in "International Relations"
at the University of Wales in 1919. In Learning and Leadership he described the "task of intellectual
cooperation" as "the promotion of a unity in the world of thought itself" as a precondition for
peace:
The future, not of democracy but of constitutional government as an effective power in
the ordering of human affairs depends upon its association with the arts of thought.
Unless regular and recognized methods of collaboration are worked out between the
thinkers and the doers, between experts knowledge and the representatives of the public
interest, power will continue to pass into private and irresponsible hands, and the drift
to disaster will become irresistible. How can unity be brought about in the world of
knowledge? The answer is not difficult. By the promotion of systematic arrangements for
the discussion of the interests common to all who are engaged in the pursuit of
knowledge. •
Zimmern spoke of a "council of scholars" who would represent "the international mind" and
whose mandate would be to bring humanity "into harmony with the great moral forces which rule
path for curbing the further expansion of empires. (David Long, "J.A. Hobson and Economic Internationalism," Thinker
of the Twenty-Years' Crisis, 122.) For a survey of the debates about the Lenin-Hobson theory, see A. M. Eckstein,"Is There a
'Hobson-Lenin Thesis' on Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial Expansion?," in The Economic History Review, (May, 1991),
297-318. Even Woodrow Wilson saw his own Fourteen Points as a response to Lenin's own proposal for an "open
diplomacy" in 1917. See Cornelia Navari, "The new diplomacy and the new state," in Internationalism and the State in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Routeledge, 2000), 254-255.
13 Bull, International Theory Today, 76.
14 Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen points speech and the covenant of the League Covenants are the two documents to
consult for the original phrasing of the "covenants openly arrived at." A period edition is Frederick Pollock, The League of
Nations (New York: the Lawbook Exchange, 1920).
is Alfred Zimmern, "The Problems of Intellectual Life," in Learning and Leadership (London: Oxford University Press,1928), 85.
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the destinies of mankind." Zimmern imagined that "moral revolution" had to occur before the
lessons of a world order could be absorbed by an international polity.
The fact that intellectual cooperation was not one of the League's covenants, but was the raison
d'etre of a whole branch of its activities, is usually taken as evidence of a confusion of means and ends
and of an organizational hybridity: the League as a bureaucracy was torn between a traditional
"governmental" model (where a doctrinal arm might be devoted to maintaining the ideological
foundations of power), and a postwar "international organization" (where moral agreement is
achieved only as by-product of the achievement of specific goals). A comparison with the structure
of the United Nations, whose organization is more strictly "functional", is useful here. Insofar as the
UN is devoted to an ideal, it is the ideal of international human rights, which is written everywhere
in the UN Charter. Indeed the Charter concludes with a pledge to devote cooperation to the
promotion of "the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 16 Yet not
one of the UN "specialized agencies" (Unesco, WHO, etc.) is devoted specifically to these rights. In
the case of the League, this relation was reversed: the rhetoric surrounding the League was permeated
with references to an "international outlook," which was not written in any of the League covenants,
but still became one of the League's concerted "functions," with the creation of the Commission for
Intellectual Cooperation (CIC) in Geneva in 1922. (fig 1.01)
The idea of enlisting intellectuals in the promotion of international solidarity had been
suggested by the 1 8th Century philosophers who had pioneered internationalism itself. Immanuel
Kant's 1795 Essay on Perpetual Peace, for instance, specifically discussed the transposition of the platonic
"philosopher-king" into modem international politics. While Kant's "Three Definitive Articles of
Perpetual Peace" added little to the work of the moral philosophers and internationalists that
preceded him, Kant added a trademark "Secret Article" that granted the philosopher a special status
within his international federation:
The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a
public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war.
... The state shall silently invite suggestions for this purpose, while at the same time
keeping the fact secret.
... That kings should philosophize, or philosophers become kings, is not to be
expected. ... But it is absolutely indispensable ... that both kings and sovereign nations
... should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid the expression of
their opinions, but should allow them to speak openly. And since this class of men, by
16 Charles G. Fenwick, "The Problem of Moral Disarmament," in The American Journal of International Law, (Jan 1947), 115.
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their very nature, are incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes
of political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism. 17
Kant had specifically rejected the notion of a "state of nations" since "many nations in one state
would constitute only one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since they are so many separate
states and are not to be fused into one.""• In contrast to political philosophers like Rousseau who saw
the modern nation-state dissolving in an international one, Kant offered a remedial solution of a
"federation," where individuals' relation to the international order was mediated by national leaders.
Thus by giving the philosopher the right to voice a direct opinion on matters of peace Kant made a
structural exception to his federal proposal: the philosopher would be the only person not bound by
"the relation of one who rules to those who obey." This was made possible by a distinction between
practical and ideal goals: "perpetual peace" itself was "impractical," but the "political principles
directed towards this end" were not serving as a "continual approximation to the ideal." The secrecy
of the arrangement, in other words, was necessary in order to herald a truly "universal union of
states" as an ideal.
It is this Kantian reliance on individuals deemed "incapable of rebellion" that was enacted in
the CIC in 1922, under the chairmanship of French philosopher Henri Bergson. While the League's
other committees were staffed by delegates designated by member states, the CIC members stood
purely on the merits of their intellectual achievements, representing themselves in "complete
independence":
The members of the committee were all personalities eminent in the various branches of
human knowledge, and their relations with their respective governments, which they in
no way represented, were those of complete independence.' 9
Yet a crucial modification to the Kantian scheme occurred in the passage from Kantian (moral)
idealism into Wilsonian (political) idealism: a deliberate removal of Kant's "secrecy" clause and its
replacement with "Publicity." League detractors did not fail to point this out as a crucial fallacy:
when historian of diplomacy Harold Nicholson accused Woodrow Wilson of being "an idealist, and
what was perhaps more dangerous, a consummate master of English prose," he implied that
political idealism was better left un-publicized.2 0 Wilson's idea of an "open diplomacy should
7 Immanuel Kant, "Second Supplement: A Secret Article for Perpetual Peace," in Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Essay, trans.
M. Campbell Smith (London: Swan Sonneschein, 1903), 158.
18 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 129.
19 International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, Minutes of the First Session (1922), 3. UNESCO Archives.
20 Harold Nicholson, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method (London: Constable, 1954), 84-85
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proceed always frankly and in the public view" was intended to provide an image of an international
order more advanced than the order actually achievable at any given moment in history.
Accordingly, the intellectuals of the ICI were never kept a secret; on the contrary, their
affiliation with the League was widely publicized, even though their work was subjected to
significantly less scrutiny than the other technical committee. Even as the ICI became mired in
controversy, its famous members were absolved from critique, their individual brilliance in no way
compromised by their inability to deliver a credible program or palpable results. "Despite the
eminence of the intellectuals who constituted the Committee--such men and women as Bergson,
Curie, Einstein, Madariaga, Murray, Radhakrishnan, Unamuno , and Valery-it was largely
ineffectual."2 1 Institutional structures were blamed for failures instead. It is true that the CIC
demanded the formalization of an essentially informal activity. Witness for instance how a booklet
titled Where Minds Meet, produced to popularize the ICI at the 1939 New York World's Fair, described
intellectual cooperation by completely obscuring its meaning:
The object of intellectual co-operation is international collaboration with a view to
promoting the progress of general civilization and human knowledge, and notably the
development and diffusion of science, letters and arts. Its purpose is to create an
atmosphere favorable to the pacific solution of international problems. Its scope is that of
the League of Nations.22
By the time this booklet was published in 1939, the phrase "intellectual cooperation" had been used
to designate activities as diverse as the legislation of intellectual property, the protection of intellectual
workers, the making of an international education policy, the legislation of Esperanto, the publication
of translations, the circulation of scientific abstracts, radio publicity about the activities of the League,
the promotion of the cosmopolitan ideal latent within modern European philosophical thought, and
the mere exchange of ideas between well-known intellectuals. (fig 1.02)
What is revealed in this combination of intellectual ecumenism and bureaucratic opacity is
that the Enlightenment category of the "philosopher" had changed radically since Kant wrote in
1795. Consider for instance the involvement of French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) who
was appointed the first CIC president in 1922. Bergson had already played a semi-political role as a
French envoy to Woodrow Wilson in 1917 and 1918, and he was an immensely famous public
intellectual in France and at home. Bergson felt the need to theorize his own involvement in
diplomacy; he did so by offering a simple philosophical distinction: between the authority of
intellectual engagement (which he refuted on principle) and the authority of celebrity (which he
21 T.V. Sathyamurthy, 386.
22 James Shotwell, Where Minds Meet: the Intellectual Cooperation Organization of the League of Nations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1939).
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accepted as a matter of pragmatic necessity). As Philippe Soulez has demonstrated, "Bergson's
missions to Wilson presupposed a platonic representation of the philosopher-king that bergsonism
forbids on a theoretical level, all the while authorizing it, by pragmatism, to make use of it for
utilitarian ends."23The CIC took this platonic representation and elevated it to institutional levels. In
this sense Bergson occupied a transitional role, which followed in the tradition of bilateral diplomacy
by way of personal envoys inaugurated by Richelieu, while helping to usher in a 'new' multilateral
diplomacy staffed by a professional class of designated individuals. 24
The "complete independence" of Bergson and his colleagues at the CIC was thoroughly
tested by a series of debates over the question of German participation in the Commission. Since the
CIC was perceived as a "vehicle of French cultural policy" (a perception that recent research has
shown to be accurate),25 there was much pressure to appoint a German member. The problem for
Bergson was to find an individual acceptable to French delegates of the League where anti-
germanism was rampant, as it was in France as a whole. The solution was found in the appointment
of Albert Einstein, who had impeccable credentials as a pacifist and as a promoter of internationalist
science. Einstein, however, was skeptical of the League and resigned almost as soon as he was
appointed in 1922; then, having been lured back in 1924, he threatened to resign again.
Einstein's on-again, off-again membership prompted British CIC member Gilbert Murray to
publish an open letter in the Times accusing the French of sabotage and recommending the
temporary suspension of the CIC. "If it is still impossible," he wrote, "for Frenchmen, Belgians, and
Germans to work together, even in the dispassionate realm of the intellect, that means that
"intellectual cooperation" is not at present possible." 26 This laying-bare of the internal politics of the
commission incensed Bergson, but he declined to publish a rebuttal that would have asserted
unconditional openness to German cooperation. Instead he declared his allegiance to France:
On this point my duty is to account for French public opinion: it is my duty as a
Frenchman, and it is also in the absolute interest of our Commission, since I do not
think that it wants to break with French public opinion, with French science.27
23 Philippe Soulez, "Les philosophes dans la mdlee," in Vingtieme si&le. Revue d'Histoire, 10. (Apr-Jun 1986), 122-124. See
also his Bergson Politique (Paris: PUF, 1989), the reference work on the subject, and the edited volume, La Guerre et Les
Philosophes de la Fin des Annres 20 aux Annees 50 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1992).
24 The classic period text on this transition is Nicholson's The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, which explains the shift in
diplomatic models and conveys the animosity that this shift provoked. An exposition of the "old"- 1 7 th Century--
diplomacy can be found in Frangois de Cailleres' On the Manner of Negotiating With Princes (Boston: Houghton, 2000).
2s For a detailed account of the French perspective, see Jean-Jacques Renoliet, L'Unesco Oublice: La Socidt des Nations et la
Cooperation Intellectuelle (1919-1946), (Paris: Sorbonne, 1999), 42.
26 Gilbert Murray, "The League and Germany," Letter to the Editor, in The Times (5 Mar 1924), 10.
27 Bersgon to Halecki, 13 mar 1924 (SdN registry, 1924, Coop int., 13c/33877/33877/IX)
Lucia Allais
Given the opportunity to make a Kantian statement of universal support for a cosmopolitan ideal,
Bersgon preferred to perform a political role as a delegate of an imaginary "French people" and or
"French science."
Bergson's position was inspired in part by his popularity as a public intellectual: a
philosopher whose "lectures were major events," to which "tourists and society ladies flocked, as
one of the sights of the capital."2 8 In this sense Bergson was acting more as a Hegelian intellectual,
revealing another crucial transformation that the Kantian ideal had undergone: it transformation into
an organicist vision of the body politic. In 1806 Hegel had critiqued the moralism of Kant's Perpetual
Peace for being detached into a formalist abstraction, rather than attached to what he called "the
ethical life." 29 Morality could only result from a social and cultural development of a social body,
conceived in organicist terms, and the philosopher was the necessary vehicle for the "reconciliation
of spirit (Geist) with the history of the world."'3 By the end of World War I, League advocates
brought what one historiographer calls "a transposed Hegelianism" to the theory of international
organization (the "transposition" having occurred through the work of liberal reformers like TH
Green at Oxford). They hoped that the League would bridge organically over a gap between history
and politics: between the international community and their position in history.31 It was Alfred
Zimmern again who was most explicit in applying this Hegelian organicism to intellectual
cooperation. The Intellectual Foundations of Intellectual Cooperation he wrote, was to bring "the reason and
judgment of man into harmonious relationship with his environment, to resume their ascendancy in
the rhythm of an altered world.""32 If the works of the intellect and the works of the international
community were reconciled, then history would proceed dialectically forward. Ironically, it is
because Bergson was alone in embodying this organic model of intellectual leadership that he
encountered difficulties as the head of the CIC. Bergson could reasonably claim to speak for France's
intellectual life-since he and his theories formed the centerpiece of it-but other intellectuals in the
CIC were not in the same position, and this organic model of intellectual representation was on the
wane. Even as they replayed the debates of German idealism with a century's delay (in Gilbert
28 H. Stuart Hughes, "Bergson and the Uses of Intuition," in Consciousness and Society (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), 113.
29 Thomas Mertens, "Hegel's Homage to Kant's Perpetual Peace: An Analysis of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'," in The
Review of Politics, (Autumn, 1995), 665-691.
30 Hegel, Philosophy of History, 457. For an overview of the relationship, see George Armstrong Kelly, "Politics &
Philosophy in Hegel," in Polity (Autumn, 1976), 3-18
31 For a summary of the "transposed Hegelianism" see Jeanne Moresfield, in Imperialism and Internationalism. See also "The
progenitors of the new liberalism," in Navari, 232.
32 Alfred Zimmern, The Intellectual Foundations of International Cooperation (Paris: Institute of Cooperation, 1928), 19.
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Murray's words, "All of us were then deeply under the German spell")"3 , the CIC intellectuals were
confronted with their own inability to bring the actual state of Germany "organically" into an
international institution that had been constructed in large part to exclude it.
The relationship between intellectuals and the social fabric of their countries was not the only
issue raised by Einstein's membership. It was also the relationship of the intellectual to the scientist
that was at stake, and their competing claims on "reality". League advocates looked at the sciences as
a basis for their work, noting both "the startling accumulation of scientific knowledge and its
application to technological innovation" as one of the key "development that seemed to promise
lasting cooperation in international relations." Their favorite examples were infrastructural: "the
development of railways, telegraphic communications networks, sanitation infrastructures," but they
also looked at "the internationalization of scientific research."34 As a result of this "promise of
science," many of the League's committees were devoted to establishing links between the league
and existing international scientific organizations. Therefore one solution to the impasse of national
membership in the CIC itself had been to suggest that German absence was amply compensated in
the League's other commissions, of which many were "technical" in the sense outlined above. To
this Bergson replied with a distinction between the way "persons" and "things" negotiate conflict:
You have rightly noted that Germans are already part of certain of the League's
commissions. No doubt, but these are technical commissions, concerned with hygiene
or the railroads: it is only "things", not persons, that they take into account. Negotiators can therefore
reach an agreement, whatever opinion they may have of each-other. Things are entirely
different in our commission. Intellectual cooperation is essentially a relationship
between people: it is impossible without mutual trust.35
Thus while "things" could provoke objective agreement, only "minds" could produce intellectual
cooperation. This was no small point for Bergson to make in requesting Einstein's presence at the
CIC. Indeed Einstein and Bergson had a much more fundamental disagreement on the way "things"
and "people" could produce "agreement."
Since 1921 Bergson and Einstein had been engaged in a disagreement over the philosophical
repercussions of Einstein's theory of relativity, which Gaston Bachelard later summarized as forcing a
choice between "The philosopher's time or the scientist's time."36 In his Dur& et SimultaneitY, Bergson
questioned the "twin experiment" on which Einstein had based his theory of relativity. (Peter and
Paul, each armed with a clock, travel to and from each-other, one traversing a different timeframe
" Moresfield, 96.
34 Jan-Stefan Fritz, "The Promise of Science," in Imperialism and Internationalism, 141-158.
35 Bergson to Oscar Halecki, (SdN registry, 1924, Coop int., 13c/33877/33877/IX). Emphasis added.
36 Bachelard sided with Einstein while Merleau-Ponty defended Bergson. Merleau Ponty, "Einstein and the Crisis of
Reason," Signs (Northwestern University, 1964), 193.
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and the other not, to find themselves "simultaneously" back together, despite having in fact spent
different amounts of "time" apart.) "As far as time is concerned," Bergson argued, "there is no
difference between a system endowed with any motion whatever and one in uniform translation." 37
Einstein took this statement to mean that Bergson had simply misunderstood his science. Yet in a
public encounter the disagreement was revealed to be altogether more profound; Bergson questioned
the hermeticism of Einstein's thought experiments, asking whether "once we admit the theory of
relativity in physical theory, all is not finished." 3 8 To this Einstein replied in no uncertain terms that
"there is no philosopher's time." While the encounter was called a victory for Einstein, it continues
to generate arguments for both sides today. 39 In short, the Einsteinian view is that since relativity of
time originated in physics, time as a concept now belongs only to a physical theory of reality. In
contrast, the Bergsonian view sees the "subject" (for example, the one viewing the experiment) as
the ultimate site of relativity, and contends that so-called physical evidence for this change could be
found if searched for. Clearly the debate unfolded as a disciplinary turf-war, which eventually
validated science's "objective" grasp on a reality once exclusively described by philosophy. Yet it has
also been noted that, by claiming the epistemic category of time for himself, Einstein had acted
more like "a philosopher" (in the Kantian sense of a formal claim to knowledge) than Bergson.
For our purposes it is most important to note that the debate hinged on a distinction between
"watch" and "subject" as bearer of standards-the same distinction Bergson had made between
"people" (intellectuals) and "things" ("hygiene, or railroads") as catalysts for agreement at the CIC.
This is especially important since these early years of intellectual cooperation were modeled on the
procedures of international science organizations, with their conventionalist view of knowledge."4
Indeed the CIC borrowed most of its techniques for circulating knowledge from science, including
abstracting and producing bibliographies.41 As Jimena Canales has shown, the two men saw their
political and epistemological disagreements as related, and the theoretical rift between them
37 Henri Bergson, "Foreword to the Second Edition (1923), in Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein's Theory trans,
Leon Jacobson (New York: Bobb-Merrill, 1965), 3.
38 The exchange took place on April 6 1922, and is reproduced as "Discussion avec Einstein, in Henri Bersgon, Milanges
(Paris: PUF, 1972), 1340-1347.
39 Most recently, Alan Sokal and Jean Brickmont saw the incident as the first example of constructionism in science,
making Bergson the grandfather of postmodernisms as "fashionable nonsense." Impostures Intellectuelles (Paris, 1997). The
English edition omitted this chapter. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science (St Martin's, 1989).
40 It was the International Metric Commission, precursor of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, that
"brought scientists into association with diplomats for the first time" in 1875. For a history of the transformation of
science into an "Internationale," see Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," in Science Studies I/i (Jan
1971), 23-42.
41 For a chronicle of Einstein's involvement in the CIC, see "International Cooperation and the League of Nations
(1922-1927) in Otto Nathan and Heinx Norden, Einstein on Peace (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 58-89.
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effectively led to the demise of their political collaboration at the League."2 When Einstein resigned, it
was as much out of frustration at the inability of the CIC to produce agreement even on matters of
seemingly pure science (like the "proposal for the establishment of a bureau of meteorology" and
the plan to "standardize scientific terminology"), as for the rampant anti-germanism that he
detected in the committee.
The Einstein-Bergson debacle was certainly a failure of Kantian cosmopolitics, but astute
historians have noted that the CIC emerged as more of a "caricature" than a "failure." 43 It is
important to note the structural implications of this "caricature" on the institutional development of
Intellectual Cooperation in the 1930s -in particular, the effect of this assumption that "things"
could bear discord more easily than "minds." On the one hand, this assumption produced a
tendency to delegate disagreement to "technical" committees. Thus it is within an intricate series of
technical branching-offs that "monuments" became the subject of a CIC Committee. On the other
hand, demise of the CIC as an umbrella organization led to a broad re-definition of intellectual
cooperation in "literary" terms. These two trends combined to provoke an intricate institutional tree,
which alternated between creating ever-larger statement of literary ideals, and localizing any
specificity into a 'technical' sub-committee. In both cases, the issues that had been drawn out by the
Einstein-Bergson episode were replayed in these sub-committees.
After the so-called politicization of the CIC, the task of articulating a general mandate for
intellectual cooperation was passed onto the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation
(Institut International de Coophration Intellectuelle, IICI) in Paris. (fig 1.03)Within the League, the creation of
the IICI in 1926 was perceived as a victory for the French view of cultural politics, since the Institute
was underwritten entirely by the French government, programmatically and ideologically
autonomous from Geneva. But its creation had also been supported by other League member states,
who detected a trend of decentralization from which their capital cities might benefit.44 The IICI did
not initiate many endeavors, but it played a crucial role in hosting the work of other committees and
publishing their voluminous conference proceedings and journals: notably, the International Office
42 Jimena Canales, "Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation and the League of
Nations," in MLN, 120 (2005, 1168-1191.
43 See Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, Les Scientifiques et la Paix: la Communiaute Scientifique internationale au Cours des Annres 20.
(Montreal: Preses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1978), 216. For a more pointed study of the attitude of National
Scientific organizations in each concerned country, see her "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International
Scientific Organizations after the First World War," in Science Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, (Apr 1973), 93-118.
44 Renoliet, 111. See particularly the creation of the Istituto Centrale del Cinematografia in Rome
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of Museums (Office International des Mus~es, OIM), the Permanent Committee on Art and Letters (soon to
be nicknamed La Societe des Esprits), and the International Studies Conference (ISC).
The OIM was launched from Geneva, from a small "Sub-Commissions on the Arts and
Letters" that had been created in 1924 as the only literary group in a list of technical Sub-
Commissions: on "Intellectual Property," "Bibliography", "University Relations."'4 The OIM was
sent to be headquartered at the IICI, where it benefited from the literary influences of Paris and was
liberated from the diplomatic solemnity of Geneva. It was programmatically independent from
both, although the CIC funded its work and the ICIC published it. It was as a project of the OIM that
the Athens Conference was organized, and the only League of Nations committee ever devoted to
monuments, the "International Commission on Historical Monuments" was a sub-committee of the
OIM. In 1930 the CIC's sub-commission on arts and letters was replaced by a Permanent Committee
on Arts and Letters which soon came to be known as "The League of Minds," and repeated the
branching-off pattern that had been established. First, it headquartered itself in Paris, where it held its
conferences and events. In 1934, it created the International Office of the Institutes of the History of
Art and Archaeology (Office International des Institute d'Histoire de l'Art et Acheologie OIAHA) which was also
headquartered in Paris. This series of lateral moves were usually conceptualized as "technical"
developments: spinning issues raised in the "general" discussion off into a "specialized" committee.
(fig 1.01)
The only other organization to share the OIM's status (launched from the CIC in Geneva,
administratively hosted by the IICI in Paris, programmatically independent of both) was the
International Studies Conference (ISC). Launched in 1926 to create disciplinary cooperation among
institutions teaching international political science, it was intended as a solution to increasing
disillusionment of the League and its perceived recuperation by traditional power politics. The goal
was to focus the technical discussion onto "political science," with the ambition to accomplish a
synthesis of idealism and practicality in the political sphere itself--albeit academically. Recent
research has shown that the ISC prefigured in many ways the development of IR in the postwar,
although its own post-war life was rather a failure.4 6 In contrast to the ISC which started with high
45 Institut International de Cooperation Intellectuelle,: Cahiers de Relations Artistiques, La Cooperation INtellectuelle et les
Beaux-Arts (Paris: PUF, 1927), 5. The CIC's early inquiries into the "the conditions of intellectual work" had included
aspects of what was called "artistic life," including the effect of economic crisis on Austrian painters, the dissemination
of taste in France and the living conditions of museums. See William Martin, "The conditions of life and work of
musicians;" A. Dopsch, "Conditions of intellectual work and workers;" Julien Luchaire, "Preservation and
dissemination of artistic taste" in Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, Enquiry into the conditions of intellectual work
(Geneva: The League, 1922).
46 David Long summarizes that the ISC "complicates the story of the relationship between international relations and
political science." He too accuses the ISC of elitism and idealism: "The ISC was an anachronism that imploded," in part
because it "reflected the elitist approach inherent in League-era intellectual cooperation. Yet rather than detecting this
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ambitions but lost any impetus in the postwar, the Museums Office (henceforth, OIM) was begun
casually but is the longest-lasting organization of intellectual cooperation created in this period. It
outlived the temporary sub-commission from which it was launched, as well as the CIC and the
IICI. It resumed its publications in 1945 and in 1946 it became the International Council of Museum
(ICOM), which is active today. It is easy in retrospect to see the success of the OIM as a sign that
"museums" represented a fortuitous merging of "technical" imperatives and "literary" tendencies
of post-scientific intellectual cooperation. But it is also important to remember that, in contrast to the
ISC, the Arts and Letters Committee was created with the self-effacingly modest ambitions of being
an "honest and disinterested courtier of the arts." In fact, in order to get approval from Geneva the
group was defined negatively, in opposition to an inter-governmental mandate: "the intention is not
to be an International Ministry of the Beaux-Arts." 47 In the next section I describe how this modest
proposal launched an organization that succeeded precisely in channeling an ambitious mandate and
taking on a near-ministerial structure.
The OIM: "Ready-made Intellectual Cooperation"
The idea of creating an "international office that would connect all the museums of the
world" was first suggested by French art historian Henri Focillon (1881-1943) during the first
meeting of the Subcommittee on Arts and Letters in 1926. (fig 1.06) "Museums," Focillon argued,
"appear to be ready-made institutions of intellectual cooperation." 48 It was in order to achieve what
he called "practical results" that Focillon suggested taking advantage of existing institutional
networks. The report he submitted at the next session in January 1926, included a historical
overview, whereby museums had long "played a role in the history of travel, of the exchange of
ideas and of influences" and in so doing had served as "the first medium of a European and global
conscience." 4 9 Creating the OIM was a way to formalize this network for internationalist purposes.
Yet there would also be a benefit to this existing network, which would expand and decentralize.
elitism in the ISC itself Long chooses uses an example from "Arts and Letters" (the Freud-Einstein exchange of letters)
to demonstrate this elitism. Long gives the ISC's association with the League as one of the top reasons why the ISC
"died" in the face of other competing organizations like the American-born ISA and Unesco's own Political Science
division. David Long, "Who Killed the International Studies Conference?," in Review of International Studies 23 (2006), 603-
622. For an explanation of the place of the ISC in the CIC institutional structure, see Renoliet, 315.
47 "La Section des Relations artistiques ne doit pas ambitionner d'etre un ministire international des beaux-arts. ... Elle
sera donc ce 'courtier honnite et desint6resse des arts.' >> << Id6es Directrices, >> La Cooperation Intellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts, 9.
"8 Institutions de cooperation intellectuelle toutes faites." Henri Focillon, cited in "L'Oeuvre de Cooperation
Intellectuelle et l'Office International des Musees," in Mouseion Vol. 1 (1927), 3-10.
49 Focillon, Ibid. In order to make this medium "useful to the international organization of intellectual work," and to
"enrich the knowledge that peoples have of one-another," Focillon posited that museums had a three-fold existence:
museums are necessary to art historians, to amateurs, but most importantly before all for the public."
Lucia Allais
From the beginning Focillon was interested not in the national institutions that already served as sites
of cosmopolitan exchange in capital cities, but in smaller provincial institutions that were unwitting
participants in an international network of knowledge distribution. "In almost every provincial
town," he wrote, "more modest museums reveal the nation to foreign visitors and present examples
of the genius of foreign civilizations to the people of the city." Undoubtedly influenced by his own
past as a director of the provincial museum in Lyon, he sought to grant smaller institutions a place in
an international order. Thus Focillon specifically rejected the temptation of specialization, and in
particular the trend of likening the museum to the laboratory: "it is not our intention," he wrote, to
"consider the International Office as a kind of super-museum." By this he meant an index of an
index, consisting of "cards and documents" of all the works of art collected in museums worldwide.
The OIM would be "informed, in order better to inform others," but it would be a place of action:
the OIM "must act, or rather, incite action." Focillon's was a self-consciously opportunistic proposal:
to use museums as institutions that came with "ready-made" audiences.
In contrast to the indexical detachment of a "super-museum," Focillon sought to activate the
"the federative power" of cultural institutions, based not on the isolation of objects but on their
intrinsic "fraternity." For example, he proposed a "system of adoption" for smaller museums to
affiliate with larger ones, provoking exchanges of art works and leveling the playing field between
museums, since "any museum where there is a great work, a work of great historic and human
significance, is a great museum." From the aesthetic "greatness" of art itself Focillon derived a
whole a theory of social solidarity. The fraternity originated in the artworks themselves, but
expanded into the space of the museum, which became an intellectual milieu. "If the exchange of
works and objects is difficult," Focillon wrote, "the exchange of ideas should not."
Museums must be not only research institutes but also, and as soon as possible,
environments [milieux] where one learns to love life, history, and the masters, and gets
acquainted with the diversity of the world.
With characteristic vitalism Focillon wrote of a loose and supple network, using a language of
influence, of radiation to describe, first, how people learned from art objects, second how museums
needed to be filled, then surrounded, by people. He enlarged this scheme to the scale of the whole
city, inspired by the growing professional networks of urbanism in the interwar:
It has recently been pointed out how much good can come when cities collaborate to
find solutions to the problems of building, of hygiene and administration. Could this
not be extended to museums?so
so Focillon, Ibid.
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In order to make the final step from urban sociability to international solidarity, Focillon
recommended that the OIM use local "Friends' Societies," (Associations Protectrices) to develop
educational programs with an internationalist bent. In contrast to their traditional "solemnity,"
museums were places to access art-historical insights without performing difficult analyses:
It is difficult, in these solemn milieux, to speak of great works aloud. Yet this is done, and
with success. There is much in the universal history of art that attests to the efforts of
men to understand and enrich each-other. ... It is not the role of the League of Nations
to invent a comparative method of art history, but rather to trigger an understanding of
this comparative breadth in museums worldwide. Telling the history of how a European
conscience, a universal conscience, progressively came into being through the
disinterested world of art, is likely to provoke such discussion. By organizing tours and
lectures whose principal goal is to insist on this universal conscience, protective societies
will usefully cooperated to the activities of the League of Nations.s l
In four steps, Focillon spanned from the autonomy of art, to the museum as intellectual milieu, to
the kinship between all museums, to the solidarity between nations.
The reference to the "invention of a comparative method of art history" is of particular
interest since a few years later Focillon created the OIAHA to develop precisely this international art-
historical method. Already in 1928 he explained the virtues of this "comparative" framework in the
museum, in a text titled "Exchange and Comparison," published in Mouseion after the Conference on
Ethnographic Museums in Prague. The "comparative method so central to ethnography and
folklore," was useful in that it showed "influences, exchanges, resemblances, identities" between
objects, revealing "a profound accord" (un accord profond) between seemingly unrelated cultures. Here
again Focillon focused on smaller regional institutions, with little obligation to be "encyclopedic":
For regional museums, the goal should not be to enrich them, progressively, with a
disparate collection, an ethnographic pell-mell. Conservators must choose the most
useful documents and comparisons. ... As for me, I will be happy whenever I will
encounter, in the glass cases of a local museum, a foreign object that has been accepted
because it recalls a kinship, an agreement (un accord), even if it is fortuitous, and which
will therefore provoke a spontaneous passage from the provincial to the universal.52
Thus the "life" of museums was not only a social life of groups learning about art, but also an
interior mental life propelled by comparative insights. Museums were hosts of a comparative
kinship, which allowed a passage from "province" to "universe."
s Henri Focillon, as cited in Institut International de Cooperation Intellectuelle, Cahiers des Relations Artistiques: La Coopiration
Intellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts (Paris: PUF, 1927), 8.
52 "There are two types of popular museums: the first is encyclopedic type, which attempts to capture a totality, like
the Scandinavian museums and the beautiful museum in Vienna (a necessary expression of the mosaic that is the
Hapsburg monarchy). The second is regional." Henri Focillon "Echanges et Comparaison," in Mouseoin, Vol.2 (1928),
210-211.
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There is a strong methodological correlation between the vitalist formalism that Focillon is
known for pioneering-his interest in "the life of forms in art"-and the arguments he made for
expanding the international solidarity of artworks-his interest in "expanding the life of the
museum." Focillon was a convinced formalist, and heavily influenced by Henri Bergson. In some
sense, his work constitutes a "specialized" continuation of Bergson's work in the CIC. Yet unlike
Bergson, who saw his role as a pragmatic exception to his own theories, Focillon saw his
participation in Intellectual Cooperation as continuous with his formalist beliefs. It was only because
art existed in an aesthetic "world" apart that it could be put to use for political purposes without
compromising its fundamental value.
In his 1934 La Vie des Formes, Focillon famously introduced the term "life" to describe this
fundamental value. Intended to supercede the notion of Style, "Life" allowed Focillon to construct a
theory of formal change in art that did not subject forms to historical contingencies.
We must never think of forms as simply suspended in some remote, abstract zone,
above the earth and above man. ... The life of forms gives definition to what may be
termed "psychological landscapes" without which the essential genius of the
environment would be opaque and elusive for all those who share in them... I am not
anxious to isolate works of art from human life, and condemn them to blind automatism
and to exactly predictable sequence. The state of a style, or, if one prefers, a state in the
life of forms, is simultaneously the guarantor and the promoter of diversity. 53
The Life of Forms can be understood as an organicist expansion of the formalist autonomy of art into
time and space: an animated version of Kantian aesthetics. Thus "Form" was at the center of an
entire cosmology which moved and evolved. While Focillon never once used the word "form" in
his OIM proposal, he used "life" extensively to apply the same method for the international
expansion of museums. Consider this passage, where Focillon could be speaking either of the literal
museum or of the figurative "world of art:"
Technical analysis of comparative methods lead us to consider forms as living beings,
milieux like plastic frames, modified by nomadic genius, inventors of novelty or by
sedentary people who lives out of time and finally to consider spiritual families that
neither chronology nor geography do not suffice to qualify.5 4
Both museum networks and "worlds of forms" enacted the intrinsic "life" between forms. Focillon
employed the same vitalist language to describe the "psychological landscape" of forms in La Vie des
Formes and the "life of the museum" in the OIM.
S3 Focillon, Life of Forms in Art (New York: Zone, 2001),111.
54 Focillon, "Exchange and Comparison," 208.
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The Life of Forms has been read as a text operating on "such a level of abstraction" that it is best
read as an "adventure of the mind" than as a "method of art history in general.""5 At best it is a
"treatise of such concentrated intellectual power" that it qualifies as a humanist tract in the medieval
sense. At worst, it is an abdication of art history to a Hegelian teleology, re-aestheticized for a
Bergsonian audience. Indeed as a medievalist Focillon was keen to develop collective interpretations
of art, but he rejected anything resembling the 'social history of art.' Thus the collective "vitalism"
that permeates his work was an alternative to sociological work and he famously feuded with
Marxist colleague Meyer Schapiro, who read Romanesque art as an aesthetic symptom of a social
system.5 6 Yet much of the putative "abstraction" of Focillon's treatise relies on the ethno-geographic
language of intellectual cooperation. Focillon's description of "the world of forms" as "a spiritual
ethnography that cuts across the best-defined races," composed of "families of the mind ... beyond
all restrictions of time or place," and constitutive of "a living word in a universal language,"' " are
not just poetic generalizations. Read in light of the political idealism of the League, the infamous
obscurity of Focillon's Life of Forms acquires the tone of an international politics of art.ss
It is important to note, then, the role that "space" played in Focillon's theorization of the
"life" of forms and museums alike. As Meyer Schapiro wrote, The Life of Forms "is mainly about
space," to which he added, that it was "so fashionable a concept today, when it has practically
disappeared from the arts!" Subsequent historiographers have agreed that the formalist notion of
"space" inherited from idealist aesthetics found one of its main "internationalizers" in Focillon, who
popularized the idea in both France and the USA.59 One passage that appears early in the first few
pages of The Life of Forms in Art is evocative of the way Focillon had, by 1934, reconfigured the
relationship between space, form, and politics into a nested set of autonomies. First, Focillon claimed
"space" as the realm of art, then immediately excluded from it "the soldier and the tourist":
Space is the realm of art-not the space of everyday life involving, say, a soldier and a
tourist-but space treated by a technique that may be defined as matter and as
movement. A work of art is the measure of space. It is form, and as form it must first
make itself known to us.
ss Emanuel Winternitz, Review of Life of Forms in Art, in College ArtJournal (Mar 1943), 88-90.
56 Walter B. Cahn has given a detailed account of the argument between Focillon and Schapiro, in "Schapiro and
Focillon," Gesta, Vol. 41, No. 2, (2002), 129-136. Cahn points out that the debate concerned the work of one of
Focillon's students, and that he and Schapiro ultimately arrived at similar interpretations of Romanesque sculpture.
57 Life of Forms, 63.
58 For example, "Its life of the mind is simply a preparation for its life in space," Life of Forms, 122. "Flowing together
within [the work of art] the energies of many civilizations may be plainly discerned."31.
s9 Georg Germann, "L'invention de l'espace architectural," in Cahiers de la Recherche Architecturale 26 (1990), 53-58.
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Yet having now situated form within a space apart, Focillon then immediately referred to a realist
definition of life as art, only to withdraw again into the "entire universe" that is art:
In one of his political tracts Balzac has affirmed that "everything is form, and life itself is
form." ... So it is with art as well. The formal relationships within a work of art and
among different works of art constitute an order for, and a metaphor of, the entire
universe." 60
It is the ease with which Focillon made this appeal to a tradition of realist art (Balzac), and the
rapidity with which he excluded reality (in the form of "the tourist and the soldier") from space,
that alerts us to the similarity between the idealist "life of forms" and the international "life of the
museum." The point is not just that an international political project helped Focillon's to construct his
formalist theory. It is also that Focillon's theory, far from a vaguely organicist humanism, is more
properly described as a politics of form, whose primary medium is space.
The conceptual tie between Focillon's "life of forms" and what I have called his international
"politics of form" can be found in an early lecture, titled "The Modern Conception of Museums,"
that Focillon delivered at the 1921 Congres International de 1'Histoire de l'Art in Paris, and from which much
of his 1926 report OIM report was inspired. Two conceptions, Focillon proposed, had come to
determine the 2 0 th Century museum: "the masterpiece museum" (a Romantic legacy, devoted to
the joy and education of the artist), and "the serial museum" (a Renaissance project now informed
by Tainean teleologies and devoted to historical categories). Between "the historian's museum and
the artists' museum" Focillon proposed a third model: "I do not hesitate to say that museums are for
the public. The public, I am convinced of it, comes to the museum to find more than an ephemeral
distraction, more than a technical lesson." To explicate this he theorized the kind of "reality" that
was represented in the museum, a reality he opposed both to "history" and to the "life" outside the
museum:
Museums are not only the concrete commentary of history, and art is not only a series of
documentary vignettes. Museums do not produce a pure copy of reality: they take hold
of reality, decouple it, transfigure it, and suggest its hidden poetry. ... The public must
come out of museums with a heightened sense of life.61
This reference to the museum as a "concrete" instance of history and a "heightened" version of
reality, recalls Balzac's realist creed that "everything is form, and life itself is form." Focillon's early
descriptions depict the museum as a kind of realist medium, and already in 1921, the mission of this
60 Focillon, The Life of Forms in Art, 33.
61 Focillon, "La Conception Moderne du Musee," in Actes du Congres d'Histoire de 1'Art Organisý par la Socidte de I'Histoire de I'Art
Frangais Paris 26 Sept-5 Oct 1921 Vol. I, (Paris: PUF, 1923), 90.
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medium was to decentralize and publicize. The 1921 talk gave the same recommendations as the
1926 OIM proposal albeit in more imperative form. The educational suggestion was rendered as
"What is most essential is that the museum be alive," the touring proposal, "Finally, we must talk a
lot in museums." Most importantly, the "comparative" method was expressed in terms of exerting a
"liberal influence" upon the public:
Finally, for us museums are a lesson in intellectual liberalism. By seeing so many
different aesthetic and moral preferences expressed over so brilliantly over generations,
one sheds the habit of judging on principle and on preconceived notions. One loses the
habit of making fast judgments and acquire the habit of reflection and comparison.62
As explicated in 1921, Focillon's museum was a realist medium which "heightened reality" by
offering a "comparative viewpoint" whose goal was to "liberalize" the public."63
When transforming this 1921 paper on "museums for the public" into his 1926 "report on
museums as international institutions," Focillon made some crucial changes: he re-framed his
historical overview in terms of the "growth of a European conscience," and subsumed the distinction
artistic/historic/public into one "intellectual milieu." Yet the basic politics of the museum remained
the same, and not far from the political liberalism of League advocates: the museum offered a
parallel reality where judgments are deferred, thereby delivering what Focillon called "a lesson of
life, a lesson of liberalism." 64
Focillon's proposal for the OIM implied a fundamentally modern vision of the museum as a
mass-medium, but the "ready-made" network of institutions from which he hoped to form the
OIM presented a distinctly less forward-thinking reality. As soon as the OIM was formed it became
plainly evident how much European museums were still invested with state power, nationalist
narratives, and auratic myths. For example, Focillon had written a resolution that museums should
act as "centers of reproduction", implying with Benjaminian overtones that that the museum should
incorporate, rather than resist, the "reproducibility" of the work of art. The first OMI resolution in
this direction was to regulate the "copying" works of arts by easel-painting, and to produce two
international agreements on the decidedly uncontroversial techniques of plaster casting and copper
engraving.6 s While these early efforts eventually led to more work on international legislation of
62 Focillon, "La Conception moderne des musees," 85-94.
63 Focillon, "La Conception modeme des mus6es," 90-91. Focillon assumed a paternalist stance: "how could this liberal
influence not exert itself on the public, since it exerts itself on the conservators, when they are men of good will?"
64 Focillon, "La Conception moderne du musee," 93.
65 These early efforts did produce language on "reproduction" that eventually led to discussions of international
legislation of photographic reproduction and distribution rights. In October 1926, an "Accord entre les Chalcographies
de Madrid, Paris, Rome" was signed, followed in January 1928 by an "Accord entre les laboratoires de moulage des
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reproduction, copyright and rights, the media at hand were deliberately chosen to make art different
from all other media. Consider, in contrast, Italy's willingness to embrace mass-media as vehicles
for international promotion: in response to the creation of the IICI in Paris, Italy had created an
International Educational Cinematographic Institute in Rome, whose goal was to encourage "the
production, distribution and exchange of educational films."66 Indeed later Focillon would
encourage the use of films in museums himself.
There were not only technical, but also political obstacles to Focillon's vision of a "flexible"
international network. The hope that the OIM would be a self-decentralizing network, spawning a
chain of institutional "adoptions" was soon confronted with the rigidity of existing museum
administrations. The very composition of the OIM reveals an overwhelming representation of
national arts administration and capital-city museums:
F. Alvarez de Sotomayor, director of the Prado Museum, Madrid
D. Baud-Bovy, president of the Swiss Federal Beaux Arts Commission, Geneva
J. Capart, chief conservator at the Mus6e du Cinquantenaire, Brussels
M. Colasanti, director-general of the Beaux-Arts, Rome
Max Friedlander, director of print museum, Vienna
M. Gluck, painting conservator at the Kunst Historiscghen Museum, Vienna
J. Guiffrey, painting conservator at the Louvre, Paris
M. Oikonomos, chief conservator at the museums in Athens
Ugo Ogetti, editor of Dedalo, Florence
M. Petrovics, chief conservator of Beaux-Arts, Budapest
L. Coleman, director of the American Association of Museums
H. Verne, director of National Museums, Paris67
This ministerial representation of its board meant that the international ideal of the OIM was
essentially subjected to existing institutional structures, and their national agendas.
The first issue of Mouseoin is a case in point. France submitted an article on the history of the
Mus& de Sculpture Compare, as an example of "a documentary museum created to inform the public
about French art and the work of the Service des Monuments Historiques." For the Louvre-centric French
museum system, this constituted a 'decentralization' of sorts, since this institution had been created
against the grain of the established academic tradition. Indeed the director recalled, the museum had
been inspired by Viollet le Duc, in order to impress the importance of medieval art on a public
whose opinion was "still strongly imbued with absolutist theories that beauty belonged exclusively
mus6es d'Ath~nes, Berlin, Bruxelles, Florence, London, Paris." In 1928 two exhibitions of casts and chalcographies was
circulated to these museums. See "L'activit6 de l'office des mus6es," in Mouseion Vol. 1I (1928), 177.
66 The IECI remained open until Italy left the League in 1937.
67 "L'Office des Mushes et la Cooperation Internationale," in Mouseion Vol. I (1927), 136.
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to classical art.""6 Yet this was hardly the tutelage that Focillon had in mind. Similarly, the same issue
featured a lengthy expose of the "Re-organization of Italian Museums." According to Francesco
Sapori, the inspector of Beaux-Arts in Rome, the re-organization showed "that the Fascist state has re-
invested Italy with its cultural patrimony, and that future generations, moved by a proud ideal and
confidently in control of their own destiny, will make blood with their own blood, to offer to the
world the luminous proof of their particular, ever-productive, creative forces.""69 Thus the modernity
of the fascist state in the decentralization of its regional museum-conservation only attested to the
superiority of Italian traditions and the strength of the national ethos. (fig 1.08)
Few of the OIM's efforts to soften the prevalent academic model of arts administration
succeeded. Instead, the imperative for regional representation resulted in a shift of emphasis from art
to ethnography. Rather than enlisting art museums from smaller cities, the OIM drew large
ethnographic museums from capital cities-to create a "decentralizing" effect. This was partly in
response to Focillon's own interest in so-called folkloric arts, and his promotion of a "comparative"
framework inspired by ethnographic institutions. Furthermore, exchanges of ethnographic objects
were significantly less controversial than that of exchanges of works of art. There were other issues at
stake that made ethnographic museums fertile ground for the international imagination. 1932 the
ILO commissioned a report from the IICI on the possibility of using museums to activate the
potential of "folkloric" arts ("art by the people and for the people") to "raise the general level of
culture of workers," and occupy them during newfound leisure hours resulting from the eight-hour
workday.70 (fig 1.09) Although the report produced few results, it tied directly into the popularizing
potential of museums, describing a blurring of reception and authorship of the folkloric objects.
"The idea of reviving the popular arts is particularly seducing. They are less art for the people and
more an art by the people, a source of joy for peoples, its authors." 7 1 At face value, the result of this
emphasis on ethnography was still a broader regional representation of each country. But the success
of ethnographic institutions in this decade can undoubtedly be tied to the rise of nationalism
throughout Europe, and ultimately the "regional" representation circulated in the pages of Mouseion
was one undeniably controlled by state authorities.7 2
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the implementation of Focillon's vision, however, was that
few European directors thought of the museum as a fundamentally public educational "milieu."
68 "Le Mus6e de Sculpture Compar6e du Trocad~ro ! Paris," in "La Vie des Mus6es," in Mouseion Vol. 1 (1927), 39.
69 Francesco Sapori, "R6organisation des galleries et Muskes Nationaux d'Italie," in Mouseion Vol I (1927), 205-221.
70 "Folk Arts and Workers' Leisure: An Enquiry by the IICI," in Bulletin of Intellectual Cooperation (Oct Nov 1932), 159.
71 "Note," in Bulletin de Coopiration Intellectuelle 22-23: L'art par le peuple (1932), 1214.
72 Nationalism and Ethnography in Museums in the 1930s.
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This aversion to education was made clear at a "Conference on the Educational Role of Museums"
convened in Paris in October 1927."7 The conference consisted primarily of European museum
directors rebutting the suggestion that they follow the "American Model," which was described by
the director of the American Association of Museum (AAM), Laurence Vail Coleman. The need to
attract "the advice of an American expert" had been requested from Geneva-and Coleman did not
disappoint. He described American museums as "extensive educational institution." By this he meant
that they "exist for the purpose of raising the general level of culture and enlightenment in the
community rather than devoting themselves to special interests of any one class or group." Despite
this rather grandiose democratic language, Coleman spoke with great lucidity of the administrative
and financial underpinnings of the AAM's associative solidarity:
There are several possible explanations of the close ties of mutual interest which bind all
of our museums together, but administrative considerations seem largely to be
responsible. Each American museum is governed by a board of so-called trustees, each
trustee being a public spirited citizen and a man of affairs.
A second bond between American museums is the fact that most of them are similarly
supported. They receive on the one hand gifts from private sources and on the other
appropriations from public treasuries. The common experience of seeking adequate
support and justifying it by commensurate public service gives museums many interests
in common.
By describing this feedback loop, between the educational mandate of US museums, their funding
and taxation structure, and their public service, Coleman painted a picture of an "associative"
network, in the manner Focillon had suggested. Clearly the AAM was supposed to stand as model for
the OIM. Mouseion reported yearly on the activities of the AAM.
Ironically, by the 1920s the American museum system was transforming towards a
European model. As Paul DiMaggio has shown, the AAM experienced unprecedented growth in this
period, fueled in large part by the support of the Carnegie Corporation, of which it was the
"principal client." Yet as "the early emphasis on education shifted markedly toward acquisition and
connoisseurship as soon as aesthetic standards were articulated and art works embodying these
standards came within grasp of American collectors. By 1920, the art museum's organization
reflected the ideal and status interests of the urban social elites who governed them.""7 Indeed by the
73 "Programme de l'Office International des Mus6es," Premiere Reunion d'Experts. (Genive, 13 et 14 jan 1927). "La
r6union attache une telle importance aux diverses fagons dont les mus6es peuvent remplir leur r61e 6ducatif et contribuer
i la culture g6n6rale qu'elle croit d6sirable la convocation d'une r6union ayant cet objet sp6cial, pouvant enregistrer les
r6alisations d6ja obtenues dans cet ordre d'id6es et examiner les suggestion en vue de l'extension et du d6veloppement
de ces m6thodes, avec l'assistance, si possible, de sp6cialistes ambricains. >>
74 Laurence Vail Coleman, "Education by American Museums," in Mouseion Vol. I (1927), 268-271.
zs Paul DiMaggio, "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: US Art Museums, 1920-1940," in
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Ed. Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, (Chicago: University of Chicago
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time Coleman traveled to Paris to advertise the public dedication of the American Museum, the AAM
was engaged in an internal debate about the relative value of public participation and art acquisition,
with elite museums like the MFA attempting to distance themselves from public obligations. From
the European perspective, however, the AAM appeared homogeneous, and Coleman delivered a
critique of what he perceived as the "static" museums of Europe:
In Europe a museum might be defined as a collection. In America, it would be defined as
an organization which employs the collection for specific purposes. The call to action
binds American museums together; the acceptance of the idea of a static museum holds
European museums apart.
The distinction between "The European conception" and the "American conception" was repeated
throughout the conference, although it was rephrased by Max Fridelhinder as a matter of precedence
between "form" and "function:"
The essential difference between European and American museums seems to lie in the
fact that European museums were formed before a clear idea of the museum's function
had been set. They developed autonomously, whereas in America the reasons for
studying at the museum was anterior to their function.76
The implication was that European institutions had an intrinsic core that needed to be preserved
against purposeful instrumentalizations.
Most European curators responded to Coleman's critique by defending the museum
hierarchy of their home country, either for the sake of preserving art-historical expertise or for the
sake of a paternalist approach to education. "American-Style" experiments that had been made in
Germany, Max Friedlander attested, had proved unsuccessful. Since "the formation of the
conservator is not apt to put him on the level of a popular audience, it is preferable to educate school
teachers." Similarly, the Italian minister referred to the reform of education under Benedetto Croce,
which made the history of art a mandatory subject in secondary school, thereby eliminating the
need for conservators to address non-specialists. Both suggested that instead of training curators to
talk to children (and halfway through the conference "children" began to stand in for any un-
specialized audience) one could simply teach schoolteachers to speak about art. The delegates from
France and the Netherlands, advocated a more gradual approach, using the diversity of museum
types to educate the public's taste in art. The director of the Rijksmuseum proposed three "stages" of
appreciation "from museum of natural history, to historic museum, and finally to the art museum."
Press, 1991), 269. DiMaggio also chronicled the formative years of the museum and other cultural institutions
("American art museums originated in the late nineteenth century as educational institutions dedicated to refining
national taste.") in "Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston," in Non Profit enterprise in the Arts: Studies in
Mission and Constraint (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 42-61.
76 Max Friedlinder, "R61le educatif des musees: m&thodes actuelles et resultats," in Mouseion Vol. II (1928), 253.
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For the Louvre's Louis Hautecoeur, the introduction would be done through "natural history," then
onto "to local history," and only special individuals would be selected for an appreciation of
"beauty" in art.77 All proposed to separate the "function" of the museum from its "form", and
hoped to instill appreciation of one before confronting the other. This was far from Focillon's
organicist, behaviorist, and ultimately populist notion that it was precisely by circulating around art
that museums could be activated for an international cause. Whatever its conceptual deficiencies,
Focillon's liberal politics of form took the museum seriously as an aesthetic medium.
The OIM entered the 1930s having already shifted away from the educational ideals of
Focillon's proposal. Mouseion did produce a network of institutions, which successfully brought a
circulation of ideas, of information, of publications, of sales catalogues, etc, amongst museums. The
journal's organization reflected both its vitalist ideals and its indexical reality; rubrics included "The
Life of Museums" and "Museum Catalogues." Other OIM publications also show that the two
models of "super-museum" and "ready-made cooperation" continued to compete. On the one
hand, the OIM published Repertoires of collections and of museums; on the other hand, it compiled
"Technical manuals." The order in which inventories were published exemplify where real power
lay in the commission: the first was for Holland, the second for Poland, then, France. (fig 1.10)
These two parallel trends (the "re-organization" of national collections and their international
inventorying) were reported with equal frequency in Mouseion-so much so that, by the end of the
decade a regular reader would have the impression that an international index "was increasingly
filling up with records, while the national museums were increasingly emptying out of objects. In
an early embodiment of what later cultural figures would call the "imaginary museum," the more
the "super-museum" was full, the emptier the "life of museums." (fig 1.08)
The OIM also published a series of Technical Manuals, whose themes were determined by the
OIM's original program, which was methodically and sequentially addressed in a series of
Conferences throughout the 1930s. The first conference, on "The Conservation of Museum Objects,"
took place in Rome in October 1930."7 Following closely behind, and prompted by suggestions
made in Rome, was the Athens Conference on the Conservation of Monuments in 1931. The third
was a Conference on the Architecture of Museums in Madrid in 1934, the fourth was a Cairo
Conference on archaeological finds in 1937. Each conference was followed by the creation of a
17 M. Colasanti and Louis Hautecoeur, in "R61e Educatif des Mus6es: MWthodes Actuelles et R~sultats," 257-258.
78 See "Conclusions adopt6es par la confErence internationale pour 1'Etude des m~thodes scientifiques appliques i
1'Examen et la Conservation des oeuvres d'art Rome 13-17," in Mouseoin Vol. 13-14, No. 1 (1931), 2.
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rubric in Mouseion-after 1932, the informational supplement to Mouseion was renamed Musees et
Monuments; after 1934 Mouseion began to feature a "museography" section, etc. In fact, for most of the
1930s the papers in Mouseion in consisted of undeniably "super-indexical" reports, interrupted by the
proceedings of all the conferences. The ballooning effect of publishing these conference
proceedings eventually led to the division of "news" from "doctrine;" in 1932 a monthly
information bulletin titled Museums and Monuments was inaugurated.79 (fig 1.11)
The significance of this "Conference model" of cooperation is that each conference theme
allowed the OIM to expand into neighboring fields, bringing back a new kind of expert into 'ready-
made' cooperation. None of these technical "themes" spun off into autonomous committees; instead
these thematic gatherings lent to the OIM an aspect that it lacked by itself. As we will see in Chapter
3, the Museography conference opened the field of "space" itself for discussion and served as a filter
for architectural modernism to enter the international discussion. (fig 1.07) As we will see in Chapter
4, the Archaeology conference addressed territorial issues and became the primary site for a
redefinition of "exchange" between cultural institutions.8 0 What did the Athens Conference give to
the OIM, and what did it get in return? In the next section I argue that the field of monument
conservation inherited from the OIM the idea of a regular "maintenance" of monuments-a
regularity that was crucial for the projection of an international order onto monuments-and gave
back a broader, more inclusive spatial image to the idea of the 'life' of art, both by way of a broader
regional network and by technical discussions of city life.
Athens: The International Monument
The 1931 Athens Conference on Monuments was convened as "a logical sequel" of the 1930
Rome Conference on Museum Objects."8 (fig 1.12) The Rome Conference had given a definitively
"technical" answer to the question of the museum as "milieu," and the Athens conference was to do
the same for monuments: "the conservation of architectural monuments deals with problems of
such a particular nature," the OIM Governing Board wrote in its preliminary report, that the
79 (In comparison the magazine Museum of the AAM displays a consistency that reveals the stability of the professional
network of which it was an image. In 1946 the ICOM took the name "museum international" and the ICOM was
largely taken over by French and American interests.).
80 Confirence Internationale des Fouilles Le Caire: 1937. Reprinted in Mouseion, I-II (1939).
81 "Suite logique et n6cessaire du programme de Rome, elle sera consacr6e i la fois aux probl~mes relatifs i la
protection et a la conservation des monuments d'art et d'histoire et viendra compl6ter le cycle des problimes de
conservation ressortissant aux trois grandes divisions des arts plastiques : peintures, sculptures, architecture, dont 1'6tude
est pr&vue par les statuts de l'Office. > << L'activit6 de l'Office International des Mus6es, Rapport pr6sent6 i la XIIIe
Session de la Commission internationale de Coop6ration Intellectuelle par M. Jules Destr6e, >> in Mouseion, Vol. 16 No. IV
(1931), 103.
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specialists gathered in Rome were not qualified to address them. Although this implied that an
entirely new set of characters was to enter the realm of intellectual cooperation, their entrance was
staged to correspond to expectations set by the Board. At its April 1930 meeting, the board outlined
three spheres of interest ("legal, doctrinary, and technical") and composed a conference agenda that
nested them one into the other: beginning with a legal survey of a national present (I), ending with
an international future(VI), and spanning doctrine (II) and technique (III-V) in between:
I. Exposition of different legislations for the protection and conservation of artistic and
historic monuments
II. Monument restoration. Doctrine.
III. Deteriorations due to the passage of time and to atmospheric agents.
IV. The Surroundings of monuments
V. Use of Monuments
VI. What are the particular points on which it would be desirable that the OIM take an
initiative, for further study or for further action? 82
In advance of the conference, a legal committee was appointed to gather information about national
legislations and study precedents for cooperation, including the specific possibility of "classifying
certain objects as "heritage of mankind," thereby implying certain international obligations." This
constitutes one of the earliest articulations of the idea of "the heritage of mankind," but the label was
to be used with great discrimination: "to be classified in this last category of objects," the Board
continued, "works would have to be of a truly unique interest in the artistic patrimony of the
country in which they are found.""8 In other words, monuments were to be national monuments
first, international heritage only secondly, and uniquely.
By making "heritage" an international exception to a national norm, the OIM Board was
taking direct inspiration from a paper given by an Italian jurist, Antonio Fabrizi, at the 1921 Paris
Conference (the same conference where Focillon had pleaded for a "liberalization of museums").
In a paper titled "International Agreement (Entente) for the Defense of Monuments of Art," Fabrizi
addressed two principles of international cooperation which were "already pervasive in the minds of
jurists." The first was that art belongs, conceptually, to "all of mankind":
The first principles establishes that artistic monuments, whether movable or immovable
... belong to all of mankind, so to speak, since they are the surest documentation of its
material life, its sentiments and its tendency for betterment and progress.
All of mankind has collaborated to the production of these monuments, although their
material execution was the product of a small number of chosen ones.84
82 "L'Activite de l'Office International des Musies," Mouseoin No 14, 92-94.
83 "L'Activitf de l'Office International des Musees," Mouseoin No 14, 92-94.
84 Alfred Fabrizi, "Entente Internationale pour la Defense des Monuments d'Art," in Actes du Congres de 1'Histoire de 1'Art,
Paris 26 Sep- 5 Oct 1921, Vol 1 (Pris: PUF, 1923), 220- 226
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Since art is the product of a unique, collective and vicarious type of authorship, Fabrizi derived from
it the basis for the possibility of an "international entente" between "civilized" nations. This
collective clause allowed him to exclude those countries which did not "share the same civilization:"
such an international understanding, he added, was only possible in countries that already had
national legislation in place. Fabrizi noted the apparent contradiction between private property and
this idea of "guardianship," recognizing that national legislations over monuments usually only
allowed for "control," "protection," "regulation," and "surveillance" of monuments rather than
actual "ownership" of them.
While Fabrizi's first principle abstracted "property" into an international generality, the
second principle abstracted "place" into a national specificity, attaching monuments to a specific
location. Therefore the second principle was in tension with the first:
The second principle concerning artworks of a monumental character is less general than
the first, and consists of the following: that works of art are "inseparable from the
country where they were created." Indeed, aside from the very understandable malaise
that is felt in national sentiment of peoples who consider it an injury when any of their
masterpieces is exported, it is evident that the place that is best suited to the study of a
masterpiece is the place where it was created."s
This second principle of "inseparability" collapsed three forms of attachment into one: the aesthetic
attachment of a "creation" to its place of origin, the sentimental attachment of a monument to "a
people," and its disciplinary attachment to a context "for study." Furthermore, the principle
stipulated that the nation-state was the best way to inscribe all three of these values geographically.
Fabrizi resolved this tension by introducing a distinction between "movable" monument (subject to
a relational law and bilateral agreements) and "immovable" property, (subject to a positive
declarative law and international conventions)."86 In so doing, he produced a text that expressed a
fundamental tension between international value and national appurtenance, with an emphasis on
mobility that reveals the weight of World War I and the issues of damage and restitutions that had
arisen from it. In fact, the OIM board presented the Athens Conference as long-awaited follow-up to
85 Fabrizi, 222.
86 In the case of stationary monuments, "any international agreement would be limited to their conservation, whether
they belong to the state to communities or to private individuals." The only cause for which international action might
be required was to "declaration as monument of a building that the nation which possesses it has not yet declared as such."
In other words, if a monument could not be moved, all that international action could do was to designate monuments
as such. In contrast, artworks which were subject to movement could benefit from international action and arbitration
in order to be returned to a "place of origin." To make this point Fabrizi recalled a long tradition of intellectuals
protest against pillage and theft, beginning with a 1796 appeal of Quatrembre de Quincy to French presence in Italy.
Fabrizi, 223.
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the 1921 Paris Conference: to Fabrizi's work, to the request for international legislation, to the
problem posed by monument conservation, and to the issues that had been raised by World War I.8
With characteristic idealism, League advocates used the Athens Conference to reconfigure
Fabrizi's two legal principles (the international "belonging" of monuments, and their national
"situatedness") so that they were no longer in conflict. Instead these two qualities of monuments
were presented, at the close of the Athens Conference, as nested expressions of a single ideal of
"international solidarity." This was made clear in a report of the President of the OIM Board, Jules
Destr6e, who presented the Conference as having produced "two veritable innovations in the
international sphere:"
First, there is the admission, on the part of the entire Conference, of this new notion,
according to which the preservation of the masterpieces that are the highest expression
of civilization is in the interest of the community of peoples. This notion implies a
restriction of the right of national property against its intrinsic egoism.88
In this first principle, the international value of monuments that had been speculated by Fabrizi was
stated authoritatively and positively. The second principle, in contrast, was projective: it granted the
responsibility for this international value to "the people themselves: "
There is another point, corollary of the first, to which the Athens Conference paid
particular attention. The members of this conference have considered that the best
guarantee of the conservation of monuments and artworks resides in the attachment that
the people themselves carry for them. 89
This projection of responsibility onto "the people" represented a subtle but crucial modification of
Fabrizi's model: a geographic "inseparability" of the monument and locale had been reduced to a
sentimental "attachment" of people to monuments.
Whereas Fabrizi saw these two principles in a state of tension, for Destr'e they were merely
different expressions of the same "international solidarity." The two main recommendations that the
87 Indeed many of the debates which were subsequently addressed within the League, concerning both monument
conservation and art historical methodology was addressed at this Congress, including multiple American expositions of
the educational role of museums and Lionello Venturi's call for a "a history of art criticism." (See L.Venturi, "Histoire
de 1'Art et Histoire de la Critique," in Actes du Congris, 167). In addition, the Congress had closed with a resolution to
recommend further study of the matter of international legislation, upon request from Venturi and Fabrizi, as well as a
resolution to request further study on the conservation of monuments, on the request of Cuypers. "Conservation,
Restoration des Oeuvres d'Art. Mus6ographie" in Congris International (1922), 228-230.
88 The original translation in the English version of the Bulletin was: "First, the whole conference agreed to the new idea
that the preservation of masterpieces, which represent civilization's highest power of self-expression, is a matter of
interest to the community at large. This implies a restriction of the right to national ownership, inso far as this right is
of a selfish character.
89 Jules Destr6e, "Rapport du Pr6sident du Comit6 de Direction de l'Office International des Mus6es sur les Travaux de la
Conference d'Ath~nes," in Office International des Mus6es, La Conservation des Monuments d'Art et d'Histoire [henceforth:
CMAH] (Paris: IICI, 1934), 408-410.
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Conference had made to the League, therefore, were evidence of a dual course of action. On the one
hand, the principle would be demonstrated through the creation of a "procedure susceptible to give
to this international solidarity a concrete expression." (This meant that the groups would be able to
ask the League to intervene for "the conservation of such and such a monument" without "impeding
on national sovereignty.") On the other hand, the principle would be instilled into people's minds by
"educational initiatives." (This meant that the League would ask its member states to "ask public
authorities to develop in the people the respect for the remains of the past, whatever the civilization
and epoch to which they belong.") 90 By the time Destr&e drafted recommendations on behalf of the
IICI for the League of Nations, the principle of "popular attachment" had become an umbrella
concept, a precondition for international valuation of monuments in both "concrete" and
"educational" form:
The IICI,
believing that the best guarantee for the conservation of monument and works
of art is to be found in the respect and attachment towards them felt by the peoples
themselves, and that these feelings can be greatly stimulated by appropriate action on the
part of the public authorities,
Requests that the Assembly address the following recommendations to member
states:
That Member States should establish closer and more concrete cooperation with
each-other for the purpose of ensuring the conservation of works of art.
That Member States should ask educationists to teach children and young people
to respect monuments, whatever the civilization of period to which they belong, and
that this educative action should also be extended to the general public with a view to
associating the latter in the protection of the records of any civilization.9
Between Fabrizi's 1921 formulation to these 1933 recommendations, two shifts had occurred in the
definition of a monument's "attachment" to its site: first, the link between monument and its place
of origin had become a link between monument and "people;" second, this principle of attachment
had become an overarching principle confirming monument's universal "belonging," rather than
contradicting it. This gesture, of using "popular attachment" as an umbrella concept had long-lasting
repercussions for the codification of international heritage law in the following decades. The
formulation was cited verbatim in all of the OIM's (and later, Unesco's) work leading up to the
World Heritage Convention of 1972.92 It is not until the 1980s that Fabrizi's original distinction
between national and international action was rediscovered, by legal scholars seeking to account for
90 Destree, 409.
91 Original English translation, in "Programme of the International Commission on Historical Monuments," in Bulletin of
International Cooperation, (Dec 1933-Jan 1934), 29.
92 This included the 1960 Recommendation for international principles for archaeological digs which was based on the 193 7 "R6gime
des Fouilles." As cited in C.A. Beerli, UNESCO: Campagne Internationale des Monuments, Projet pr6liminaire, (16 Oct 1961), in
Brew Archives
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restitution disputes.93 In the meantime, all international action was to have a "demonstrative" value,
derived from one principle, and conveyed in two different ways. It is all the more crucial, then, to
note the difference in the examples that the Athens Conference offered for "concrete" and
"educational" forms of action.
What was meant at Athens by "educational initiative" was a deferral of internationalist goals
to European nationalism. The priority of nationality over international citizenship had been a main
point of doctrine for intellectual cooperation. "The road to internationalism lies through
nationalism," wrote Alfred Zimmern in his 1919 Nationality and Government, expressing a paternalist
view that national feeling was a necessary stage for the achievement of any international outlook:
Nationality is the one social force capable of maintaining [people's] links with the past ...
It is the one force capable of doing so, because it is the one force whose appeal is
instinctive and universal."'94
Thus "nationality [was] an educational, not a political concept." By 1929, when he was the Vice-
president of the IICI, Zimmern had turned this theory into a distinction between "true and false"
internationalism:
Any fool can book a ticket for a foreign country, just as any fool can learn Esperanto. But
contacts so established effect nothing. It is through a deeper exploration and enjoyment
of the infinite treasures of the worlds' nationalities by men and women whose vision
has been trained and sensibilities refined because they themselves are intimately bound
up with a national of their own, that an enduring network of internationalism will some
day be knot and a harmony of understanding established in a work of unassailable
diversity.95
In other words, the function of the IICI was to "refine the sensibility" of peoples-to civilize
them--before they could learn from one another. Similarly, OIM Board president Jules Destr&e (in
some ways the Alfred Zimmern of cooperation in the arts) hoped to "unify mankind around the
concept of beauty," by intervening in arts education. He saw the Athens Conference as a significant
step towards this unification. "The whole spirit of the Conference," for Destr&e, lay in the
articulation of this educational imperative: "abstract principles, rules and defenses will never have
enough strength alone to safeguard the artistic heritage of mankind; only a personal conviction,
ingrained since childhood, will achieve this.""96
93 It is not until 1986 that John Henry Merryman returned to this conflict between national and international
valuations, in "Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property," The American Journal of International Law (Oct 1986), 831-
853.
94 "True and False Nationalism," in Nationality and Government, 78.
95 Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internationalism," in The Prospect of Democracy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), 93.
96 E. Foundoukidis, "L'Oeuvre Internationale de Jules Destr6e dans le Domaine des Arts," in Mouseion 33-34 (1936), 12.
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The most direct expression of this educational principle at Athens was a short speech given
by the director of the Parisian Iconographic Society on the education of children to "respect
monuments from childhood,""97 but it was the Polish example that best showed the value of
monumental nationality. The Chief of Historic monuments in Poland recounted how Prussian,
German and Russian administrations had applied varied principles to the country's various
monuments. "For lack of a protection by the state, it is the Poles themselves who took matter into
their own hands, since this matter was so intimately connected to the question of their national
culture." Here the national narrative of Polish liberation from the triple hold of imperialism was
presented as a triumph of national coalescence, from which monuments and education had emerged
interconnected. By the end of World War I, monument protection had become an mandate of the
"National Ministry of Cults and Public Instruction,""98 and monuments were educational
instruments, vehicles of national emancipation.
In contrast, what was meant by "concrete cooperation" throughout the Athens Conference
was intervention in a colonial context. Calls for the opening of a multilateral channel of action-
whether legal or technical-were only made in the places where a paternalist international regime
that had been operative since the middle of the 1 9 th Century, through archaeological institutes or
colonial administrations. The single most important example of this kind of concrete action was a
call to salvage of Island of Philae, in Egypt, which was faced with annual flooding due to the second
raising of the Aswan Dam. As Chapter 4 will show, the survey operations that ensued set the stage
for post-war redefinitions of "cultural exchange." Belgian conservator Jean Capart made a point of
presenting the Philae case as an exception, necessary in places where "popular attachment" to
monuments had been severed by historical discontinuities:
Some circles might express discomfort at the thought of an international organization
pretending to dictate the actions of to private individuals and public authorities in
sovereign countries. ... But there are in the world a certain number of monuments and
archeological ensembles whose conservation is of international interest ... for example,
the remains of exceptionally brilliant ancient civilizations. Great population movements
have created such breaks in traditions that nations currently occupying such and such a
territory no longer feel any direct link with the peoples who had built the monuments
that now evoke international interest."
In other words, whereas European populations felt an uninterrupted "attachment" to the monuments
on their soil, countries where intervening "breaks" in historical continuity like Egypt and Greece
97 Respect for monuments would become "one of those gestures, one of those figures of speech, one of those
sentiments that have become instinctive." Henry Nocq, "Le Role Educatif dans la Conservation des Monuments," in
CMAH, 394.
98 Jaroslaw Wojciechowski, "Lfgislation des Monuments Historiques en Pologne," CMAH, 142.
99 Jean Capart, "International Collaboration for the Conservation of Monuments: the Example of Philae," CMAH, 387.
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required an international action. What Capart did not mention was that, like Poland, Egypt already
had strict heritage laws in vigor, which had been instituted in order to minimize illegal exports of
archaeological finds.
Under the guise of a dichotomy between "concrete" and "educational" internationalism, the
Athens Conference presented two standards of action, to be applied in European and non-European
contexts. In doing this, it performed a conceptual trick that has now been identified as typical of
intellectual cooperation under the League. Recent literature has shown that EH Carr's distinction
between "realism" and "idealism" in international diplomacy hides a much more fundamental
debate between "imperialism" and internationalism" as two forms of international order which was
inherited from the colonial expansions of the late 19 th Century. Long and Schmidt, for instance,
argued that scholarly focus on the "newness" of the "new diplomacy" concealed the extent to
which long-standing debates continued to pervade the preoccupations of the League. They used the
International Studies Conference as an example: "The formal agenda of these conferences," they
wrote, "concerned classically internationalist topics such as collective security and peaceful change.
But the substance of discussion was more often about demographic change and the allocation of
colonial dependencies." 100 By analogy, we can say that the Athens Conference agenda addressed
classically internationalist topics like "universal heritage" and "attachment of monuments to
people," but the substance of the discussion reveals another axis of concern. First, there was the
increasing division between "imperialism and internationalism," as evidenced by the distinction
between the colonial management of heritage and the trans-national exchange of art. Secondly-and
more importantly-the Conference replayed debates that had marked the formation of monument
conservation as a discipline, pitting the "interventionism" of Viollet-le-Duc, against the "non-
interventionism" of William Morris and John Ruskin. 10'
The classic restoration/conservation debates of the late 19th-Century surfaced everywhere in
the Athens Conference. The Conference organizers had done enough research to foresee this: OIM
Secretary General E. Foundoukidis gave a 1931 radio address on the "technical and doctrinary"
ground to be covered by the Conference, which reminded the international community that "two
points of view" had been inherited from the 19 th Century: "the architectural" and the
"archaeological." In this he borrowed a terminology made at the 1921 Paris Conference by a Dutch
100 David Long and Brian Schmidt, "Introduction" in Imperialism and Internationalism, 14.
101 According to Choay, "the consecration of the historic monument" in the nineteenth century unfolded both through
an institutionalization of restoration practices, and a broadening of legal and administrative mechanisms for listing and
classifying monuments. Choay, L'invention du patrimoine, 1 1 1.
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museum conservator, A. Cuypers: the "architectural" aimed to "put the monument back in its
primitive state, taking away all additions, all changes that have taken place over the centuries," while
"archaeological-historical" action attempted "to conserve anything in the monument that might
have acquired a historical value." 102 Cuypers called for a type of "modem restoration" based on an
"evolutionary point of view," and Foundoukitis followed his lead, offering the Athens Conference as
synthesis. That this architectural/archaeological debate upstaged the "legal" discussions is shown in a
revision of the order of the Conference agenda, where legal survey was now preceded by discussions of
doctrine:
I. Doctrines. General Principles
II. Administrative and Legislative Measures Regarding Historical Monuments
III. Aesthetic Enhancement of Ancient Monuments
IV. Restoration Materials
V. The Deterioration of Ancient Monuments. Scientific study of Methods of Treatment
VI. The Technique of Conservation. Characteristic examples.
VII. The Conservation of Monuments and International Collaboration.'03
Each paper in the session on a "Comparative Study of Doctrine" consisted of a national
official recounting how the 19t-Century debates led to a contemporary restoration practice, in his
own country. Paul L6on, speaking on behalf of France, endorsed Viollet-le-Duc's statement of the
fundamental "modernity" of restoration ("Restoration: both the thing and the word are modem")
and recounted the three-phase advent this modernity in France: through an "empirical period," a
"doctrinal period," and "experimental period." Having now internalized the critique of its
opponents, this rationalist tradition had stabilized into a set of national institutions. "Most architects,"
Leon asserted, "have foregone the reconstruction of buildings as they might have been, and turned to
their conservation in the state that history has left them to us. Restoration has turned to conservation."
Such temperance was necessary for conservation in a contemporary moment, "a period in which
monuments will survive, rather than being resurrected."'"0 What L0on advocated was a modest
deployment of the rationalist arsenal. In a neat re-enactment of the 19t Century debates, the second
speaker was the British president of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, A.R Powys, who
began by recounting the Society's creation, at the initiative of William Morris in London in 1877.
Founded largely in reaction to the spread of French-inspired "restoration" practices, the Society
followed the principles of "consolidation ... aimed at conserving of those parts of the building that
102 "L'Vvolution des id6es concemant la restauration des monuments architecturaux et d6coratifs depuis le milieu du
XIXe Si&cle aux Pays-Bas," CMAH, 206-226.
103 "The Conservation of Artistic and Historical Monuments," CMAH, 417-420. Original in English.
104 Paul LEon, CMAH, 56.
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still exist, without replacing those parts that have been damaged by the work of time or of men." Yet
he also admitted that "certain kinds of restorations" were acceptable, especially in cases of structural
instability or when original parts to buildings were re-discovered. It was no longer the idea of
intervening in history at all that the Society resisted, but rather the hybridity of turning monuments
into "an assemblage of old and new.""10
Following this exposition of French thesis and British antithesis came an unapologetically
Hegelian synthesis on the part of Italian architect-historian Gustavo Giovannoni (1873-1943).
Giovannoni began with the critique that Camillo Boito had leveled against Viollet-Le-Duc in the late
19th Century, drawing from this criticality the vision of a new generation of Italian theorists, whose
set of "new principles" he enumerated in one run-on sentence:
Severe and rigorous respect of every construction project that contains and artistic or
historic aspect, minimization of additions, for the filling of lacuna and the re-alignment
of edges, the usage of new materials with no ornamentation and as close as possible to
the consistency of the original; prolongation of lines in a style similar only in cases of
geometric expressions deprived of any decorative originality; highlighting of additions,
either by the use of new materials or by the use of a framing system with no ornamental
pretensions, or by signage and epigraphy; respect of the context of a monument; precise
documentation of works, by way of analytic reports and photographs illustrating
different phases.' 06
These principles provided a just equilibrium between "two extreme tendencies," which Giovannoni
called "architectural and scientific." Speaking as if a diplomat, Giovannoni granted that sacrifices had
to be made for the sake of neutrality. "Like all efforts at conciliation and equilibrium," he wrote,
"these efforts will most likely be judged too neutral.... But it is precisely why they appear to be the
more felicitous method to adopt today." Giovannoni's approach was also notable for identifying
constituencies of monuments, rather than attempting further categorizations of material phenomena.
Thus Italian restoration aimed to take into account "the point of view of the erudite, who does not
want to loose any trace of the building phases that the building has gone through," the "point of
view of the architect, who aims for the architectonic unity of the building and the "point of view of
the citizen, who carries particular affection for the monuments of his own city." In this he vaunted
that Italian restorers had known to be inspired by "the spirit of the monument." What he meant by
"spirit" was a combination of artistic creationism with legal jargon: not only were Italian restorers
in metaphysical communion with their objects, but insofar as they adopted theory of restoration, it
would be "the spirit, not the letter of this theory" that they followed."10
105 A.R Powys, "La Restoration des Monuments en Grande Bretagne," CMAH, 70-74.
106 Gustavo Giovannoni, "La Restauration des Monuments en Italie," CMAH, 63.
107 Giovannoni, CMAH, 66.
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Subsequent expositions of "doctrine" repeated this pattern: recounting disciplinary debates,
tracing their effects in specific national, typological, or stylistic spheres, and announcing that an age
of synthesis had arrived. The Spanish representative began with the influence of Viollet-le-Duc on
late-I 9 th Century Spain, continued with "contestations" of this system at the turn of the century, and
culminated in the creation of a National Restoration Service, operating since the teens under the
principles of a "new spirit." Given the diversity of architectural styles at hand, he declared himself
against "the establishment of general rules" for conservation, asking instead for a "general
orientation," guided by "respect for the old," avoidance additive building, and maintenance of the
"artistic effect" of the existing work.'08 He too spoke in conciliatory terms, calling for "eclecticism
and elasticity." Even statements of doctrine that were not country-specific depicted an inherited bi-
polarity to be sublated into scientific categories. Belgian architect Jean Hendricks rephrased the
debate in medical terms and proposed a six-class categorization of monuments and their state of
health.'" 9 Similarly, the Belgian conservator Paul Saintevoy admitted that the debate had for him
been settled by the mere fact that "everything in nature gets destroyed" and proposed to correlate the
amount of usage of buildings with different levels of "patina."' o Finally, even the last exposition of
doctrine, a defense of "the historic and rational restoration" given by Polish conservator A.
Lauterbach, was conciliatory in its admission that the original rationalist tradition had been imbued
with too much romanticism."' He proposed to resolve this with a theory/practice dichotomy,
wherein "in theory only conservation is allowed, but in practice restoration cannot be omitted."" 2
What did the Athens Conference contribute to these debates? Notwithstanding the
conciliatory tone of these opening speeches, the conference papers revealed that the two principal
poles of conservation theory still existed, and that national legislations could do little more than offer
108 L. Torres Balbas, "La Restauration des Monuments en Espagne," CMAH, 66-69.
109 "Reconstruction and restoration are audacious attempts to heal, or even to resurrect monuments" while "protection,
maintenance, consolidation and partial reconstruction of buildings ... [which] instead of attempting the total healing
of the monument, only aim to fight against the ill that ails them." The diagnostic range went from "monuments in a
state of near-perfect preservation" to "ruins," spanning "buildings still standing but risking collapse" and "buildings
that have been despoiled of ornament." Jean Hendricks, "Consolidation et RMfection des Monuments," CMAH, 90-91
110 "Must we restore monuments? We could debate this at great lengths, but in my opinion, a side has been taken by
an overwhelming assumption: everything in nature gets destroyed." Paul Saintenoy, "La Restauration des monuments:
principes g6ndraux," CMAH, 81-83
"' A. Lauterbach, "Restauration historique et rationelle des Monuments," CMAH, 79.
Z Lauterbach made perhaps the most Rieglian attempt to establish a connection between practices applied to
monuments and the values attributed to them. The problem was therefore that too much "artistic value" had come to
be projected onto buildings which had really only "historic value." He concluded, "the principle of "historic"
restoration is therefore based upon the relative value of the monument" but remained "the most rational and the least
risky" available.
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classifications. Indeed preservation historians agree that from the point of view of doctrine, the
restoration/conservation debates had been resolved by the late 1870s, but that in practice historicist
"restorations" continued well into the 2 0 h Century."3 In the context of this disconnect between
administrative practices and theoretical doctrine, the Athens Conference signaled a threefold shift in
the way these two doctrinal poles were addressed. First, it identified a new set of threats and causes
of decay; second, it rephrased the "technical" problem of maintenance in terms of an organic
integrity; third, it applied bureaucratic principles to monument conservation in order to integrate
them into political life.
Certainly the gathering of national representatives had the effect of softening the absolute
opposition between "architectural" and "archaeological" doctrines. This softening was validated by
descriptions of technical conditions for work: it was no longer in a range of extremes between
complete abandonment and total reconstruction that most European restorers operated. The very
presence of "administrative and legal" limits meant that the possibility for complete reconstructions
favored by rationalists was increasingly regulated by state agencies. Conversely, the "natural decay"
to which romantic critics had imagined abandoning monuments was increasingly interrupted by
other factors. The contingent forces of deterioration, whether attributed to the effects of "nature" or
to the passing of "history," produced effects that were increasingly difficult to aestheticize as
"sublime" or "picturesque." This second generation of restorers was, for instance, increasingly
encountering already-restored monuments:
The conservation of monuments unfortunately does not consist only in protecting of
buildings against deterioration produced by age or natural decrepitude; but also to
repairing the errors that our predecessors have made." 4
Whereas 1 9th Century theorists imagined that monuments were either restored or not, the 20 Century
monument was likely to be an already-restored hybrid. Furthermore, monuments were no longer
depicted as existing in an abstract space, but rather in a changing and complex urban environment.
The growth of city planning and its technologies was perceived as a major new force to contend
with, including in its modernist undercurrent:
113 Wim Denslagen notes that the dispute might well have been settled by Morris' 1877 manifesto. "In practice,
however, few concerned themselves with these principles." He sees this realization delayed until the 1960s and makes
this point for various countries in his introduction to Architectural Restoration in Western Europe: Tradition and Continuity
(Amsterdam: A & NP, 1994), 12-31. Rudy Koshar, uses Riegl as starting point for this delay in German-speaking
countries, "if conservationist theories carried the day, in practical terms many preservationists, builders, and state
officials continued to restore historic buildings and sites. It could be argued that restorationism became stronger, not
seaker, iesecially in response to the depredations of the world wars." Koshar, "On Cults and Cultists," in Giving Preservation
a History ed. Page & Mason (New York: Routledge, 2004), 51.
"
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I know from experience how difficult it is sometimes to save monuments that are
threatened: you run against urbanism with its alignments (which are inexhaurable) and
its hygiene (which must be achieved) or against the modern spirit, with a modernism
that cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the past. 5s
Yet modernism was only one type of threat that arose from the urbanization of monumental
contexts. Infinitely more urgent, for the participants, were the dangers of advertising and vandalism.
Similarly, the definition of a ruin was significantly modified in the case of colonial climates:
The conservation of monuments encounters in the Orient difficulties that are entirely
different from those of the Occident. Exuberant vegetation, great daytime heat followed
by considerable nighttime cooling, as well as the earthquakes to which these countries
are subjected are so many factors that produce ruins instantly. 116
The implication of this differentiation between Orient and Occident was that an "instant" ruin was
hardly a "ruin" at all, since it could not bear the melancholic projection that had been the source of
its value in temperate climates.
Perhaps the most vivid example of a type of decay that caused a re-thinking of conventional
restoration debates was offered by Austrian representative Justus Schmidt, who argued that the
primary international threat associated with city planning was the urbanization of Europe's pigeon
population:
One of the most important measures that have recently been instituted by the Austrian
Historic Monuments Office and should be of greatest interest to the international
community, was the initiative concerning the deteriorations that are caused by birds, and
particularly, by pigeons.
A significant proliferation of birds-and particularly of the pigeon population-has been
recorded across the large cities of Europe. This phenomenon is apparently explicated by
a growing favor these birds encounter with citizens, who ensure they are regularly fed." 11
Having identified the pigeon as a hybrid urban-natural threat to European monuments, Schmidt then
recounted in great detail his negotiations with Austrian animal protection agencies. Here the great
clash between civilizational and natural forces that had been dramatized by 19tE Century critics was
re-enacted in petty form: the pigeons and monuments of Europe were competing for the affections
of city populations, each waiting to be collectively domesticated.
All of these new threats were addressed through a vitalist conception of "the life of
monuments" adapted from the OIM's idea of "the life of museums." This constitutes the Athens
Conference's second, and most detailed, contribution to the 19 th Century patrimonial debates: that
monuments were centers of city life and their maintenance was to be enacted organically, from
11s Paul Leon, "La Restauration des Monuments: Principes Generaux," CMAH, 80.
116 F. A. Moojen, "La Conservation des Monuments aux Indes Nierlandaises," CMAH,
117 Schmidt, CMAH, 223.
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within and from without. Foundoukidis had already described the monument's predicament as a
heightening of Focillon's vitalist schema. "The life of an architectural monument, more so than that
of a work of art conserved in a museum, is in a tight and constant relationship with the particular
conditions of a country in which it is found."" 8 Applied to buildings, this vitalist notion acquired a
specificity far beyond the abstraction of the "life of the museum," where art objects are surrounded
by "talking tours." In part, this was due to the inherited discourse: the conception of buildings as
living organisms had permeated the thought of 19 th Century thinkers for whom architecture and
restoration were continuous."119 In Athens, however, it was primarily an urban, functionalist
transposition of organicism that was incorporated into preservation discourse. Monumental
autonomy was defined as an equilibrium activated from within (from the material existence of the
monuments itself) and from without (through the design of the boundaries between object and its
milieu.) This balance was made clear in the theme of the two main "technical" sessions, titled "The
Surroundings of Monuments" and "The Use of New Materials in Monument Conservation."
The section on "The surroundings of monuments" asserted the inherent relationship of
monuments with their urban contexts. "The beauty of cities," Italian architect Giorgio Nicodemi
wrote, "comes from the rhythm that has been created over the centuries, between monuments
houses, and nature, by generations of architects acting in an almost unconscious collaboration."' 20
Here the collective value of monuments supported their material and aesthetic connection to their
surroundings. In contrast, Belgian architect Victor Horta spoke of the tension between urban life and
monuments conservation: "while monuments require permanence, city life requires constant
change." So as to avoid creating "museum-cities, or dead cities," Horta proposed a set of "general
laws" for the urban "valorization" emanating from monuments themselves, based on an aesthetic
projection of perception around the monument. He began by drawing three perimeters around the
monuments, from "free space" to "access road":
The surroundings of Monuments consist of three essential parts:
1. The open space (espace libre) between the monument and its surrounding
2. The surrounding (entourage) which consists of utilitarian or decorative buildings
3. Access to the surroundings, which is to say, the public roads that grant access to it.'•2
118 Foundoukitis, Ibid.
119 An overview of the organicist roots of modern architecture is provided by Caroline van Eck in "Organicism in
Nineteenth-Century Architecture: An Inquiry into Its Theoretical and Philosophical Background," in The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, (Summer, 1997), 346-347. A detailed analysis of the entrance of the word "function" in 19 th
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Horta then proposed a set of "aesthetic rules" emanating "from the architecture of the principal
building," and extending to "open space." Based on a stylistic distinction between "horizontal and
vertical" architectures (i.e., classical and gothic), the rule revolved around a single 45 degree line,
drawn from the top of the monument into the ground: horizontal buildings required an espace libre
which expanded past the line, while vertical buildings required a narrower space than the area
delimited by this same 45 degree line. Horta's rules reflect a progressive focusing on the technical
rules of the aesthetic effect of monument, and a clear attempt to make a link between the
"liberalizing" effect of heritage and the "liberation" of monuments from their surroundings.
The session on "The use of modern materials for restoration" brought the vitalist
maintenance imperative into the monuments' structural core. Whereas discussions of urbanism
revealed some anxieties about cohabitation with modem buildings, an undeniably progressive tone
pervaded these discussions. Paul Leon explicitly highlighted the service that modern architecture had
rendered to preservation practices by creating new materials:
It is singularly paradoxical that modern architecture, which had clearly broken with
ancient construction traditions..., by its universal use of molded and plastered materials,
should have helped so powerfully to conserve ancient monuments, to which it is
radically foreign in principles, and which it is destined eventually to replace. '
Modernism had provided a new life to the skeletal structure for all monuments-and Leon implied
that all monuments were therefore all becoming modem, from within. Leon and Horta offered
different interpretations of the "life" of monuments. Prefiguring his 1951 La Vie Des Monuments
Franpais, Leon hoped to write destruction into the history of French architecture would help to
moderate the radicality of French modernist architectural rhetoric.'2 3 As for Horta, he channeled into
urbanistic formalism the vitalism he had once expressed more literally as a pioneer of the Art Nouveau,
with a rigidity and conservatism that had already earned him the label of retrograde as judge for the
infamous League of Nations competition in 1926.124
While Leon abdicated "the spirit of the age" to modernism as a pervasive architectural force,
and Horta regulated monumental resistance to this force in geometric terms, it was Gustavo
Giovannoni who was alone in theorizing the need to rethink conservation at both a material and an
urban scale. Giovannoni was both a historian and an architect, and has now been described as "the
central figure in the elaboration of a method for the history of architecture that served as the basis for
122 Paul Leon, "La Restauration des Monuments en France," CMAH, 58.
123 Paul Leon, La Vie des Monuments Franpais, Destruction Restauration (Paris: Picard, 1951).
124 By this time Horta had been discredited for abandoning his avant-garde roots; in Barry Bergdoll's words, "as
president of the jury for the infamous [League of Nations] competition Horta's reputation as a rear-guard had been
sealed." Barry Bergdoll, "Brussels: Horta," in The Burlington Magazine, (Feb. 1997), 137.
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the definition of a historical-architectural discipline," for which Italian historiography is now
known. 2 ' For Giovannoni, material and urban "integration" of monuments into life were but two
components of a single theory of "the integral architect" that he had been developing since the turn
of the century. He brought this theory with him to Athens, giving two separate interventions. First, he
advocated the expansion of conservation to vernacular typologies and parts of cities:
There is one fundamental principle on which I would like to insist, and which has taken
on considerable importance in Italy. Conservation is no longer a question of
attributing-or not-a monumental value to a building, and extending conservation
only to those works that are the most beautiful and the most important. Secondary works
must also benefit from these privileges when they are sufficiently interesting, whether
by their collective character or their relation with more grandiose constructions, or by
the testimony they bear on the architecture of various epochs. 126
The modern monument had a "live function" as "an object made for people." Trained as an
engineer and engaged in urban planning, Giovannoni advocated the incorporation of monuments
into practices of hygiene and realignment characteristic of European urbanism in the teens. 127 Having
made this distinction between "live" and "dead" monuments, he then described the technical means
of resuscitation. In a second intervention on the use of modern materials, Giovannoni proposed a
statement of principle that prefigured by a half-century the theories of "integrity" that Unesco
would eventually endorse:
The art and science of restorations must make use, without exception, of all building
means that modern technology makes available, and use them as much for the purpose
of consolidation as for the goal of re-integration. 1•8
Thus monuments could be modernized both from within and from without, through a concept of
"architectural integrity" (integralite architecturale) which was to replace the idea of "stylistic unity" of
the 1 9 th Century restorationists.
To explicate his idea of "integration" Giovannoni went on a "digression on the application
of modern architectural techniques for monument restoration," which outlined a two-fold relevance
of contemporary architectural techniques for conservators: "on the one hand, the simplicity of
125 Maristella Casciato and Barry Fifield, "The Italian Mosaic: The Architect as Historian," in The Journal of the Society of
Architectural Historians, (Mar2003), 92-101. This article features a diagram of the "School of Rome" which places
Giovannoni at the source of an entire geneaology of architectural historians we know now.
126 Giovannoni., "La Restauration des monuments en Italie," CMAH, 61.
127 See "Gustavo Giovannoni, La naissance de l'architecte integral en Italie," in Annales de la Recherche Urbaine, (Dec
1989),185-194. As an urbanist Giovannoni was involved in for designing working-class neighborhoods in the style of
"barocchetto"- an unassuming and vaguely nostalgic architectural style intended to produce continuity with Italy's
past. This was intended as a "progressive response to eclecticism, " and also as an alternative to the fascist use of
architecture, both in its endorsement of modernism like Terragni's and in its "monumental" tendencies in urban
settings. Bruno Reichlin, "Figures of Neorealism in Italian Architecture (Part 1)", Grey Room (Fall 2001), 96.
128 Giovannoni, "Les Moyens Modernes de Restauration," CMAH, 181
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obtaining effects of mass and of ornament, and on the other constructivism, which is to say, a
perfect correspondence of form and structure." Here he paused to critique the direction taken by
modern architects and "other ultra-rationalists":
What do we intend by constructivism? Is it a generic and synthetic expression of the
special possibilities afforded by new materials and new procedures, or is it the direct
expression of constructive elements, whether left grossly bare or stylized? I firmly insist
that the first answer is the right one and that the whole history of architecture stands to
prove it. To take to the extreme the mechanical expression that is desired by Le
Corbusier and other ultra-rationalist modern architects, is to abandon any preoccupation
for rhythm, for signification and emotion, for relationships with settings-for everything
that makes architecture an art.' 29
Far from merely borrowing the materials of modernism, Giovannoni sought to make monument
restoration "a true expression of our age" (une sincere expression de notre 0poque), through the application
of modern materials. In other words, Giovannoni saw restoration as a path to an alternate
modernity, more modern than modernism itself.
Giovannoni's attack on modernism revealed a cohesive theory of conservation as modern
architecture. This theory, along with his role in the codification of the Italian architectural profession
in the 20 th Century, has earned Giovannoni a particular place in the historiography of Italian
modernism. Bruno Zevi noted that while "Giovannoni understood nothing of modern architecture,"
his ideal of the "integral architect" was not far from the Bauhaus plan for the "total scope of
architecture." 130 Similarly, for Manfredo Tafuri, Giovannoni had discovered a special kind of
historian's "autonomy" but deployed it to decidedly wrong-headed ends. Tafuri blamed Giovannoni
for having been "rediscovered" by a postwar Italian architectural culture eager to preserve its historic
cities, provoking a turn away from the CIAM's Athens Charter."'1 This revival was for Tafuri "all the
more serious because it was carried out without a clear understanding of what it was postulating." 3 2
129 Giovannoni, "Les Moyens Modernes," CMAH, 180.
130 Bruno Zevi, "Gustavo Giovannoni," in Metron 13 (1947), 6. The issue of Metron was delayed so that Zevi could publish
his memoriam, expressing the effect of the loss of Giovannoni by modern architects "whom he considered adversaries."
Zevi's homage was a harsh critique of a moral and intellectual failure: he saw Giovannoni's work and life as a missed
opportunity, his involvement with fascist cultural politics an unforgivable mistake and his aversion to modern
architecture an inexplicable blindness-both of which kept him from contributing to Italian modernism the necessary
historical foundations it sorely lacked.
13
' Tafuri wrote: "When Italian architectural culture of the 1950 Os picked up again the question of historical centers, it
did not link it directly with the tradition of the modern movement, but, with the excuse of introducing new valencies,
turned its back on the Chartes d'Athenes and picked up again Giovannoni." Manfredo Tafuri, Theories and History of Architecture,
trans. Dennis Sharp (London: Granada, 1979), 51.
132 Tafuri would have preferred that "the past" re-enter the city on the terms of the Athens Charter, as "fetishized"
islands of history. "By reducing, in fact, the semantic poly-valency of the ancient textures to the generic concept of
organism, by substituting the myth of the figurative unity of the historic center to the study of the dialectic within
the urban structures, by producing a neat cut between the old and the new, the modem architects were expressing their
guilt complexes towards history and their renunciation of an objective and analytical study. The historical centers were
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By this he meant that Giovannoni's urban protectionism was imbued with a deeply nostalgic
nationalism which, if not totally continuous with the cultural politics of the fascist state, was at least
conveniently adapted to it. Indeed as a historian of Roman architecture, Giovannoni willingly
depicted "Rome" as the origin of culture, Bramante as "the most Italian of all Italian architects," and
restoration as the practice that would help Italy achieve "world dominion" again.' 33 As the editor of
the new magazine Palladio Giovannoni had promised "to illustrate Italian monuments, to create
around these an awareness and affection, and to demonstrate what grand and almost uninterrupted
means of a dominant civilization these are still able to document." 134 Within Giovanoni's world
view, restoration was a major Italian contribution to world culture, a unique form of modernity that
corresponded to the dawn of a new age of "Italianiti." Giovannoni expressed this nationalist
ambition in the opening paragraph of his Athens speech: "The restoration of monuments is in Italy a
matter of national interest. ... Since Italy has achieved its national unity, and especially since the
fascist regime has placed new value into the living forces of the Nation, the restoration of ancient
monuments has been the object of intense activity.""' These nationalist opening statements were
excised from Frangoise Choay's recent re-edition of the Athens Conference proceedings, where an
abridged version of Giovannoni's speech appears, beginning with the neutral declaration, "There is
one fundamental principle on which I would like to insist." 136 As we will see, Giovannoni's
nationalistic view of architectural history did not necessarily place him first among the collaborators
of fascist cultural politics, since these tended to favor more frankly modernizing versions of
"Italianiti." For now it will suffice to note that Giovanoni's intervention at Athens differed from that
of all the others in that he was the only one to propose an aesthetic modernism reliant almost
entirely on restoration as the model for the architectural practice in the future.
Upon his return to Rome, Giovannoni composed an Italian "Charter of Restoration" (Carta del
Restauro) which functioned until 1942 as a norm for Italian conservation. Although this document is
now most famous for being the first to articulate a distinction between "live" and "dead"
conceptually enclosed in an abstract dimension: they were, in fact, reduced to unusable festishes." Tafuri, Theories and
History, 57.
133 For a commentary on the Bramante analysis that Giovannoni presented to the "circle of architecture lovers" in 1927,
see Christof Thoenes, "Bramante: Giovannoni, Il Rinascimento intepretato dall'architettura fascista,"
134 Giovannoni Palladio: editorial, (1940) 145-146.
135 Giovannoni, CMAH, 60.
136Gustavo Giovannoni, "La Restauration des Monuments en Italie," CMAH, 57.
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monuments, it was also blatantly based-sometimes word for word-on Giovannoni's Athens
intervention, and included a reference to the work of the Conference, and Italy's triumph in it:'37
In essence our country was able to demonstrate not only an important amount of work
achieved in the salvage, re-integration, and valorization of its wonderful artistic
patrimony, but also a set of elevate scientific and artistic principles and an organicity of
legal provisions that precede by far those of any other nation.'38
Giovannoni saw the organic integration of conservation into the state as a progressive step in the
achievement of a bureaucratic form of "scientific and aesthetic" existence. This is no small point:
having been a crucial part of the reform and modernization of the Italian architectural profession in
the early part of the century, he worked throughout the 1930s to expand the "integration" of
conservation into Italian state machinery. As we will see, the relationship between "art and the state"
would later bring him back into contact with Intellectual Cooperation at the Venice Biennale
Conversation organized by the IICI in 1934. More than a nationalist proposal, Giovannoni's was a
bureaucratic blueprint for the integration of restoration practices into the workings of the state-
beginning with the fascist state, but continuing to others as well. Noting that "people everywhere"
were expressing a renewed interest in monuments, he found that in an age of extremes, the
reasonable collective spirit had found refuge in monuments:
It almost seems, in this unfortunate period that humanity is currently traversing, when
the violent "winds against the serene life" are thundering, and an invading mechanical
civilization inflames minds and lights the artistic spirit, that humanity's sentiment
willingly has found refuge in the memory and the art of the past, renewed its affections
for the monuments in which the best of antique thought is rendered stable, and
attributed to them a new function for life. In the tumultuous and contradictory time in
which we live, the survey, the therapy, the re-integration of these remains of past
architectures is one of the most characteristic most significant and most continuous, most
important themes of our human action.139
For Giovannoni, it was a "therapeutic" potential in architecture itself-in distinct contrast with the
other arts-that allowed restoration to lay a claim on "the age." It is undoubtedly because it phrased
a nostalgic claim in terms of a theory of modernity that Giovannoni's theory of "integration" was
attractive to international organizations in later decades: as a professional ethic.
This brings us to the last, and most important way that the Athens Conference contributed to
the patrimonial debates of the late 19 th century: by proposing to have them regularly. The "General
137 The Charter is reprinted as "Norme per il restauro dei monumenti," in Bollettino d'Arte (Jan 1932). For a commentary
and detailed analysis of this and the two following Charters of the Italian 1930s, including Argan's Counter-proposal,
see Paolo Nicoloso, "La Carta del Restauro di Giulio Carlo Argan, in Annali di Architettura 1994, 101 -11S. The Charter is
also printed in appendix. It was also printed in Mouseion in 1934.
138 Giovannoni, Carta del Restauro, 4.
"39 Gustavo Giovannoni, "La Conferenza Internazionale di Atene Pel Restauro Dei Monumenti, " in Bollettino D'Arte, 408-
409
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Conclusions" of the Conference, which assigned conclusions to each item of the agenda, opened
with the following statement of agreement:
1. Doctrines
The Conference heard the statement of the general principles and doctrines
relating to the protection of monuments.
Whatever may be the variety of concrete cases, each of which is open to a
different solution, the Conference noted that there predominates in the different
countries represented a general tendency to abandon restorations in toto and to avoid the
attendant dangers by initiating a system of regular and permanent maintenance calculated
to ensure the preservation of the buildings. 140
In other words, despite remaining divergences over how to preserve monuments, the conference had
reached agreement on when monuments should be preserved: regularly. In a way, this was merely a
way for the conference to express collectively the creed of "conserve, not restore" that had been
uttered so many time by its participants. But when expressed as an international bureaucratic
method, this resolution represented a significant shift from the international debates of the 19"
century, where individual monuments acted as catalysts for debates between ideologically opposed
camps. Here, the mere tendency to shift away from "total" reconstructions allowed a space for the
institution of preservation to be established: maintenance came first, technical and ideological
debates came second. The parallel with the institution of "conference diplomacy" and the League are
blatant: like the League of Nations, which was devoted to the maintenance of regular international
relations, the OIM proposed to institute a regular regime of maintenance for monuments. Both
systems were designed to replace ad-hoc, purpose-based practices (addressing specific conflicts
when they arose / monuments when they needed restoring) with regularized, bureaucratic, regimes
of care (maintaining international relations between states / maintaining monuments in a state of
upkeep.) In other words, the Athens Conference placed the monuments of Europe in what Harold
Nicholson called "a permanent state of conference." 4" While the analogy between buildings and
states was never explicitly made, the Athens Conference and the OIM projected onto monuments the
legitimacy and self-sustaining political power that the League of Nations professed to give to its
member states. It is this regularization that constitutes the primary contribution of the Athens Charter
to 20 h Century preservation.
140 "Conclusions of the Conference," [Original English translation, 28-29] as re-printed in an appendix in CMAH, 448.
141 Nicholson, 89. "The method of diplomacy by conference... I do not mean several ad hoc conferences; some of these
were necessary, such as Spa, Cannes, Genoa, Lausanne, Stresa and son on. I am referring rather to the permaent state of
conference introduced by the League System and later the United Nations. These conferences to little to Satisfy the
vague desire for what is called open diplomacy; but they do much to diminish the utility of professional diplomatists
and, in that they entail much publicity, many rumors, and wide speculation, -- in that they tempt politicians to
achieve quick, spectacular and often fictitious results, -- they tend to promote rather than allay suspicion, and to create
those very states of uncertainty which it is the purpose of good diplomatic method to prevent.
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That the Athens Conference intended to place monuments in a "constant state of conference"
is perhaps best evidenced in the type of committee that was created in its aftermath, the International
Commission on Historical Monuments. Composed exclusively of "representatives of national fine
arts administrations,"'142 the commission was to be "an international body whose members would
have the competence and authority to give an official character to their deliberations and findings."
All 28 member states were included, (unlike the OIM board which was composed of those museum
officials with the most power,) the roster of membership offered a snapshot of the types of arts
administration which ruled in 1935: some were keepers of "state collections," others were "chief
archaeologists" and heads of antiquities departments, some ministers of various branches of
government, from art to education, academic deans, and-all ending with the US Director of the
National Park Services. (fig 1.16) The mandate of the commission, however, was still written by a
small advisory board composed of influential museum directors, in the broadest possible terms:
The International Commission on Historical Monuments was formed to meet the need
to co-ordinate the efforts made in every country towards the conservation of testimonies
of the past; its first task will be to promote the establishment of organizations
responsible for such work in countries where none so far exist; late it will endeavor to
facilitate discussions, exchange of documents and technicians; to constitute a collection of
international documentation for the general benefit; to study the solution of problems
referred to it by the administrations, and, lastly, to develop in the public mind an ever-
increasing respect for monuments and a spirit of international solidarity. 143
In order to set a single basis for this international bureaucratic action, the same meeting of experts
defined "monuments" negatively, as that which is maintained by the state:
Generally speaking, it may be said that the designation "historical monument" applies to
an edifice the conservation of which is of interest to the community by reason of its
significance for history and, in particular, for the history of art. 144
The goals of this conservation, then, were divided into moral, legal and technical action-with
international "documentation" a cumulative fourth:
1. Moral and educative action
2. Legislative and Administrative Action
3. Technical Action
4. International Documentation.' 45
142 Bulletin, 30.
143 Ibid. This expert committee was chaired by Giovannoni's colleague, Roberto Paribeni of Italy, with Oruerta y
Duarte, Director-General of Fine Arts in Spain, Petrin of the Bundesdenkmalamt in Austria, Radford of Historic
Monuments in Britain, and Hautecoeur of the Louvre in Paris.
144 Meeting of a committee of experts on 21 and 22 November 1933, to "lay down the aims, composition and the
functioning of the future Commission." Cited in Bulletin of Intellectual Cooperation, (Dec 1933-Jan 1934), 30.
145 Ibid
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This four-part mission replicated the structure of the Athens Charter, with slight replacements:
"statements of doctrine" now became "educative" principles, and "international sphere" was now
reduced purely to "documentation." Perhaps most importantly, the replacement of doctrine with
education meant that a monumental value was now dispersed into the population, "beginning in
childhood and reaching adults as well, of all social classes." That the international value of
monuments was therefore now to be understood as political is evidenced in the re-definition of the
main threat to monuments, in terms of vandalism and collective psychology:
It also happens that public opinion demands the destruction of this or that testimony of
the past which offends a people's national, political, racial, religious or social sensibility.
These psychological reactions, particularly marked in countries which have suffered
under foreign domination, have already had all too many occasions to manifest
themselves. To counter these manifestations, and facilitate the work of public agencies,
often powerless in the face of these exigencies of public opinion, the OIM will work to
develop a spirit of tolerance and of international solidarity."4 6
Despite the fact that few of the interventions at the Athens Conference had dealt with these specific
vandalist threats, the Monuments Committee still used the Conference to establish that monuments
were to be treated exactly as political relations were to be treated within the League of Nations: by
institutions relying on regular maintenance (rather than as isolated events) and with the assumption
that international goodwill permeates them (rather than that chaos is default.)
Monuments became a concern of international diplomacy only insofar as they were
contained within museums, where regular maintenance was not a matter of debate but a
fundamental assumption. Far from an accident of bureaucracy, this was an essential step in
formalizing the international "guardianship" of monuments. A reciprocal benefit between museums
and monuments developed, which revolved around the conception of space as integrating aesthetics
organically into urban, political, modern "life." Monuments inherited from museums the idea of
having a regularized "life" which needed to be maintained by material and environmental
"temperance." What the OIM got from monuments, in return, was a regional expansion of its scope
and a broader "regionalization" of its network. However, this nesting of monuments in museums
also means that efforts to produce an international institution, whether "legal" or "bureaucratic,"
devoted to conservation were never fully realized. Little progress was made by way of inter-state
cooperation in technical matters. The Philae monuments were dealt with in bilateral arrangements
146 Ibid.
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between US archaeologists and the UK engineers in charge of the dam.' 47 While Mouseion published
the progress of national administrations in classifying and legislating monuments throughout the
1930s, efforts at any international legislation stalled.'48
Before the outbreak of war the Monuments Committee made two efforts to expand its work
outwards, both literally and figuratively. The first was a proposal to consider possible "international
coordination" in "The Conservation of historic Monuments and the Exigencies of modern
urbanism." Proposed by a French delegation and entirely phrased in reactionist terms, the
memorandum on urban expansion referred to all the themes that had been bought up by
Giovannoni in Athens, including the possibility of preserving "monumental axes," "ancient cities"
and "other urban elements.""'4 9 The resolution led to the creation of a "Study Center on Architecture
and Urbanism" but the project disappeared from the agenda of the following year. The second
effort was more successful in its production of an actual resolution to the League Assembly: a
proposal for the "Regulation of International Architectural Competitions," which had been requested
by the International Union of Architects in 1927. '"0 As we will see in chapter 3, both of these
endeavors laid the groundwork for modern architectural discourse to enter international
organizations in the postwar. But in the decade following the Athens Conference they appeared as
punctual and tentative reports which never had a life outside of the committee that produced them.
In part, the lack of further cooperative results on Monuments after the Athens Conference is
explained by international events and their repercussions within the League. Between the time when
the Athens Conference was held in 1931 and its proceedings were published in 1934, Germany and
Japan pulled out of the League of Nations. Within another year, the Spanish War had broken out and
OIM experts were suddenly drawn into questions of wartime protection. The Spanish war provoked
a series of articles in Mouseion, as if an impromptu "conference" had been called on a new
"technical" subject: a British expert was called as a "neutral" observer; the head of the Prado
reported on the protection of paintings; experts wrote on the material effects of different weapons.
Yet the sudden appearance of "war" into the page of Mouseion was also the first test of the
regularization of conservation discourse, and the test proved successful: the War was seamlessly
147 International tensions were increasingly reflected in the work of the legal commission on the "protection of national
collections of art and history."
148 Between 1927 and 1940 Mouseion reported on legislation in Germany, USA, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, UK,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, English Indies.
149 "Travaux de Coordination: La Conservation des Monuments Historique et les exigencies de l'urbanisme moderne."
In "Rapport Annuel pour l'Exercice 1935-1936," reprinted in Mouseion Vol 35-36 (1936), 232-234.
Is0 "La Riglementation des Concours INternationaux d'Architectes," in Mouseion Vol 35-36 (1936), 201-207. The
committee was composed of H. van der Velde, Paul Vago, Paul Viscer, Cart de Lafontaine and E. Pontremoli.
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integrated into the rhetoric of bureaucratic monument "maintenance." Indeed the Spanish civil war
produced a set of legal, technical and administrative precedents that were eventually used in World
War II. As we will see, this gradual replacement of "war" for "conservation" as the main course of
international legal action by the OIM and the Monuments Committee constitutes a change of course
away from the "idealism" of the League. But before tracing how a "realist" framework for
monuments protection was worked out by 1939, two specific effects of this focusing of technical
activities on war can be noted.
First, coverage of the Spanish war finally placed images of monuments in the pages of
Mouseion, which had previously featured mostly images of museum interiors. As we have seen, the
innumerable articles on "the re-organizations of museums" ensured that a steady stream of interior
museum photography was published, often with before/after pairs, which showed museum objects
gradually acquiring a greater isolation from other objects-as if to illustrate the liberalization of the
milieu by way of a spatial liberation of objects. (fig 1.08) Despite the corresponding discourse on the
"open space" around monuments and their "integration" into urbanism, no image of this
unencumbrement was provided in photographic form; images of buildings were documentary shots
of facades. Now, as a result of the Spanish war, monuments also appeared as objects themselves,
surrounded not only by this espace libre but also by sandbags, which abstracted their shapes into
protective shields-as if the "space of form" that Focillon had argued belonged to art had been
systematically outlined. (fig 1.33)
Secondly, the OIM found in the Spanish Civil War experience an unexpected vindication of
its rhetoric about the "public valuation of monuments." Both the international outcry over the fate of
monuments in the civil war, and the help that was provided by civilian volunteers, were described in
detail. Jos' Renau's explication of "the Organization of the Defense of Spanish Artistic and Historic
Heritage during the Civil War" devoted an entire section to "The People's Collaboration," identifying
"the spiritual element in the work of protection of artistic heritage" which had moved technical
professions in charge of preservation, intellectuals and artists attached to art for its sake, and the
national population into a single solidarity:
We cannot neglect an important part of the factors that contributed to the salvage of
Spain's heritage ... a who series of motives have come into play which have, together,
their origin in the spiritual attachment to the nation's patrimony. ... The conscience of
the danger that threatened works of art and documents of our civilization sparked the
interest of the people in general, and particularly of young artists and intellectuals, who
offered their collaboration without reserve. The principal characteristic of the defense of
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Spain's artistic patrimony has been this relationship between the technical defense of
objects and this newfound respect and attachment of the people for its cultural values."51
Thus the attachment of people to monuments, which the OIM hoped to instill by teaching, had been
catalyzed by destruction instead. War had been an unexpected form of "educational action."
Retnau even concluded that the experience of using "popular collaboration as a crucial lever in the
defense of cultural values" had increased attendance to monuments and museums in Spain.L52
This replacement of "war" for "education" had far-reaching consequences for the OIM's
work on the international legal value of monuments through the rest of the decade. But to see
progress in monument protection in the years between the Athens Conference and the war as moved
solely by the contingency of external events-the rise of Hitler and the Spanish Civil war-is to miss
another political development within the League itself: a re-orientation of intellectual cooperation in a
"cultural" direction, and a theorizing of the collective and "spiritual" origins of the worldwide
malaise, as expressed through militarist fever and economic depression. 1932 marked the creation of
the "Committee on Moral Disarmament," which was devoted to creating a moral stigma against
war that would lead to "material" disarmament. The IICI's work on Moral Disarmament is now
remembered as its worse mistake-not only in that it was "based on erroneous premises" but that it
actually "did more harm than good in the cause of world peace." The effect of its effort to "build a
popular movement in the defense of international peace" 15 3 was to place emphasis on collective
psychology as the central component of warfare. In this context, the work of the IICI on
monuments and museums acquired a whole new dimension, as further groups turned towards "the
arts and letters" as sources for international morality. Two groups are considered next, whose work
raised the stakes of describing monuments as containers of "international solidarity," by repeatedly
calling for the "collective value" of art to provide a "cultural" antidote to this collective psychosis.
The OIAHA, headed by Focillon and modeled on the OIM, theorized the "space" of art not as an
active liberal milieu but as a politically neutral interpretive space. The Committee on Arts and Letters,
soon to be known as "The League of Minds" assigned to art a value dialectically opposed to war.
Together, these committees ensured that, by the time war broke out, it was perceived as a primarily
"moral" event-in the idealist sense of the term: an expression of a collective, spiritual will.
"51 Jose Renau, << L'Organisation de la Defense du Patrimoine Artistique et Historique espagnol pendant la guerre
civile, >> in Mouseion Vol. 39-40 (1937), 7-62.
1sz "La collaboration populaire: levier fondamental dans la defense des valeurs culturelles," in Renau, Ibid, 56.
153 Even Jan Kolasa, the most generous of the historians of intellectual cooperation, delivers a virulent critique of the
Moral Disarmament project. See International Intellectual Cooperation: The League Experience and the Beginnings of Unesco (Wroclaw:
1962), 120-127.
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The IICI: "A League of Minds"
The idea that intellectual cooperation should proceed by regular exchange of "Open Letters,"
followed by international "Meeting of Minds" was first proposed by French poet Paul Valery at the
meeting of the Permanent Committee on Arts and Letters in 1930. (fig 1.05) Valery sought to turn
intellectual cooperation and international politics into "parallel" worlds; "a League of Nations, he
wrote, implies a League of Minds." 1 "4 (Societe des Esprits) (fig 1.17) This analogical model was an
implicit turn away from the CIC in the 1920s: away from the scientific idea of agreement by
convention, towards an aesthetic model of representation and autonomy. Valery raised the stakes of
intellectual cooperation by placing at its center "man" and his "disinterested mind."
The League of Nations, then, is founded on a belief in man, of a certain conception of
man, which implies a trust in the intelligence of man. This belief and this trust are of the
kind that are essential to all scientific research, and, indeed, to every effort of the
disinterested mind [l'esprit desinteresse.] "s
Valery's elegant prose alone elevated the work of the Commission, and that coining the phrase "A
league of nations implies a league of minds" was undoubtedly his most lasting contribution to the
cause. 15 6 His proposal having been accepted, Valery joined forces with Henri Focillon to compose a
manifesto for a literary view of intellectual cooperation eventually known as "The Valery-Focillon
Proposal." The literary elevation was intended to remedy invisibility of the 1920s: "so far, the whole
world of intellectuals is unaware of our effort for intellectual co-operation. The intellectual neither
thinks about it nor joins in it.... Neither the need nor the habit has been created." Intellectual
cooperation had existed "only administratively, in the perishable form of paper." Based on this
critique, the Val&ry-Focillon Proposal described a performative model, of a regular schedule of
conferences, in the spirit of the League itself. These would be followed with letter-exchanges,
recalling the medieval concibulae that had been "the most powerful means of contact between minds
between 13th and 17th centuries." Together these regular events would construct "a living network,
154 This was officially a proposal to transform the sub-commission on Arts and Letters into a Permanent Committee of
Arts and Letters. "L'initiative de M. Paul Valery, Rapport a la Commission Internationale de Cooperation Intellectuelle,
Juillet 1930., in Les Arts et les Lettres a la Socidt6 des Nations: Supplement au numero 7-8 du Bulletin de la Cooperation Intellectuelle,
(Paris: IICI).
"' Paul Val&ry, Report to the CIC, July 1930. In "Creation du Comite Permanent des Lettres et des Arts," Bulletin de
Cooperation Intellectuelle No. 7-8 Les Arts et les Lettres a la Societe des nations.
156 For "literary" translations of the texts Valery contributed to the League, see "Part V. The League of Nations," in the
Volume History and Politics of Val&ry's Complete Works, trans. Denise Folliot and Jackson Matthews (New York: Pantheon,
1962). Most of Valery's contributions are abridged. In this dissertation, translations here are my own, or as published
by IICI. The phrase itself was the first of the "resolutions" passed by the Committee in 1930; it was often re-printed as
an aphorism at the head of IICI publications. See for example the yearly summary of the IICI of 1935, "Definition of
Intelectual Co-operation.
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ever expanding, ever renewed, where intellectual life expresses itself with more force and candor
than in actual works." 5 7
Over the course of the next eight years, four exchanges of "Open Letters" (Correspondance)
were provoked and nine "Conversations" (Entretiens) held, resulting in twelve volumes published by
the IICI. (figs 1.18-1-30) The themes of these events advertised the agenda of the group: its pacifism
(Why War? L'Esprit, L'Ethique de la Guerre) its culturalism (L'avenir de la Culture, Civilizations, L'Avenir de l'Esprit
Europ&en) and its humanism (La Formation de i'Homme Moderne, Le Nouvel Humanisme). The Conversations
were also sometimes parasitically attached to existing conferences: Entretiens sur Goethe (centennial of
Goethe's death), L'Art et la R&alite, L'Art et l'Etat (Venice Biennale), Europe-Amerique Latine (PEN Club)."'5 8
The Val&ry-Focillon Proposition sought to create both a new discourse on "the role of the
intellect" in the League of Nations and a new subject-position to hail European intellectuals into
action. What was needed was a new "man" by which the modern epoch could be defined, in which
intellectuals could recognize themselves. Valery and Focillon used a variety of images to describe
how this drama of recognition would unfold, initially conjuring the idea of a painting gallery:
Every great epoch has consciously given us a clear definition of man: not an accumulation
of happy or unhappy experiences, not a collection of contingencies, but a kind of ideal
portrait, shown as an example and capable of eliciting resemblances. History is a gallery
of semi-real portraits, whose reality is all the more real in that it has been persuasive."59
This museological view of history echoed Valeiry's critical writings on museums, as well as the work
that the OIM was already performing on Focillon's initiative since 1927.Yet after this initial usage no
further museological reference was made. In their first Proposal, Valery and Focillon described the
League as "a kind of city of intellect that is spread over the whole earth;"'60 later, Valery referred to a
random field of spontaneous combustions: "during some thousands of years the mind had here and
there taken fire at odd hearths, scattered casually over the globe." '61 Valeiry even used the popular
cerebral analogy ("More Brain!", he exclaimed). But what he meant was not "the gigantic
educational system operating through the whole body of mankind" that visionaries lie HG Wells had
called "World Brain." 162 What he meant was that the League of Minds would trigger semi-scripted
s'7 Les Arts et les Lettres 6 la Socid~t des Nations, 22.
158 These endeavors were all to be "in a state of parallelism." See for instance the opening note to the 3 rd letter exhange:
"The present volume, third in the collection of "correspondences," follows the collections published in 1933: Towards a
League of Minds, and Why War. It also maintains a constant parallelism with the series Entretiens, notably those on The Future
of Culture and The Future of the European Spirit. L'Esprit, L'ethique de Ia Guerre, unpaginated.
"9 "Les Bases de Discussion (Proposition Valery-Focillon)" in Les Arts et les Lettres 1 la Socidte des Nations, 7-8, 13.
160 Paul Valery and Focillon, League of Minds, 15.
161 Paul Valiry, in Soci~th des Esprits, 1 16, .
162 H.G. Wells, "Preface," in World Brain (London: Methuen, 1938).
Lucia Allais
conversations, formulating ideas "by a series of monologues, as it happened in the human brain."'63
Yet the most consistent conceptualization Valery provided of the League of Minds was theatrical:
"living collaboration" meant regularly scheduled performances, by a given troupe, for a given
audience. Regularity itself was meant inspire confidence in the "order, faith and constancy" of
intellectual work, even in the face of "fears about the direction of the future of civilization." As
president and moderator, Valery often spoke of his role as that of "making a curtain call before the
play begins."' 64
This theatrical image was based in part on a conception of politics themselves as theatrical. "I
confess that the spectacle of the political world turns my stomach," Valery declared in his inaugural
intervention in Paris in 1930. He rejected that what he called "external politics" were necessarily out
of reach of intellectual speculation, since nations themselves were intellectual constructs, "political
ideas of entities which can only be clearly conceived by men of a culture sufficiently great and
imagination sufficiently strong to identify and personify systems of millions of being." In other
words, intellectuals were especially gifted diplomats: individuals uniquely qualified to channel
political ideas in literary form. '6 The "League of Minds" simply regularized this "personification,"
allowing intellectuals to perform political situations.
If Valery and Focillon set up the Conversations and Open Letters as a series of plays, the
civilizational drama to be re-enacted was first elaborated by Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud.
Geneva officials had been anxious to re-engage Einstein in intellectual cooperation, and Valery
himself had attempted to intervene by bringing Einstein to visit an ill Bergson in Paris. Einstein was
thus enrolled into the first exchange of "open letters." He chose Sigmund Freud as interlocutor and
"war" as his subject. This selection was hardly random: the two were engaged in correspondence,
where Einstein had broached the subject of intellectual cooperation. He had even attempted to enlist
Freud himself into "such a group of international scope, whose members would have to keep
contact with each other through constant interchange of opinions," exerting "significant and
wholesome moral influence on the solution of political problems." 166
163 Paul Val&ry, Le Destin Prochain des Letters, 146.
164 Valery, Esprit Europ&en, 14.
165 Valery to Madariaga, 127.
166 "Do you not," Einstein had asked, "share the feeling that a change could be brought about by a free association of
men whose previous work and achievements offer a guarantee of their ability and integrity? ... Such a group of
international scope, whose members would have to keep contact with each other through constant interchange of
opinions, might gain a significant and wholesome moral influence on the solution of political problems if its own
attitudes, backed by the signatures of its concurring members, were made public through the press. Such an association
would, of course, suffer from all the defects that have so often led to degeneration in learned societies; the danger that
such a degeneration may develop is, unfortunately, ever present in view of the imperfections of human nature.
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Einstein's decision to seek psychoanalytic answers rather than philosophical ones was a sign
of a broader "ctiltural turn" in intellectual cooperation. Indeed by 1932 Bergson himself had drawn
"civilizational" lessons from his experience with the CIC, concluding for instance his Two Sources of
Morality and Religion by addressing the fundamental inadequacy of the League of Nations in the face of
"the deep-rooted war-instinct underlying civilization." 167 Thus, by 1932, philosopher and scientist
alike had come to believe that the main obstacle to intellectual cooperation was cultural, not
epistemological. It is clear that Einstein adapted to his new interlocutor, consulting Freud's work
before officially addressing him his "Open Letter." Einstein rephrased his question in general terms;
the subject was no longer "the League" but "mankind" ("is there any way of delivering mankind
from the menace of war?) and, he now made with a psychoanalytic suggestion of his own (that war
was due to a "psychosis of hate and destructiveness.") 168 When the exchange was published, it was
with a title, Why War?, that reflected its explanatory tone.
On the one hand, the attribution of "the will to war" to all of civilization was a generalization
of an accusation that had, throughout the 1920s, been leveled solely at Germany. In Einstein's own
words, "the oft-cited 'German war-spirit' was frequently exaggerated" throughout the 1920s and it
is all the more significant, then, that the "League of Minds" took its cue from two thinkers writing in
German and soon to be refugees. 169" Yet the dichotomy between "civilization" and the "instincts"
undermining it had also been brandished by political thinkers of the league, for whom it was not
"war" but "the economy" that constituted the primary threat to peace. Political liberals hoped to use
international institutions to reform what they felt was an unchecked capitalist expansion of nations
and empires. Hence Alfred Zimmern, in his inaugural lecture at Oxford:
We find ourselves, through no fault of our won, in a world in which the barbarians, in
the shape of the international economic forces which mould our material existence, have
assumed the mantle and have become accustomed to exercising it.... Our choice is
between attempting to civilize the barbarians and abandoning our own city. It is between
cooperation and exile from the world's life: between internationalism and monasticism:
However, and despite those dangers, should we not make at least an attempt to form such an association in spite of all
dangers? It seems to me nothing less than an imperative duty! Once such an association of intellectuals--men of real
stature--has come into being, it might then make an energetic effort to en-list religious groups in the fight against
war. The association would give moral power for action to many personalities whose good intentions are today
paralyzed by an attitude of painful resignation. I also believe that such an association of men, who are highly respected
for their personal accomplishments, would provide important moral support to ... the League of Nations. Letter from
Einstein to Freud, reprinted in Einstein on Peace, (1931.)
167 "Even if the League of Nations had at its disposal a seemingly adequate armed force it would come up against the
deep-rooted war-instinct underlying civilization Bergson theorized this "war instinct" as "independent, though
hinging on rational motives"-much like the sphere of intellectual cooperation in which he had detected it. Henri
Bergson, The Two Sources of Religion and Morality, (New York: Doubleday, 1932).
168 Albert Einstein, "Warum Krieg/ Pourquoi la Guerre?" (Paris: IICI, 1931).
169 Text of a statement given by Einstein to the Berliner Tageblatt, cited in Einstein on Peace, 88.
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between an effort at Hellenization, by whatever means may be at hand, or acquiescence
in catastrophe and a return to the Dark Ages. 70
Zimmern's dramatic vocabulary conjures in retrospect the vision of the War, but he actually intended
these words of "barbarity" as a description of the failures of economic liberalism in the previous
decade, of which the most recent Depression was but a repercussion.
In fact, Einstein himself had hinted at an economic explanation for war in his letter to Freud.
Einstein began his letter by suggesting that failure in spite of good will meant that unconscious forces
were at work. "The ill success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last
decade to reach this goal [of peace] leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are
at work which paralyze these efforts." This paralysis was in fact due to "a small but determined
group" who had "made a tool of the emotions of the masses" to achieve their mercenary goals. But
rather than concentrating on the economic motives of "this small clique" Einstein asked, rhetorically,
how had it had "bent the will of the majority." The answer was ontological: "man has within him a
lust for hatred and destruction." Here Einstein relied on his own experience at the League to
implicate "the so-called intelligentsia" as much as the majority-both equally "apt to yield to the
most disastrous collective suggestions."171 Yet it was "the uncultured masses" that had the power to
produce "the most extravagant, the most cruel form of conflict" Einstein therefore concluded by
rephrasing his question: how could one prevent this "aggressive instinct" from being elevated into a
"collective psychosis?"
In his response to Einstein, Freud confirmed that "it is easy to infect men with the war fever"
because "man has in him active instinct for hatred and destruction, amenable to such
stimulations."1 72 Recounting the "mythology" he developed in his 1930 Civilization and its Discontents,
he argued that "suppression of brute force by the transfer of power to a larger combination,
founded on the community of sentiments linking up its members." When addressing his political
present, however, Freud was distinctly less mythical, suggesting specifically that the League of
Nations was helpless without a court of justice and an executive force. "We must admit," he wrote,
"that warfare well might serve to pave the way to that unbroken peace we so desire." After this
moment of realism Freud then considered the more "indirect attack on the war impulse" that
Einstein had suggested, which he summarized as a proposal for "a superior class of independent
170 Cited in Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis, 87.
171 "Experience proves that it is rather the so-called "intelligentsia" that is most apt to yield to these disastrous collective
suggestions, since the intellectual has no direct contact with life in the raw but encounters it in its easiest, synthetic
form-upon the printed page."
172 Freud to Einstein, 7.
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thinkers, unamenable to intimidation ... whose function it would be to guide the masses dependent
on their lead." Yet having succinctly paraphrased the Kantian paradigm, Freud then dismissed it as
"utterly utopian," comparable to "ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is
ready, men are dead of hunger.""'73 Freud even implicated himself in this utopian dismissal, granting
in conclusion that "as you see nothing comes of consulting a theoretician aloof from worldly
contact, on practical and urgent concerns."
Rather than ending his letter with this abdication of theory to "worldly concerns," however,
Freud used it to launch the question he had meaning to address all along-what motivates certain
individuals ("pacifists like us") "to protest so vehemently against war?" This reversal of question and
answer is crucial. While he declined to argue that a Hegelian priestly caste was best suited to the
cause of peace, Freud offered instead to detect in pacifists a particular attitude of mind. This
diagnostic approach set Freud apart from Einstein, and from most others in the "League of Minds."
Furthermore, the answer was that pacifism stemmed "not merely an intellectual and affective
repulsion, but a constitutional intolerance.... And it would seem that the aesthetic ignominies of
warfare play almost as large a part in their repugnance as war's atrocities." Thus Freud concluded by
delivering perhaps the greatest validation a "League of Minds" could receive, namely, that "we may
rest on the assurance that whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war." In
other words, pacifism was not just ethical but aesthetic, not just intellectual but cultural.
This diagnosis of a collective "will to war" and the recommendation of a "cultural" solution
were consistently repeated in the rest of the Correspondance and Entretiens. In the next set of Open Letters,
titled L'Esprit, 1'Ethique de la Guerre, Austrian psychoanalyst Robert Wilder took the "collective psychosis"
where Freud had left it, in a long "Letter on the Etiology and the Evolution of collective Psychoses."
Wilder drew from Freud's 1921 Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse to explicate how "popular
movements contribute to provoking war and to maintaining, in crowds, a bellicose state of
mind." 174 In the same volume, Aldous Huxley gave a more succinct version of the same theory:
"Man likes emotions. War, among other things, is a source of intense emotions. This is the reason
why men like war." 17 Subsequent exchanges were peppered with references to a collective will to
173 Freud, 31.
174 Wilder depicted modem man as nomadic (heimatlos) who engaged in war to compensate for his lost home. "The
perpetual menace of death," he wrote, "increases the potential for life to the extreme. He knows what a sedentary man
no longer could: the plenitude of triumph." Sigmund Freud, Group psychology and the analysis of the ego, trans. James Strachey.
(New York : Norton, [1975] c1959). Robert Wilder, "Lettre dur l'Etiologie et l'Evolution de Psychoses Collectives,
suivie de Quelques Remarques Sociologiques Concernant La Situation Historique Actuelle, >> trad. Anne Berman, in
L'Esprit, L'Ethique de la Guerre (Paris : 1934), 4.
175 Aldous Huxley, "War and Personal Psychosis," in L'Esprit 1'Ethique de la Guerre (Paris: IICI,
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war, expressed in poetic statements (de Madariaga: "Wars. ... Wreckage! Are we merely pieces of
wreckage?"),"176 mythical analyses (de Haldane: "The story of Cain and Abel represents a cultural
conflict between two forms of civilizations), "' or aphoristic statements (Val&ry: "everything
instantaneously engenders its opposite. War is present in the midst of peace. Want is born of
Abundance.") 178
Yet there was an important methodological difference in the way Freud and Valeiry (and, by
extension, the League) approached the relationship between war and culture. Freud had arrived at
"culture" as an antidote to "war" only after having exhausted the political aspect of the problem,
and addressed the functioning of the League of Nations as an institution. The "League of Minds," in
contrast, took up the opposition between culture and war but left out the intermediary step. Indeed
Valeiry's theatrical model disallowed discussion of contemporary international relations, resorting
instead to a strategy that Val&iry called "the politics of the mind." "'79 This interdiction caused
significant friction during the Entretiens throughout the decade, and explains why these events did not
live up to the ambitions of the Valery-Focillon proposal.
Some of the "Conversationalists" did adeptly produce political theorizations out of non-
political analyses. Thomas Mann, whose membership was a symbolic coup on par with Einstein's CIC
affiliation,180 made what we could call a 'discursive' analysis by reading the exercise of power in the
dissemination of knowledge. Thus he connected "war" with "the intellect" in a broad historical
conspiracy that began with 18th-Century idealism. "We tend to consider," he wrote in his
contribution to La Formation de 1'Homme Moderne, "the current state of the world, economic, intellectual,
and moral, as a result of war." But while "the war had created immense material wreckage," Mann
rejected the materialist view as insufficient; "war did not create the world." Instead Mann traced
contemporary "moral decadence" to the 1 9 th century thinkers who had theorized the violence to
which Enlightenment ideals had been subjected. From these thinkers-Nietzsche and Marx,
principally-the masses had only retained the language of violence: "violence is a principle that
simplifies things to the extreme; it is not surprising that it is understood by the masses." The masses,
'76 de Madariaga to Yun Pei, in A League of Minds : An International Series of Open Letters, (Paris: IICI, 1933), 97.
177 L'Avenir de la Culture, 56.
178 Paul Val&ry, in A League of Minds, 116.
179 Paul Val&ry, "La Politique de l'Esprit," originally printed in Varihte, translated and reprinted as "Politics of the
Mind," in Oeuvres, 89-129.
"80 This membership had been hard-earned. See the exchange between Mann and Valiry at the end of the first meeting.
"Thomas Mann admitted that before arriving in Geneva he was skeptical. It was a great joy to have found a basis for
common understanding, an harmonious atmosphere for work in good faith. His skepticism was soon replaced by a
faith in the authority of the Commission, to which he is proud to belong. / The president (Valfry) replies that it is
useful for Mann to repeat what he just said in his own country, where too many people have demonstrated the same
skepticism towards the League of Nations-to which the German novelist had fallen prey." Les Art et les Lettres, 42.
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Mann concluded in a poetic turn of phrase, "are sentimental and they are catastrophically
philosophical."'"'11 While this was a sophisticated analysis, the end-result was yet another conceptual
scheme where collectivity and intellectuals acted as separate vehicles for apparently contradictory
forms of spiritual development (Geistesgechichte).
What Mann's text highlights is that despite overwhelming agreement on the "collective
psychosis that leads to war," the extent to which intellectuals were implicated in this psychosis was a
matter of considerable debate. Intellectual historians point to the 1930s as a decade of growing
insecurity about the value of intellectual engagement in political causes. As H. Stuart Hughes
summarized, rightist and leftist engagements had come to "reinforce each-other in a redefinition of
the intellectual's role, implying an impatience with the traditional concept of what the European
philosopher or moralist should do."1 82 The only certainty in this predicament was that
enlightenment philosophy and political ideology had progressively merged.
Thus the IICI can be situated as a French institution within the "franco-french" debate on
intellectual autonomy that was unfolding in Paris in the years when the "League of Minds" was
most active. 183 Tony Judt has attributed the intense manifesto-production that overtook Paris in the
first half of the 1930s to the emergence of a new generation of thinkers. "Between 1930 and 1934,"
he wrote, "there appeared a steady flow of books, pamphlets, clubs, plans, journals and circles, all
peopled by the men and women in their twenties; some came from the political Right, others from
the Left, thought most made a point of asserting their indifference to existing political divisions and
organizations."' 184 It is undoubtedly in response to this Parisian climate that the IICI published its first
8 volumes with a unified graphic style to that expressed intellectual exchange with typographic
dynamism: parallel bars for Open Letters, oblique shapes for multilateral Conversations. (figs 1.25,
1.30) The same manifesto-fever can be detected in the IICI's compulsion to re-publishing excerpts in
its Bulletin de Cooperation Intellectuelle, where parts of ad-libbed speeches acquired the air of political tracts.
Yet even in this "manifesto style" the League offered no clearly legible position within the field of
competing political ideologies: its literary focus, its stubborn resistance to all things "technical," and
181 Thomas Mann, La Formation de 'Homme Moderne, 14-15; 16.
182 H.Stuart Hughes, "The Decade of the 1920s: The Intellectuals at the Point of Cleavage," in Consciousness and Society: The
Re-Orientationof European Social Thought 1890-1930 (New York: Octagon, 1976), 393.
183 Julien Benda, Esprit Europben, 64. Benda's had been an indictment mostly of French intellectuals, who had
givennational politics with a transcendental importance per se rather than to each particular cause. Benda explained the
Society's political helplessness: that its internationalist argument simply had no traction against nationalisms, because it
implied no reason for sacrifice.
184 Tony Judt, "Decline and Fall," in Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: UC Press), 19.
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the fact that all participants were well past forty years old-all contributed to its image as a mildly
nostalgic enterprise for re-covering the bygone "humanism" of a mythical "European spirit."
In the context of a growing division between left-wing internationalism and right-wing
nationalism, proposing both "Europe" and "culture" as a unifying political concept meant taking a
specifically liberal, centrist position. Thomas Mann serves as a case in point of this liberal centrism;
having taken what he called a "non-political" position during World War I, he had now become
invested in defending liberal culture as a mitigation of extremes."'s Thus he acknowledged that the
reliance on culture for political stability was un-popularly "bourgeois":
Culture! The snickers of an entire generation accompany this word. They snicker at the
favorite term of the liberal bourgeoisie, as if culture was ultimately nothing more than,
precisely, the liberalism of the bourgeoisie itself, as if it didn't signify the opposite of
human brutality, the opposite of laziness, ... in short, as if culture, ...wasn't the very
essence of moral discipline! 186
Mann was willing to defend culture itself as a political concept, attached to a specific mode of
governance and its history. But he was practically alone in doing so. The League of minds never
composed a coherent political defense of liberalism-no doubt because few would have been able
to explicate exactly what culture's role in this polity was. Similarly, while Valery has now been
historicized as a precursor to postwar politics of European integration, the "Europe" that was
presented by the League of Minds remained a conceptual escape. 87
The Conversation on The Future of the European Mind, held at the IICI in October 1933, can serve
to draw out the problems of the League of Minds. Several intellectuals from outside the League were
invited, who had acquired reputations as defenders of intellectual autonomy. Consider for instance
the intervention of French polemicist Julien Benda, whose 1927 La Trahison des Clercs (The Betrayal of
Intellectuals) had provoked a sensation across Europe with its indictment of 20 th century intellectuals. By
investing all intellectual work with contemporary political value, Benda argued, intellectual had
"betrayed" the philosophical autonomy that he had inherited. This book has become a
historiographic marker, for the beginning of the ideological debates of the 1930s-and for
85s Thomas Mann, Confessions of a Non-political man (1918). His change of heart is reflected in his 1930 "An Appeal to
Reason," reprinted in Martin Jay, Ed., The Weimar Republic Reader. To the meeting, the Future of European Culture Mann
contributed a written exposition of this point of view: "It can be easily admitted that many of the things that were
held for sacred, indispensable and inalienable, in the 19th century-the epoch of bourgeois liberalism, have to day lost
the strength of serving for life and to triumph against necessities in which European man finds himself by the force of
complicated circumstance. But it is only for men who find barbarism agreeable and are intent on negating the
European spirit that this consideration would mean the same thing as moral anarchy."
186 Mann, La Formation de l'Homme Moderne, 13.
187 For a view of Valery as a Europeanist, see Robert Frank, "Les contretemps de l'aventure europeenne" Vingtieme Sicle.
Les engagements du 20e sidcle (Oct. - Dec., 1998), 82-101
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inaugurating what has been called "the Century of the Intellectual." '" Some of Benda's
formulations in defense of intellectual autonomy resonated with Val&ry's conceptualization of the
League of Minds as a world apart--"the intellectual must declare himself impractical," "wars today
are cultural wars," "the nationalization of the spirit" has to be avoided.'"8 Furthermore, Benda
articulated the possibility of an intellectual engagement in exceptional cases--of which the Dreyfus
affair was the all-too-obvious prototype. Thus we can understand the work of the IICI in Benda's
terms: an attempt to describe the catastrophic advance of a "will to war," to provoke a crisis urgent
enough for intellectuals to get involved: a new Affaire worthy of a new J'accuse! But Benda's book also
ruthlessly catalogued the futile international causes in which intellectuals were engaged: "the
pacifism of scientific ambitions" and "other nefarious pacifisms", the illusion of "a trans-national
court of justice," and the confusion of "humanism" with "humanitarianism." In fact, he insisted on
distinguishing "humanism" from "internationalism," pointing out that "for a certain class of
individuals, (workers, bankers, industrials) passion for the nation seems to be a movement of
disinterested idealism. "'90
Benda brought this skepticism with him to the Conversation on "The future of the European
mind." The event was attended not only by the "League of Minds" but by assorted politicians,
including the French minister of Education and the Italian minister of Fine Arts. Given the breadth of
ideological positions represented, Benda stated outright that he was critical of the event's conciliatory
tone. "A Europeanism apt to collect and reconcile the differences in national civilizations" Benda
insisted, was a "radically false idea." He was particularly critical of the IICI's unwillingness to
recognize that nationalist narratives would have to be sacrificed for the sake of a European cause.
"There is no Europe possible without sacrifice," Benda warned, and he pointed out that the League of
Minds had become enslaved to the sterile vocabulary of the League of Nations, where nations could
be collected in "a concert, a harmonious accord." 191 The League's idealist language was so vague
that it was equally applicable to nationalist and internationalist visions of a collective "spirit."
In this critique of this "false Europeanism" Benda was joined by British novelist Aldous
Huxley, who sarcastically pointed out that, while the League of Minds loftily heralded Europe as a
humanistic ideal, the "real" Europe continued to sink to ever-greater depths of anti-intellectualism
188 For a detailed historiography, see David L. Schalk, "La Trahison des Clercs--1927 and Later" in French Historical Studies
(Aut. 1971), 245-263. For a summary of the century that uses Benda as a trope, see Jean-Frangois Sirinelli, "Les quatre
saisons des clercs" in Vingtieme Sicle Les engagements du 20e siecle (Oct - Dec 1998), 43-57.
189 Benda, 120,
190 Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs (Paris: Grasset, 1958), 178.
91 Benda, in L'Avenir de l'Esprit Europ&en, 665. It was Huizinga who brought up "concert" by attributing to Dutch political
philosopher Grotius the birth of a political Europeanism.
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and vulgarity. "Anti-intellectualism," Huxley explained, "is an ongoing movement that manifests
itself in different forms-Bergsonism, Freudism and Behaviorism." Having accused two of the key
thinkers of intellectual cooperation of "flattering the dangerous passions" of the masses, he then
arrived at a solution that they themselves had recommended, namely "Art." Like Freud, Huxley
made the passage from intellect to art through political helplessness: "various national education
systems are not in our hands and we are not propagandists or crowd-manipulators. Thus, for us, the
only way of action on minds is persuasion-which is to say, art." Yet since "art does not rule,"' 9 2 he
proposed either to wait for the coming of an "artist of the intellect" or to begin remedying
"vulgarism" by teaching "taste." For this purpose Huxley recommended a comparative exercise
where classics of literature, art, music, would be paired with contemporary examples:
If I had to teach young people the art of distinguishing between the beautiful and the
ugly, the real from the fictitious, I would try to choose my examples from the
contemporary world. Train them to use critical sense on the speeches of politicians and
on commercial advertisement. I would teach them to hear the qualitative differences
between a piece of jazz and one of Beethoven's last quartets. I would have them read any
detective novel, and then Crime and Punishment.1 93
Huxley's story of the demise of taste since Enlightenment was essentially the same as Mann's
narrative of "catastrophic philosophy" in the masses-with artists instead of philosophers. "Popular
composers" had learned the great progression in musical technique of the 19th century (for Huxley:
Beethoven, Berlioz, Wagner, Rimsky-Korsakoff, Debussy), and condensed them into kitsch. The only
way out was to "exert the critical spirit" of the masses so that this kitsch may be recognized.
Huxley's condemnation of every -ism he could conjure vividly demonstrates the basic
insecurity of a European intellectual in the 1930s, as it had been pointed out by Benda: the fear of an
irreversible confusion of intellectual work with political ideology.19 4 It is partly because the League
of Minds did not address this confusion, that it ultimately failed, as both a political and an intellectual
endeavor. Furthermore, Huxley also pointed out that the League of Minds had no educational
mandate, whether assigned (that "various national education systems are not in our hands") or self-
appointed ("we are not propagandists or crowd-manipulators"). Early 19th-century adaptations of
Enlightenment internationalisms had characteristically promoted the creation of a cosmopolitan
192 Huxley, in Avenir de l'Esprit Europ&n, 135. "Unfortunately art does not rule. Maybe an artist of intellectuality will
appear, maybe he will not. It is not in our power to create him. Everything can be organized, except art."
'93 Aldous Huxley, L'avenir de I'Esrpir Europ&en, 139-141. Referring to a law of political economy regulating competing
currencies, Huxley declared that "in morals and aesthetics there is also a Gresham's law... the bad always tends to chase
away the good."
194 Huxley's equation of Bergsonism with anti-intellectualism drew protests from veteran of intellectual cooperation
Leon Brunschvig, who recalled Bergson's own "universalism" and used another exchange of letters-the recently
published exchange between Bergson and William James-to show that Bergson rejected any "vulgar" philosophy like
pragmatism. ("I only accept from pragmatism its negative parts.") Avenir de 1'Eprit Europ&en, 144.
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educational system. Saint-Simon, for one, saw "vulgarization" as a positive tool towards his utopia;
even modest proposals to federate the bourgeoning national education systems had a distinctly
optimistic flair. 19s But none of these proposals were followed through, as one postwar critic wrote,
"liberalism and nationalism developed a kind of state which monopolized not only arms and taxes,
but also education and history." 196 By the time the League was formed, the question of state control
over education was so touchy that a clause in favor of "examining a scheme for an International
Office of Education," had to be deleted from the CIC's program before its creation was approved by
the League of Nations Assembly in 1921.197 As we will see, an International Bureau of Education was
created, but never integrated into the League. This educational helplessness was seldom addressed as
an institutional obstacle. For example, while Valery's "politics of the mind" was based on the
recognition that "all politics contain a skewed interpretation of history, which is one of the more
powerful instruments of political illusionism,"" 19 he never addressed the dominant "instrument" of
this illusion in European nations--their educational systems.
This European "Conversation" was the first real test of the Valery-Focillon proposal, and it is
important to note that Huxley's critique elicited a different reaction from the two instigators. Valery
reacted by calling Huxley's diatribe a picturesque tableau, ("we have all enjoyed Mr. Huxley's tasty
world tableau") and chiding him for breaching into political territory. ("We should not penetrate
the political realm you have touched, my dear Huxley-not even for an instant.") In contrast,
Focillon confronted Huxley's critique head-on: he confessed that he was an avid reader of romance
novels, and that he found advertising to be poetic. He then used this personal confession to warn
against "excesses of purity." Rather than being "purged of "bind forces," European culture should
emerge from the masses, through a "filtering" from below.' 99 To achieve this filtering, Focillon
advocated teaching "European heritage", and argued his point with a long speech that described the
geography of Europe:
'9s For a period exposition of Saint-Simon's and other's proposals, see Pierre Renouvin, "Les id6es et les projets d'union
europ~ene au XIXe si&cle," Dotation Carnegie, Bulletin 6, 1931. For his follower's proposals on the same theme, see Antoine
Picon, "Enseignement Scientifique et Vulgarisation," in Les Saint Simoniens (Paris: Belin, 2002).
196 Gottfried Delatour, "The Problem of International Understanding," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 255 (Jan., 1948), 3.
197 Marie Butts, "The International Bureau of Education," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 235,
(Sep., 1944), 12.
198 Val6ry, Esprit Europ~en, 303.
199 "The European spirit no longer confuses masses with hordes, human race with animal species. We will never accept
that the fate of the masses is separated form the fate of the elite. This amorphous mass-we are only too eager to filter
it, to elevate it to the human condition, to take away from it this kind of fearsome privilege of animality. ... Voltaire
never separated from the masses." Focillon, in Avenir de l'Esprit Europ~en, 147.
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A number of vivid and familiar images can be conjured to oppoed the notion that
Europe is in pieces, fragmented, and regional.
The Mediterranean landscape does not belong exclusively to Spain, Italy, Sicily or France
.... The Oceanic landscape ... is not a diorama of contrasts... The Baltic landscape is not
defined by territorial waters. ... The great European plain creates a kind of pedestal for a
common activity. ... The alpine landscape is not fragmented by borders ...
To every European man belong the sea, the plains, the mountains and the landscapes.
To every European man also belongs the European city... the city rich in antiquities and
the city of middle ages, the city of the classical age and the city of the nineteenth century,
and the city of today... Today as in the past, modernity belongs to everyone.
This is the patrimonial decor where the heroes of the European mind lived their tales.
In a final step, then, Focillon returned to "Art" as product and author of this patrimonial landscape,
countering Huxley's proposal to teach the "canon" of European music by saying that Europe itself
was a canonical milieu:
Europe is the work of Diirer, Poussin, Michelangelo, Velasquez and Rembrandt.... The
study of the history of art aims not to reconstitute a canon but to locate the family
heirloom within a dilapidated heritage. 200
By describing Europe primarily as an artistic milieu and its art as the product of "collective values,"
Focillon sought an organic model of emergence, upon which to base a politico-aesthetic theory of
autonomous action.
For Focillon "milieu" was both an aesthetic and a political medium, and just as he had used
it to activate the museum, he continued to resort to the idea of "milieu" as a way out of the
hermeticism of the League of Minds. In "The Future of Literature," he proposed that the "life of the
mind" could be understood allegorically, as a "play" or a "novel," but only if the rest of the world
was included as the allegory's "milieu." (Since "readers are also characters in a novel," he asked
"isn't the milieu in which we are living itself a novel?") 20' Focillon also used milieu to create a
critique of totalitarianism:
The notion of milieu is difficult to pin down: biologic milieu, geographic milieu, social
milieu. But as long as man has a hand in the configuration of his milieu, there is hope
for the future of the spirit. ... What I find most categorically reprehensible in totalitarian
states, is the way they harden milieus, deprive them of their plasticity, their necessary
elasticity.202
Again here Focillon described "the milieu" as a realm of political freedom: the same space that he
claimed as a disciplinary ideal in his Life of Forms, as a "liberalizing" force in the OIM, and he would
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also inscribe as scholarly freedom in the OIAHA. In the context of the League of Minds, which was
itself detached from any real milieu, this critique offered little direction for action.
Neither Focillon's proposal for a history of art nor Huxley's proposal for comparative taste
lessons was taken up. Instead the representative of the League's "Committee of European
Cooperation," Mr. Borel, proposed to establish an academic Center for European Studies, based on the
model of the International Center of Statistics. Despite skepticism, both latent and expressed (some
voice a fear of "cooptation", others asked whether another "historical center" was really needed) the
proposal was approved. The end of the meeting was devoted to a highly theatrical "birth" of this
new institute, with declarations, statues, and self-congratulatory applause. This institute was
inaugurated in Nice the following March, with Valery as its first president, and a Conversation on The
Formation of Modern Man to mark the occasion. This turn of events-that the tension between the real
and imagined political value of "Europe" provoked the creation of a new "institute"-only confirms
the tautology inherent in Val&ry's theatrical model of cooperation: that whatever the issue raised, the
"League of Minds" was itself supposed to stand as a solution.
It was French novelist Jules Romains who bitingly summarized the artificiality of the
situation, in a closing statement which drew a parallel between the sterility of political speech and
the safety of academic jargon. The externality of "The Political," he complained, had been
supplanted by the hermeticism of "The Academic:"
It was agreed from the beginning that the problem of politics, the political aspect of
things would be set aside from our debates. The motives for this prohibition do not
escape me, and far be it from me to deny their validity. But it is my sense that this
prohibition threatens to render our debates completely sterile. Indeed throughout our
conversations The Political has remained more or less outside. But it is The Academic
which has taken its place. I propose that we name "Academic" the science of speaking
without compromising oneself in any subject during difficult periods. It is a science that
is extremely useful for the temporal tranquility of representatives of the spirit. But I
don't believe there is any other virtue to it."203
The League of Minds was merely an academic refuge, where the interdiction to speak of political
matters only concealed political differences. But Romains went further, attacking not only the form
of the discussion (the habit of falling back on scholarship) but its terms (the assumption that
intellectuals stand in for a collective "Mind"). This false sense of collectivity simply allowed
intellectuals to use a rhetoric of "will" (vouloir) to talk about otherwise unexplainable political
phenomena. In other words, Romains accused the "League of Minds" not of being too detached but
of being slavishly attached to seeking relevance for itself. The fundamental delusion lay in the
compulsion to describe the mind as "willing" history at all:
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A very prudent, not very heroic, but very human attitude of mind, would consist in
saying: "what is happening is temporarily stronger than I. This is a time when the
inferior powers of the soul have taken hold of Empire, dragging the peoples of Europe
one after the other in a circular vertigo. Let us be patient. The world has seen worse."
What I find offensive, is that the "spirit" has now started saying "I willed this." No,
gentlemen-with maybe one exception this is a kind of pious lie, a way to redeem
oneself, or to save one's pride. The only thing the spirit should be saying is "I did not will
this. 204
It was a false metaphysics that inspired intellectuals to claim any agency in the forces that were
leading Europe into its vertiginous political chaos. Between the poles of engagement and detachment,
"the League of Minds" had merely constructed a vocabulary that allowed intellectuals to capitulate
while pretending to fight. The intellectuals flattered themselves into thinking that there was a "will"
at all. In a sense, this accusation was much worse than Benda's "betrayal": an abdication to
dominant forces, followed by a theorization of one's own cowardice.
It is perhaps because Romains, Huxley and Benda articulated the helplessness of the League
of Minds so poignantly that this European "Conversation" marks a turning point in the IICI's
work.20 The "Conversations" that followed went on to include a progressively larger selection of
political characters who often found it easy to recuperate its theatrical hermeticism. This is
particularly true in the "Conversations" that were attached to existing international congresses,
conferences and events. On the one hand, this parasitic structure helped to enlist a broader selection
of thinkers-from Le Corbusier to Jacques Maritain. On the other hand, these events came with the
obligation to pay tribute to the political authorities hosting the events; in this context the League's
taboo on political discourse was all too easily confused with silent endorsements of political regimes
as diverse as the French Popular Front, Italian Fascist Party and Spanish republicanism. All these
events were heralded as successes by national and international authorities alike, illustrating with
yearly cadence Benda's prediction that the League's internationalism was one for which no sacrifice
of nationalist myths was necessary.
In 1934 the second annual Venice Biennale was held and the IICI organized, at the invitation
of the Italian Government, on the theme of Art and Reality/ Art and the State, to unfold
contemporaneously with the Biennale. The Venice Conversation was promoted "as a further step
forward in the series of Conversations, hitherto confined to debating very general subjects," and closer
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inspection of the conversations' debates demonstrates that it was architecture that was increasingly
proposed, as a way out of the hermeticism of "The Political" and "The Academic." The theme of
Art and Reality had been proposed by the Italian delegation-a reflection of the intense preoccupation
with art and architecture that was characteristic of the fascist state.206 The "reality" in the title was a
euphemism for economic depression and political tensions, conditions that placed a burden of
reciprocal responsibility onto art and the state. The conference agenda therefore placed emphasis on
issues of patronage, causing debate over the relative value of state sponsorship and artistic freedom.
Here architecture was used repeatedly to demonstrate the absurdity of the distinction (Eric MacLagan
quipped "The state commissions an architect to design a bridge because it needs this bridge and not
because the architect is destitute.") 207 There was also an implicit critique of contemporary art in the
title: modernism severed the mimetic relation of art to reality. Some argued, in Herbert Read's word,
that "modern art is abstract because all reality is psychological"--and others followed the classic
League of Minds pattern by identifying an underlying "will to war" as expressed in abstraction.
Viennese art historian Hans Tietze, for instance, presented 20 th Century art movements as
"intellectualized expression of conflicts that were likely to break out in other domains." This
discussion of war also brought into the fold a discussion of monument protection: Italian critic Ugo
Ojetti objected to Tietze's interpretation, but only after recalling that he and Tietze had become
friends through their respective work as monuments officers on opposing sides of World War I,
which Ojetti called an instance of "intellectual cooperation under fire."208
In Venice, architecture was repeatedly proposed as a compromise to the increasing tension
between "art and reality," although no single theory of architectural agreement was proposed. Henri
Focillon offered his most explicit defense of formalism yet, denying "any positive value to the terms
reality and realism." The intention of the artist and his patron were irrelevant; "whether he wants to or
not," Focillon asserted, "the artist is always the author of a world apart." 209 As an example offered
the "forms" of Gothic and Romanesque cathedrals in the High Middle Ages, which arisen out of a
conflict of civilizations between the "animal style" which captured live forms and the
"anthropomorphic" realism of classical humanism. "Architecture appeased, contained, and
stabilized the debate," Focillon claimed. This model of architectonic conciliation proved that a "new
humanism" could arise in built form, a model he proposed to apply for the future.
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So it is possible that the monuments of tomorrow will see the birth of a "real" figure of
man under the effect of laws that regulate the immobile life of stone, and of a thinking
truly accomplished through stone-not the stone of the statue, molded in some elegant
likeness, but the stone of the wall, given over to exigent reason.210
In other words, Focillon proposed architectural monuments as sites of abstract agreement, on a plane
higher than that of human likeness. This was a politics of "abstract form," detached from "content":
"Must we aggravate architecture with politics and submit it to the obsession with "content?" Alas,
the history of forms can be abused to serve the purpose of any theoretical justification." Focillon
then concluded with an appeal to cities as ultimate expressions of this aesthetic phenomenon of
conciliation: "The agreement (accord) between abstraction and concrete, between an image in reality
and an image in thought, can be found in cities with their temples and monuments. Cities invite us
to expand our definition of man, to find him not in aesthetic agitations but in the mass of built
things and in the order of collective forces."Z'1In a sense, Focillon's rejection of realism-articulated
the same year as his Life of Forms was published-represented a final choice between autonomy and
engagement, politically and aesthetically.
But if the Venice Conversation allowed Focillon to further articulate his politics of form, it
also inspired a heterogeneous set of characters, peripheral to intellectual cooperation, to promote
architecture as a medium with a vaguely privileged relationship to "reality." Le Corbusier took
Focillon impassioned speech as an invitation to speak of urbanism, and gave a long dissertation on
Venice as a Gesamtkunstwerk that belied the traditional categories of realism. "Venice is a totality; it is a
unique phenomenon, as it is currently conserved, a unique expression of integral purity and civilized
unity." Rephasing his 1924 "architecture or revolution," Le Corbusier described Venice as the "only
modern place where one finds this intimate harmony that works of art can acquire when no
revolutionary phenomena has subverted them." Similarly, but for entirely different reasons,
Viennese art historian Josef Strzygowski, a pioneer in early Islamic and Byzantine architecture, also
turned to Venice as a positive example of relationship between art and state, congratulating the
Italian state for having "conserved its Venitian heritage," despite the fact that it represented
alternative to the Roman historiography favored by fascism. The association of "realist
representation" with "state service," Strzygowski reminded his colleagues, had produced a European
figurative classicism that "often destroyed and annihilated" more humble and collective forms of
art.212 To this, conservationist Giovannoni responded by offering a different vision of totality and
210 Focillon, L'Art et la Rialiti, 64
2zl Focillon, L'Art et la Rialitý, 64.
212 Stzygowski, L'Art et la Rialiti, 149.
1. Will to War, Will to Art
integrality, where architecture was "the just path between art and reality." For Giovannoni the two
poles were not between "realism" and "idealism" but between "theory" and "practice." Retracing
the entire history of architecture in terms of this relationship between books and buildings,
statements and construction, he offered architecture as a mediation of extremes "Construction alone
is mechanics, form alone is scenography or embellishment; architecture is both, harmoniously
combined into a whole." 213
The Venice Conversation is one of the most blatant examples of an IICI event where
disagreement passed for concord. 2'4 Few of the speakers who referred to each-other's interventions
would have agreed on much if they had confronted each-other in direct exchanges. Conversely, few
of the real points of agreement--such as the value of preserving Venice-received the attention they
might have drawn in a more focused conversation. As Strzygowski later recalled of a Gorgione
painting he insisted represented the "spirit of Venice," "if we had tried to find an agreement in front
of this painting, to establish who has the right to speak of it and who does not, we would have
managed to clarify things and dissipated some of the chaos."" ' Yet an important point was learned
from the way that architecture's collectivity and its abstraction seemingly offered intellectual
cooperation a stable basis upon which to produce an aesthetic discourse as a model for political
agreement. Certainly Focillon was aware that it was only because he was speaking of architecture
that he could say, "reality is what we agree [convient] it is" without drawing accusations of pure
relativism from his self-conscious "League" colleagues. In this sense the Venice Conversation
revealed the difference between Valeiry's "politics of the mind" and what I have called Focillon's
"politics of form": namely, that formalism already presumed a theory of representation. Thus
discussions could concentrate on specific representations-like Venice. It was undoubtedly this
realization that led Focillon to turn his attention to a disciplinary model of international debate within
the International Office of Art History, the OIAHA.
The last exchange of Open Letters, between Focillon and Viennese art historian Josef
Strzygowski, who was since 1909 the director of the Wiener Kunsthistorisches Institut, the so-called
"3 Gustavo Giovannoni, l'Art et 1'Etat, 1 20.
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"Vienna School" of art history, prefigured the methodological debates that would take place within
the OIAHA. (fig 1.04) Srzygowski initiated the exchange in May 1932, as a follow-up to the
Conversations on Goethe in Frankfurt where he had presented two Goethe drawings, interpreting them as
evidence that Geothe was "a man of the North," moved by a "Nordic spirit" that "emanated from
the profound depths of his being." 16 Since the drawings were of mountainous landscapes,
Strzygowski argued for a geographic aesthetics close to Focillon's own ("It is to landscape, as a way
that nature expresses itself, that Goethe owes his place in the development of German art") but his
emphasis on pan-German nationalism had alarmed all the other participants. Georges Opresco had
warned that "to make of Goethe essentially a Nordic man is to belittle him."217 Here too architecture
had played an important part: Strzygowski had proposed to build in Frankfurt "a monument to
Goethe, and, through him, to the whole of German art ... a pilgrimage site for all creative minds to
worship Goethe's own creative spirit." 2 18 Swedish architect Ragnar Ostberg had countered that if it
was "as a young architect Goethe went to Italy," it was "universality," that the classical temples of
his Italian tour had inspired. The disagreement had been left unresolved and the Conversation had
ended with repeated declarations that a "synthesis" between Orient and Occident, between
"Mediterranean" and "Nordic" spirit should be attempted by the League, in the name of Goethe.
It was this debate over the "Nordic Mind" that Strzygowski hoped to follow-up in his Open
Letter to Focillon. "A cult of the Mediterranean", he complained, produced a "habit of mixing up the
concept of Hellenism and Latinity with that of the ancient Orient." Advocating instead "a return to
the North," he recounted the historiographic arguments he hade made in his 1903 tome, Orient oder
Rom?: that European cultural history could not be explained only by philological sources linking
Latinity to Hellenism, but revealed also the morphological influence of "Aryan" art-forms inherited
from Greece, Iran and India."' This was as much a methodological argument as a formal one,
therefore he complemented this analysis it with the attack on classical humanism he had made in his
1923 Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften: namely, that "humanist education has impregnated us with
Mediterranean civilization." 220 It was only by deliberate, anti-humanist educational action that the
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"spirit of the North" would be revived; for this purpose he outlined a specific program of research,
based the one he constructed at the Wiener Institut, proceeding from "the object" to "knowledge."
Stzygowksi has now become a "case" in German intellectual history: his "success in
securing the Middle East, Asia Minor, and India a place on the art historical agenda;" his "odious
personality," anti-semitism and Nazi sympathies; and finally his "rise to modest institutional power"
in turn-of-the-century Vienna-all have been linked to two contradictory currents of German
intellectual history. On the one hand, the growth of the Institut fur Osterrische Geschischtsforschung
and of its art-historical offshoot was fueled by a historicism deployed "in defense of the polyglot
world" of the Autrio-Hungarian empire."'221 Thus Strzygowzki learned from his teachers, Alois Riegl
and Franz Wickhoff, to work on periods of art history that "emphasized the international character
of European cultural development."222 On the other hand, the growth of this historical tradition and
its associated archaeological finds spawned an "anti-humanist" movement, of which Stryzgowski
was a prime advocate, and non-specialist bourgeois audiences with volkisch taste were the satisfied
customers. This popular audience was interested as much in the content of Strzygowski's pan-
Germanic scholarship as it was in infiltrating the elitist university sphere of Vienna and undermining
its emphasis on the Roman empire. The more Strzygowski found "Aryan" roots for every important
artistic development in European history, the more popular he became as a public intellectual.223
By the time Strzygowski became involved in Intellectual Cooperation, he was at the end of
his career and perceived his popularity with this non-specialized audience as a sign that his life's
agenda had been vindicated. "The freedom of the spirit has begun to take on such an importance in
Germany," he wrote to Focillon, "that it can no longer be neglected." Thus Strzygowski tied his own
historiographic efforts with the political rise of Nazism, and advocated the teaching of the "Nordic
point of view" in Germany, so that the country "which had already been liberated from the
oppression" of classical humanism, could "take its place among the western community." He
concluded by pleading for cultural specificity in the name of universality:
We aspire to a new order of generality, which encompasses the farthest regions of the
globe, and, if possible, all of humanity. But do we not want this order, conceived on the
fields he pioneered (early Islamic art, Byzantine architecture, the art of Armenia and the Balkans.)" but also saw him as
"harbinger of UNESCO universalism, both in the sense that the latter would not have been possible without the
ridiculous excesses of their biological theories, and that the post- 1945 transference of politico-moral legitimacy to a
non-elitist, anthropological definition of culture was prepared in part by the underworld's attack on classical
humanism." And that, therefore, "we are in many ways Strzygowsky's heirs."
221 Strzygowski's anti-semitism is briefly summarized in Margaret Olin, "Nationalism, the Jews, and art history," in
Judaism: A Quarterly Journal (Sep 1996).
222 "The Case of Josef Strzygowski," 1 15
223 On Strzygowski's concept of race see Thomas Da Costa Kaufman, Towards a Geography of Art (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press,) 70-73.
Lucia Allais
basis of the possibility of a common social existence, to guarantee to each people its
intellectual freedom-just as every State intends to preserve its political power?224
In a sense, Strzygowski's anti-humanism was an argument for political autonomy: it was political
pressure of Mediterranean elitism that had led Rome to become the privileged center of art historical
scholarship-and it was this same hegemonic spirit that compelled the "League of Minds" to want
to reconcile the "spirit of the North" and "Latinity" into one happy collective "civilization." Instead
Strzygowski made one of the earliest arguments for cultural incommensurability that is to be found
in the pre-history of Unesco-including its implications that intellectual freedom would produce
national autonomy. Strzygowksi's path to Unesco, however, went through Nazism.
While Stzygowski had begun his letter by recalling the Goethe disagreement, Focillon replied
to him by recalling a moment of agreement: the first meeting of the "League of Minds" in Geneva,
which addressed each artistic medium as a potential field of international action: "Music and Film";
"Literature" (including "Translations, Poetry, Theater"); and "Modern Art." This last category of
"Modern Art" was taken over entirely by a discussion of architecture, triggered by a polemic of
Swedish architect Ragnar Ostberg against modem architecture. "We are in an epoch," Ostberg
ranted, "when some want to eliminate beauty from architecture.""22 Calling for the committee to
take a stance against "this social ideology of modern architecture," Ostberg drew approving
comments from Paul Valeiry, who proposed the following resolution:
In our epoch, monuments and urban works are increasingly given over to collective
enterprises. The weakness of modern architecture lies precisely in the fact that no
monument is the work of a man alone, but rather the anonymous result of an multi-
headed organism. 22
At this first meeting of a group devoted to the collective power of intellectuals in bureaucracy, Valeiry
produced a statement discrediting architectural modernism for its bureaucratic anonymity. Focillon
aborted the resolution, recalling that "some mass-civilizations had left admirable monuments, such
as the cathedrals of the middle ages,""227 and finding an ally in Strzygowski, who proposed an
alternative resolution, for "the encouragement of modem art." '28
That Focillon should refer back to this moment in his letter to Srzygowski is exemplary of the
difference between two forms of "agreement." In Geneva, Strzygowski and Focillon agreed as
224 Strzygowski, Letter to Henri Focillon, (May 1932), in Correspondance: Ginie du Nord-Latinite (IICI: Paris, 1934), 126.
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226 Paul Valery, Ibid, 40.
227 He also recalled 19 "' century developments, including the work of Saint-Simonians, as evidence that "even the
engineer had produced beauty."
228 Strzygowsky & Focillon, Ibid, 40-41.
1. Will to War, Will to Art
specialists of art and architecture: first of all, that forms seemingly authored by collectives were not
to be discarded from the history of aesthetics; secondly, in Strzygowsky's words, that "the domain
of art could be used as a characteristic example of the sciences of the mind;" thirdly, in Focillon's
words, that in architectural history "monumental texts hold the same value as written texts-in fact
an often superior value; "229 and finally, that art history needed to learn from the comparative
methods of ethnography. Yet this agreement was in no way a guarantee that political concord
existed. Indeed Focillon continued his letter by strongly rejecting Strzygowski's political agenda.
While he agreed art history should have an "immediate use", a refuted any "politics based on
archaeology":
The "Genius of the North" is not, any more than the Genius of Mediterranean, an
invariable given, placed once and for all at the basis of history. ... If we were condemned
to perpetually resemble a rigorous anthropological maquette, civilization would be
without future and without becoming. All of history condemns the concept of race.
Like you, I think that our research is not without pragmatic value. Our work carries
effective actuality: by unfolding our origins before us, by showing us our successive
portraits and the breadth of our interconnected genealogies, it shows us how much
previous generations have worked amongst themselves, and how our humanity is made
atop them, like a terrain of superimposed layers and innumerable spiritual waves.
A rigorously archaeological politics not only goes against the interest of the community,
it also impoverishes it the nation that adopts them. As soon as demagogy takes hold of
this mystique to fascinate a youth that is exhausted before it has even had any hopes-
this worries me. We can see where the myth of Aryan purity can lead. I think the dignity
of our work forbids us to take this path.230
Although he argued eloquently against Strzygowski's prejudiced research, Focillon was faced with
the methodological lacuna of his disciplinary liberalism. While he merely advocated an international
exchange of ideas, Strzygowski imbued his very methodology with a civilizational scheme that
culminated in a pan-German present. It is undoubtedly in response to this growing disagreement
that Focillon began to focus his energies on the OIAHA. Formed in 1930, the Office did not begin
publishing its Bulletin Periodique until June 1934. In the next section I follow the migration of this
debate into the specialized realm of art history.
The OIAHA: Towards an International Critical History of Art
The OIAHA was created by Focillon on the model of the OIM, at the first meeting of the
permanent Committee on Arts and Letters in 1930. Satisfied with the incorporation of "the men who
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collect, classify and conserve works of art" into intellectual cooperation, he proposed to do the same
for "those who study works of art as expressions of the spiritual life and superior witnesses to
civilization."231 As with the OIM, this was to be a decentralized network of institutions: Focillon
echoed his earlier argument that "any museum where there is a great work, is a great museum" by
arguing that any "even in more modest institutions ... there are researchers of the highest caliber."
This was, in some sense, a return to the "scientific" cooperation that had been at the core of
intellectual cooperation in the 1920s, based on a sharing and abstracting of information. "University
and scientific institutes do not only form researchers; they structure research." Thus the proposed
course of action for the Institute and its journal followed the classic scheme of gathering information
and disseminating it:
I. Material for study
II. Methods of archaeology and art history
III. Scientific formation
IV. Fieldwork
V. Publications and propaganda. 232
Although Focillon was careful to distinguish art historical institutes from museums, he made the
same argument for their activation as "ready-made" institutions,233 and the same disclaimer about
the OIAHA not being a "super-institute." 23 4 Like the OIM, the OIAHA was a reaction to the
institutional developments of the discipline in the first decades of the 2 0th century, in particular the
growth of research institutes with admittedly "scientific" goals, like university departments in the
United States, and European archaeological institutes. As with the OIM, the OIAHA was a mechanism
for bridging from the aesthetic autonomy of art to the political autonomy of those interpreting it (in
this case, art historians).
If the OIM was an attempt to codify a new museum interior, the OIAHA was an attempt to
codify the new scientific atmosphere. The pages of the Bulletin demonstrated that this scientific milieu
extended both to the institute and its field-work, through photographs of archaeological sites and
well-stocked libraries. (fig 1.31) But if the OIM was a true invention, art historical scholarship had
operated internationally for some decades, and the Bulletin was neither the first organ of international
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233 "Institutions of art history," he wrote, "have a different requirement for influence and than museums and it is
important not to confuse them. Museums gather, conserve, grow and display the treasures upon which art historians
and archaeologists work." Henri Focillon, "L'Office International et son But," in Bulletin Priodique, 4.
234 "I1 ne s'agit pas de creer un "super-Institut" mais une liaison destinee a faciliter les recherches des travailleurs," G2
1932 "Rapport sur la R6union du Comite d'Experts pour la creation d'un Centre international des Instituts d'Art et
d'Archeologie." (Paris, les 28-29 janvier 1932).
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art historical discourse nor a very well-circulated publication. Focillon self-consciously proposed to
coordinate its activities with the International Academic Union and the Permanent Committee of the
International Congress of the History of Art, both of whom already circulated publications
internationally. Furthermore, the fit between the "milieu" model of internationalization and the
reality of institute life was awkward, as demonstrated in the photographs published in the Bulletin. In
Mouseion, the technique of juxtaposing photographs of objects and of museum environments had
successfully rendered the "containment" of one into the other, and the way this "milieu" promoted
the "circulation of ideas" around objects and people. Here, in the Bulletin, pictures of sites filled with
monuments and libraries filled with books only illustrated the gap that had grown between a
philological tradition of interpretation and its material objects of study.
The OIAHA was a hybrid form of cooperation that combined the lofty goals of the League of
Minds and the opportunism of "ready-made" cooperation. It is clear that Focillon hoped to intervene
into the "generalist" discussions of the League of Minds. (In 1933 he proposed that the next
Conversation address the question "What is the comparative value of plastic arts and literature, as expressions of
civilization; their reciprocal contributions and their points of contact?""2 ) On the other hand, the OIAHA project
allowed Focillon to design the decentralized network he had been imagining since 1921. Thus he
spent the years 1930-1933 gathering "technical" information from institutes across the world-
including courses taught, student enrollment, methodological emphasis, history of each institute-in
an effort to develop a truly regional network.23 6 It is only after having compiled extensive data that
Focillon turned to the matter of a publication, drawing up with an editorial board a list of suitable
"subjects to be explored" in its pages.237 To differentiate itself from other art historical institutions,
the OIAHA would pay particular attention to issues of methodology. A "Methodological" section
was created in the Bulletin, to host "international action on the basis of the scientific activity of
national institutions, in all of its complexity and diversity." Art history now could take on "domains
of international collaboration in the following disciplines:"
- prehistory and history
- ethnology
- sociology
- aesthetics
235 F.30.1936. Office International des Institute d'Archeologie et d'Histoire de l'Art, Comite de Direction: Reunion des
(18-19 Dec 1936), 41. (P1010710)
236 The questionnaire composed by Focillon ##
237 Current state of research in the domain of archaeology and Byzantine art; Current state of research in archaeology,
numismatics, arts of the far-east, graphic arts, precolombian arts; Islamic arts; Study of the history of art and
archaeology in Roumania, Greece, France; History of art criticism: (a) Art criticism in Plato's time (b) Art criticism in
France from 1840 to 1850 etc.; The architecture of Greek theater in relation to dramaturgy and d6cor; Problems in
documentation of contemporary art;
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- archaeology and history of art, properly speaking, with its corollaries:
- art criticism, and even:
- connoisseurship (l'expertise) 238
Clearly there was a parallel, in Focillon's mind, between internationalism and inter-disciplinarity.
The more he described the mandate of the OIAHA, the closer the parallel between trans-national
relations and trans-disciplinary projects became, in a clear response to Strzygowski's argument that
certain art historical objects necessarily implied certain political subjects.
The OIAHA's most distinctive contribution to intellectual cooperation was a sustained debate
on "a new critical method of art history" that took place in the pages of the Bulletin between 1934
and 1939. This was a disciplinary enactment of Val&ry's theatrical model, where an art-historical
"League of Minds" engaged in a heated discussion about intellectual autonomy, which was in fact a
thinly veiled political discussion. The debate was inaugurated by Italian art historian Lionello Venturi
(1885-1961) in the fourth issue of the Bulletin, with a simple question: "Where does this total lack of
unity come from, this methodological chaos that is found in the history of art as it is taught in
universities-a chaos that is in stark contrast with the relative order that reigns over the work that is
being done in museums?" 239 Venturi's answer, essentially, was that art history had become divorced
from criticism-that art historians, in their recent zeal to establish encyclopedic comprehensiveness,
had forgotten to cater to their own faculty of judgment. For this he blamed the threefold
specialization of the discipline (art history, art criticism and aesthetics (the first encyclopedic, the
second concrete, the last philosophical.) "To understand the absurdity of these distinctions," Venturi
continued, "it will suffice to recall the Kantian principle that any concept without intuition is empty
and any intuition without concept is blind." 240 Then cited extensively from Benedetto Croce's 1910
Problemi di Estetica, as establishing the "identity of aesthetics and criticism":
Here is the solution to the antinomy: a work of art certainly holds a value in itself, but
this "itself" is not something simple, abstract, it is not an arithmetic unity: it is
something complex, concrete, alive, an organism, a whole composed of parts... This
solution establishes the importance of historic interpretation for aesthetic critique or-
better yet, it establishes that real historic interpretation and real aesthetic critique
intersect.241
238 F.30.1936. Office International des Institute d'Archiologie et d'Histoire de l'Art, Comit& de Direction: Reunion des
(18-19 Dec 1936), 35. (P1010707)
239 Lionello Venturi, "Les Instituts universitaires et 1'Histoire de la Critique d'Art," in Bulletin de I'Office International des
Institts d'Archeologie et d'Histoire de l'Art Vol 2, No. 4 (July 1935), 5 1
240 Lionello Venturi, "Les Instituts universitaires et l'Histoire de la Critique d'Art," Venturi cited Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason, "Intuitions without concepts are blind; concepts without intuitions are empty."
241 Venturi,
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In the same way as Focillon had drawn the "space" of the object into the realm of aesthetics, to give
form its own autonomous "life," here Venturi pulled "critique" into the history of art in order to
give artworks a historiographic "life."
Having established the equation of art history and criticism, the question was left of the
relationship between this new "critical history of art" and aesthetics. Again it was with an appeal to
Kant-this time, the Kant of the third Critique--that Argan found the path to be followed: "as Kant
himself showed, aesthetic judgment, though it holds universal value, cannot be proved in the same
way as a logical judgment."2 42 Therefore no amount of philosophical speculation would elucidate
the nature of this critical faculty. Instead Venturi proposed to derive insights from a historical
analysis of the bond between critique and its objects-a historical survey of the relationship between
the judgment over a particular work of art (the work of criticism) and the definition of art (the work
of aesthetics), beginning with the Renaissance.
To remedy an "insufficient self-consciousness of the discipline," Venturi called for "a study
of the history of the discipline itself" which he had already begun in his recently-published Storia della
critica d'arte (History of Art Criticism). This work has now been historicized as the first work to
disseminate German art historical historiography in Italian, from W61lfflin, Riegl and Dvorak, and it
was to these same figures that Venturi appealed in the Bulletin. A fundamental shift occurred, he
argued, since "aesthetics had become an autonomous discipline" in the 18 th Century. This meant
that, starting in the 18th Century, "criticism has two functions: to express the particular taste of an
epoch, and to contribute in itself to the theory of art." Therefore the history of post-Enlightenment
criticism was not simply a succession of theories and interpretations, but a cumulative development
that led to the progressive understanding of the autonomy of criticism, itself an art. Venturi made his
point by comparing Vasari and W6lfflin: while Vasari had special insight into "the linear" because
he understood drawing "as Michelangelo did," he had been blind to the birth of "the painterly" in
front of his very eyes, and it was only W61fflin that "represented in our mind this pictorial ideal as it
was independent from drawing." As a gesture towards this history of criticism Venturi offered a
rapid and dense surveys of critics of all kinds, granting them all the privileged aesthetic position
usually granted only to art itself.
One consequence of this "double function" of post-Enlightenment critique was that art could
now no longer be dissociated from its reception: artworks entered the realm of aesthetics
accompanied by the critical judgments of historians, and their theoretical bases. The history of
242 Venturi, 55.
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judgment was itself a history of creation-of intellectual "re-creation," to be precise-and therefore
it needed to be taught with the same rigor as the history of art itself:
The intuition of the critic resembles the intuition of the artist in a direct and immediate
manner. The reason of the critic finds in the artist's reason an even more secure bond,
more easily demonstrable and analyzable... It goes without saying that to critique a work
of art is primarily to relive it. ... This is why, I propose that the methodological unity for
a history of art and for university institutes where art history is taught should be the
history of the criticism of art.243
A corollary of this principle-that the history of criticism should be taught-was that judgments of
value could now be made between different forms of criticism. Here, Venturi took a stance
specifically against Strzygowski, by declaring his relative "critical immaturity" within the Vienna
School of Art:
I would also like to note that the renown of art historical books do not always
correspond to their critical maturity. As an example I would cite the Vienna School of Art:
to this school belong both Riegl and Wickhoff, whose critical ideas hold great value, as
well as M. Strzygowski, whose critical value is more limited-although this has not kept
him from achieving international renown.244
By declaring Strzygowski's critique inferior to that of Riegl and Wickhoff, Venturi took sides in a
fight that had pitted Strzygowski against the other heirs to the Vienna School. Indeed Strzygowski
only presided over a bifurcated institution, which had been separated into two branches to satisfy
both "humanist" and "Volkisch" tastes and inclinations. Strzygowski and Max Dvorak had both
earned their chairs in 1909 as compromises for one another, coexisting in separate realms, presiding
over separate research endeavors, speaking to separate audiences and adhering to separate
ideologies. 245 From the point of view of intellectual cooperation as a political ideal, this judgment
was a crucial political twist on an otherwise purely disciplinary project. By excluding the popularity
of Strzygowski's work as irrelevant to its critical value, Venturi hoped to place historical responsibility
on disciplinary methods. This historical responsibility was the "second function" of criticism.
Venturi's article provoked a plethora of responses, most addressing his rhetorical question but
not his proposed solution. Each contributor was eager to explain "methodological chaos" as a
symptom of a variety of disciplinary, institutional, and national turf-wars. For example,
archaeologist W. Deonna refuted the argument that art history needed to learn from aesthetics,
contending that it was aesthetics which needed to look at objects more closely:
243 Venturi, 60.
244 Venturi, 62.
245 Marchand, "The Rhetoric of Artifacts," 125.
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Whether it is Kant, Schelling, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, or whether it is
de Jouffroy, Taine, Guyau, Seailles, Bergson, Delacroix, Lalo, etc... from ancients to
moderns, the procedure is the same: aestheticians ignore monuments, or have a limited
knowledge of them. ... It is for aesthetics to use the results of art history, rather than for
art history to start learning from aesthetics.2 46
The priority of critique and analysis, in other words, should be reversed. What this response failed to
grasp was the extra-disciplinary historical project that was contained in Venturi's proposal. Similarly,
American art historian MacMahon explained the necessary "pragmatism" that had accompanied the
institutional development of art history in America. While he connected scholarly tendencies with
political ethos, it did so in voluntarist and presentist terms:
Liberalism facilitates and accelerates the inevitable development of the historical process;
while in barbaric anti-liberalism, there is no place for history, there is only place for
myths, and there is no tolerance for freedom of critique, whether it is exercised on art
or on other efforts of human endeavors. We must write the history of art criticism while
we are still free to study history and to express rational judgments on art.247
By rephrasing Venturi's project in pragmatist terms, MacMahon fundamentally mis-understood the
project of locating historical synthesis within the realm of aesthetic judgement itself-to the exclusion
of other types of judgment. The urgency of MacMahon's tone, however, does reveal that the
influence of the rise of Nazism on art historical scholarship was paradoxically more keenly felt in the
USA, especially at the Institute of Fine Arts where he was teaching, and where multiple German
refugees had already fled. 248
The only urgency that was correspondingly felt in the European world of art history was that
of a growing competition between national traditions. The plenary session of the 1933 International
Congress of the History of Art asked for example, "When, in the history of art of a certain nation,
can a national character be felt for the first time, or in a particularly interesting way?" 249 It is telling,
then, that this attempt to find nationalist roots in art historical work was consciously avoided in the
pages of the Bulletin, addressing its methodological debates instead.2 o Swiss art critic Schaub-Koch
saw the Bulletin debate as a continuation of a disagreement that had arisen in Stockholm between him,
Venturi and Focillon, and contributed a lengthy article critiquing his two colleagues. Against Venturi
he offered a legalistic interpretation of history and acused Venturi (and, by implication, Croce) of
246 A. Deonna, "De la Necessite d'une Methode en Histoire de l'Art," in Bulletin Periodique, (Nov 1935), 36.
247 Philip MacMahon, "L'Histoire de la Critique de l'Art et l'Etude de l'Art dans les Universites Ambricaines," in 55.
248 See Chapter 2 for an in-depth summary of the migration of German art historians to America.
249 XIIIe Congris International de l'Histoire de l'Art, Resumbs des Communications (Stockholm: Boktryckeri, 1933), 13-51.
2s50 There is a clear relationship between the papers given at the session "History and Principles of Art Criticism," where
Lionello Venturi had delivered a version of his text on criticism. Lionello Venturi, "Sur quelques problimes actuels de la
critique d'art," in Risumis des Communications, 247.
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confusing judge and witness: "In the tribunal of the history of art, it is the historian who renders
judgments... the critic is only one witness, who contributes his testimony."25s His critique of
Focillon was consisted of a scathing review of The Life of Forms in Art, which had just been published.
Schaub-Koch questioned the idea of "life as form," countering that "the only creator is man." While
art could be attached to form and space, these were abstract categories, not spatial variables:
Space belongs to art, says Focillon. But what is space? We have no idea. Space is empty, a
nothingness that we measure by the time that it takes to go from one end of it to the
other. Time and space are purely and simply unlimited conceptions, uncertain ideas in
our minds. All three are infinite, which is enough to confuse them. But if it please Mr.
Focillon, we would like to situate the work of art in the mind of man, and not
elsewhere."52
What Schaub-Koch objected to most vehemently was the usage of this "space" to grant art both an
autonomy from history and the power to transform it. "Mr. Focillon," he wrote, "depicts an
aesthetics that would transform the climate of Venice, shows us VanDyck's portraits as transforming
English nobility, Rembrandt attacking Dutch tradition." Unwittingly, Schaub-Koch identified in this
pattern precisely the model of historical agency that Valery and Focillon had hoped to develop in the
Valery-Focillon Proposition, with its image of a painting gallery activating intellectual work: but for
Schaub-Koch, the problem was that "portraits become models."
From this canonical portrait gallery Schaub-Koch launched an unforgivingly conservative
counter-proposal: that portraits were not active historical objects, but autonomous masterpieces, "to
be erected into verified law" and "criteria for comparison by which all art can be judged and
critiqued in an absolute measure. "2 Invoking Lessing, he looked for a set of "invariable, positive"
values, based on "a series of works of art from various schools that have always been admired by a
unanimous elite since the origins of Western art." 254 Although Schaub-Koch called his own method
"experimental" (against Focillon's "metaphysical" and Venturi's "encyclopedic" approaches) and
incorporated the works of Picasso and Cezanne into his canonical narrative. Schaub-Kauch's critique
is useful in that it identifies the affinity between Focillon and Venturi: their debts to Croce and Kant,
their willingness to understand aesthetic autonomy as expandable beyond the "work" of art, their
desire to "locate the work of art in time and space,""' and their refusal of any positivism based
251 Emile Schaub-Koch, "De diverses methods de critique et d'histoire de l'art," in Bulletin P&riodique, (Nov 1935), 63.
252 Emile Schaub-Koch,.
253 Schaub-Koch, 62.
254 When "studied across all epochs, across all schools, across all theories, across all the individual personalities of artists,
across all technical methods, these aesthetic qualities remained true and permanent." Emile Schaub-Koch, 57.
255 Schaub-Koch, 59.
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upon identification of "the eternal masterpiece." 25 6 But this debate also demonstrates the limits of the
project of intellectual cooperation when it entered a realm of art history: the limits of specialization
itself.
Venturi and Focillon hoped to spark a debate about interpretation as a historical act, but most
art historians did not agree that the link between history and interpretation needed to be made at all.
Within the confines of their own discipline, Venturi, Focillon and Strzygowski were more in
agreement than they were with others. Much as most political theorists of the time thought of
nationalism as a path to internationalist empathy rather than a hindrance to it, so most art historians
failed to recognize any politics of art history, except as subjected to institutional structures and
methodological allegiances.
The political stakes of this "methodological chaos" only became clear again in the 1936 issue
of the Bulletin, with an intervention of another Italian art historian, Giulio Carlo Argan (1909-1992),
who wrote a review of the history of the Vienna school (Die Weiner Schule der Kunstgeschichte) published
by one of Strzygowski's competitors in Vienna, Julius von Schlosser. 25 7 Like Venturi, Argan saw the
"methodological chaos" as due to "a fundamental tension between 'critique' and 'philology', the
two terms denoting, not altogether correctly, the first an idealist tendency, the second a positivist
tendency," with its corollary distinction between "archaeology" and "history of art." The history of
the Vienna School, then, demonstrated how these two disciplinary poles had been connected
historically: the Vienna School had been founded upon "positivist premises," but its work had
eventually led to "a new critical imperative, critical exigencies that found a concrete expression in
the work of Riegl and Wickhoff." Argan retraced this history, from the early "comparative
imperative," through the heydays of archaeological depth, leading to "a distinctly idealist
renaissance."
In this rise "from the valley of philology to the summits of philosophy," Argan identified
the Rieglian concept of Kunstwollen as a crucial theoretical support. Riegl had invented the notion to
counter Semperian materialism, with "its overestimation of technique." The Kunstwollen was the "will
to art" or "will to form" that propelled the transformation of formal motifs, in a self-contained
autonomous development, which related these motifs to social and cultural norms.258 The term
256 Straub-Koch, 60.
257 Julius von Schlosser, Die Weiner Schule der Kunstgeschichte. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1934). An English translation of the
section on Riegl is available as "Riegl," in Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work (London: OPA, 2001), 33-48. The translation
reviewed by Argan was Julius von Schlosser, La Storia dell'Arte Nelle Esperienze e nei Ricordi di un suo cultore, trans. Giovanna
Federico Ajroldi, (Bari: Laterza, 1936), 175-221.
258 Riegl's definition of the Kunstwollen from Late Roman Art Industry, as translated by Christopher Wood: "All human will is
directed toward a satisfactory shaping of man's relationship to the world, within and beyond the individual. The plastic
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Kunstwollen was therefore intended to grant art its own autonomy, while implying a collective impetus
that could only be understood as somehow connected to a "historical" reality. For Argan, the
Kunstwollen allowed a sublation of individualist creation into collective phenomena, a realization:
... that the history of art contained an abstraction that went beyond the individual and
that deformed it, whether in its historical signification, or in this special sense that there
is no "art" but "artists," that all the labels of "schools" of "trend" of "genre" do not
render artistic activity,
... that the dissolution of 'expression', which is always autonomous and individual,
leads the "history of art" towards that utilitarian and empirical grammar that we call
"knowledge." 25 9
Riegl's Kunstwollen was for Argan the hinge that brought together this double function of criticism, by
separating the question of style from the question of authorship. What Kunstwollen allowed was
twofold: historically, to get past the problem of authorship and historiographically, to get past the
problem of taste.
The vagueness and evolution of the concept of Kunstwollen in Riegl's usage has fueled a
century-long theoretical debate, which began almost the moment that Riegl coined the term.260 Von
Schlosser himself noted that by 1935 it had become "a glib catch phrase." To mention two poles,
Gombrich famously indicted Riegl for coining a dangerous stereotype, while Giedion found in it a
the foundation for a history of modern architecture. More recent art historical analyses have parsed
its significance as a formalist and psychological heuristic that prefigures post-structuralist critiques by
a half-century. 261 As we will see, in heritage discourse the Kunstwollen is seen as allowing both
monuments and their interpretations to become historical realities. The easiest way to understand
Argan's particular appeal to the Kunstwollen in the pages of the Bulletin of the OIAHA is as an attempt to
Kunstwollen regulates man's relationship to the sensibly perceptible appearance of things. Art expresses the way man
wants to see things shaped or colored, just as the poetic Kunstwollen expreses the way man wants to imagine them.
Man is not only a passive, sensory recipient, but also a desiring, active being who wishes to interpret the world in such
a way (varying from one people, region, or epoch to another) that it most clearly and obligingly meets his desires. The
character of this will is contained in what we call the worldview (again in the broadest sense): in religion, philosophy,
science, even statecraft and law." Wood, The Vienna School Reader (New York, 2000), 94-95.
259 Argan, 37.
260 Henri Zerner distinguished two directions the term took in the work of Riegl's immediate successors in Vienna: a
neo-Kantian version preferred by those like Panofsky who saw in Kunstwollen a kind of "immanent meaning," and a
Hegelian metaphysics preferred by Sedlmayr and his "structuranalyse" colleagues. Henri Zerner, "Alois Riegl: Art, Value,
Criticism."
261 For a historiographic overview see Margaret Iversen, "The Concept of the Kunstwollen," in Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 2-19. Gombrich's critique is in the introduction of his Search for Cultural History. In 1976
a special issue of Daedalus had contributions from Henri Zerner and Siegfried Giedion. For a distinction between Riegl's
Kunstwollen and Schnasse's teleology, see Michael Podro, "Riegl," in The Critical Historians of Art (New Haven: Yale, 1992),
96-97. Christopher Wood argues the Kunstwollen was primarily a disciplinary conceit ("the basic unit of art history")
that productively spawned the work of the later Vienna School. Michael Wood, "Introduction, " The Vienna School Reader
(New York: Zone, 2000), 26. Margaret Iversen connected Riegl with contemporary theories of language, ("Style as
Structure: Alois Riegl's Historiography," in Art History (Mar 1979), 63-72.
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replace the artist by the critic-in a moment when artistic originality was in crisis. Argan
emphasized that Riegl had invented the idea of Kunstwollen to interpret the late-roman period, "a
period in which we do not find the presence of many artistic personalities which are historically
individuated." This lack of artistic authorship (in history) could be compensated by critical
interpretation (in the present); thus Riegl had shown that "this lacuna in no way constituted a limit
to critical activity." Here the parallels with contemporary phenomena of international politics were
clear; Argan offered to the "double function" of criticism, as if criticism had become an intellectual
ethic for an age of mass culture.
It is important to note that, by using the publication of Schlosser's memoir as a pretext to
return to the methods of the Vienna School, Argan deliberately obscured Schlosser's own critique of
these methods. Schlosser resisted the concept of Kunstwollen, which he thought was as "an allegorizing
personification of historical forces like those incarnations of collective spirits if which the Romantics
were so fond." 262 Schlosser still believed in the distinction between philological and art historical
treatment, and explicitly critiqued Riegl for blurring the line between "the history of style (the
history of individual artists)" and "the history of language (the history of the transmission of artistic
conventions.") 263 Instead Schlosser resorted to Benedetto Croce in resisting any abdication of the
label of "art" to any anonymous collectivity. Yet in the Bulletin Argan went out of his way to
downplay Croce's influence on Schlosser. "It is certain that Croce's theoretical explication of
aesthetics influenced Schlosser," he wrote, but "equally important was the direct and patient study of
the work of art." 264 It was the completeness of the critical experience developed in Vienna that Argan
found admirable: the rigor and discipline of formalism. Argan depicted this perceptive concentration
as a powerful defense mechanism of the critical faculty, against both historical positivism and
philosophical enslavement:
More than by adhering to the latest philosophical currents, this school has found
stimulus for renewal in the rigorous determination of the problem of art, and in a
method which consists in placing yourself in front of the work of art with the
willpower to understand precisely to understand its entirely intrinsic value, its pure,
262 Otto Pacht, "Art Historians and Art Critics: VI: Alois Riegl," in The Burlington Magazine (May 1963), 188-193.
263 Julius von Schlosser, "'Stilgeschichte' und 'Sprachgeschichte' in der bildenden Kunst," (1935). This text was
translated and published in the same volume of Schlosser's biography and the history of the Vienna School that Argan
was reviewing. The translation is "Storia dello Stile e Storia del Linguaggio," in von Schlosser, La Storia dell'Arte Nelle
Espeirenze e nei Ricordi di un suo cultore," Trans. Giovanna Federici Ajroldi, (Bari: Laterza, 1936), 175-221. For a brief overview
of Schlosser's critique see Podro, 212 and Picht, 190. For a distinction between nationalist and international strains in
both art historians, see Thomas DaCosta Kauffman, "Stereotypes, Prejudice, and aesthetic judgement," in Art History
Aesthetics and Visual Studies, Clark Studies in the Visual Arts (New Haven: Yale, 2002), 76-77.
264 Argan, 35.
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absolute value, without attempting to avoid the problems that arise from it by placing it
into abstract schemes that have nothing to do with it. 26
Argan described the critical act as a performance of personal willpower, a proof of the courage to
treat the work of art autonomously, resisting the temptation to resort to pre-existing historical
schemes. This was almost a scheme of political resistance, which led the critic away from historical
circumstance and into a higher realm of history. Thus "by posing exactly the problem of art, one is
necessarily led to the problem of history."26 6 The lessons of the Vienna School were that a leap was
possible: from art, to history, through form.
But Argan was also taking sides in another critical debate, centered not in Vienna but in
Rome.267 The Italian debate divided Croceans and non-Croceans, fascists and non-fascists,
architecture and the other arts: so for Argan to argue against a "positivist historicism" was to argue
against the Rome-centric, fascist-friendly historiography which was promoted by Giovannoni.268
Against Croce and his followers, who emphasized the "aspect" of art, Giovannoni argued that
architecture was a distinct art form with unique ability to support political agendas and be integrated
into bureaucratic life. 269 The disagreement culminatedin Argan's appointment at the head of a
commission to revise Giovannoni's 1931 Carta dd Restauro, where he removed the difference between
"live and dead" monument and the right to build architecture "in the style" of its original
construction. Here too the disciplinary debate had a political dimension: proponents of Crocean anti-
fascism like Argan were in ministerial positions because they hoped to advocate for the artistic
autonomy of arts from politics, and it is in the context of this de-politicization of the arts that Argan
deprived architecture of any claim to "reality."270 But while in the national context Argan was eager
to claim the Crocean mantle and its anti-fascist stance, in the international context Argan modified
265 Argan, 38.
266 Argan, 38.
267 Schlosser concluded his Vienna School History with Croce, and his desire to popularize the "great master's" work in
German, granting himself "the modest role of a mediator between German and Italian cultures." Schlosser, La Scuole
Viennese, 163.
268 There is some disagreement over the different roles played by Argan and Giovannoni in fascist Italy. In 1965 Millon
gave a central part to Giovanoni and his journal Palladio in his account of the role of architectural history in the spread of
fascism. But he also implied that Argan, as editor-in-chief of Le Arti, had contributed to a shifting editorial policy that
gradually supported Mussolini's favorite nationalistic myths. ("Le Arti was not a Fascist propaganda organ, with an
editorial board composed of a few people who liked to wear black shirts, but a journal advised by the major art
historians of the country.") Henry Millon, "The Role of History of Architecture in Fascist Italy," The Journal of the Society of
Architectural Historians, (Mar., 1965), 53-59. Others have suggested that Argan took the ministerial position only in order
to promote the autonomy of the arts from within.
269 Gustavo Giovannoni, "11 Metodo nella Storia dell'Architettura," in Palladio (1939), 77-79. On Giovannoni's
contribution to architectural history, see Guido Zucconi, Gustavo Giovannoni: Dal Capitello alla Citta (Milano: Jaca Book, 1996).
270 For a complete account of this debate and the text of Argan's revision, see "La "Carta del Restauro" di Giulio Carlo
Argan," in Annali di Architettura (1994), 101-115, 104.
106
1. Will to War, Will to Art
his argument by distancing Schlosser from Croce, using both as neutral bridges between Italian and
Austrian traditions.
Argan's promotion of a Viennese-inspired critical formalism as a model for international
action was therefore adapted from his national model of critical resistance to the fascist regime. But
why return to the Vienna school at all? In part, this was a return to the original cosmopolitanism of
the Hapsburg empire-an attempt to wrest the comparative methodology it has yielded from
Stzrygowski's political grasp.271 In addition, for Venturi and Argan, intellectual cooperation seemed
the appropriate opportunity to return to the first tradition of art history to rely on a theory of the
"mind"- Geistesgeschichte-and find in this original importation a solution to the problem of
"taste." 272
The trouble with presenting a Viennese critical method as a form of political resistance,
however, is that Strzygowski also wielded a narrative of political resistance to completely different
ends. In the same issue of the Bulletin, Strzygowski took on the entire debate and its attacks against
him, in a lengthy re-exposition of his scholarship, his career, of his argument with Focillon,
summarizing his entire life's work as a historiographic fight to undermine the master-narrative of the
"art of the conqueror:"
Against the general conviction of the superiority of the art of the conqueror (Machtkunst) of the
Mediterranean I can only oppose the results of my entire life's work, which tend to
prove that a much superior form of art manifests itself in Greek Iranian and Gothic arts-
an art that came from the North and propagated through the Middle East.273
Against the formalist idea of autonomy as resistance Strzygowski dramatized his own criticsim as
redeeming a centuries-old historical injustice. He echoed this narrative with a personal story of
resistance to institutional forces at the Vienna Institute.
When the first institute of History in Vienna was created, the Institute for the History of
Art was in order to be devoted to the work of comparison, concerning the entire world,
all periods and all peoples. Today we no longer need such an initiative. ... What we
need today is an inter-state institute to serve as liaison between institutes and university
chairs, which could give them themes for their research and use the results for the
common goals of our science. All results would have to be given over to this central
organism, where they would be classified and organized, and made available to all
collaborators. 274
271 Margaret Iversen addresses the relation of Vienna School scholarship to contemporary empire politics.
272 For a brief summary of this filiation in German-speaking art history see W. Eugene Kleinbauer, "Geistesgeschichte
and Art History," in ArtJournal, (Winter, 1970-1971), 148-153.
273 Strzygowski, "L'Avenir des m6thodes de recherches en matibre des beaux-arts," in Bulletin 8-9 (Nov 1936-Mar
1937), 74.
274 Strzygowski, Ibid.
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Lastly, Strzygowski cast a retrospective glance at his work in the League of Minds, admitting that "I
have also always felt isolated in the meetings of the Committee on Arts and Letters, I always had the
feeling of being alone among the men that I have had to combat my whole life, since my
experience has led me to reject the historic humanism under which my colleagues were taken." The
Directorial Board which was established in 1933 did not include Strzygowski, and had a distinctly
Mediterranean composition. 27s Still Strzygowski took some credit for the creation of the OIAHA and
saw in it a hope that had been squandered in his own Vienna:
When the IICI was created in 193 1 he pleaded to add the "the terme Recherches sur 1'Art
(Kunstforschung) to the name of the organ, so that the superior procedures of science,
rather than just the history of art, be used in this organism. I wish upon this organism to
reach this goal faster than the German association of art, Kunstwissenschaft attempted to do it
20 years ago. One institute alone could not achieve this. I myself tried it in Vienna after
the Great war, to establish this center that we all need, and that we all yearn for, in the
great country of ancient culture that is Austria. We could have fused my institute with
the archaeological institute in Warsaw, which considered my offer. But ignorance was
then still too widespread and when I retired the institute was destroyed in a manner so
arbitrary that it must be seen as a heroic performance of a dying humanism.276
He then concluded by re-proposing the same programmatic overhaul of the OIAHA he had already
proposed in his 1932 letter to Focillon, 277 which was intended to deal with "art objects" directly-
without having recourse to written sources. But now Strzygowksi added a preliminary
methodological step: the creation of a post-humanist "observer":
I. Study of the observer
II. Study of the object
(a) essence
(b) evolution
(c) knowledge (conaissance) 278
Whereas Focillon's plan for the OIAHA reflected the structure of institutional cooperation,
Strzygowski's method contained a structuring of subjectivity-one devoted to forming post-
humanist subjects. Under the section "knowledge" he detailed a plan for teaching schoolchildren to
recognize the importance of objects, so that when they arrived at university they were prepared to
275 Com/Ex/Institut.26. 1934. "Office International des Instituts d'Archeologie et d'Histoire de l'Art." The Comite de
Direction" was composed of: Diego Angulo (l'Universite de Seville.); A. Colasanti, (Universit& de Rome); WG
Contsbable, (Courtauld Institute); W. Deonna (Universitý de Gen&ve), H. Focillon (Sorbonne), G. Opresco (Universit6
de Bucarest)
276 Strzygowski, Ibid.
277 "The chaos that is felt by all those who approach the history of art today does not come from the insufficiency of
scientific method. It is caused first and foremost by the lack of a certain bibliography and the lack of a serious and
objective critical practice."
278 Strzygowski's ambition was to overhaul completely the methodological tradition he had inherited in Vienna, had
already proposed the "objective" side of this program in his letter to Focillon: "I. Determination of object of study II.
Structure III. Evolution." Strzygowski, Civilizations, 160.
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process the mass of monuments produced by the "Nordic spirit." Strzygowski's anti-humanist, anti-
Roman, anti-critical project therefore had its eye on a post-humanist subject, and one which was
adapted to the increasingly scientific paradigm of research that art history was developping.
Thus we find in the work of the OIAHA the same discursive pattern as that of the Athens
Conference and the International Studies Conferences: a reworking, under new theoretical headings,
of old disciplinary debates and categorizations. Like idealists League supporters, the art historians
were addressing the consequences of the influence of German idealist historiography onto their
discipline, in the absence of Germany itself. But within this inherited discourse there were now two
disciplinary debates in play. The first pitted classical antiquity and its advocates, with their textual
sources and their archaeological institutes, against those who studied medieval, Byzantine, folkoric
and other "oriental" art forms, who relied on physical inspection of material objects. Within this
second category, however, the formalists were pitted against the scientists: the former sought to
create a new criticality from the liberation from textual forms; the latter insisted that further
accumulation in itself would redress an imbalanced picture of world history. Both were equally
populist, and both believed in the political potential of their insights. Strzygowski was part of a
movement to popularize art history; Focillon insisted on seeing art criticism as a modern medium.
These two trends were undoubtedly both inherited by Unesco in the postwar. As Strzygowski
specialists have noted, his vigorous critique of Romzentrismus made him as useful to Nazi pan-German
ideology as to late-century culturalism. As for Focillon, his insistence on the formality of "life"-the
life of art and the life of institutions-helped to incorporate the aesthetic model of autonomy into
the programs of postwar international bureaucracies.
The Legislated Monument
In 1939, the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation published two books dealing with the
international value of monuments. Both volumes were re-publications of material that had appeared
throughout the decade in the pages of Mouseion. The first was to be the inaugural volume in a new
thematic series, Recherche, edited by Focillon, and sponsored by all the organizations of intellectual
cooperation with an interest in art and architecture: the International Museums Office, the
International Commission for Historic Monuments, the International Office of Institutes of History
of Art and Archaeology, the International Commission for Popular Arts and the International Study
center on Architecture and Urbanism. 279 (fig 1.32) The second, also co-published by the OIM and the
279 Recherche I: Le Problkme de l'Ogive (Paris: IICI, 1939).
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International Monuments Committee, was a "technical and legal manual" on The Protection of
monuments in War Time. Both were intended to project a conciliatory politics onto architectural forms.
(fig 1.34) But while the first was a soon-forgotten collection of scholarly essays on the relatively
obscure topic of Gothic rib vaulting in architecture (Le Problime de l'Ogive), the second synthesized
monumental protection so effectively that it became an obligatory reference in postwar international
heritage discourse. To conclude this chapter I argue that the Manual and the Recherche contain many of
the same principles and that their apparent lack of relationship reveals the bifurcation between
"realism" and "idealism" instituted by the political structure of the League had been absorbed even
in those realms of intellectual cooperation where architecture was supposed to bridge between them.
Le Problime de l'Ogive was supposed to inaugurate a new focus on artistic and architectural forms
as sites of international debate. The first debate it addressed was the controversy over the structural
role of gothic rib vaulting, triggered by French architect Pol Abraham, who argued that rib vaults
created an aesthetic effect of structure rather than performing any actual structural function. Against
Viollet-le-Duc, who saw ribs as icons of a proto-modern structural rationalism in Gothic architects,
Abraham observed that in partially-destroyed gothic constructions, some vaults had remained intact
despite having lost their ribbing.28 0 Abraham's contention that Viollet le Duc had reduced the
expressive potential of Gothic architecture caused a minor controversy in France, concentrating
broad questions of geo-political history in a debate of architectural techniques which drew even the
attention of historians of the Eicole des Annales.281 Focillon's contribution to this debate, in essence,
was to replace a structural idea of function with a cultural one: rib vaulting should be understood as
a paradoxical and changing expression of civilizational conflicts. He enlisted the expertise of four
colleagues who provided archaeological examples from "Islamic architecture" and "trans-
Caucasian" architecture, as well as a text from Abraham and contributing his own.28 2 Together all
these studies provided a plethora of examples that did not fit the "classical and exemplary solution"
examined by both structural rationalism and its detractors. Despite their a-typicality, these attempts
were not to be ignored "as exceptions, as aberrations." In what can no doubt be considered a
demonstration of Venturi's "double function" of art historical criticism, Focillon performed what he
called an act of "intellectual restitution":
280 Pol Abraham, Viollet le Duc et le Rationalisme Midijval (Paris: Vincet & Fr~al, 1934).
28s Louis Lecrocq
282 Pol Abraham, << Les donn~es plastiques et fonctionnelles du problme de l'ogive ; >> Walter Godfrey, << L'Arc ogival,
raison esthktique plut6t que nkcessitE fonctionnelles, >> Elis Lambert, << La crois~es d'ogives dans l'architecture
islamique, » Gurgis Baltrusaitis, << La crois~e d'ogives dans l'architecture transcaucasienne, o Marcel Aubert, << Origine et
d~velopppement de la voite sur crois~e d'ogive. >
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The problem of the ogive cannot be posed in abstracto, as if it existed "in itself after a few
concessions to primitive forms. ... Our problem is one of intellectual restitution. To
think like the artist--that is the rule of our research. Indeed the artist does not think
once and for all; he searches, he invents, he adapts, he perfects, he errs. The problem of
the ogive is therefore double: it is historical and it is structural. 283
The Problmrne de I'Ogive was supposed to be a didactic demonstration of the new critical agency that had
been latent the League's art-historical agencies. Taking an issue of "form" as its main subject, the
volume gathered multiple disciplinary strands into a single interpretive act, emerging from the
accumulation of archaeological evidence with a critical point of view that confidently made
judgments, folding present interpretations into the historical value of cultural artifacts. Here was
"concrete" agreement, in the form of a ribbed vault.
The advent of war obscured the impact of the Problime de 'Ogive--although it is unlikely that it
would have had much of an impact on the debate at all. As Charles Rufus Morey pointed out in
1944, is only after being republished in a posthumous collection of Focillon's essays, Moyen-Age:
Survivances et Riveils, that Focillon's synthesis of the issue received attention.284 Focillon died in 1943
after emigrating to the United States and seeing his physical and mental health rapidly deteriorate. 28s
It was another essay in this collection, titled "From Germanic Middle Ages to Occidental middle
Ages" which Morey noted was probably "one of Focillon's last" and "reflected in some degree the
profound effect of the war upon his burdened spirit." 286 Structured as a critique of Henri Pirenne's
theory that Islamic conquest had created a historical break between Antiquity and Middle Ages,
Focillon painted a millennium-long tableau of the "potent consolidation of Germanism" that took
hold in Europe during the Carolingian empire.2 87 This text is of interest here because it offered a
more eloquent redemption of the "Germanic spirit" than Strzygowski ever managed. Germanism
needed to be understood in light of the "atrocious wars that tore Christianity from paganism and
chaos." These wars, Focillon wrote, had left a long lasting "moral imprint" upon Europe, in addition
to giving it an "obsession with universal empire and a taste for unmeasured enterprises and colossal
buildings." Although Focillon found in this history of battles the origins of the "slowness" and
283 Henri Focillon, "Le Problme de l'Ogive," in Bulletin P&riodique I (1934), 42, reprinted in Le Problime de l'Ogive (1939).
284 Henri Focillon, Moyen-Age: Survivances et RIveils: Etudes d'Art et d'Histoire (Montr6al: Brentano's, 1943).
285 Focillon immediately became involved in the Ecole Libre des Hautes 6tudes in New York, where many other
luminaries of French intellectual life came to find refuge, including Claude Levi Strauss. Madeline Stinson, "The Leaders
of French Intellectual Life--At Home and in Exile," in The Modern LanguageJournal, (Mar., 1944) 246-253. In 1941 he also
composed the outline for a text titled "L'Histoire de l'art et la Vie de l'Esprit," that re-iterated the need to find the
solution to war in a history of "the mind." The text is republished in Relire Focillon (Paris: Mus6e du Louvre, 1998),171-184.
286 Charles Rufus Morey, "Book Review. Moyen Age: Survivances et Riveils" in Art Bulletin (Dec 1944), 278-279.
2 Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris: 1937).
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"barbarity" of Germanism, "its lack of originality and creativity," he also found poetry in the way
this Germanic spirit had stoically defended Europe and the Mediterranean against extinction for a
millennium. "It is in its archaism that lies its grandeur." In a final twist, Focillon then breached into
political territory he so carefully avoided at the League:
The old continental domain of Germany seems condemned to a sort of immense
provincialism. In the history of its evolution, one has to account not only for Germany's
late entrance in the European community, but also for the a particular geographic place it
has held since the Treaty of Verdun. Germany sees everything through an imperial lens,
because it was born a violent birth, of Carolinginan wars. From this prehistory it has kept
the drive for merciless wars, the nostalgia for forets and migrations of peoples, the belief
in abslute value that weighs down neighboring populations. ... It is natural that it
should concentrate on a racial dream.2 '8
Thus Focillon eventually succumbed to the temptation of historicizing the "drive for merciless
wars." He did so not in order "to diminish the contribution of a nation," but rather to explicate the
behavior of the "Germanic body" of Europe "in light of information borrowed from history and
geopolitics." Focillon then articulated perhaps one of his clearest statements of method, and the most
lucid exposition of his instrumental politics of form: that "tradition is like a vertical force," and that
"whatever the diversity of this intense movement, it represents the collaboration of past to the
historic present." 289 Even in this tragic time of exile, Focillon displayed both the potential and the
tragedy of intellectual cooperation, delivering this geo-political explication of contemporary
atrocities with tempered liberalism and self-restrained disciplinarity.
Unlike the Problime de I'Ogive, whose untimely publication doomed it to irrelevance, the Manual
on the Protection of Monuments and Works of Art During Wartime was as a timely response to a growing sense
of urgency, on the part of an organization that was soon dissolved. The Manual was divided into two
parts, reflecting the division of tasks that had been carried through since the early days of the
Einstein-Bergson debacle. A first part on the "Technical Methods of Protection" gave specific
recommendations on measures to be taken for the storage of movable monuments and emptying of
immovable ones. All of these recommendations were largely inspired from the experience of the
Spanish Civil war, and contained examples already published in Mouseion. The second part, titled
"International Protection," compiled all the work that had been accomplished to date on the
legislation of monuments. The Manual, in other words, was re-resented everything that had been in
"technical" and "general" work on monuments since the Athens Conference--with the addition of
"war" as a theme.
288 Henri Focillon, "Du Moyen Age Germanique au Moyen Age Occidental," in Moyen-Age: Survivances et Riveils, 44.
289 Focillon, "Du Moyen Age Germanique," 46.
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The technical portion of the manual was a validation of regularized "maintenance." In his
introduction, OIM president Foundouldkidis presented war as a continuation of ready-made
cooperation between museums. In an "ideal situation," he wrote, "museums would be emptied of
artworks and transformed into centers of public information." As if the war was an opportunity to
enact the "ready-made" network idea long ago articulated by Focillon, Foundoukitis depicted a
wartime network of institutions "activated" and "decentralized" by war. "Conservators are called
upon to evacuate their artworks to provincial institutions, where they will find a new public."
Similarly, Foundouldtis presented war as an occasion to re-vive Focillon's idea of "tutelage" by larger
museums of smaller institutions. "This type of decentralization will conform to a tendency that had
been manifesting itself for the last few years in museographic circles."29 0 Perhaps the most obvious
form of opportunism was the suggestion that the idea of "international solidarity" long promoted
by the OIM could finally be demonstrated, since war focuses public opinion. This was especially the
case, Foundounkitis wrote, of monuments that existed in the public view:
War will initiate an ever-growing public to the value that is attached to monuments.
While regrettable, the necessities of war will draw the attention of all to the treasures that
are conserved outside museums. Our works of protection, which will transform the
physiognomy of artistic and historic buildings, of public monuments, statues, fountains,
these structures that temporarily hide them from view, have naturally awoken the
interest of population for works that it often only considered with a distracted glance, or
an eye desensitized by habit.29
In war, monuments encased in protective forms rendered an educational service merely by being the
in the public eye.
The section of the manual tided "International Protection" surveyed precedents for the
protection of artworks in wartime, and proposed a new international convention. This was the work
of Belgian jurist and Permanent Court of International Justice member Charles de Visscher (1884-
1973),292 who had been at work on legislating monuments since 1934.293 He began his
commentary by addressing the possible contradiction of legislating war-time protection within an
institution that was devoted to the perpetuation of peace. Yet he rejected the idea that writing laws
for the conduct of war was an admission wars's legitimacy. "Any international regulation," he
290 Foundoukitis, "Introduction," in Office International des Musbes, La Protection des Monuments et Oeuvres d'art en Temps de
Guerre, (Paris: IICI, 1939), 14.
291 Founoudkitis, "Introduction," 17.
292 The Court had been created as part of the League Covenants, although it was technically an advisory body outside
the League tree. ##
293 Visscher's reports were already cited in the OIM advisory work in Spain. See JF Sanchez-Canton, "Les Premibres
measures de defense du Prado au course de la guerre civile en Espagne," MouseionVol 39-40 (1937),65.
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wrote, "must be inspired by a frankly realist viewpoint."2 94 In this he was making the case that he
would later make in his Theory and Reality in International Law, that laws are not imposed forms, but
deduced norms. 295 In the case of art protection, "realism" meant that protection could not conflict
with military necessity.
The "idealist" position against which Visscher was positioning the convention had been
made clear at the second meeting of the Permanent Arts and Letters Committee in 1932, when CIC
president Gilbert Murray, declared that "if one is wise enough to spare monuments and works of art,
then it would be better to start by having the wisdom not to make war at all." 296 Murray was
responding to the suggestion that the Athens Conference resolutions should be complemented, in
light of "recent troubles in the change of political regime in Spain," by a recommendation
concerning protection of monuments in wartime. 297 But Murray was an idealist in EH Carr's sense of
the term: involved in the League's "Conference on Disarmament," he took the "perpetuation of
peace" as the only criterion for the League's work. In the 1939 Manual, Foudounkitis specifically cited
Disarmament work as the reason why the League Assembly had stopped short of including
provisions for wartime protection when ratifying the results of the Athens Conference. "It seemed
inopportune," he wrote apologetically, "to raise the question in a moment when all efforts tended
towards the establishment of a state of affairs that would eliminate war, and when the Conference
for Disarmament was so actively working towards this goal." 29 Similarly, after the episode of the
Spanish Civil War de Visscher had articulated a broadly-based defense of realism. There were two
forms of skepticism to an international convention. The first was the same as the one expressed by
Murray:
Some estimate that any new tentative to regulate the law of war is inopportune. Justly
engaged in the abolition of war itself, and hoping to inspire in public opinion the
greatest possible horror about war, they refuse to participate in a project whose avowed
object is to regulate its conduct and limit its destructive effects. 99
294 On de Visscher's life and career, see the special issue of European Journal of International Law, "The European tradition in
international law: Charles de Visscher," (2000) De Visscher, Manuel Technique etJuridique, 170.
295 Visscher particularly argued against the formalism of Hans Kelsen. See "The Gropings of Doctrine," in Charles de
Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law," trans. PE Corbett, (Princeton: PU Press, 1957).
296 Gilbert Murray, cited in J.F. Sanchez-Canton, Mouseoin p. 65
297 Indeed Spain triggered concern as early as 1931. At its 1931 meeting the OIM composed a press release titled
"Recent troubles in Spain and the Protection of Works of Art," noting the "alarming news" that "works of art had to
suffer during the troubles that marked the recent political changes" and publicizing a communique of the Spanish
Beaux-Arts condemning this damage. See "Activit6 de l'Office International des Mus6es," in Mouseion Vol 16 (1931),
107-108. Since these events had unfolded between the Athens Conference and its recommendations to the League
Assembly, questions had arisen as to the possibility of adding a "wartime" clause to the Athens Recommendations.
298 Foundoukidis, "Commentaire du Projet," in Manuel Technique etJuridique, 202.
299 Visscher, "Rapport Pr6liminaire pr6sent6 au comit6 de direction de l'Office International des Mus6es le 12 Octobre
1936 par le Professeur Charles de Visscher," in Manuel Technique etJuridique, 168.
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But Visscher outlined an ever graver objection, which had been commonly made after the
experience of World War I: that past experience showed that belligerent nations usually made a
point of breaking whatever regulations for war were in place. Here Visscher offered an expert
opinion that such violations "are to be attributed less-as had been thought-to a deliberate will and
rather more to the intervention of unforeseen and unexpected factors." Hence Visscher concluded
against "will" and in favor of "contingency". Against contingency, then, he proposed that one
should concentrate on "values whose preservation in wartime does not necessarily contradict the
military interest of belligerents. Values on the order of Humanity: the fate of prisoners and the
wounded. Values of an intellectual order: the protection of the artistic and historic patrimony of
civilized nations." Thus even in his deliberate realism Visscher granted the League's international and
collective "life of the mind" the same value that the International Committee of the Red Cross
granted to individual "life."
Having set a "realist" tone for the legal project, Visscher began exactly where the Athens
Conference had left off: by finding reasons to protect monuments in "the will of the people
themselves: "
It is certain, as the Assembly of the League of Nations recognized on 10 October 1932,
that "the surest guarantee for the conservation of monuments and works of art resides in
the respect and the attachment that is shown to them by the people themselves" and,
consequently, that any attempt at an international regulation in times of war will find its
most solid ground in the growing interest that has everywhere been arouse by the
conservation of art and of vestiges of the past. 300
But these attachments would prove effective source of public pressure in war only insofar as "they
are founded on a moral opinion of the world which, thankfully, is proving to be more and more
conscious, every day, of the human significance of witnesses of civilization." Setting out to compare
existing precedents, Visscher rejected the Hague Conventions of 1907 as obsolete since they relied on
a "localization" that distinguished between "defended" and "undefended" sites:
In reality, already in the last war the traditional distinction between "defended" and
"undefended" sites was rendered obsolete: in ground warfare, by the expansion of the
reach of canons; in naval warfare by the authorization of navies to destroy any objective
deemed military, and in aerial warfare by recent developments in military aviation.301
This "triple development," involving the expansion of warzones, the dispersal of military objectives,
and the extension of weapons, led Visscher to assume a territorial totality of war. Similarly, Visscher
300 Charles de Visscher, "Rapport Prdliminaire," 172.
301 Visscher, 140.
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rejected as "unrealistic" the Roerich Pact, signed at the Pan-American Union Conference in 1935,
because it relied on the assumption that one could "neutralize" certain locations altogether out of
war.302
Since the Hague Conventions were outdated and the Roerich Pact unrealistic, Visscher offered
two precedents as better starting points. The first was a study that the Dutch Archaeological Society
produced for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1918, to learn the lessons of World War I. The Dutch
jurists noted that measures for the protection of artworks and monuments had been more effective in
countries which had joined the conflict later than in those where the war began in August 1914. This
meant that war should no longer be seen as a punctual event: "the protection of art works in
wartime," was "also a mobilization that can no longer be improvised in military terms." Thus the
eventuality of war (including the specific fact that "modern wars "break out with thunderous
rapidity,") had to be built into peace-time protective measures. In what is perhaps the most direct
application of the principles of the "new diplomacy" to monument conservation, de Visscher
advocated that being equipped for the 'perpetuation' of peace prepared nations for the eventuality of
War.
Visscher's second example of a precedent adapted to the "new exigencies" of total war was a
set of "Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare" constructed in a Conference at The
Hague in 1923.303 This attempt to regulate aerial warfare unfolded against a backdrop of
improvement of bombing technologies and their testing against colonial rebellions by British, Italian
and Spanish governments. 30 4 It was the Italian delegates to who added to the basic set of interdictions
a provision for "signaling to military commanders the monuments or buildings which are to be
spared, as well as the presence of certain points on the territory of depositories where works of art
would be gathered." This proposed convention was never made law, in large part because of a
disagreement between US and UK delegations over what exactly was to be "spared" from the
bombing. The UK wanted to restrict air attacks by using a functionalist concept of "military
objective," while the US commission preferred the geographically specific "combat area." While the
US won the fight and the convention text was phrased in geographic terms, the UK and France were
dissatisfied enough that the regulation never was approved by the League Assembly. Still, Visscher
vaunted the "realism" of these provisions, which gave "concrete and detailed dispositions, inspired
302 Visscher, 170.
303 James W. Garner, "Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare," in The American Journal of International Law,
(Jan., 1924), 56-81.304 For a brief account of these, see Sven Lindquist, A History of Bombing (New York: New Press, 2001), 48-49.
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by a concern for conciliating international monuments protection with the inevitable exigencies of
war.
The Hague provisions, which de Visscher cited extensively, reflect the spatial orientation of
the US conception: they delimit an "area of protection" around monuments, and give specific
dimensions and for using "flares" to demarcate monuments and the space around them:
Article 26
1. Any state will have the to establish an area of protection around monuments on its
territory, In times of war these zones will be shielded from bombardments.
3. The area of protection can include, in addition to the space occupied by the
monument or the group of monuments, a surrounding zone whose width is no more
than 500 meters from the outer periphery of this space.3"'
Here again the designation of the "open space" around monuments became the basis for the
delineation of a "surrounding zone" of political autonomy. It is clear that, while the convention was
never enacted between states, the prominence of this spatial idea in the manual influenced those like
Paul J. Sachs and WG Constable who first proposed that the Allied Air Forces mark monuments on
their target maps. 306 While De Visscher admitted that the specifics of the regulations might need to
be revised in light of technological advances, he still heralded them for being "inspired by a realist
spirit" and cited them in their entirety in the Manual.
By singling out these two precedents De Visscher repeated the pattern that had been
established in Athens: one plan provided for the "regularization" of protective measures in peace-
time; the other was a specific project for an "international accord" by which the specific endeavors
would be regulated. The idealism of one (regulation) was offset by the realism of the other
(international convention.) 307 Lastly, then, Visscher emphasized a specific mode of action: that a
group of "disinterested international experts" be designated to oversee the implementation of the
convention and arbitrate any disputes. While the 1923 convention proposed that these be appointed
by each state, as a kind of monument-diplomat, de Visscher went further, asking that these neutral
experts be centralized into a single international institution, which would act as a "neutral control
committee" (commission neutre de surveillance):
It seems that this neutral overseeing committee should belong to a central institution.
Named by this institution, its members would inspire more confidence in the
305 As cited in Ch. De Visscher, 173
306 Paul Sachs' personal copy of the manual is now kept in the Harvard Libraries. Correspondance shows WG Constable
recievd his copy in England before emigrating to the US in 1936.
307 Visscher, 173.
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belligerents; they would receive from this commission both instructions for their own
actions and the assurance of protection. 30 s
Visscher prepared the ground for monuments to be protected from a double "totality" of war:
spatial totality, totality over time. But by relying on a neutral "central organ" to implement this
totalizing norm, forgetting to incorporate the psychological totality of "the people's value" upon
which he had, taking a cue from the Athens Conference, based his entire project. As we will see in
Chapter II, it is towards the incorporation of this third "totality" that most of the work of the war-
time monuments' committees would be devoted to: asserting an authority to implement these
protective spatial measures without the institutional neutrality ensured by the League.
What is the connection between the Problime de l'Ogive and the Technical Manual? One answer can
be found in the archives of British art historian WG Constable, who was on the editorial board of one
(Recherche) and whose annotated copy of the other (Technical Manual) are in the archives of the US Air
Force. In 1943 Constable composed a Manual for the US Army, title Field Protection of Objects of Art and
Archives, which cited as inspiration "the American Red Cross First Aid Textbook," and described "the
Importance of safeguarding monuments" as follows:
Safeguarding cultural monuments will not feed hungry people nor give them physical
security; but it will affect the relations of armies with the peoples whose countries they
occupy... It will show respect for their beliefs, the culture and the customs of all men, it
will bear witness that the cultural heritage of any particular group or society is also the
cultural heritage of all mankind, and it will lay a firm basis for activity in the arts the
sciences and learning after the war. 9"'
What is striking in this paragraph is how self-evidently Constable conjoined the three spheres of
international action that intellectual cooperation had kept so arduously separate: the parallel between
humanitarian "life of individuals" and the humanistic "life of the mind;" the assertion that
monuments contain a "cultural heritage" that transcends national boundaries; and, perhaps most
importantly, the notion that war is but one event in a continuum of learned activity and monumental
"maintenance."
Indeed if the Technical Manuel de Protection is the greatest contribution left by the League to
postwar heritage discourse, it was hardly the legacy that the protagonists of intellectual cooperation
had hoped to leave behind. League proponents-political idealists like Zimmern and Murray, but
also cultural figures like Val&ry and Focillon-all sought to create moral norms of temperance and
308 De Visscher, 179.
309 War Department, Civil Affairs Information Guide: Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives, (War Department: 12 May 1944).
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liberalism, not technical rules for the legislation of objects. Each side arrived at architecture's ability
to represent "agreement" from opposite sides of the gap that separated political and aesthetic realms.
Political idealists began with an assumption of popular value, and derived from this value the
(ultimately aesthetic) rules for monument preservation. The cultural critics, on the other hand, began
with formalist criticism and tried to extract from it some rules for temperate behavior for an
(ultimately political) liberalism. That the "international value of monuments" was launched in a
thoroughly bifurcated sphere can be seen in the first publication that the OIM published when the
war ended, in 1946: an index of Mouseoin covering the all 50 issues published between 1927 and
1940, where the following sequence can be found under the letter "H":
Humanisation de la guerre / Humanization of war
Humidification de F'air et airation dans les musies / Humidification and circulation of air in
museums. 310
In linking aesthetics and politics-the "will to art" and the "will to war, "--intellectual cooperation
hoped that the space of art would produce a revival of humanism, while the space of war would be
regularized into obsolescence. What happened instead was the reverse: war was humanized and art
rendered entirely technical.
Epilogue: on Representation
The goal of this chapter has been to ask how monuments entered the bureaucracy of
intellectual cooperation, and to detect the answer in an intricate nesting of committees that was
created in response to political events within and without the League. On the one hand, I have
argued, monuments appeared to be natural sites of cooperation, which offered an uncontroversial
opportunity for administrative coordination between nations. On the other hand, an intricate
discourse was woven around monuments so that their value would fit within the idealist parameters
of intellectual cooperation. Thus broadly conceived notions of "form" and "space" were theorized
as media for international political autonomy. Of course form and space had already been
conceptualized, throughout the second half of the 19th Century, as the sources for a new art- and
architectural modernity. In the context of the League, however, the form-space discursive construct
was called upon to establish a double analogy between political and aesthetic realms: a legal analogy
(where form is regulated by aesthetic "laws," which are adjudicated by critics); and a diplomatic
analogy (where artworks are delegates of constituencies, whose cultural conflicts they "stabilize").
The presumed universal validity of aesthetic judgment, then, could be harnessed to educate people's
10 "Index Alphabktique des matieres," in Mouseion: Index des volumes 1 a 50 (Paris: OIM, 1945), 61.
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political instincts: criticism would teach people to "defer judgment," museums would teach them to
"compare," and monuments would teach them to "respect." This is what I have called the "politics
of form."
Demonstrating that this politics of form was a politics at all is rendered difficult by the
premise of intellectual cooperation: that any explicitly "political" speech should be avoided. This
tactic-literal detachment to demonstrate liberal engagement-also means that these episodes fit
uncomfortably in the intellectual history of interwar Europe, with its patterns of exile and resistance.
Indeed the "engaged intellectual" is a familiar figure of 20' Century cultural history, whose
detachment from his homeland is a source of political lucidity and critical insight (think Benjamin,
Adorno, Said). The institutions of intellectual cooperation crossed path with some of these figures (it
was Thomas Mann who declared "My homeland is where I am") but they were mostly attended by
a different type of intellectual, who sought a political engagement that was geographically grounded
and institutionally centered. These figures (Valery, Focillon, Argan) adopted a bureaucratic tongue as
a viable mode of discourse, and accepted institutional cooperation as a viable mode of authorship.
While most of them stood in some accord with national political leaders, they also encountered a
problem typical of the new breed of diplomats that had been created by the League of Nations: the
problem of representing a nation, as an individual, without having been chosen by its population.
The League of Minds never took seriously its role as a political "representation." How its
actions were supposed to impact the international "world court of public opinion" was never
discussed; instead it compulsively set itself apart by pointing out its imperviousness to political
ideology. Thus the discussion of ideas among intellectuals was supposed to be intrinsically different
from the propagation of these same ideas within the masses. Note the deadpan way Ugo Ojetti
declared that guiding "the life of the Mind" in no way required "changing one's mind":
Our conversations are not made to change the ideas of those who take part in them. I
even think that the participants emerge more convinced of the fundamental correctness
of their thesis and the error of their adversaries.... You can only change the opinion of
men who are in bad faith or men who have no culture. By asking questions of the men
who spoke before me, I have no intention of changing their opinions. 3 ,
Ojetti's disclaimer was aimed at Josef Strzygowski, a man who, more than any other, embodies the
conflation of intellectual autonomy with political ideology. Yet the absurdity of the theatrical model
of the "League of Minds" was only ever addressed in jest, as when Duhamel sarcastically suggested
311 Ugo Ojetti, in L'Art et la Rialit6, 51.
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that all "the Mind" could do was to project a conciliatory optimism, issuing the Resolution: "The
Committee, after having been convened for four days, contends that all is well.""'
The only committees to debate the political mediation of "the life of the mind" with any
specificity, I argued, were made of art and architectural historians, who contributed to the new
diplomacy's political representation a theory of aesthetic representation. Ironically, these were figures
who customarily attract accusations of detachment within their disciplines: Meyer Schapiro accused
Focillon of constructing "a formalist universe"; Tafuri chastised Giovannoni for achieving a "kind of
autonomy, a detachment from general history,"31 3 and even Strzygowski's attachment to the
"germanic spirit" has been read as proof that he was 'out of touch' with reality. Their involvement in
the League shows that they intentionally cultivated this detachment, in search for a political and
disciplinary modernity based on the autonomous development of monuments and their milieu. It is
this same project that allowed Strzygowski, Giovannoni and Focillon to make such crucial
contributions to the growth of architectural history as a discipline in their home countries. These
figures thought they were discovering a new field of agency, where distinctions between historical
agency and critical interpretation was no longer necessary, as long as historical judgments were
imbued with contemporary value.
If these committees offered the League an analogy between political freedom and aesthetic
judgments, what intellectual cooperation promised in return was to deal with a single problem: the
perceived accumulation of new "monuments" since the last decades of the 1 9 Century. In art-
historical discourse, the proliferation of artifacts to be analyzed was accompanied by an unchecked
progress of "positivist" methods. Thus the OIAHA hoped to establish an international critical eye and
codify comparative methods in order to establish hierarchies between all these artifacts. In
Strzygowski's words, "the role of art history is to contribute to the concentration and the conciliation
of these various monuments, and guide them in a spiritual direction"314 In conservation discourse,
the accumulation of ever more "monuments" in the rosters of European nations was accompanied
by an increasing failure of state mechanisms to assume responsibility for their conservation. Thus the
Athens Conference was meant in part to distribute responsibility for care among political
constituencies. All this talk of accumulation certainly resonates with the concerns of contemporary
multi-culturalism, but it is also important to note how strikingly canonical the "monuments" in
question were, from a 2 1st Century perspective. The OIAHA's most oft-cited examples of fields
312 Duhamel, in Le Destin Prochain des Lettres, 190.
313 "Manfredo Tafuri su Giovannoni," excerpt from a 1994 interview republished in Casabella (Apr 1996), 73.
31) Sztrygowski, 71. "L'Avenir des MWthodes de Recherche en Matibre des Beaux Arts."
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which had been "excluded" from the canons were "Gothic Architecture" and "Egyptian art."
Similarly, the Athens Conference debated the conservation of monuments which are now world-
famous and project the image of being under perpetual maintenance: the Pantheon in Rome, the
Parthenon in Athens, and the Alhambra in Spain.
Despite their disciplinary kinship and institutional proximity within the League, these two
poles of aesthetic idealism--popular, 'ready-made' idealism and learned, 'critical' idealism--were
never conjoined. Instead, I have shown, each committee replayed the disciplinary debates that were
already unfolding in national contexts, to little international effect. There is, however, one turn-of-
the century debate that was notably not replayed on the international stage, although it concerned
precisely how a "Geistesgechichte" could be harnessed to manage the modern phenomenon that Alois
Riegl termed "The Cult of Monuments" (Denkmalkultus). In light of the revival of Riegl's Kunstwollen by
the League's art historians, the fact that his work on monuments, which was imbued by the same
cosmopolitan Kunstwollen, was never referred to is of interest. A brief look is warranted here.
Riegl's Denkmalkultus essay, written in 1903 when he was the director of the Austrian
Monuments Commission, has always triggered a kind of melancholia in historians of 20th-century
heritage. Even as these historians trace the filiations between various thinkers and the gradual
formation of national administrations, they express a fundamental longing for an alternate scenario:
a history of heritage that would end with World Heritage but would begin with Riegl's Denkmalkutus,
which prefigures so many of the postwar developments in international heritage. To cite two
examples, Choay found in Riegl's work the "germination of future interrogations" and bemoaned it
"could have constituted the basis for practices and pedagogies of the historical monument;"315 Mario
Frigo reads in Riegl's legal project an "extraordinary modernity," which was only manifested in
reality in the 1954 Hague Convention.316 Instead of discovering their origins in the Athens
Conference (with its technocratic tone), contemporary heritages wishes it could legitimately trace its
roots to Riegl's Cult of Monuments (with its elegant aesthetic theory).
The "modernity" of Riegl's text lies in the way it places monuments in a relative system
based on scales of dichotomous values (intentional/unintentional, historic/ artistic, newness/age,
etc.). While some of these values are contained in monumental forms, the system is designed to
account mainly for the social and psychological values, which are projected onto the monuments. In
3s5 Choay, I'Alligorie du Patrimoine, 126.
316 Mario Frigo, "Sul progetto di legge per la riorganizzazione della tutela dei monumenti in Austria del 1903," in
Sandro Scarrocchia, ed., Alois Riegl: Teoria e Prassi della Conservazione dei Monumenti Antologia di Scritti, discorsi, rapporti 1898-
1905, con una scelta di saggi critici (Bologna: Accademia Clementina, 1995), 499.
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fact Riegl described the cult as "socialistic", the political character of his language has been under-
examined: the cult unfolded as a series of "conflicts" between "values," and this language of
conflict lead Riegl to use term Kunstwollen as if it denoted a living political constituency whose
attentions must be courted.317
More to the point, what has been overlooked is that Riegl's essay was only the preamble to a
legal project, a "Project for a Legislative Organization of Conservation in Austria", which had been
commissioned by the Austrian Government. The famous ending of the Cult of Monuments essay--its
call for incorporating "the farthest-reaching interests of the public," was in fact not an ending but a
beginning. It was immediately followed by a text on protective laws, which opened with this
question: "Why has not been hitherto in Austria a protective conservation law, and why has it
become necessary, in this moment, to introduce such a law?""318 Riegl found the answer in the rise
of "age-value" in the public imagination. Previously monuments had been valued only by
sentiments that were "national-egoistical, state-egoistical," which is to say, based on an experience
of "isolation" between cities, empires and nationalities." In contrast, Riegl wrote, "the sentiment of
age-value, is based on a solidarity with the entire world. ... This is a universal sentiment." He
therefore concluded that an Austrian protective law had not yet been devised because this sentiment
had not yet reached the level of universality to compete with the "contemporary value" placed on
the built environment. It was only now, that this universal feeling become "pervasive and
socialistic," that a law was warranted:
Today a law protecting monuments in Austria has become a necessity, because today
everyone considers monuments to have age-value, and any offense against this age value
is considered as painful as the desecration of symbols of faith. ... The resurgence of age-
value is but another aspect of a broader social movement. In a monument we find
something that concerns us all, without exception, and which therefore must be
removed from the hands of individual interests. This social characteristic is
complemented by an objective side of things-that age value remains independent from
other values, as those of the material, technique, or artistic and historic content. In other
words, from the point of view of age value, all monuments are equal.
Riegl's notion of age value has attracted as much theoretical speculation in heritage discourse as the
Kunstwollen in art history. Indeed the two concepts are related: the "conflict" between "age value and
newness value" can be understood as a fight for the attention of "the modern Kunswollen." Yet again
"3 "Here a true conflict between newness-value and age-value arises which surpasses all previous conflicts in sharness and
implacability. Newness-value is indeed the most formidable opponent of age-value;" "it would appear that we are
facing an irresolvable conflict." "a monument has to appeal to the modem Kunstwollen," and or can "appeal downright
ugly in the view of the modem Kunstwollen.")Alois Riegl, "The Modem Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its
Origins," trans. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo in Oppositions 644.
318 The second half of the text has not been translated into English. Translations above are from the Italian republication:
Alois Riegl, "La Legge di Tutela dei Monumenti," in Scarrocchia, ed., Alois Riegl: Teoria e Prassi, 208.
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few have noted the national/international distinction that Riegl used to define the term: "artistic and
historic" values were nationalist, whereas "age-value" was international.
In 1905 Riegl made this distinction between national and international values even clearer
when he engaged in a debate with German conservationist Georg Dehio. Dehio had made a very
public argument that monuments should be legislated because they were "a part of national life." 319
Riegl responded to this lecture in a 1905 review article on "new tendencies in monument
conservation." He endorsed Dehio's thesis that "in front of a monument, the interest of the
collectivity supervenes in immeasurable ways the interest of the individual," but he protested that
nationalism was a form of egotism and an unsuitable basis for law. Nationalism was an illusion
adopted by those who were afraid of the irrationality of their own attachment:
The modern cultured man does not want to admit that the sentiment he feels in front of
a monument is not immediately explainable: he deludes himself into thinking that the
monument pleased him because it was beautiful or historically interesting. This is also
the direction that Dehio takes: that it is a national conscience that moves the cult of
monuments, because this conscience is based on a common belonging to race and
constituted an effectively universal factor.
Instead of masking egoism with nationalistic pride, Riegl described a far-reaching metaphysical
longing, "a feeling of humanity" (Menschheitsgeffiihl):
It is a sentiment both irresistible and imperious that pushes us to the cult of
monuments, not aesthetic or historic passion. ... Monuments fascinate us as testimonies
of the fact that the collective of which we are a part was alive and productive for such a
long time before us.
Any law could only be founded on a sentiment that is akin to a religious feeling,
independent of any aesthetic of historic specialization, and free of any rational
consideration--a feeling that is such that, the lack of its respect would be felt as
unbeable.320
In fact, Riegl thought that Dehio's nationalist rhetoric hurt his own preservationist agenda, which he
had encapsulated in his slogan "Conserve, don't restore," (Konservieren, nicht restorieren). The "weak
spot" in Dehio's polemic was that "national feeling" was still a "specialized" value which could
therefore be "restored" specifically, rather than being the reason for a generalist ethic of
"conservation."
From this cursory overview it should be clear why Riegl's Denkmalkultus has become a favorite
reference as a precursor for late-20f Century heritage discourse. Every component of his theory
31 The texts of the debate are republished as Alois Riegl & Georg Dehio, Konservieren, Nicht Restaurieren: Streitschriften zur
Denkmalpflege um 1900 (Wiesbaden: Vierweg, 1988). Dehio made this speech in Strasbourg and in the presence of
political authority, and therefore the in speech that now stands as a marker of preservation's disciplinary formation, and
its connection with German politics.
320 Riegl, "Le tendenze nella conservazione," 295.
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legitimates an international valuation: the "feeling of humanity," its collective articulation, its ability
to raise the "unbearable feelings" in the masses-all of these are what the expression "cultural
heritage of mankind" was supposed to embody. That he developed this theory in a public debate,
over the relative value of national and international legislation, makes its absence in the League's
work all the more conspicuous. Nor was this a case of academic obscurity; as Rudy Koshar has
noted, by the first half of the 20th Century "the German cult of monuments had an international
profile." 321 Why, then was it conspicuously absent from Athens, and from Intellectual Cooperation?
Two answers can be ventured here. The first is that Riegl's theory was sacrificed to the
institutional tree of intellectual cooperation, and the way it reflected a disciplinary and
historiographic feud between Rome and Vienna. Strzygowski (Riegl's student, who disagreed with
him vehemently but shared his methods), was not interested in preservation. Giovannoni (who was
the most influential of the restorationists) was not interested in any theory outside those linked to
Renaissance Rome.322 The second answer is that insofar as a historiographic trail exists of Rieglian
influence, it dead-ends into Germany. For example, the work of Bonn conservationist Paul Clemen
appears in Paul de Visscher's notes of for the project of an international Convention in 1936, but
Clemen disappears.32 Indeed insofar as institutional discontinuities at the League were due to a local
feud between Vienna and Rome, Germany had developed a national conservation discourse that
overcame the provincialism of this debate and struck an administrative compromise between
national and universal valuations. This German discourse would have been an apt model for
international action. Yet the Athens Conference took place after most of the League's "technical
subcommittees" had been depleted of German participation. Only two German conservationists
attended. By the time the Monuments Committee was formed, Germany had withdrawn from the
League. In this sense, the theoretical absence of Riegl from 20th Century international conservation
discourse can reasonably be linked to the political "failure of the League." Ye this is not to say that a
Riegl-centric scenario can reasonably be imagined. If Riegl's work on monuments had been
purposely introduced into intellectual cooperation, it is likely that his theories, like Freud's, would
have been turned on their head. Given the chance, Charles de Visscher would have undoubtedly
argued against Riegl's conception of law, which was as formalist as his art-historical method and
32" Rudy Koshar, "On Cults and Cultists," in Giving Preservation a History, ed. Max Page & Randall Mason (New York:
Routledge, 2004.), 49.
322 See Tafuri's specific assertion that Giovannoni would not have known of Riegl and found the implication that he
should distasteful. In "Manfredo Tafuri su Giovannoni."
323 Max Dvo•tk, Katechismus der Denkmalpflege, (Wien : J. Bard, 1916); Paul Clemen, Aufgaben und arbeiten des kunstschutzes im
weltkriege (Leipzig, J.A. Barth, 1921); cited in Charles de Visscher, Technical Manual, Op. Cit., 141.
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stood as an "idealist" counterpart for the "realist" vision that he successfully institutionalized.3 24 This
is a subtle but important distinction. Contemporary heritage discourse thinks of the "conference
model" as the reality of preservation and "international law" as its universalizing ideal. Yet primary
lesson of the diplomatic history of monuments in intellectual cooperation is that monuments entered
international organizations the other way around: conference diplomacy became the international
"form" of monuments, and international law became their normative reality. This was,
undoubtedly, a failure of the politics of form.
324 Riegl's legal project bears rhetorical and conceptual similarities with that of Viennese scholar Hans Kelsen, who
argued that international law was a path towards international peace, and against whom de Visscher worked arduously
while on the Permanent Court. See Danilo Zolo, "Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law," in
International Law Journal (1992), and de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, Op. Cit.
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FIG. 1.01 Creation of "Arts & Letters" Committees over time. Diagram by the Author.
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FIG. 1.02 The CIC at work in the 1920s.
FIG. 1.03 The IICI at Palais-Royal, Paris.
FIG. 1.04 Josef Strzygowski, ca 1930.
FIG. 1.05 Paul Valery, ca 1922.
FIG. 1.06 Henri Focillon, 1939.
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FIG. 1.08 "Re-organization of Museums"
in Mousejon, 1934-1939.
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FIG. 1.13 Museographie, 1934.
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FIG. 1.15 Images shown at the Athens Conference, c. 1937
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List of Members of the
INTERNATIONAL COAMMISSION ON HISTORICAL MONUMENTS
(International Museums Office) (1)
Algeria : M. Eug~ne ALBarNs•, Inspector of Algerian Antiquities, Pro-
fessor at the Colg ied France; Australia : Mr. Kenneth BRrNs, Librarian
of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Canberra ; Austria : Dr.
Leodegar PETs•s, President of the Bundesdenkmalamt; Brazil: M. Gustavo
BAnoso, Director of the National History Museum, Rio de Janeiro, member
of the Brazilian Academy of Letters ; China : Mr. Li Kr, President of the
Preparatory Committee of the National Central Museum ; CZechoslovakia:
M. Josef CrauLcx, Professor of Theology at Prague University ; Denmark:
Dr. N. MACKEPRANO, Director of the Danish National Museum ; Esonia :
M. Gottlieb NY, Director at the Ministry of Public Education ; France :
M .G. HusmAN, Director-General of Fine Arts; Greece: MA. G. OIxoNoMos,
Director of the Archeological Service ; Hungary : m. Tiberius Grnevrrcn,
Vice-President of the Commission on Historical Monuments, President of
the Hungarian Society of Archbology and History of Art; India: Mr. Daya
Ram SxNrs, Director-General of Archiology ; Irish Free Slate. Mr. H. G.
LEASK, Inspector of National Monuments ; Ialy : H. E. Roberto PARTrENI,
Formerly Director-General of Antiquities and Fine Arts, Member of the
Italian Royal Academy Japan : Mr. S. KKUSAwA, Director of Religious
Affairs at the Ministry of Public Education, Head of the Historical Monu-
ments Department; Latvia : Dr. Francis BALODIS, President of the Ancient
Monuments Of4ice ; Luxemburg : M. Paul Wroz•ux, Principal Government
Architect ; Mexico : Dr. Alfonso CAso, Director of the Mexican National
Museum of Archaeology ; Morocco: M. G. Hfls•kN, Director-General of Fine
Arts, France; Netherlands: Dr. J. KALF, Director of the Bureau of Historical
Monuments ; Poland : M. Georges REMuER, Chief Curator at the Ministry
for Worship and Public Education ; M. Alfred LAUTEURBAC (deputy mem-
ber), Director of State Art Collections ; Portugal Dr. Jose ~ Fziouz•Do,
President of the Academy of Fine Arts, Director of the Museum of Early
Art, Member of the Lisbon Academy of Science ; Roumania : M. N. JooA,
Former Prime Minister, President of the Commission on WIstorical Monu-
ments ; Spain : M. Eduardo CUJcaiao, Director-General of Fine Arts ;
Switzerland: Professor Albert No&ut, President of the Federal Commission
on Historical Monuments ; Syria : M. Pierre COUPnL, Architect of the Anti-
quities Department ; United Kingdom: Mr. J. S. RtcnuaisoN, Inspector
of Ancient Monuments for Scotland; United Stales: Dr. Arno B. CAMMERETR,
Director of the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior,
Washington.
(1) List of members drawn up at the beginning of 1935.
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FIG. 1.16 International Commission on Historical Monuments, 1935.
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FIG. 1.17 Les Arts et les Lettres a la Socidt6 des Nations, Paris, 1930.
FIG. 1.18 Entretiens: Entretiens sur Goethe, Frankfurt, 1932.
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FIG. 1.19 Entretiens: L'Avenir de la Culture, Madrid, 1932.
FIG. 1.20 Entretiens: L'Avenir De L'Esprit Europ6en, Paris, 1933.
LIMBURG
HUIZINGA BROENDAL
Institut International de Cooperation Intellectuelle
LUAVENIR DE UESPRIT EUROPEEN (Paris, 1933)
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FIG. 1.21 Entretiens: Civilisations: L'art et la R6alitd, /'Art et I'Etat, Venice, 1934.
FIG. 1.22 Entretiens: La Formation de L'Homme Moderne, Nice, 1935.
DESTREE STROMBER
ZIMMERN MANN
OLLLA FORMATION DE 'HOMME MODERNE (Nice, 1935)[ROMAINS STRZYGOWSKI
Institut International de Cooperation Intellectuelle
LA FORMATION DE L'HOMME MODERNE (Nice, 1935)
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FIG. 1.23 Entretiens: Europe - Am6rique Latine, Buenos Aires, 1936.
FIG. 1.24 Le Destin Prochain des Lettres, Paris, 1937.
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FIG. 1.26 Correspondance: La Socidt6 des Esprits, 1932.
FIG. 1.27 Correspondance: Warum Krieg?, 1932.
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FIG. 1.28 Correspondance: L'Esprit, I'Ethique de la Guerre, 1933.
FIG. 1.29 Correspondance: Civilisations: Orient-Occident; G6nie du Nord-Latinit6, 1934.
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FIG. 1.34 La Protection Des Monuments et CEuvres d'Art en Temps de Guerre, 1939.
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Chapter 2
Protected Monuments
American art history and European cities in war, 1943-1945
That cities have acquired the iconic value once reserved for monuments has recently been
evidenced in the creation of a new category to designate their destruction: the category of
"urbicide."' The contemporary discourse on urbicide blends an ethical concern for human rights
into its aesthetic readings of urban destruction, to arrive at a definition of cities as autonomous forms
of cultural and political "representation." This definition has reignited a long-standing debate over
what happened to European cities in the Second World War: did they "die", along with millions of
their inhabitants whose homes were deliberately bombed? Or did they "survive", since they were
largely rebuilt on their existing footprints? Phrased in these humanitarian terms, these questions seem
to resonate with renewed urgency. Indeed urbicide, defined broadly as the modern killing of cities,
was coined at the end of a century when large-scale, spectacular destruction became a norm of
urban warfare and urban planning alike. In this climate, it is easy to forget that such destruction was
already an integral component of urbanism, defined in the early 2 0th century as the planning of
modern cities.2 Undoubtedly, World War II solidified this integration. The conflict broke out when
urbanism was in its infancy, and the objecthood of Europe's cities belonged chiefly to their
monuments. By 1945, the "European city" itself had emerged as an object, albeit one in ruins. This
ruined object now stands as the prototype for a theory of urban iconoclasm in the 20 th century, yet
its architectural characteristics have yet to be elaborated.3 Thus the truism that the "totality" of
modern war manifested itself in the legible form of a tabula rasa has been left unverified. This chapter
addresses this truism, by looking at the monuments that were still standing among the ruins in 1945.
The discourse on "urbicide" gathers geographically disparate areas of research under a single theoretical umbrella:
post-Soviet Balkan cities, post-colonial Middle Eastern cities, and post-war American urban renewal. See the conference
Urbicide: The Killing Of Cities (Nov 2005) whose proceedings will be published in the journal Theory and Event, as well as The
Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal as Ethnic Cleansing Ed. Michael Jones (South Bend: Indiana Press, 2004).
2 The "planning" referred to here is not that of Europe's distinguished lineage of ideal cities (Plato's Republic, or
Filarete's Sforzinda) and urban transformations (Baroque Rome, Haussmann's Paris). It is rather the technocratic
instrument, prescribing formal rules for future expansion, that was institutionalized Europe-wide in the 1910s.
"Urbanism" was first chronicled in Leonardo Benevolo, Le Origini dell'urbanistica (1963), anthologized in Franýoise Choay,
Urbanismes: Utopies et Rbalites (Paris: Seuil, 1965), and polemicized in Manfredo Tafuri, Progetto e Utopia (Milano: Laterza,
1973).
' Recent works on iconoclasm address its 2 0 th century transformations: Dario Gamboni's The Destruction of Art: Iconoclasm and
Vandalism since the French Revolution (New Haven: Yale, 1997) asks whether "the image of disorder must really remain a
disorder," while Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel's Iconoclash: Beyond the Images Wars in Science, Religion and Art (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2003) provides a taxonomy of iconoclastic intentions and their political effects.
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These have only ever been treated as fortuitous survivors, passive recipients of the opportunism of
wartime strategists and postwar architects. Instead, I investigate their aesthetic and ethical
predicament as "protected" objects, by examining the way the Allies excerpted them from their
bombings of Western Europe, cared for them during their occupation, and facilitated their survival
through even the most radical of reconstructions. The agents of this protection were the members of
the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, also known
as the Roberts Commission: a group of art historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, curators, museum
directors, and architects, who volunteered to help the US Army "avoid" Europe's monuments and
were, to their own surprise, recruited to the task.
Between 1943 and 1945, over a hundred and sixty scholars were enlisted into the Roberts
Commission, to produce lists and maps of monuments to be "protected" in the US's aerial
campaigns, first in Europe, then in the Pacific Theater. As a civilian agency in Washington, the
Roberts Commission was composed of prominent cultural figures such as former Librarian of
Congress Archibald MacLeish and National Gallery director David Finley (fig 2.01). However, this
official body resulted from the merging of more informal "Monuments Committees" from two
volunteer organizations. On the one hand, a committee of the American Defense-Harvard Group, headed by
Harvard Fogg Museum director Paul J. Sachs, enlisted sixty-one scholars in a list-making project
headquartered in Cambridge. On the other hand, a committee of the American Council of Learned Societies,
headed by archaeologist William Bell Dinsmoor, had the collaboration of over a hundred scholars to
make maps in New York. (figs 2.02-3) Together these two committees mobilized a veritable who's who
of American art history, from luminaries to graduate students. Over the span of two years, they
produced one 50-page "List of Monuments" for every country involved in war, with the exception
of the US, Britain and the USSR. (fig. 2.04) These lists were annotated with a system of "stars" to
indicate relative importance of monuments, and prefaced with "Introductions" describing each
country's valuation of them. Reduced to 25-page "Short Lists," they were appended with maps and
published by the Army as Civil Affairs Handbooks and Atlas Supplements (figs. 2.05-7). The maps were also
translated into target maps for US Air Force pilots, annotated with instructions on "how to miss
cultural sites." (figs. 2.08-9) The implementation of this policy on the ground was ensured by the
creation of the Monuments, Fine Arts & Archives Division (MFA&A) of the Army, headed by an
architect, Col. Henry Newton, and composed of soldiers with art-historical expertise. The mission of
the MFA&A was to protect monuments from the ground, and provide "first aid" in case of damage .
Finally, the Commission organized a lecture tour of the universities for officers in training. The
Roberts Commission eventually collaborated with its British counterpart, the McMillan Commission.
Under the combined mandate of the inter-allied Vaucher Commission, members of both became
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involved in the Conference of Allied Ministers (CAME) which led to the formation of UNESCO, and
after the war other members transitioned into an involvement with issues of restitution and
reconstruction. Although the existence of the Roberts Commission has been acknowledged, the
immense volume of material it produced has never been approached as a cohesive body of work-
whether as product of an unprecedented disciplinary collaboration, or as instrument of a protective
mandate of unprecedented scale.
My purpose in examining the Allied policy of monument protection is to not verify its
efficacy, but rather to ask whether it constitutes a mitigation, or an integral part of the concept of
"total war." For this reason, I do not recount the chronological progress of Europe's tabula rasa, but
only its prophetic conjuring as an emblem of totality, in war and in modernism. Chroniclers of
destruction have perfected a "Short World War History of Architecture" that locates spared and
damaged monuments along the war's unprecedented crescendo of destruction, from Warsaw to
Hiroshima.4 Retracing this timeline here would be all the more redundant, however, in light of my
second caveat: that I only account for one side of the story of monuments at war, the Allied side. I
do not follow the development of Axis policies on art-the creation of the Kunstschutz, the treatment
of so-called degenerate art, the dilemmas of restitution-except as they were perceived by the Allies,
with their avowed goal of "combating totalitarianism," and their willingness to detect in this
totalitarianism a symptom of aestheticism gone awry. Scholarly literature on Nazi art policies tends
to retrace a narrative arc that the Allies already constructed in wartime: to cite a 1946 account, from
"Hitler's Aesthetic Intuition" to "Nazi Looters Act According to a Plan" ' Like Walter Benjamin in the
1930s, throughout the war the Allies diagnosed as a trademark of fascism the tendency "to
experience humanity's own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure." 6 The fear of this tendency-more
so, I argue, than the fear of destruction itself-was the key trigger for the creation of the Allies'
policy of protection, and a constant foil in its perpetuation.
Haunted by the looming totality of war, and racing against their enemy's "rendering
aesthetic"7 of it, the scholars charged by the Allies with protecting monuments were constantly faced
4 This title heads the second chapter in Nicola Lambourne's War Damage in Western Europe: the Destruction of Historic Monuments
During the Second World War (Edinburgh University Press, 2001), which gives a comprehensive overview of Axis and Allied
policies, including a paragraph on the Commission. Lambourne's scope is international, but continues a lineage of
national surveys, cf. Paul Leon's La Vie des Monuments Franpais: Destruction, Restauration (Paris: Picard, 1951).
' These two phrases head the first and last chapter of George Mihan's Looted Treasure: Germany's Raid on Art, Alliance Press,
1945. Recent research gives a more nuanced, though hardly more forgiving, view of the Kunstschutz: Lynn Nicholas' The
Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (New York: Vintage, 1994) accounts for
both sides. See also Degenerate Art: the fate of the avant-garde in Nazi Germany (New York: Abrams, 1991). As for restitution,
recent de-classifications have prompted research that promises to implicate Allied actors in Nazi smuggling schemes.
6 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," trans. Harry Zohn, in Illuminations (New
York: Schoken, 1968), 242. Benjamin famously countered that "communism responds by policitizing art."
' Ibid., 242.
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with the question of whether they, too, were "acting according to a plan." It is this question of
historical agency that guides my research-a question that posed itself all the more vividly since the
pre-war discourse of intellectual cooperation had completely failed to address it. Intellectual
cooperation, as described in Chapter 1, presented no plan for military intervention, and relied on an
institutional and epistemological framework that quickly dissolved at the outbreak of war. When the
occasion for protection arose, the conditions for its implementation had radically changed, under the
terms of the Allied Military Government. Most obviously, the material prepared by the IICI was
uselessly encyclopedic: at war, art-historical knowledge had to pass through the disciplinary filter of
American academia to be codified as useful civilian expertise. Similarly, legal instruments prepared
in the pre-war now needed to become active political agent in planning future reconstruction. In
other words, while the creation of the Roberts Commission qualifies as an instance of intellectual
cooperation (a group of intellectuals, collaborating across disciplinary and national boundaries for
the cause of a future peace), it was also an event that registered in the disciplinary trajectory of art
history, in the development of psychological warfare, and the architectural history of modernism.
Proceeding chronologically, I begin in the pre-war, by examining the parallel prophecies of
radical change made by proponents of modernist urbanism and of aerial warfare. The radical
"totality" in both realms lay not in a quantitative fact, but rather a qualitative effect, and I argue that
the ethical problem of deliberate "wantonness" in one echoes the aesthetic deployment of
"pictorialism" in the other. I then follow the fulfillment of this convergence through the staging of
art history as civilian expertise, in the context of the US Army's reliance on the "sciences" to support
their precision-bombing policies. The formation of the Roberts Commission two sub-committees is
examined through their arguments for the aesthetic autonomy of "monuments" at war, which
parallel mid-century arguments for the autonomy of the Humanities in academia. The value of
monuments as cultural objects in war was thus tied to the value of Lists of Monuments as
disciplinary artifacts in the university. Although they served as catalysts for an unprecedented
collaborative authorship, these lists also provoked considerable ethical anxieties, culminating in a
moment when the scholars were faced with the prospect of molding their objects of study into the
shape of their own classifications. These epistemological anxieties arose, I argue, as a type of warfare
and a mode of scholarship were revealed to be dependent upon the same spatial paradigm: a
territorial and discursive totality in which a selected urban collection of "monuments" stand in for
the collective unconscious of entire civilizations.
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Prewar Prophecies: modernism's tabula rasa and militarism's total war
In 1924, the Swiss-born architect Le Corbusier proposed to turn the center of Paris into what
he called "a coquettishly arranged cemetery, ai la Monceau," in which "historical monuments are
carefully collected, because they are a page of history or a work of art."8 By collaging a swath of his
ideal Ville Contemporaine onto an aerial photograph of Paris, he aimed to resolve the debate that had
animated French urbanism since the teens: would the capital's ills (congestion, insalubrity) be cured
by "Surgery, or Medicine?"' Le Corbusier proposed to combine the drastic precision of surgery with
the comprehensive moderation of medicine; crucially, he called upon the city's monuments to
demonstrate the point. Although his diorama featured "Cartesian skyscrapers" gleaming tall amidst
the greenery, its caption read: "The Plan Voisin: on the left, the Louvre, in the background, the Sacre
Coeur" (fig 2.10), as if Paris's identity was preserved as long as its monuments remained intact.
Accordingly, Le Corbusier began perfecting a sequence of pictograms which told the history of city
as a collection of landmarks, under the heading "This is Paris!" (fig. 2.13)10 The last vignette showed
the Plan Voisin as a natural extension of this city of objects. Yet Le Corbusier made no apologies for
the extensive demolition this Plan required, defiantly re-printing images of Parisian streets buried
under piles of Haussmannian debris. This polemical stance overshadowed his conciliatory attitude
towards historic monuments, and the Plan Voisin, displayed at the 1924 Exposition des Arts D&coratifs,
instantly became an emblem for the modernist urge to erase history.
It is not until a half a century later that Le Corbusier's famed tabula rasa was revealed to be a
slate wiped-not-quite-clean, a city punctuated with monuments. To take a canonical postmodern
example, in their 1978 Collage City, British architectural historian Colin Rowe and American architect
Fred Koetter drew a "Gestalt diagram" of the Plan Voisin which showed the monuments Le Corbusier
left standing." (fig. 2.14) "The principal aim is manifesto," they wrote, emphasizing Le Corbusier's
nonchalance and his insistence on speaking of destruction of Paris as a pictorial gesture, "an
architectural composition."' 2 Yet Le Corbusier's selective preservation was not purely rhetorical, it
was the product of a curatorial mentality, not unlike that of Haussmann's, which can be detected, for
example, in the way the crenellated pattern of the maisons ac redents (housing blocks) neatly frames
Ibid., 272.
Le Corbusier, Urbanisme, (1925; Paris: Flammarion, 1983), 248. Translation mine.
'0 Le Corbusier, Pr&isions: On the Present State of Architecture and City Planning (Paris: 1930), 1975. For a detailed examination of
monument conservation in the Plan Voisin, see Thordis Arrhenius, "Restoration in the Machine Age: thems of
Conservation in Le Corbusier's Plan Voisin," in AA Files 38 (Spring 1999), 10-21.
" Colin Rowe & Fred Koetter, Collage City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), 62. Subjecting a number of city plans to this
graphic treatment, they argued modernist urbanism reversed the figure-ground proportion of "the traditional city,"
concluding that "in considering the modern city from the point of view of perceptual performance, by Gestalt criteria it
can only be condemned." Ibid., 64.
12 Collage City, 72
151
Lucia Allais
Charles Garnier's Opera House, and seamlessly incorporates the Place des Vosges. The Plan Voisin was
indeed a "prophecy theater," a "phoenix symbol rising from the ashes of old," but Le Corbusier's
choice of monuments was not casual, as Rowe and Koetter would have it. Rather the composition of
his modernist typologies around the monuments produced a picturesque effect of surprise and
carelessness. "The past", in Le Corbusier's words, was "put in its place." 13
The Plan Voisin has remained the "prophecy theater" for modernist urbanism as a whole,
not only because it set the stage for the future by constructing the remains of a specific past, but also
because it now stands as a remarkably accurate prediction of the fate of European cities in the 2 0 th
century. Whether this prophecy is seen to be self-fulfilling depends on the historical agency one
attributes to a treatise, The Athens Charter, in the face of a catastrophic event, World War II. In the 1934
Athens Charter, Le Corbusier and his colleagues from the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne
formally articulated the "four functions" around which the modernist city should be designed and
constructed: Living, Working, Leisure, Circulation.' 4 A little-known section entitled "The Historic
Patrimony of Cities" was appended to this famous foursome, to make a distinction between "slum"
to be destroyed and "monument" that could be preserved. Hence the Athens Charter further elaborated
Le Corbusier's ambition to "put the past in its place," yet like the monuments of the Plan Voisin, this
section was long outweighed by the doctrinaire gravitas of the rest of the Athens Charter. Although its
notoriety grew, the Charter remained unpublished until the war broke out. Its publication, in 1943,
was intended to capitalize on the providence of war: by some cruel twist of fate, World War II was
implementing the most theoretical component of modernist urbanism (the destructive component)
and even the most utopian pre-war proposals, like the Plan Voisin, were gaining retroactive
plausibility.'5 Le Corbusier did not fail to point this out, publishing in 1941 a revised version of the
plan under the title "The Destiny of Paris," based on the assumption that the center of Paris was
"destined for destruction." 16 By 1947, the Athens Charter's four functions had been written into urban
reconstruction programs across Europe. Whether the principles of modernism were thereby
faithfully translated continues to be a matter of debate among supporters and detractors alike. Yet all
accounts of the European reconstruction are unanimous on one point: in the words of French
architect Marcel Lods, that the war presented architects with "a monstrous opportunity."" 17
13 Le Corbusier, Op. Cit., 272.
14 Le Corbusier, La Charte d'Athines (1943; Paris: Seuil, 1965). Translation mine.
1' On the decision to publish the Athens Charter, see Eric Mumford, The CIAM Discourse On Urbanism, 1928-1960
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).
16 Le Corbusier, Destin de Paris, avec des illustrations de l'auteur. Paris: F. Sorlot, 1941
"7 Lods, a member of CIAM, opined that "to use the slightly brutal but justified expression, the monstrous opportunity
of war had been lost." Marcel Lods, Le Mitier d'Architecte (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1976), 25. Translation mine.
Modernists generally thought the principles of the Athens Charter had been diluted, while conservative architects and
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If the Athens Charter is remembered as the charter of blank-slate urbanism, World War II is
remembered as the war of unconditional destruction. And just as with the totality of modernism, the
totality of the war is seen to begin, a few years after the Plan Voisin, with a prophecy that turns out
to have been remarkably accurate. In 1927, Italian General Giulio Douhet predicted that the "War of
19_" would be a "total war" that would rely on aerial power to unfold over entire territories rather
than on specific fronts. Douhet's was "a particularly unvarnished summary of the view of many
bombing advocates before World War II."18 These advocates drew a two-part lesson from World
War I: in civilian terms, that the Versailles Peace treaty would undoubtedly lead to a second conflict;
in military terms, that this conflict would be fought over "the command of the air."" Warring
nations would have to be conceptualized as uninterrupted battlegrounds, as they could be perceived
and attacked from the air. This aerial conquest, in turn, would eradicate the distinction between
civilian and combatant, "because when nations are at war, everyone takes part in it: the soldier
carrying his gun, the woman loading shells in a factory, the farmer growing wheat, the scientist
experimenting in his laboratory." 20 Douhet saw this new war ethic as both exceptionally inhumane
and as exceptionally efficient:
A complete breakdown of social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to
this kind of merciless pounding from the air. The time would soon come when, to put
an end to horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-
preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war.21
Thus the totality of the new war was to be conceived in both territorial and psychological terms: just
as the physical space of war would expand to include every point on a nation's map, so the
discursive space of war would expand to include every civilian's potential outrage at the atrocity of
war. It is this tension, between military efficiency and civilian morality, between physical
destruction and rhetorical deterrence, that constitutes Douhet's real legacy.
urbanists from the academy thought radicalism had essentially won. See Anatole Kopp, L'Architecture de la Reconstruction
(1984), and the special issue of Rassegna: The Reconstruction in Europe after World War II, Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 1993).
18 Stephen Garret, Ethics and Airpower in World War II (New York: St Martin's, 1993), 8.
'9 Much as in architectural history, in military history the pre-war advocates of "total war" are alternatively seen as
precipitating the prophecy they proclaimed, or as improperly foreseeing its consequences. DC Watt's Too Serious a Business:
European Armed Forces and the approach to the Second World War, (Berkeley: UC Press, 1975) argues that European armies' lack of
realism contributed to interwar appeasement, exacerbating international tensions. Historians of the strategic bombings
of city centers that ensued continue to debate where ethical responsibility for these bombings should be attributed,
whether in technological insufficiencies or geo-political one-upmanship. Military, political and literary views of this
problem are represented, respectively, by Garrett's Ethics and Airpower, Sven Lindquist's A History of Bombing, trans. Linda
Rugg (New York: New Press, 2001) and W.G. Sebald's On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Random House,
c2003).
20 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, followed by Probable Aspects of a Future War, trans. Dino Ferrari, (1928; Milan: Italian
Ministry of War. republished by Office of Air Force History, 1983), 196
21 Douhet, 6-7.
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Throughout World War II, Allied and Axis countries negotiated between actual destruction
and the perceived threat of potential destruction, each claiming to be achieving that elusive
"breakdown" of the enemy's "social structure." The bargaining chips in this negotiation were not
military assets, but cities, as sites of civilian density. In Douhet's words, "what could happen to a
single city in a single day could also happen to ten, twenty, fifty cities."22 Hence Hitler obtained the
surrender of the Netherlands in 1940 by threatening to "terror bomb" the center of Rotterdam.23 On
the Allied side, the British "area raids" over Milan in 1942 were deemed successful not for the
"amount of material damage" they produced, but rather for the very immaterial "hysterical
behavior" and "utter disorganization" they provoked in the Italian population.24 (figs. 2.16-17) Yet if
Douhet was proved right in the advent of aerial warfare, the desired effect-precipitating peace--did
not follow suit. Instead, the blurry psychological variable he had called the "instinct of self-
preservation" became progressively codified, into a discourse on "morale" that could turn even the
most psychological losses into material ones, and vice-versa. Perhaps the best evidence of this
codification is the series of qualifiers that were appended to the gerund "bombing" to connote
varying degrees of atrocity-area bombing, carpet bombing, indiscriminate bombing, mass bombing, morale
bombing, fire bombing, saturation bombing, terror bombing-each referring to a slightly different technology,
but all euphemisms for the "merciless pounding from the air" theorized by Douhet. As the conflict
was prolonged, cities grew in importance, as concentrated sites of civilian psychology. This rise of
cities as strategic objects was facilitated by the development of aerial photography as a pictorial
counterpart to the totality of war. By recording a potentially continuous horizontal image of the field
of war, aerial photography seemingly provided a "total image" through which to envision the "total
war."25 Through this dual mechanism of area bombing and reconnaissance photography, the ruins
of cities acquired value as representations of psychology destroyed, retroactive emblems of the
values that once held together the social fabric of the enemy. It is in reaction to these emblems that
that modern architects spent the war years planning, Athens Charter in hand, the reconstruction of
22 Douhet, 58.
23 Rotterdam was actually bombed after the Dutch had already surrendered-in a quid pro quo that itself demonstrates that
the value of "terror" as a deterrent was always arbitrary. For a view of bombing as political bargaining, see George
Quester, "Bargaining and Bombing During World War II in Europe," in World Politics Vol. 15, No. 3 (Apr., 1963), 417-
437.
24 Sir Arthur Harris, Despatch on War Operations, (London: Frank Cass, 1995. Orig. 1946), 38. Sir "Bomber" Harris'
appointment at the head of the RAF in February 1943 marks the adoption of aerial bombing as central strategy. The
British amended their aims to include "the attack the morale of the enemy's civil population and in particular, of the
industrial workers." Alan Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. (London: Praeger, 1992), 6
25 Aerial photography as a technology was not new, but repeated aerial views of the progress of trenches offered limited
strategic advantages in the first World War; while in the second, intelligence could be derived from the interpretation
of a single shot. For a theorization of aerial photography as a proto-digital imaging technique, see Manuel de Landa,
War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Swerve, 1991) 5-6.
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European cities-somewhat grateful for the war's fortuitous "clearing of slums", and somewhat
incredulous at the "miraculous" survival of so many of Europe's monuments.
Yet if aerial bombing relieved Le Corbusier and his colleagues from the obligation of
becoming latter-day Haussmanns, the agency in the production of this "monstrous opportunity" is
attributed to war as a generic phenomenon: a technological fortuity that turned pre-war theories into
post-war realities. In this view, the survival of monuments is a happy accident. The episode of the
Roberts Commission complicates this account, by suggesting that the patchwork terrain that was
handed to European architects for reconstruction after the war--the punctuated tabula rasa that served
as the literal and conceptual ground for the dissemination of modernist urbanism in Western
Europe--was in some sense determined by the work of a group of American academics. What are
we to make of their intervention? Are we to understand the Commission's very existence as a
mitigation of the concept of total war? The cursory account of the preceding pages demonstrate that
the totality of war and the totality of modernism both accommodated accident and fortuity within
their unconditional prophecies of radical change. Hence the Roberts Commission stands as a
potential link between the ethics of "deliberate" bombing, and the aesthetics of "deliberate"
preservation-a mitigation of the accusation of "wantonness" in war and of "pictorialism" in
urbanism.
The few existing accounts of the Commission's work have concentrated on the weakness of
its authority in the war, correctly pointing out that its protective mandate seldom trumped the
destructive needs of military authorities. Nicola Lambourne, for example, concludes that "the
physical effects of war on historic monuments were of far more interest to propagandists exploiting
the symbolism of this aspect of the Second World War than to those with the power to damage
those buildings.""6 Lambourne concedes that the monuments of Europe emerged largely protected.
Yet her insistence on distinguishing between the realm of "power" and that of "symbolism" leads
her to conclude, in the manner of Rowe and Koetter, that "the principal aim was manifesto." Far
from a polemical conclusion, this finding should stand as a theoretical starting point: if the goal of
monuments' protection was not the imposition of an ethical absolute, but rather the projection of a
symbolic effect, what is the nature of this effect? If the principal aim of architectural survival was
manifesto, what did the surviving monuments eventually manifest?
The closest approximation of a "manifesto" for the Roberts Commission's work was
delivered on May 26', 1944, when General Dwight Eisenhower issued an order to all commanders:
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Shortly we will be fighting our way across the Continent of Europe in battles designed to
preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance we will find historical
monuments and cultural centers which symbolize the world that we are fighting to
preserve. These monuments by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate
the growth of the civilization which is ours We are bound to respect these monuments
so far as war allows.
If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own
men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the
choice is not always so clear-cut as that. 27
Eisenhower presented the protection of monuments as a matter of demonstrating that war, far from
constituting a decline of civilization, continued to illustrate its growth. Clearly this was a victor's
discourse, and as such, it is a useful key for understanding the version of "total war" endorsed by the
US Army he commanded-its emphasis on occupation, its penchant for precision, and its reliance
on expertise.
While Eisenhower outlined a hierarchy between the relative value of "men's lives" and
"famous buildings", the more crucial formulation was one that weighed the military means of
achieving victory against the political instruments for occupation. This trope was common in the
language of Military Government, an Army component developed to achieve better occupation, by
ensuring that "by the time the war is won we have not inadvertently undermined some of the aims
for which it is being fought." 2 Learning from the First World War, the US military instituted a
School of Military Government in Charlottesville, VA to achieve a "territorial form of military
government," where political criteria for governance were built into military operations." What
Eisenhower grandly called "the growth of the civilization which is ours" was but a political means
of achieving a successful occupation. Accordingly, the commanders training at Charlottesville were
instructed to present the protection of monuments to their troops as a means of obtaining "the
cooperation of the local population." Local civilians, the argument went, would be more likely to
collaborate with occupation forces if they showed sensitivity to their "culture", as embodied in their
"monuments." Despite this emphasis on locality, the discourse on the value of monuments in an
American occupation of Europe was perforce unconditional: in order to support a policy that would
27 Dwight Eisenhower, Letter to All US Air Force Commanders, May 2 6th, 1944. As cited in Final Report of the American Commission for
the Protection and Salvage of Monuments in War Areas (Washington: 1946).
28 The "military government" officers publicized their work in an article, "Prepare to Occupy," in Fortune Vol. 27, No.
2, The Job Before Us (Feb 1943), 90-214. It described the founding, "much to the president's surprise," of the School
of Military Government, aimed at "the improvement of our technique of occupation." As the article put it, "the
numerous civilian organizations now set up there is a great deal of confusion." Ibid., 214.
29 Col Joseph Harris, "Selection and training of Civil Affairs Officers," in Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 4,
Occupation of Enemy Territory (Winter 1943), 694-706. Harris distinguished this from the "tactical form" employed
First World War, putting the matter in terms of total war: "We are today in the midst of a total war in which whole
nations are engaged. The skill with which occupied territories are administered is highly important factor in the
winning of the war."
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be equally applicable to Axis and Allied countries, monuments had to be presented as the bearers of
a universal value, of which Europe had been the creator and America would become the keeper, if
temporarily.
This territorial management of occupation is intimately connected with the US Air Force's
stated preference for "precision" bombing. Rather than attempting to destroy large swaths of
enemy-held territory, US bombs were aimed at crippling nodal points in the German war
economy."0 This preference was supported by suspicions that the RAF's area bombings confused the
qualitiative totality of war with its quantitative fulfillment. This flaw was chillingly summarized in
the months immediately following the war, in the few pages of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
devoted to "the attack on the will to make war, commonly known as morale." 31 In addition to
evaluating physical losses, the analysts of the USSBS were asked to quantify the psychological value
of destruction. Using such variables as "wanting the war to end", "showing demoralizing fear" and "willingness
to surrender" they exposed the architectural equation that had underlain the logic of area bombing: a
destroyed home equaled a depressed worker, which equaled a weakened war machine. What
emerged from their analysis, however, was that "morale" was not, as Douhet had thought, inversely
proportional to "home destruction" (fig. 2.15). In fact, in as much as it could be quantified, the
psychological value of architecture offered only "diminishing returns with increasing bomb
tonnage." (Although workers in bombed towns were proportionally less "willing" to make war than
those whose towns were intact, this relationship weakened with increasing destruction.) In other
words, the tabula rasa imagined by advocates of area bombing was not, in psychological terms, worth
the bombs that had been required to achieve it-a small amount of destruction would have
sufficed.32
It is important to note that this evaluation of area bombing was quantitative, not ethical.
While supported by a distaste for civilian casualties, America's strategy of precision was a policy
driven primarily by technological concerns.33 This technological imperative could be readily be
combined with the British area raids: hence the joint Allied Bomber Offensive over Europe, as agreed
30 Having spent the interwar years developing smaller and faster airplanes, the US had bet its entire air force apparatus
on precision. For a synthetic account of the technological developments that ensued from this decision, see Peter
Galison's "Ontology of the Enemy" in Critical Inquiry 21 (Autumn 1994), 228-266.
31 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Report: European War. (Washington: Sept 30 1945).
32 The Survey concluded that "bombing thus succeeded in lowering psychological morale but its effects upon behavior
was less decisive." Later studies, such as those commissioned during the cold war by the Rand Corporation, confirmed
that the British estimations of the value of morale was "more propaganda than fact", while also calling into question
the USSBS's scientific protocols: "the actual incidence of anti-enemy sentiment was probably underestimated ... since
the interviews were conducted by Americans ... under military occupation." Irving Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) 132.
33 The development and deployment of nuclear weapons shows that, given the right weapon and a different civilian
population, the US military willingly engaged in "wantonness." See Sven Lindqvist A History of Bombing, 100.
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upon at the 1943 Casablanca Conference, was based on a "round-the-clock complementary
campaign." While the RAF continued conducting daylight area raids, the US Air Force began
conducting precision raids at night. This round-the-clock policy implicated US authorities as much as
their British counterparts in the deliberate targeting of civilians. In other words, although the
preservation of monuments inaugurated in 1943 brought a new understanding of "morale" the
Allies' war (placing greater emphasis on the "will to collaborate"), protected monuments did not
become the immediate psychological substitute for targeted civilians. Rather, the "round-the-clock"
policy ensured that preserved monuments were always simultaneous with civilian casualties, to the
effect that the former became a de-facto way to memorialize the latter. The role of redemption, was
unproblematically projected onto art and architecture, and here then the ethical implications of
Eisenhower's order become clear: if the whole of European cities had been razed, but all of their
monuments had survived, then "European civilization" could still have been said to have remained
intact.
Monuments had already risen as emblems of the growing disconnect between civilian lives
and civilian psychology. In the months of May and June 1942, the flaw in morale bombing's logic
of architectural containment had been made dramatically obvious when the Luftwaffe raided four
historic British towns, which held neither strategic importance nor particularly high civilian density.
These attacks soon earned the name "Baedeker Raids," because their targets seemed to have been
picked out of the popular Baedeker's tourist guides. (figs. 20, 21) The Baedeker Raids inaugurated the
emergence of architecture's monumental value as a variable with which to compute morale,
illustrating that even the willingness for arbitrary destruction could be deployed with deliberate
precision. After the Baedeker Raids, it became necessary to determine exactly what a monument was
worth. Nor should this convergence of target list and tourist guide be taken as a mere turn-of-phrase.
In 1944 the US published a target list, entitled The Bomber's Baedeker, which contained "a guide to the
economic importance of German towns and cities." but no information on culture or history.34 (fig.
2.19) Art history entered the war at precisely the moment between these two instances. While
precision was not intended as a mitigation of total war, it reconfigured the concept, notably
requiring the support of a widespread civilian effort of expertise-an expanded version of what
Douhet called "the scientist working in his laboratory." In Eisenhower's terms, art history was the
form of expertise that could relate the material value of "a famous building" to the morale of "the
world we are trying to preserve."
" The Bomber's Baedeker: A Guide to the Economic Importance of German Cities and Towns. Washington: 1944.
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The Staging of Expertise: from Baedeker Raids to Bomber's Baedeker
The entrance of art history into the Allies' war bridges the gap between the 1942 "Baedeker
Raids" and the 1944 Bomber's Baedeker. These two invocations of Karl Baedeker's name were coined for
propaganda effect, to connote a sinister marriage of tourism of warfare."3 Yet Baedeker figures
literally between them in the historical record of war: between the touring guide as symbol for
Germany's wantonness, and the touring guide as an emblem of America's intelligence, there stand
the actual copies of Baedeker's famous Handbook for Travellers that were checked out of university
libraries across the Northeast, to serve as primary source for the US Army's lists of protected
monuments. As soon as the Harvard Committee's Army liaison, Colonel James Shoemaker, made the
first official request for "a summary list of important art monuments, divided by countries" in mid-
March 1943"36, the Committee's list editors began using the image of the Baedeker to commission
collaborators ("Your report will look something like a Baedeker, but an edited Baedeker").37 As a
result, Baedeker became an indispensable source of form and content for what came to be known as
"The Harvard Lists."
The idea of using Baedeker as a guide for avoiding monuments was first circulated in
Washington in early 1943, in a two-page manifesto written by British 6migre art historian W.G.
Constable (188 7-19 76). Constable, who was curator of paintings at Boston's MFA and soon became
vice-chair of the Harvard Committee, argued for monument protection on general terms but gave
the specific suggestion that military officers be issued "(a) strictly limited lists of important
monuments, collections, etc., which in the case of Europe might well be Baedeker's two stars and one star monuments,
and (b) very simple instructions ... for safeguarding these.""38 By May 1944, Constable's two-part
scheme had effectively been implemented, with the first Harvard Lists issued in May 1943, and a
manual on Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives published a year later.3 9 By then Constable had also
transformed this initial memo into a public lecture, where he described the "elaborate machinery"
through which the Harvard Lists were composed, and addressed the question of why the Army was
not just using Baedekers themselves. The answer was both quantitative ("Baedeker does not cover all
the countries, ... [and excludes] archaeological sites and private collections) and qualitative
" As Nicola Lambourne points out, the Baedeker Guidebook company was still distancing itself from this effect in
1959. Postwar editions of the Baedeker's Guide to England included a disclaimer discounting any involvement their
eponymous "Raids."
36 "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Lt-Col. James H. Shoemaker," March 17, 1943. Perry Papers, ADHG
Archive.
37 Letter from Charles Robinson to William Bell Dinsmoor, 23 Apr 1943. ASCSA 1/2.
38 W.G. Constable, "Works of Art During and After the War," December 21, 1942 petition. Emphasis added.
Correspondance Folder, ADHG. This memo was the first attempt at a statement of purpose for the Harvard Committee.
39 Known among the scholars as the "Manual on Safeguarding," published as Civil Affairs Information Guide: Field Protection of
Objects of Art and Archives. War Department Pamphlet No. 31-103. War Department: 12 May 1944.
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(Baedeker is too long and complicated for the immediate purpose of the list"). 40 Yet Constable did
not seek to disprove the basic fact that tourist guides and military lists were composed of the same
information-adding only that the latter were more "useful", because compiled by "specialists." 41
The role eventually played by Baedeker's Handbook in making the Harvard Lists was that of a
standardizing framework. What was needed was an existing listing typology, to unify the work of
scholars who were both methodologically disparate and geographically dispersed. The Harvard
Committee was composed of 34 scholars, residing in 7 cities and affiliated with 11 institutions,
including university museums, commercial art galleries, research institutes and art history
departments. All sent their lists to the Fogg Museum, where they were edited by Constable and Hugh
O'Neill Hencken Curator of European Archaeology at Harvard's Peabody Museum. The Harvard Lists
adopted two key formatting standards from the Baedeker series: its "system of star" and its regional
divisions. The history of the modem tourist handbook is a history of standardization--one in which
the Baedeker family achieved "international hegemony" by the end of the 19" century, modulating
its voice to suit a variety of national narratives. 42 Baedeker's use of "the asterisk as a mark of
commendation", inaugurated in 1844 as a "laconic substitute for the adjectival raptures of
competing authors," 43 had by the mid-20th-century become the trademark of an entire genre of
touring literature. The Harvard Lists expanded this system to *, ** or ***, to indicate "monuments
of first, second, and third importance," and later, reduced these initial 50-page lists by using the
"starred monuments only." Similarly, the Harvard Committee adopted Baedeker's ready-made
division of Europe into discreet regions and distinct national audiences.4 Thus Baedeker effectively
functioned as a source of multilateral objectivity. As Constable made clear in a 1953 homage, the
"long row of smallish volumes, of the same size, bound in the same hard cloth with gold lettering,
and marbled edges" had become a trusted companion for sedentary scholars as much as for touring
travelers, who relied on Baedeker as much for "his attitude, which is that of a compiler for railway
40 W.G. Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime," Lecture delivered Jan-Mar 1944. Constable Papers, AAA #3077.
41 Col. Shoemaker put the point more bluntly, in response to early versions of the Lists that included touring advice:
"There will doubtless come a time, as at the end of the last war," he wrote in March 1943, "when troops can go on
sight-seeing trips. But ... instructions in respect to this will appear rather ironic to officers under present conditions."
Letter to Perry on May 14, 1943, Perry Folder, ADHG Archives. He was correct in this prevision; the MFA&A organized
such sight-seeing, notably in Italy, starting in 1944. By then the duality of soldier and tourist had been resolved into a
single museological framework: under the supervision of curators-turned-soldiers, "protected sites" were marked with
touring regulations, and opened for visiting hours.
42 For a history of guidebooks' influence on national narratives, see Rudy Koshar, "What Ought to be Seen: Tourists'
Guidebooks and National Identities in Modem Germany and Europe." Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 33 No. 3
(1998), 323-340. See also Edward Mendelson, "Baedeker's Universe", in Yale Review of Books Vol. 74, No. 3 (April 1985)
and James Buzard, The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature, and the Ways to Culture (Oxford Press, 1993).
43 Mendelson, 391.
44 On April 11 1943, Constable wrote to Georges Wildenstein and Kenneth Conant, who were jointly compiling the
List for France, that "the division between Northern and Southern will be as in Baedeker." Constable Papers, AAA
#3077.
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timetable or a telephone directory," as for offering "a consistent set of principles for action, a
Weltanschauung.""4
By the time Baedeker's Handbooks provided the Harvard Committee with a functional
framework for listing, their purpose as touring guides had been superceded by their popularity as a
representation of Europe, and the uniformity of this Weltanschauung had been detached from the
hypothetical tourist to whom it was addressed."46 Yet the art historians of the Harvard Group should
not therefore be seen as mere conduits of commercially-available information. Modem tourism and
modern art history share common roots in the post-Enlightenment rise of nationalisms, and the
concomitant valuation of "monuments" as centers of attraction for tourism and scholarship alike.
Yet it is the academic art historian, not the commercial guide-writer, who handed the US Army their
Baedekers.
The prominent role played by such a popularized version of art history in the discipline's
military contribution, however, points to the primacy of "the list" in giving art historical knowledge
a tactical value in the war. Unlike Op-Ed critiques of destruction voiced throughout the war by
academics and amateurs, Constable's "Baedeker Memo" offered volunteer expertise. If this expertise
was so easily accepted, it is in large part because it could be made to fit into the already-established
format of military intelligence, which consisted of lists and maps of targets. Within the span of a
few months, the Harvard Committee was able to complement these with lists, and later maps, of
non-targets. This centrality of the list is all the more problematic in that art history famously codifies
itself as everything but the list. If Giorgio Vasari's Lives of Artists of 1550 can be taken as art history's
inaugural text, the archetypal definition of the discipline asserts that it would be possible "simply
provide a straight-forward list of works, without offering any opinions," but discounts this "mere
repertoire" as "not a worthwhile objective."' 7 The story of art history's involvement in war, then,
can be seen as a test of Vasari's two-part hypothesis: first, whether a "straight-forward list of works"
could reasonably be constructed; second, whether such a repertoire would really be devoid of art-
historical value. Constable himself articulated this hypothesis, writing that the goal of the Lists of
Monuments was "not to teach art history or aesthetic value, [but] merely to indicate by its presence in the list
4' W.G. Constable, "Karl Baedeker", Lecture at Smith College in 1953. Constable Papers, AAA #3071.
46 A study of tourist guides as a geographic representation of Europe can be found in Joze B6r6cz's work. Correlating
patterns of tourism with of industrial development, B6r6cz questions the common assumption that a search for
"alterity" alone explicates the rise of modern tourism-an assumption that has long motivated the line of scholarship
that focuses on tourists and their passivity. Of interest here are B6r6cz' illustration of the "mental maps" of Europe
according to their guide-book entries. See Bor6cz's "Travel-Capitalism: The Structure of Europe and the Advent of the
Tourist," in Comparative Studies in Society and History In Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 33 (3) and his Leisure Migration: A
Sociological Study of Tourism (New York: Pergamon, 1996).
47 I follow recent chroniclers of the "end" of art-history in choosing Vasari's Lives as its "beginning." Giorgio Vasari,
Preface to Part II in Lives of the Artists: Vol. 2, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1965), 83. See Donald Preziosi,
Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
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that a monument should be looked at."48 In their successive attempts to construct this repertoire and to
formulate its value throughout the war, the art historians were confronted with a variety of list-
making models, of which Baedeker was the most well-known, but not the most self-consciously
"objective.""4 9
That the American academic setting was crucial in staging the monuments lists as objective,
and art historians as a volunteer force, is evidenced by the reluctance of their British counterparts to
participate. When Constable sent his "Baedeker Memo" to his former colleagues in London-
Kenneth Clark, Director of the National Gallery, and Eric MacLagen, Director of the Victoria & Albert
Museum-both expressed skepticism at the ambition.s0 Clark found it "hard to believe any
machinery could be set up which could carry out the suggestions contained in your petition," and
MacLagen thrice asserted a fundamental disciplinary helplessness: "I do not feel that there is
anything which art historians like ourselves can do... I do not honestly see that anything can be done
about it... I cannot see how art historians at the present moment can be of any assistance.""1
Undoubtedly these responses reflects the reality of living in a bombed city and caring for its
museums during the Blitzkrieg. Yet this helplessness also highlights more abstractly the difference
between British and American images of the totality of war: the one imposing absolute passivity, the
other demanding involvement into an all-consuming "machinery." To answer the question of why
lists of monuments were able to become useful in America's war, then, is to ask a disciplinary
question, of how Constable and his colleagues devised an "elaborate machinery" for turning art
historical knowledge into military expertise.
An initial picture of what was expected from art history in war can be gleaned by examining
its position among other forms of American civilian expertise. The Bomber's Baedeker, for one, was the
work of a new breed of civilian experts that produced target lists out of economic analysis. These
"operations analysts" were scientists, engineers and economists recruited from the US industry to
produce, in Peter Galison's words, "a methodical theoretical reconstruction of the interconnections
that held together the German economy and war machine and that asked how it could be blown
48 Letter from Constable to British Ambassador Nickell, Sep 16, 1943. Constable Papers, AAA #1077. Emphasis added.
49 Constable himself recognized that Baedeker's value as a stand-alone list did not preclude it from carrying aesthetic
value: "Baedeker's impersonality is merely a mask. ... His famous system of asterisks and double asterisks... sheds much
light on Baedeker's tastes and aesthetic principles. Broadly, these principles stem from the 18th century." Constable,
"Karl Baedeker." Constable Papers, AAA #3071
so Constable had been the first director of the Courtauld Institute. For his relationship with Sachs, see Kathryn Brush,
"Marburg, Harvard, and purpose-built architecture for art history, 1927" in Elisabeth Mansfield, ed., Art History and Its
Institutions: foundations of a Discipline (London: Routledge, 2002), 65-84.
51 Letter from Kenneth Clark to WG Constable, 25 Feb 1943 & Letter from Eric MacLagen to WG Constable, 27 Feb
1943. Constable Papers, AAA#3077. Clark and MacLagen consulted with the British Secretary of Education on their
answer, which suggests that their helplessness was also informed by contact with British officials.
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apart."5 2 Factories were listed as targets only if they stood as significant "nodes" in this military-
industrial web, and if their destruction produced maximal return on minimum bomb tonnage. In
their first incarnation as Harvard Lists, the Army's lists of monuments resembled these lists of targets
made by the engineers: they were distributed as raw information to bombers, whose reconnaissance
photographs were marked with "not-to-bomb" targets. Yet this use of monuments as "non-targets"
from the air was never explicitly stated as the official goal of the Commission's work. Whereas the
lists of industrial targets had strategic value, the lists of cultural monuments were intended to hold a
merely tactical value. Accordingly, although the Lists served the Air Force as much as the Military
Government, officially they were only published as Sections 17 and 17A of the Military
Government's Civil Affairs Handbook. These manuals are best understood as forming a "cultural"
counterpart to the "industrial" reconstruction of enemy nations described by Galison. In Col.
Shoemaker's terms, this was described as a "framework of information and plans":
We are compiling military government handbooks by countries which will include the
general background (country and people), government, public finance, money and
banking, agriculture, labor, industry, transportation, communications, public health and
sanitation, public safety (police system), public welfare, etc., as well as material of the
sort you are sending us.S3
In form, the art historian's knowledge resembled, that of the engineers'. Yet as experts, the art
historians themselves resembled rather the social scientists who wrote the other 16 sections of the
Civil Affais Handbooks: anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and geographers.5 4 Rather than
distilling their knowledge into analytical lists, social scientists were expected to make encyclopedic
contributions that described enemy societies as epistemological totalities.
Therefore, as a form of military intelligence, the Lists of Monuments stood somewhere
between the selected targets of the applied sciences and the comprehensive theories of the social
sciences. This is no small point. As a growing genre of historiography has shown, war-time
collaborations between America's military and its academia greatly contributed to the subsequent
codification of university disciplines in the post-war. Hence the postwar engineering sciences
developed their postwar institutional structure, largely out of their contribution to the USSBS."5
s2 Peter Galison, "War Against the Center," in Grey Room 04 (Summer 2001), 8. Galison describes the transformation of
civilian applied scientists into military intelligence-producers, and the subsequent re-application of this intelligence
onto civil defense through the dispersal of industrial buildings away from city centers.
s3 Shoemaker to Perry, ADHG.
14 The "Topical Outline" repeated on the inside cover of every Handbook was:
1. Geographical and Social Background 2. Government and Administration 3. Legal Affairs 4. Government Finance 5.
Money and Banking 6. Natural Resources 7. Agriculture 8. Industry and Commerce 9. Labor 10. Public Works and
Utilities 11. Transportation Systems 12. Communications 13. Public Health and Sanitation 14. Public Safety 15.
Education 16. Public Welfare 17. Cultural Institutions 17B. Atlas of Cultural Institutions
ss Peter Galison's "Ontology of the Enemy." Critical Inquiry (Autumn 1994).
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Similarly, the involvement of ego psychologists in the deployment of morale-based psychological
warfare fueled the postwar boom of the political consulting industry and psychology departments
alike.5 6 In this literature, war-time collaborations are understood as disciplinary catalysts, rather than
epistemological breaks. Hence much of the form and content for the Civil Affairs Handbooks was
inherited from the pre-war development of a "comparative approach" in the behavioral sciences.57
What these disciplinary histories share is a narrative of post-war specialization fueled by pre-
war scientific ambitions. Such a narrative can also be found in canonical histories of American art
history: as Craig Hugh Smyth has noted, James Ackerman's classic 1963 account, "stressed its
'scientific' aims in this country after World War I, and contrasted it with the earlier gentlemanly and
ethically oriented art history." 8 Yet art history's institutional trajectory towards (and disciplinary
recovery from) military collaboration differs fundamentally from that of the social and applied
sciences, in that art historians specifically entered the war under the heading of "the humanities." As
we will see, interwar American art history leveraged its own scientific ambitions against the
pressures of the sciences on the humanities, in order to become a legitimate branch of the
humanities itself. This leveraging helps to explain the peculiar position of the Lists of Monument in
wartime, as non-scientific objects serving a scientific purpose. And just as art history projected two
images during the 1930s-a scientific one from within, a humanistic one from without-so there
are two ways of telling the story of art-historical lists as disciplinary objects at war: from within
(accounting for the scientific function of lists in art history) and from without (accounting for the
function of art history in a humanistic war). I begin here with the latter, in order to highlight the
dramatic debut of the Monuments Lists as "volunteer objects" in war.
The Apparatus of the Humanities: the ACLS and the ADHG
The two monuments sub-committees out of which the Roberts Commission was constituted
were both formed as a contribution of the humanities to war. Both were sponsored by large
scholarly organizations, whose members were engaged since the 1920s in an ongoing nationwide
56This narrative is told in Emily Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: UC,
1995).
7' Formed in the image of a "Laboratory Without Walls," and embodied in the Yale-based Human Relations Area Files
(HRAF), this approach created a comprehensive encyclopedic framework, an "Outline of World Cultures," that
continued to be filled well into the post-war. See Joseph Tobin's "The HRAF as Radical Text?" in Cultural Anthropology
Vol. 5, No. 4, (Nov., 1990), 473-487A; Outline of Cultural Materials, Behavior Science Outlines (New Haven: Human
Relations Area Files, Inc, 1950), Human Relations Area Files, 1949-1959 Report (New Haven: HRAF, 1959), and Function and
Scope of the Human Relations Area files, (New Haven: HRAF, 1949). For a critique, see Franz Boas's "The Limitations of the
Comparative Method of Anthropology," in Race, Language and Culture (New York: MacMillan, 1940), 270-280.
58 Craig Hugh Smyth & Peter Lukehart, The Early Years of Art History in the United States: Notes and Essays on Departments, Teaching and
Scholars. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6. Smyth refers to James Ackerman & Rhys Carpenter, Art and
Archaeology. Humanistic Scholarship in America (Princeton: PU Press, 1963).
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debate on the importance of the humanities in US universities. At stake in this debate, which raged in
university administrations, education journals and Op-Ed pieces in the national press, was the
continued relevance of humanistic studies in the face of the rise of laboratory-based scientific
research." It is a testament to the advent of a Douhetian form of total war that, far from being
overshadowed by the prospect of military conflict, this civilian concern with the structuring of
undergraduate education only intensified at the outbreak of war. In a 1944 article titled "Humanities
vs. War," W. Edward Farrison took stock of this intensification, summarizing that the usual peace-
time critique of humanities professors, "not relating their subjects to life", had now been
complemented by a follow-up question, "What is the place of literature, or of philosophy, in a
world at war?""6 It is in the context of this two-part pressure that the parent organizations of both
Monuments' Committees must be understood. Throughout the war, the Humanities acted both as the
epistemological filter through which Monuments Lists were volunteered to the Army, and as the
discursive chamber in which any argument for the protection of monuments could resonate.
The Frick Committee was created under the tutelage of the American Council of Learned
Societies (ACLS) and the leadership of archaeologist William Bell Dinsmoor (1886-1973), then-
director of the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA). As Dinsmoor recounted in a 1935 address
at Columbia University, the ACLS had been founded, as a national counterpart for the Union
Internationale des Academies, and one of the first American organizations to claim an exclusive concern
with "humanistic fields." 61 In his lecture, titled "New Trends in Humanistic Studies", Dinsmoor
gave "internationalism" as an answer to the question of "humanism." His narrative spanned from
the 1425 Council of Constance (where political events had circuitously led to the discovery of
forgotten Cicero manuscripts), to contemporary "debates on peace and war" at the League of
Nations. "The days of simple humanism are long past," Dinsmoor wrote, "it has become quite
impossible for any single individual to acquaint himself with all sides of it. .. What internationalism
59 This debate turned out to span the whole century. The mid-century moment is book-ended by Patricia Beesley's
influential 1940 The Revival of the Humanities in University Education (New York: Columbia), and the ACLS's own 1964 Report of
the Commission on the Humanities (New York: ACLS) which led to the creation of the National Endowment for the
Humanities. For a sardonic account of the "humanities as a 20th century invention" wherein, "in a technocracy, the
humanities are the opiate of the masses," see Mel A. Topf's "Smooth Things: the Rockefeller Commission's Report on
the Humanities." In College English Vol.43, No. 5, Sept. 1981. More recently see the issue of Daidalos devoted to the theme
"On the Humanities," (Spring 2006).
60 W. Edward Farrison, "Humanities vs. War" Phylon (1944) 334-338. See also Loren MacKinney "Humanities after
Three Years of War," in South Atlantic Bulletin(Dec. 1944), 1-8.
61 Steven Markus points out that the ACLS's self-designation was less useful in defining "humanistic fields" than the
splitting off of a number of organizations into the Social Science Research Council. Markus, 19. For a "Comparison of
American and French Humanism", see Beesley's The Revival of the Humanities, 61.
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offers to humanistic studies is the means of catching up with the accumulation of five centuries."62
In order to perform this task, Dinsmoor emphasized that international work was best focused on
"the apparatus of scholarship": bibliographies, indices, translations, and other comprehensive
epistemological endeavors. Yet he also faulted this approach for outlining often implausible goals,
such as "the compilation of a balance sheet of all archaeological treasures not yet found."
Patriotically, he warned that "American organizations have found that the most successful results are
obtained not so much from a predetermined program as from the initiative of single individuals or
groups of individuals.""6 It is all the more ironic, then, that once appointed to the ACLS's new
"Committee for the Conservation of Cultural Monuments in Europe" on January 29, 1943,
Dinsmoor's vision was revealed to be just as full of institutional procedure, and devoid of flexibility,
as the internationalism he faulted.6 4
The ACLS itself played a near-governmental role in the organization of America's
"homefront" starting in 1941. This bureaucratic prominence of the ACLS in Washington, along with
Dinsmoor's emphasis on "the apparatus of scholarship," helps to explain why the ACLS Monuments
Committee lagged so far behind its Harvard counterpart in its entry into war--despite the fact that
both committees were formed at around the same time, and with the same mandate.6 s By the time
Dinsmoor's ACLS committee held its first full meeting on June 25, 1943, the bulk of the Harvard
Committee's work had been completed: contact with the Army had been established, lists had been
commissioned and refined, and the first sets had been sent to Mediterranean and European theaters
of Operations.66 In contrast, Dinsmoor's first impulse had been to compose a questionnaire, to be
distributed nationwide in order to attract a "representative" sample of volunteers. This scheme was
rapidly aborted by Paul Sachs, who divulged to Dinsmoor the work of his committee on the Harvard
Lists, explaining that "it was desired by the War Department that this work should be done quietly,
62 William Bell Dinsmoor, "New Trends in Humanistic Study," Columbia University Quarterly (Vol. XXVII, No.4: Dec.
1935), 415-426.
63 Dinsmoor, "New Trends," 419, 420.
64 Director Waldo Leland, for example, served in the National Resource Planning Board, as Chairman of the Committee
on Conservation of Cultural Resources.
65 This mandate ("the protection of cultural monuments in Europe," later "in war areas.") was spelled out in an
abstracted version of Constable's Baedeker Memo, a petition dated 8 Jan 1943, titled "Protection of Monuments: A
Proposal for Consideration during War and Rehabilitation." Written by George Stout, signed by Dean of Harvard
University George Chase, and by Paul Sachs, it was circulated in Washington after being sent, for endorsement, to
Francis Taylor (for the Association of Museum Directors), Dinsmoor (for the AIA), Coleman (for the American
Association of Museums), and Waldo Leland (for the ACLS). ASCSA I/2.
66 In a neat reversal of the ACLS chronology, work on the Harvard Lists preceded the formalization of its authors into
an official "committee". The first informal meeting was held at Shady Hill on Dec 28, 1942; Shoemaker issued his
request for material on Mar 18, 1943, and a second informal meeting on March 20th was followed on Mar 22, 1943 by
the appointment of "a small executive committee to carry out the War Department assignment." ADHG/ Perry.
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unofficially and promptly." Sachs proposed that the two groups might "quietly collaborate."67 Yet
even as their two committees began to share members, tasks, and were eventually conjoined into the
Roberts Commission, Dinsmoor seemed unable to subordinate the format of the lists to the urgency
of their purpose, and repeatedly pointed out that the Harvard Lists were full of inconsistencies in
place-names, dates, and abbreviations.68 Hugh Hencken, who, as the Group's secretary, fielded both
Dinsmoor's complaints and Col. Shoemaker's requests, responded by making explicit the tension
between scholarship and instrumentality that had always plagued intellectual cooperation: "I have
never adopted the idea, and have tried to discourage others from thinking, that these lists were to be
viewed as scholarly publications.""69
The work of Dinsmoor's committee began in earnest in the summer of 1943, when it moved
into its new headquarters in the basement of the Frick Art Reference Library in New York.70 The
ACLS Committee became the Frick Committee, and Dinsmoor's emphasis on the "apparatus" of the
lists was vindicated by a shift in the Army's needs: the Harvard Lists were now to be "abstracted,"
complemented with maps, and officially published as part of the Civil Affairs Handbooks. The need for
speed (which the Harvard Committee had met by volunteering the unpaid time of prominent
scholars), was superceded by the necessity for standardization (achieved at the Frick through a
procedure involving a Rockefeller foundation grant, visiting scholars, and a secretarial staff).
Similarly, the ACLS's roster of visible cultural figures-such as Metropolitan Museum director
Francis Taylor, National Gallery director David Finley, and former Librarian of Congress Archibald
MacLeish, whom the Harvard Committee often called "art politicians""71 -eventually proved crucial
in the formalization of the Roberts Commission as an official civilian body in Washington.72 The
ACLS's prominence in Washington was particularly crucial in receiving funding for "fieldwork" in
Europe. Yet without the Harvard Committee's direct contacts the Army, this commission would
67 Sachs to Dinsmoor, May 18, 1943. ASCSA 111/2.
68 Dinsmoor complained that "every item in the Harvard Lists must be rechecked before we can utilize it," and
Hencken responded "Of course there are inaccuracies in the lists. We are meeting a deadline." Dinsmoor to Perry, Aug
28, 1943; Hencken to Perry, Sep 1, 1943. ADHG Archives, Dinsmoor Folder. Perry asked for "a relaxation of one's
scholarly standards and scruples," to "meet the conditions imposed by the rapid march of events." Perry to Koehler,
May 10 1943, ADHG/K6hler.
69 Letter from Hencken to Perry, Sept 1, 1943. ADHG/Dinsmoor.
70 Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies on Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas, "Minutes
of the First Full meeting Held at the Century Association." Frick Art Reference Library, Helen C. Frick Correspondence.
71 "When these art politicians get together there is such a lot of apple polishing that goes on that I am skeptical of the
results." Letter from Stout to Constable, Nov 29, 1943. Constable Papers, AAA #3077.
72 Finley, Taylor and Dinsmoor each wrote a letter to President Roosevelt on December 8, 1942, joining forces with
Chief Justice Harlan Stone to construct a proposal for the creation of an advisory civilian body. This proposal was
adopted verbatim in September 1943, after being "under presidential consideration" for nine months. Letter from Stone
to Roosevelt, 8 Dec 1942. ADHG Archives. Dinsmoor and Finley to Roosevelt, ASCSA III/1.
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likely have remained an advisory group in the manner of the IICI, and monuments lists would not
have reached the Army in time to effect their early missions in European and Mediterranean theaters.
How, then, did the Harvard Committee penetrate the army so "quietly, unofficially and
promptly"? The answer lies largely in its emphasis on education. To avoid political and bureaucratic
obstacles, the Harvard Committee made its initial contact with the Army by proposing to compose
Lists of Monuments for officers training at the School of Military Government. Having been
endorsed as curricular, the idea of the Lists rose the ranks through this pedagogical framework,
eventually reaching the Director of Military Government, who appointed Col. Shoemaker as
delegate. Together, Shoemaker and the directors of the Harvard Committee carefully navigated any
further contacts with civilian agencies, so as to keep their connection efficiently "unofficial." They
agreed, for instance, that "the project should not appear as officially sponsored by the Army but
rather as an undertaking of [the] American Defense Organization,"73 and avoided contact with the
inquisitive delegate of the State Department's Cultural Relations Division to Harvard.74 This nimble
use of the Army's educational network reveals an attention to manpower and implementation that
was lacking in Dinsmoor's administrative approach. Whereas the Frick Committee universally
addressed the task of collecting knowledge, Harvard's was a localized entry into the problem of
making scholarship useful in wartime. Yet it would be a mistake to diagnose in Harvard's success, as
Dinsmoor might, the effect of a heroic American "initiative". This pedagogical emphasis should
rather be read as a symptom of a different conception to which the whole of the American Defense-
Harvard Group adhered-a conception, developed by its chairman Ralph Barton Perry and imbued
in an American pragmatist tradition, that encompassed not only the objecthood of knowledge, but
contained a theory of subjectivity as well.
The American Defense-Harvard Group (ADHG) was formed in late June 1940 as part of a
wave of US political activity fueled by interventionist conviction and prompted by France's
surrender. The Group's chairman, Harvard philosopher and William James biographer Ralph Barton
Perry (1876-1957), denounced in an early circular the "imminent threat of world-dominion by the
Axis powers," which he advocated should "be met with firmness, not with appeasement." By
mobilizing "the Harvard community", Perry intended specifically to counteract the populist appeal
of totalitarianism. "Although their ends and methods are profoundly repugnant to Americans," he
wrote in the first resolution passed by the Group, "totalitarian countries derive power from the faith
73 To avoid "giving any clues to any actual strategic program." Shoemaker to Perry, Mar 18, 1943. ADHG Archives.
74 "His interest in the matter differs from ours in that it is a broader, long range, interest and lies beyond our own
Ralph Turner, Shoemaker to Perry, Apr 19, 1943. Constable Papers, AAA #3077
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and spirit of sacrifice with which all classes and individuals are imbued.""7 This culture of mass-
consent could be met with "nothing less than the united and organized effort of all the people." As
Perry's final report put it, "one of the original impulses leading to the creation of the Group was the
query, 'What can I do?"' 76 The answer was found in an early version of the concept of "a clearing
house of information": an institutional network that would work, through democratic means of
persuasion, to achieve "moral solidarity" among Allied populations.77
The ADHG's emphasis on achieving "moral solidarity" only increased once America entered
into war, but its foremost task shifted from "combating isolationism" to "supporting the war
effort." By the time its Committee for the Protection of Monuments was formed, its other committees were
devoted mostly to matters of public opinion: Information, Press and Writing, Radio, Speaking and National
Morale. Others, such as the Committee for Care of Refugee Children, served largely as fundraising organs, by
channeling Boston-area philanthropy towards Allied relief organizations. To these morale-boosting
endeavors was now also added the task of serving as a filter for academic expertise, to the effect that
"the working personnel of the Group was steadily drained away, not only into the armed forces but
into civilian agencies and bureaus in Washington and elsewhere." 78 The Committee for the Protection of
Cultural Monuments in War Areas is a case in point: W.G. Constable and Sachs approached Perry in late
1942, to get their Monuments at War petition "widely and influentially signed," and to "arouse interest
and possible action" in Washington.7 9 Perry created the Monuments Committee to host their efforts. He
provided financial support, and remained an intermediary until the Roberts Commission superceded
it. Perry proudly saw this kind of brain-drain as evidence of what "an American University can
contribute ... over and above the technical research conducted in its laboratories." For Perry the
experience of the Harvard Group "demonstrated that there is no reason why any university scholar
or teacher should feel a sense of uselessness and frustration, whatever his subject, and whether he
serve in Washington, overseas, or in his own community.""0 The clearing house of politically useful
information, in other words, also worked as a clearing house of politically engaged humanists,
providing a literal "place" for the humanities in a "world at war."
" American Defense-Harvard Group, Circular of December 18, 1940. ADHG.
76 American Defense-Harvard Group, Final Report:June 1940-June 1945, 5. ADHG.
77 ADHG, Final Report, 14. Throughout the war and its immediate aftermath, the "clearing house" concept would gain
currency as a specifically democratic response to the effectiveness of totalitarian propaganda, becoming a notable point
of consensus at the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) where UNESCO was created in 1944.
78 ADHG, Final Report. 39.
79 Constable to Perry, Dec 31, 1942. Constable Folder, ADHG Archives.
80 ADHG, Final Report. 5; 39; 19; 39-40.
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The question "what can I do?" was for Perry more than an expression of war-time
volunteerism; it contained an entire philosophy of freedom.8" Perry dedicated much of his career to
deducing from the pragmatism of his mentor William James the principles for a "militant
liberalism." Acknowledging that "all moralists, James included, emphasize the 'humanitarian'
distribution of goods over their 'humanistic' or cultural quality,"82 Perry nevertheless posited as
possible "the reconciliation of a provident and tolerant humanitarianism with the militant will--of
the idea of inclusiveness with the temper of exclusiveness.""83 In his attempts to resolve this
contradiction, the conflation of individual subjectivity with academic disciplinarity was a recurring
trope: both were based on a voluntarist conception of "freedom as enlightened choice," which Perry
notably developed in response to the question "What is the Meaning of the Humanities?" the theme
for the 1937 Spencer Trask Lectures at Princeton University.84 Against the commonplace formulation
that "the function of the humanities is to humanize man," Perry proposed to define "the humanities
as any situation or agencies ... that are conducive to freedom.""8 To counter "the pulverizing effect
of specialized research and administrative decentralization,"86 Perry recommended a view of the
humanities as transcending disciplinary divisions, by seeing "every study as a potential humanity,
even professional studies.""8 7 Thus Perry's theory of autonomous choice in the liberal individual was
also a theory of academic autonomy in the liberal arts college-an implicit critique of the branch of
pragmatism influenced by John Dewey that supported educational reform in the direction of
vocational training.88 The relevance of this "humanistic/humanitarian" understanding of
pragmatism here is that it allowed Perry to give a double definition of the Humanities--one
purposely vague, the other defensively pragmatic--that closely parallels the double value which the
Harvard Group attributed to the protection of Monuments during the war. For this reason Perry's
1937 definition of the humanities is a useful guide to understanding the value granted to monuments
at war in 1943.
81 Constable was familiar with this theory, incorporating "Ralph Barton Perry's conception of freedom for enlightened
choice, rather than an anarchical freedom..., which the artist demands" in a 1942 lecture on "Art, its Place in a
Changing World." Constable Papers, AAA #3071.
82 Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James (New Haven: Yale UP, 1938), 129.
83 Perry, In the Spirit of William James, 153.
84 Ralph Barton Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities", in T.M. Greene, Ed., The Meaning of the Humanities: Spencer Trask
Lectures 1937-1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938), 1-42.
85 Ralph Barton Perry, "Philosophy," Lecture Outline, Mar 3, 1938. Morey Papers, 10/G. Original emphasis.
86 Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," 32.
87 With this ambivalent pronouncement that anything can be humanistic, Perry legitimized Princeton's own pedagogy,
notably its creation in 1936 of an interdisciplinary "Special Program in the Humanities," based on giving students
inter-departmental freedom.
88 Dewey's position in the Humanities debate is summarized by Gerald Graf, "General Education and the Pedagogy of
Criticism: 1930-1950," in Professing Literature: An Institutional History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
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The "Fundamental Purpose" of Monuments and Documents
Perry's first proposed re-definition of the Humanities as "any activity conducive to freedom"
was calculatedly vague-so vague that the fundamental purpose of the humanities remained unclear,
much as the "fundamental purpose" of the Army's lists of monuments remained unclear throughout
the war, even as their more "immediate" use-value was constantly re-calibrated. As soon as the
Harvard Committee realized that "the idea [of preserving monuments] no longer has to be sold to
the army; they definitely want information, for definite purposes and it is up to us to supply it,"89
Perry and Shoemaker engaged in a correspondence which left this "definite purpose" unstated:
March 30, 1943
Quite apart form the fundamental purpose for which [this material] is being prepared,
there is another and very urgent need for it in connection with the training of military
administrators. 90
April 7, 1943
Quite apart from its more fundamental purpose, this project has important values in
establishing confidence in the Army in the minds of intellectual leaders in occupied areas
and in changing some of the popular misconceptions in the US in respect to the character
and the interests of the Army. 91
With every "immediate use", a new tactical function was envisaged for the Lists; by April,
Shoemaker had outlined to Perry "three functions" that the art historian's material was to fulfill in
the Army's hands. 92 This emphasis on the purpose of the Lists helped to circumvent the more delicate
question of the purpose of monuments themselves. In June Shoemaker finally arrived at a definition
of the "basic purpose" of the Committee's work, which resembles a basic definition of the
Humanities, but did so only to reinforce a "more immediate interest":
15 June 1943
The basic purpose of this work is the protection of those media through which culture is
carried from one generation to the next. We also have a more immediate and practical
interest in it, however...93
In a neat process of bifurcation, the more the "practical interest" of the lists was codified, the more
the "fundamental purpose" of monuments was generalized into a humanistic autonomy. The
crowning event in this progressive split between humanistic and humanitarian values was the public
89 March 22, 1943, WG Constable to Stout, AAA#3077.
90 March 30, 1943. Memo from Shoemaker for Dr. William Longer, Chairman, Board of Analysts, Office of Strategic
Studies Forwarded to Perry. AAA #3077
91 Shoemaker to Perry. 7 April, 1943
92 "The material you are preparing should fulfill these three functions: (1) the information in full detail will be available
to trainees in working out "problems" as a part of their training. (2) it will also be assembled to be put into the hands
of those few appointees who are experts to be used in the field. (3) the most pertinent of this material will be extracted
and summarize for use in military government handbooks." Shoemaker to Perry, 19 Apr 1943.
93 Shoemaker to Hencken, 15 June 1943. ADHG.
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announcement, in September 1943, that the Roberts Commission had been appointed to protect
monuments "for their own sake." This announcement drew protests from the Harvard scholars
themselves, who had been asked to compose lists for more "immediate" purposes. Hugh Hencken
responded to these complaints on Perry's behalf:
I am not at all sure that the appointment of the Commission to protect monuments "for
their own sake" should change our attitude towards the lists ... While we are here
interested in the monuments for their own sake, popular regard for them in occupied
countries would still be important to the military .... I should guess that we ought still
to think of as many reasons as possible for protecting these things."
Hencken's formulation, that "as many reasons as possible for protecting these things" were needed,
shows that the lack of purposive clarity was remedied by a negative definition of monuments, and of
the humanities, as that which needs to be defended from attack.
In contrast to the arguments made by the Harvard Group to convince the Army, arguments
explaining the protection of monuments to the public were explicitly modeled on the discourse on
the humanities, which had always been conducted in antagonistic terms.95 For example, Perry gave a
pre-emptive view of the humanities as a scheme of resistance against what he called the "the advance
of 'instrumentalism' and 'operationalism'." This advance had infiltrated the Humanities, which were
now threatened by a tendency to "dehumanize" themselves from within. Thus the "pragmatic" half of
Perry's 1937 definition was that "the Humanities are that which resists de-humanization." 96 This
theory of resistance led Perry to privilege art history and literature as humanistically resilient
disciplines:
The Humanities being defined ... as those studies which inhumane teachers cannot
completely dehumanize, literature and the arts possess an uncommonly stubborn quality
... The content of literature and of the arts is intrinsically humane. It presents life
concretely ... [and] will speak for itself in a voice that is never wholly drowned by the
hum of academic machinery.
Perry arrived at a theory of stubborn objecthood through a philosophy of militant subjectivity, with
a coupling of art and literature that highlighted another unspoken assumption of the mid-20h-
9 Hencken to Koehler, September 11, 1943. ADHG.
9' Perry, In the Spirit of WilliamJames, 56. The war itself was seen as symptom of this advance: "on every hand today ... we
are called upon to defend "the Humanities" against war abroad and against socio-economic and scientific-naturalistic
fatalism at home." Lennox Grey, "Editor's Foreward" in Beesley, vii.
96 "A college is a place where students ... predisposed to humanity ... endeavor more or less effectively to preserve their
humanism." This self-destructive narrative allowed Perry to that grant philosophy a lasting place in the university, as a
repository that "must carry the burden of humanism" even as "other subjects or departments have abandoned their
humanistic birthright." Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," 33.
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century discourse on the Humanities: namely, that it was an unmistakably object-based (one might
say, "monumental") approach to knowledge."
Objecthood was, for the humanities in academia and for monuments at war, a way to grant
relevance to the humanistic "past" in an evidently scientific "present." This approach owed much to
the debates over the "Great Books" programs, initially developed by John Erksine as a course for
American soldiers in France during World War I. By the late 1930s the idea of reading one "great
book" per week had gained currency as a proposal for reforming American education as a whole,
by shifting the focus away from Classics (Greek and Latin philology) and towards The Classics ("the
best sellers of the Western World" 98). Although their reformist ambitions were often thwarted,
"Great Books" advocates unquestionably succeeded in focusing Humanities education on "the book"
as an object.99 Against the backdrop of this object-based conception of the Humanities, familiar
arguments about books "containing" a history of civilization were easily transformed, during the
war, into generalist arguments for the preservation of monuments, which were especially resonant
with non-specialist audiences. For example, the "Lecture on the Protection of Cultural Treasures"
which introduced Army officers to the Roberts Commission opened with the assertion that "The
history of civilization and liberty is written in the artistic and historic monuments of Europe to whose
conservation the President's Commission is dedicated."'00 Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation
explained its financial support of the ACLS' Monuments Committee to its trustees by making a
literary analogy with Shakespeare:
The acropolis in Athens, the monasteries of the Balkans countries, the churches in Rome,
the paintings in Florence, the vast architecture and artistic wealth of Italy, these treasures
.... are as much part of the present as the poetry of Shakespeare.l"'
This description of Shakespeare's poetry as a living component of "the present" was clearly aimed at
an audience who had inherited a conception of the humanities where ideas remained relevant
9 Perry already arrived at objecthood to resolve disciplinary fragmentation in his 1926 General Theory of Value. Proceeding
by elimination, he arrived at "any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in
it; just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when anyone whatsoever aims at it." A General Theory of Value Its Meaning
and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1926), 115f.
98 Graf, 133. For a history this passage, see Steven Markus, "From Classics to Cultural Studies," in Daidalos, "On the
Humanities," 15-21.
99 In the 1953 words of Richard C. Snyder, "if there is a distinction in the kinds of general education being offered
today, this is it: Chicago concerns itself with giving practice in how to read a Great Book; Harvard, Columbia,
Princeton and Yale are more concerned with what the Great Book says." Snyder,"The Humanities in Education" in
College English, Vol. 15, No. 2. (Nov 1953), 119.
100 "Lecture on the Protection of Cultural Treasures," ASCSA IX/2.
101 "The Protection of a Cultural Heritage," in Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1943, 34. ASCSA XI.
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through a physically legible objecthood. It is this kind of redemptive objecthood that was repeatedly
projected onto the word "monument" during the war. 102
Perry's affiliation of literature and art, the Rockefeller Foundation's reliance on objecthood:
both were recognizable tropes of the way art historical discourse had entered the humanities in the
1930s. The entrance of monuments into the war, which followed closely behind this process,
involved essentially the same roster of scholars. For example, the author of the "Lecture on the
Protection of Cultural Treasures" cited above was medievalist Charles Rufus Morey (1877-1955),
founder of Princeton's Index of Christian Art and chairman of its department of Art and
Archaeology. Before serving as Vice-Chairman of the Frick Committee, Morey had been actively
involved in organizing Princeton's new Firestone library as a "Humanistic Laboratory," and in
promoting art history a legitimate "fourth branch" thereof. As early as 1929, he refuted the
"ornamental" role to which he and his colleagues had hitherto been relegated:
Art history is no longer a mere embroidering on the other humanities of history and
literature, but a humanistic discipline of independent value, nay, or paramount value, by
reasons of its power to coordinate and integrate the other humanistic pursuits. 103
The success of Morey's attempts to give art history this "paramount value" is reflected partly in the
presence of an art historian at Princeton's 1937 Trask Lectures, Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968).
Panofsky would also later be involved, in the war, in the Frick Committee's listing of monuments.
Significantly, his Trask lecture, titled "The History of Art as Humanistic Discipline," had placed
primary importance on "monuments" as disciplinary objects, by defining the humanities as "the
investigation of human 'record'."104
All human records, according to Panofksy, could be understood either as "primary material
(a monument)" or "secondary material (a document)." Generalizing that the Humanities were the realm
102 Dinsmoor wrote this equivalence between art and literature into his introduction to The Architecture of Ancient Greece, and
put it specifically in terms of an exchange between monuments and documents: "The higher flights of literature and
architecture present an almost perfect parallel. Both have more art than science, and show little progress within
themselves down the ages, while they clearly reflect the progress of the soul of man. It may be that the greatness of the
Greeks is not demonstrated most of all in their architecture; but it is by their architecture, using the word in its widest
sense, that we may now most readily comprehend their civilization in all its bearings. A masterpiece turned out in the
workshop... is in itself a document, for those who have eyes to read it, more precious by far than any single work of
Greek literature. ... In this sense architecture might be called the sheet-anchor of history, which without the everlasting
testimony of the monuments would certainly become fluid and unstable." William Bell Dinsmoor, "Introduction,"
Dinsmoor, The Architecture of Ancient Greece, ( 3rd edition, revised: 1950), xv-xvi. Significantly, this positive assertion that
an architectural monument is a document "by far more precious" than a literary work was revised in the 1950 edition,
whose manuscript Dinsmoor finished "during nights of aerial bombardement in London" in 1944; the 1927 edition
had merely asked rhetorically, "a masterpiece ... is it not itself a document... ?" (Cf The Architecture of Ancient Greece),
Anderson & Spiers (London: 1927).
103 As quoted in Constable, "The Arts in Education," 1929 Lecture, Constable Papers, AAA #3071.
104 Erwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in The Meaning of the Humanities, 91-118.
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where "everyone's 'monuments' are everyone else's 'documents'," Panofsky effectively made art
history paradigmatic of any humanistic endeavor, by defining the humanities broadly as the study of
objecthood:
Unless a scholar is exclusively interested in what is called "events" ... everyone's
"monuments" are everyone else's "documents", and vice-versa. In practical work we are
even compelled actually to annex "monuments" rightfully belonging to our colleagues.
... An art historian, then, is a humanist whose "primary material" consists of those
records which have come down to us in the form of works of art. 105
Having thereby defined every object as a potential "monument", Panofsky arrived at what Thomas
Crow has called his "zero-degree definition" of art, as "a man-made object demanding to be
explained aesthetically."' 06 This definition, which placed "monuments" at the center of all
humanities and proceeded opportunistically outward, has itself become a landmark in the
historiography of art history. Its significance here is double: on the one hand, it was re-enacted
almost literally in 1943, when the Harvard Group was faced with defining what qualified as a
"monument" worthy of protection. On the other hand, this very "re-enactment" can be seen, in
light of Panofsky's definition, as a form of trans-historical agency belonging uniquely to humanists.
Like Panofsky in 1937, the Army in 1943 began with the idea of protecting "monuments"
and ended with the protection of all possible "human records." The Harvard Committee's original
instructions only recommended that contributors include "churches, shrines and pilgrimage sites."
In June 1943, Shoemaker wrote Perry that they should expand this list: "I believe this whole subject
would receive more (and more favorable) attention if all media through which culture is passed on could be
combined and handled as various aspects of the same problem." 107 This opportunistic extension of
the protection of monuments literally rehearsed Panofsky's "annexing" of all the humanities into
the history of art, with the immediate result that the army's definition of a "monument" was
enlarged. Thus, in response to Shoemaker's request, Perry and Constable composed a detailed
taxonomy of monuments to be included for the Harvard Lists:
a. Churches and other religious buildings
b. Secular buildings, including private houses
c. Sites of archaeological, historical, or religious importance.
d. Shrines, places of pilgrimage, and other places of special local importance.
e. Works of art (movable or otherwise) such as statues, monuments, fountains.
f. Art collections, both public and private (including arms and armour collection.)
10s Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," 101.
106 Thomas Crow, "The practice of Art History in America" in Daedalus Vol. 135, No. 2 (Spring 2006), 73. In fact,
Crow refers to the slightly-modified phrase, "man-made objects to which we assign a more than utilitarian value,"
which Panofsky gave in a 1953 lecture, also generically titled "The History of Art", and published in Cultural Migration:
The European Scholar in America (Philadelphia: U. Penn, 1953), 82-111. In 1955 Panofsky republished both lectures, as the
introduction and the epilogue of a collection, titled Meaning in the Visual Arts. The active object of 1937, which "demands
to be experienced" became, in 1953, a passive object to which "value is given."
107 Shoemaker to Perry, 11 June 1943. ADHG, Shoemaker. Emphasis added.
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g. Archaeological collections, both public and private.
h. Scientific collections, both public and private
i. Libraries and archives.'08
This list "borrowed" liberally from "other media," with the particularly intriguing result that
"archives" and "scientific collections" were now to be understood as "monuments." In the terms of
Panofsky's definition, the document / monument equivalence was here translated into a logic of
containment: any building containing relevant "documents" was to be considered as humanistically
"monumental." This expansion to "libraries and archives" was completed in October 1943, when
Archibald MacLeish consulted with Solon Buck, archivist of the United States, who recommended
that the Commission should "think of archives in the widest sense ... for loss of records in modem
industrialized countries result in far-reaching paralysis of life." Buck invoked "Not only property
rights but human rights," since the disappearance of archives would mean that "Thousands ... will
have to search through public records for evidence that will be legally acceptable as to their very
identity.""109 This archival understanding of documents "giving reality" to life was adapted into the
Commission's work, echoing Panofsky's earlier definition.
Nearly a year after this new taxonomy had been composed, Panofsky was enlisted as one of
the Frick Committee's volunteers, and charged with "checking" the lists for twelve German cities,
giving "uniformity" to their number of stars, and formatting them for publication in the Civil Affairs
Handbooks. 11 (fig. 2.57). Undoubtedly he kept his expanded definition of "monuments" in mind as he
performed this operation. Perhaps more to the point, his theory of the reciprocity between
monuments and documents returns us to the "fundamental disciplinary purpose" of such an
intervention. If buildings containing documents functioned as monuments, what was the function of
a document containing these monuments in turn, such as the Lists he was helping to construct? A
paragraph Panofksy wrote in 1941 gives a hint at an answer; it was intended as his contribution to a
disciplinary definition circulated by College Art Association director, and soon-to-be Special Advisor
to the Roberts Commission, Sumner Crosby:
The historical interpretation of art works has the same autonomous value as the historical
interpretation of all other documents of civilization; it may even be claimed that this
autonomous value is greater, inasmuch as the basic experiences of the human mind
express themselves more directly in works of art than in textual sources which tend to
108 Hencken to Doro Levi, 3 April 1943. ADHG/ Levi. Form letter, sent to all contributors.
109 From Solomon Buck to Archibald MacLeish, October 1, 1943. ASCSA I/6
1• Panofsky's assignment began in March 1943 and came from Sumner Crosby, who asked "I am particularly
interested in the number of stars as I am afraid uniformity does not exist, and it is for that reason I am asking you to
check them before the final photo-statting." Crosby to Panofsky, May 21, 1944. ASCSA V/1. Panosfky's work
included the cities of Hamburg, Hanover, Munster, Paderborn, Sardt, Marburg, Dortmund, Wiesbaden and such part of
Lubeck as had erroneously been listed under Hamburg." Panofsky to Crosby, March 13, 1944. ASCSA V.
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subject these basic experiences to a process of conscious rationalization, and more
articulately than in music which is by definition non-representational. I"'
Panofsky described in terms of the "autonomy" of the art historian the theory he had previously
described in terms of the 'humanistic' value of works of art. The autonomy of the artwork
transferred, in a sense, to the interpretation of its significance, and therefore the "documents" of the
art historians became media for the expression of this autonomy.
Panofsky had already described, in his 193 7 lecture, the essence of this "re-enactment" of
the autonomy of art, by offering to make a contrast "between the humanities and the sciences."
Scientists and humanists, for Panofsky, both proceeded by "Three steps (observation, interpretation,
and organization)," but whereas scientists worked in "the cosmos of nature", humanists constructed
the "cosmos of culture," and therefore "the relationship between 'monuments' and 'documents'"
was "comparable to that between 'natural phenomena' and 'instruments.'""2 As Michael Ann Holly
has pointed out, this was a transposition of a Diltheyan distinction between physical and mental
sciences, wherein the humanist, unlike the scientist, is required "mentally to re-enact the actions and
re-create the creations" he studied."' By this criterion, the Army's Lists were the art historian's
instruments for "recreating" Europe's monuments, attesting to their presence so that they might be
survive destruction. The fact that the Army's definition closely "re-enacted" Panofsky's is far from
trivial, then, even if this re-enactment yielded documents resembling already-existing lists. The
analogy with the sciences was a way for Panofsky to theorize his own position as author of
documents, and to argue that these documents made monuments "real." ("Admittedly," Panofsky
wrote, "the Humanities concern themselves with the past. Why should we be interested in the past?
Because we are interested in reality. There is nothing less real than the present.") He illustrated this
theory of trans-historical agency in a dramatic anecdote: recalling the scientific paradigm of action:
"the man who is run over by an automobile is run over by mathematics, physics and chemistry, I
could just well have said that he is run over by Euclid, Archimedes and Lavoisier." "4 Similarly,
making lists allowed humanists to act upon the present, re-creating a "cultural cosmos" that was
seemingly being "run over" by the sciences."s
"' Erwin Panofsky, "Proposed Amendments to Draft of Circular to the Members of the College Art Association."
Attached to a letter to Sumner Crosby, June 10, 1941. Panofsky Papers, AAA #2111.
"1 This short-hand version of the argument is from Panofksy, "Art and Archaeology", Lecture Outline, 24 Feb 1938."
Morey Papers, 10/G.
"113 Michael-Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 38.
114 Panofksy, "The History of Art," 155.
"s Ralph Barton Perry had used a similar anecdote in his lecture, recounting a fundraiser who, acting on behalf of the
departments of chemistry, business, and fine arts, "called attention to the silk stockings of the ladies present. In their
dyes ... they are chemistry; as commodities, they are business administration, while in their attractiveness to the eye,
they are fine arts." Where Panofsky's model of agency differed from Perry is that while Perry was content simply to
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The Army's Lists were "instruments" which allowed US art historians to intervene in the
monumental "reality" they had been assigned to recreate. From without, this intervention was
supported by the academic framework of the humanities. How was this disciplinary instrument-
the "lists"-constructed from within art history? Lists had been a fundamental component of art
historical scholarship since Vasari; yet when the removal of an item from a list leads to its potential
destruction, the practice connotes a whole new set of ethical obligations. How did art historians rise
to this ethical challenge? Collectively, and anonymously. While the first Harvard Lists hurriedly sent
to Europe in early 1943 still contained a list of authors, by October of that year it was agreed that
"the material should be prepared impersonally" and therefore that "the name of any unofficial
group or individual should not appear" on the lists."' This collective anonymity was originally
intended to placate the rivalries between competing committees; it eventually came to embody the
disinterestedness of art history as a whole. This disciplinary cohesion, as we will see, also helped to
mask the ethical objections encountered by various scholars when faced with the adaptation of their
disciplinary "instruments" to military ends.
Sachs' Method: Composing the lists
In 1969 Colin Eisler, gave perhaps the most colorful depiction of American art history
between the two wars, by evoking a "very very American epoch" when the discipline was divided in
three camps: "Those who interested themselves in stones were completely satisfied. Those who
interested themselves in facts, possibly. Those interested in ideas, certainly not.""' Less caricatured
but similarly three-fold, James Ackerman's 1963 account also described the first half of the 20'
century in three waves: the "gentlemanly and ethically oriented art history" inherited from the 19
Century, the advent of "scientific aims after World War I," and the "arrival of a group of pre-
eminent European teachers ... who were masters of the empirical method" in the 1930s."8
Subsequent studies have left this three-part history largely untouched, although they have mitigated
the abruptness of their succession, adding institutional factors to the basic story of intellectual
migration. Notably, the proliferation of art history departments throughout the 1920s has be re-
look at a useful object, (silk stockings), for Panofsky the document played a mediating role in humanistic agency.
Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," 32.
116 Letter from Dinsmoor to Shoemaker, October 9, 1943. ASCSA 1/6.
117 Eisler was actually borrowing classicist William M. Calder's evocation of the same period in his own discipline,
Classical Studies. From "Die Geschichte der klassichen Philologie," cited in Colin Eisler, "Kunstgeschichte American Style,"
in Fleming & Bailyn, Eds, The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1969), 559.
118 Ackerman, 141. In an interview with the author, Ackerman reiterated this characterization and extended its validity
through the 1950s: "American art history at the outbreak of war had basically two branches: the fact-gathering branch
and the connoisseurship brand." James Ackerman, Conversation with the author, June 19, 2006.
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examined in light of the curricular advances that transformed the "gentlemanly" tradition into a
fully professionalized course of study (spear-headed by Paul Sachs's "laboratory for the art
department" at Harvard) and a comprehensive survey of Christian archaeology (at the Frick Art
Reference Library and the Princeton Index of Christian Art). 11" As for the wave of European emigr6s
who came to swell the ranks of these departments-the phenomenon Walter Cook famously called
"the providential synchronism between the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe and the
spontaneous efflorescence of the history of art in the United States" '20-recent scholarship has
revealed not only that transatlantic exchanges occurred decades before this mass exile, abut also that
the methodological repercussions from these 6migres' arrivals were not felt until the 1960s, when
their students graduated in large numbers."'
From this historiography, the mid-century has emerged as a period of transition for a
discipline whose members still numbered in the double digits: at worst a moment of confusion, at
best the last gasp of an elite informality. Within this field, the Roberts Commission must be seen as a
catalyst for disciplinary codification, especially in light of the overwhelming overlap in membership
between the Roberts Commission and the College Art Association. Indeed the same small-scale
informality that allowed heterogeneous methodologies to co-exist in this period also enabled the
discipline to act as a cohesive whole during the war.'22 War-time issues of the College Art Joumal
demonstrate how closely the problems of disciplinary cohesion and monumental protection were
linked: throughout 1941-1945 the Journal published an elaborate series of debates on the merits of
different forms of graduate education in the Arts, periodically interrupted by reports sent from war-
torn Europe by MFA&A officers.123 This parallel pattern culminated, in 1944, when the CAA
"9 Smyth and Lukehart's Early Years of Art History was dedicated to honoring a group of scholars who had partaken in this
institutional history. Kathryn Brush augmented the point with scholarly evidence, in her Vastly More than Brick and Mortar:
Reinventing the Fogg Art Museum in the 1920s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
120 As director of the IFA, Walter Cook had an exaggerated view of this "providential synchronism" since he who
provided many posts for European exiles. Beneficents of his policy had a similarly distorted impression of coincidence.
The citation above is from Panofsky's "Three decades of Art History;" Colin Eisner used the phrase "All Medium, No
Message" in "Kunstgeschichte American Style." The orthodox view of American art history as "provincial" was given by
John Coolidge as late as 1967: "By the early 1930s, after a decade of brilliant contributions, art history in America
remained sporadic and provincial. It was the task of the refugees from Germany to establish a unified discipline and to
bring a breast of continental practice." "Walter Friedlander," in Art Journal (Sp 1967), 260.
12' Kathryn Brush explicated pre-existing channels of influence in "German Kunstwissenschaft and the Practice of Art
History," in America after World War I. Interrelationships, Exchanges, Contexts," MarburgerJahrbuch fir Kunstwissenschaft,
(1999), 7-36: "The rapid upswing in the formalized study of art history in the United States after World War I and
the intensified contact with European scholarship that ensued did not grow out of a void. Instead the postwar "boom"
built to a large extent upon the results of earlier initiatives to establish the study of art as a serious area of academic
inquiry in America." While Thomas Crow talked about delayed influences in "The practice of Art History," Op Cit.
122 As we will see in Chapter 3, art historians' relations with Unesco and its affiliated international organizations turned
sour precisely when bureaucratic procedures took precedence over personal connections in recruiting heritage experts.
s23 The College ArtJournal (CAJ) was the 1941 re-incarnation of the Association's journal Parnassus. Reports on the Roberts
Commission's work appeared as follows: Sumner McK. Crosby, "The Protection of Artistic Monuments in Europe" CAJ
(Mar 1944), 109-113; Charles R. Morey's "The War and Mediaeval Art" and Rensselaer Lee's "The Effect of the War on
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published a "Statement on the Place of the History of Art in the Liberal Arts Curriculum," which
asserted the importance of the "useless areas" of art historical training in the face of the
"specialization, indifference to ends, disregard of the emotional and imaginative life" that had been
precipitated by war. This "Statement" was signed by an array of art historians (most involved in the
Roberts Commission's work) so staggeringly diverse that it seemed designed to demonstrate external
cohesion, despite internal strife, in the face of war. 124In light of this self-fashioning as a "useless"
discipline averse to "vocational training," it is all the more important to note that many of the
proposals for pedagogical reform devised in this period found an immediate, if unexpected, testing
ground in the instrumental war-time work of the Roberts Commission. Indeed preservationist fervor
alone cannot explain the intense competition provoked by the Commission's work, between
individuals and groups wanting to provide better, faster, or more comprehensive service to the
Army. Undoubtedly the Roberts Commission was also seen as an opportunity to showcase,
humanistic creed notwithstanding, the "usefulness" of nascent institutional formations in an
increasingly "instrumental" academic paradigm. In lieu of a person-by-person account of the
manifold convergences between art historical pedagogy and wartime protection, and in place of an
overview of the reciprocal instrumentality between the two, I narrate the making of the Lists of
Monuments through a composite sketch, by following three key figures, whose methodological
differences became the blueprint for a threefold distribution of tasks: making, editing, and
implementing lists. While Paul Sachs (and other American "museum men") established a
framework for listing, Wilhelm K6hler (and other emigre art historians) provided the geographic
Renaissance and Baroque Art in Italy" in CAJ (Jan., 1945), 75-80; Gladys Hamlin's "European Art Collections and the
War" in CAJ (Mar., 1945), 155-163; Stanley Meltzoff s "Letter from North Italy" CAJ (Nov 1945), 34-36; Marvin C.
Ross "SHAEF and the Protection of Monuments in Northwest Europe" in CAJ (Jan., 1946), 119-122. Significantly, the
Society of Architectural Historians (SAH), branched off of the CAA in 1941, and included a preservationist clause in its
mandate. See "Round Table Discussion on the Preservation of Historic Architectural Monuments, Held Tuesday, March
18, 1941" The Journal of the American Society of Architectural Historians Vol. 1, No. 2 (1941).
124 "A statement on the Place of the History of Art in the Liberal Arts Curriculum," in CAJ (Mar 1944), 82-87. It was
authored by A Committee of the College Art Association; Millard Meiss; Alfred H. Barr, Jr.; Sumner McK. Crosby;
Sirarpie Der Nersessian; George Kubler; Rensselaer W. Lee; Ulrich Middeldorf; C. R. Morey; Erwin Panofsky; Stephen
Pepper; Chandler R. Post; Agnes Rindge; Paul J. Sachs; Meyer Schapiro; Clarence H. Ward. The statement admitted to
differences in method: "The war has focused attention on an issue that has existed in American education for many
years. Immediate military necessity has led to technological training on a greatly extended scale. Faced with the urgent
demand for this training and with serious economic insecurity, our colleges have had to curtail their program of
instruction in all the "useless" areas. In this way the tendency of American education throughout the twentieth century
to become more practical and to emphasize science and vocational training has been suddenly and very rapidly
accelerated. The great dangers inherent in this tendency-specialization, indifference to ends, disregard of the
emotional and imaginative life-have now been magnified. ... The history of art has been affected by the general
educational trend, and it is faced with some additional problems of its own. The real function of the study of art in the
liberal arts college is often confused with professional training-the training of artists or of art historians. When, on the
other hand, courses in the arts are designed, as they should be, to further understanding and enjoyment, there is
considerable difference of opinion as to what method of study best achieves this purpose."
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coverage required by the lists, and William Bell Dinsmoor (as chief expatriate archaeologist) traveled
to war zones to oversee their implementation. (figs. 2.24-28) I begin with the connoisseur.
Paul Sachs' contribution to the Roberts Commission as a volunteer effort neatly mirrors his
contribution to American art history as an institution: both consisted in the application of a scientific
model of laboratory investigation-known informally as the "Fogg Method"-to the creation of
aesthetically cohesive art collections. "Every distinguished collection," Sachs wrote in the 1930s, "is a
work of art in itself, revealing qualities of proportion and harmony which spring from a controlling
idea. A true collection manifests a sense of design." 12 Sachs taught this "design" method in his
"Museum Course" at Harvard, which focused on detailed study of the objects in the Museum's
collection, and hoped to build, in this manner, both the Fogg's collection and a new generation of
curators to staff a growing number of museums in America. (fig. 2.24) Indeed the growth of
American art-history is intimately connected to the emergence of a new American collecting class-
in David Watkin's words, the rise of "the connoisseurship of wealthy collectors, many of whom
were new to the art world and therefore sought expert guidance." 126 Having been one such collector
himself, Paul Sachs saw no conflict in his curatorial and scholarly mandates, nor in the "self-
perpetuating system" of personal connections he established through his teaching, whereby alumni
who had become collectors could donate abundantly to the Fogg. It is this fluidity between
professional, personal, and academic realms that led Sachs to play such a leading role in the early
organization of the Harvard Committee's work. As one of the "most powerful gatekeepers to the
museum profession", he became the primary "gatekeeper" for the MFA&A, 127 turning his art-
historical network over to the Army, convincing military authorities that the MFA&A could be
entirely staffed by his students and alumni, and advising the entire "personnel" operation himself. 128
Months before the first List of Monuments was sent to Europe, Sachs had already composed and
transmitted innumerable Lists of Personnel to the Army. In convincing the Army that the MFA&A was a
realistic proposition, he was helped by the fact that his "museum course" included mandatory
training in the techniques of art conservation. 129 Hence the "Field Record" form distributed to MFA&A
125 As quoted in Kantor, 171.
126 David Watkin, The Rise of Architectural History (London: Architectural Press, 1980), 36.
127 "Sachs's museum course was the first of its kind in this country. Alumni (in later years, alumnae) were placed in art
museums throughout America, making Harvard the West Point of museum studies. ... Sachs became one of the most
powerful gatekeepers for the museum profession." Goodwin, 57.
128 Constable to Stout, 22 Mar 1943, "Whether the matter will broaden out into the creation of a conservation corps
and the use of trained men is another and later matter..."
129 Eisler, "Kunstgeschichte American Style," 557. According to Eisler the "unique fusion of art history with studies in
conservation and techniques," was a "short-lived combination [that] soon drew apart, each pole ossifying in isolation."
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officers to record the condition of monuments was designed by Sachs' conservator at the Fogg,
George Leslie Stout. (fig. 2.32)
One way we can understand Europe's monuments as having been "collected" by the Fogg
Method, then, is that most of the scholars-soldiers enlisted into the MFA&A were trained in Sachs'
Museum Course. Nor was it unusual for Sachs to send these students on reconnaissance missions
abroad, list of places and people in hand. As described by a former student, an integral part of the
museum course before the war were summers spent in Europe, where "contacts with dealers,
museum administrators, and other collectors were cultivated and developed for both present and
future use":
Sent forth to Europe with dozens of introductory letters (it wasn't unusual for a student
to be clutching over one-hundred letters and cards) students were expected to add
detailed information about conditions in the art world, country by country, to the list of
names and addresses, books, collections, paintings, galleries, that Sachs had
accumulated. 130
This description might well be substituted for a brief of the MFA&A's mandate in war, with the
addition of "surveying damage" and "giving monuments first aid." (fig. 2.30) The continuity
between these two practices (touring monuments in summer, saving monuments in war) is further
attested by the way Sachs' sent his "List of Personal Acquaintances," to Shoemaker-a list which had
acted before the war like a private Baedeker's Guide to the art world for his students-with a note
that "Some of these people, may, of course, have disappeared during the war. This is the 1938
list." 131 Later Sachs worked to have John Walker appointed "special adviser" to the Commission, not
in his capacity as Chief Curator of the National Gallery of Art, but because he had resided in Italy
and the mentorship of noted American collector Bernhard Berenson would have afforded him "the
opportunity to visit private collections closed to students." 132
Lists of people and lists of monuments fit together in an elaborate indexing scheme that was
kept in an extensive card file at the Commission's headquarters. (fig. 2.29) A veritable monument to
the art world, this file was constantly updated to provide an exact image of the state of monuments
and its monuments-men worldwide. Thus any list was only one item in a list of lists:
War Status I. PERSONS
a. artistic
b. dealers or firms
c. owners or donors
d. personnel, directors, art historians
Both Harvard's departmental roster and Roberts Commission's "Personnel File" were divided into "technical side" and
"art history side." See the List composed by Paul Sachs for Huntington Cairns on October 21 1943. AAA #3077
130 Sybil Gordon Kantor, "The Beginnings of Art History at Harvard and the Fogg Method," The Early Years, 171.
131 Paul J. Sachs, "Paul J. Sachs, European List (Personal Acquaintances), Roberts Commission, National Archives.
132 Minutes of Organizational Meeting of The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe.
Wednesday August 25, 1943, National Gallery of Art." ASCSA III/2
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II. PLACES
a. auctions
b. governments
c. repositories and museums, acquisitions, staff changes
d. other normal activities, discoveries, restorations
e. war damages, losses by transfer, theft, forgery
III. OBJECTS, ANONYMOUS MOVABLE
VI. PROPAGANDA, GENERAL
VII. PUBLICATIONS
Pre-War Status VIII. MONUMENTS, LIST OF FIXED
a. churches
b. palaces and houses
c. monuments
IX. INSTITUTIONS, REPOSITORIES of movable property
a. public art collections
b. private art collections
c. libraries and archives
d. scientific museums and institutions. 133
In an adaptation of Panofsky's theory of humanistic "re-enactment," the management of this
detailed inventory served as a substitute for control over the "cultural cosmos" that it represented.
The ethical value of any List of Monuments lay in this substitution: the possibility that this entire art
world might disappear was remedied by its re-presentation, in precise indexical form. It is all the
more significant, then, that monuments and institutions were recorded in their "Pre-war Status,"
independent from the contingencies of war, enacting the "autonomy" the Commission had set out
to implement.
The second way that Sachs' Museum Course served as a model for the work of the Roberts
Commission was in the application of his collecting method to the composition of the Harvard Lists
themselves. This method it is perhaps most helpfully understood as having evolved from Sachs's debt
to two successive conoisseurial traditions. Sachs inherited his institutional post from "amateur
intellectual" Charles Elliot Norton, who had taught Harvard's-and America's-first course in art
history in 1873. Norton's teachings, which were famously described by his son as "Modern Morals
as Illustrated by the Art of the Ancient," • sought to reconcile the realms of "ethics and aesthetics,"
in particular the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mills with a sympathy for Ruskin's aesthetic vision of
social reform. One consequence of this mixture was that Norton emphasized both individual
encounters with art ("The love of the beautiful is the best possession that a man who wants to lead a
133 Dinsmoor, "Frick Reference Library Status, January 4, 1944." ASCSA I/8. The location of this file was the subject of
debate in 1944, it was forwarded to the OSS. Dinsmoor to Constable, 21 Sep 1944. AAA
134 As cited in Edward H. Madden, "Charles Eliot Norton on Art and Morals" in Journal of the History of Ideas (Jun, 1957),
432. For Norton's own views, see his "The Educational Value of the History of the Fine Arts," Educational Review (April
1895), 343-348. The phrase "Amateur Intellectual" is from Timothy P. Duffy, "The Gender of Letters: Charles Eliot
Norton and the Decline of the Amateur Intellectual Tradition," in The New England Quarterly, (Mar 1996), 91-109.
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moral life can have,")'"3 and the value of art for teaching "the lessons of moderation, of self-control
of wise, sweet, simple, temperate living" in an industrializing America.'36 Two generations later,
Sachs taught his museum course from the home which had been Norton's at Shady Hill. While the
institution of art history at Harvard had undergone significant transformation in the intervening half-
century, Norton's emphasis on ethics continued to permeate Sachs' teachings."37 Witness for instance
the yearly guest lecture by W.G. Constable, titled Ethics for Museum Men, which depicted the museum-
man as motivated by a higher moral calling. "In museum work today," Constable asserted,
"intellectual ability and professional knowledge are not enough; they must be inspired and guided
by a high standard of morals and a high sensitiveness to moral implications in each
individual." '38Yet the ethical mandate of the 20 century aesthete no longer applied to only to
personal comportment; it amounted rather to a collecting ethic that stressed issues of "originality,
authenticity and value of art." 139
In this passage from gentlemanly to institutional ethics, a crucial transfer had occurred,
between the "temperance" of aesthetic enjoyment and the "isolation" of art objects. Fogg director
Edward Forbes addressed this link in a 1918 seminar on "the question of how art is to be displayed."
"The importance of quality rather than quantity cannot be strongly emphasized," Forbes argued, and
he marshaled as many Victorian apercus of moral behavior in support of this theory of display:
Everyone knows enough not to try to eat two turkeys in one meal, yet most of us are
guilty of a like lack of restraint and moderation when we are in a museum. ... I believe
that the principle should be established that no one except the habitues of museums
should remain more than two hours in a gallery.... It was a wise man who defined
intemperance as "taking a thing because it was there."
In spite of the tendency of the public to be intemperate in their use of
museums, the museum official has the opportunity to do a great deal of good ... Even
those who want too much, want one thing at a time... if a large room were filled with
five thousand of the finest Chinese porcelains in the world, the visitor would give one
look and flee discouraged. If on the other hand one of these were placed in the center of
this vast room, every one would tend to swarm in. 140
135 "Appendix B: Norton's College Lectures," in Letters of Charles Eliot Norton, ed. Norton & Howe (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1913), Vol II, 451. "I am sometimes inclined to think that simply to cultivate one's self is the best service an
American can render in these days," in Kermit Vanderbilt, Charles Eliot Norton: Apostle of Culture in a Democracy (Cambridge:
Harvard, 1959), 187.
136 Student's notes on Greek art, in Vanderbilt, Charles Eliot Norton, 128.
137 Shady Hill, which Duffy describes as one of the legendary "abodes of lettered culture" in New England," was also
where the first meeting of the Harvard Monuments Committee was convened. For a brief description of Norton's
Harvard legacy, see Stebbins and Ricci, "Charles Eliot Norton, Ruskin's Friend, Harvard's Sage," in the Last Ruskinians:
Charles Eliot Norton, Charles Herbert Moore and Their Circle, (Harvard Art Museums, 2007), 13-28.
138 "Museum Ethics," Constable Papers, AAA #3073. Also published as "Ethics for Museum Men," in The Museums Journal
(October 1941).
139 Constable, "Museum Ethics," 13.
140 "The classical example of this," he continued, "is Raphael's Sistine Madonna, which occupies a room by itself in
Dresden Edward W. Forbes. "The Art Museum and the Teaching of the Fine Arts," Seminar at the Metropolitan
Museum on March 30, 1918, The Bulletin of the College Art Association of America, (Sep 1918), 126-127.
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From a principle of "temperate" behavior, Forbes derived a spatial regime for the isolation of
museum objects. That the entire department was ruled by this translation is perhaps most easily
demonstrated in the departmental portraits, which included not only each faculty's likeness, but also
an object from the Fogg collection.
In this passage from experiencing art to collecting it, Sachs and Constable were indebted to a
more recent model of connoisseurship, spearheaded by Bernhard Berenson. After studying with
Norton, Berenson had become an "adviser to the Gilded Age's wealthiest collectors, whose gifts
would form the cornerstones of many American museums.""' While Berenson emphasized
appreciation like Norton through personal acquaintance, he also insisted on establishing the facts of
authorship, date, provenance, and genealogy, before making judgments of value. With Berenson the
tradition of the connoisseur took a distinctly "scientific" turn, as evidenced by his innovations in the
establishment of lists as a form of art historical knowledge. Thus Berenson's judgments were "brief,
elliptical, aphoristic, informal, conversational yet assertive, occasionally arbitrary and personal," in
the manner of Norton's moral apercus.14 2 But he appended them with extensive and carefully
constructed inventories of works, artists, places. (fig. 2.22) That Berenson was content to segregate his
artistry and his science is evidenced in the separate publication, after 1936, of his judgments (e.g.,
Italian Painters of the Renaissance) and his inventories (e.g., Italian Pictures of the Renaissance) arranged
alphabetically and by geographic location. In contrast to this separation, Sachs belonged to the first
generation of art historians who transformed art collecting into a fully integrated academic science,
complete with a laboratory component and a precise methodology. Where Berenson could impart
onto his clients a vague sense of the "tactile" value of art, Sachs' ambition was to render aesthetic
judgments wholly teachable.
Sachs' art history was a discipline driven by the search for protocols and the building of
classifications, and it is in these ambitions that his work for the Roberts Commission was anchored.
As with the Ethics for Museum Men, Sachs relied on his British colleague Constable to provide a written
exposition of his art-historical method. In his 1938 Art History and Conoisseurship, Constable cited
Berenson's definition of "the work of art itself as the event of art history," 143 but he distinguished
between the connoisseur, who narrates this event, and the art historian, who collects it in four steps:
141 George M. Goodwin, "A New Jewish Elite: Curators, Directors, and Benefactors of American Art Museums," in
ModernJudaism, (Feb., 1998), 47-79.
142 Michael Rinehart, "Bernard Berenson," in The Early Years of Art History, 92. Rather than seeking ethical lessons in art,
"the idea that art enhanced life was focused on tactile value."
143 W.G. Constable, Art History and Conoisseurship: Their Scope and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 10.
The citation from Berenson's Study and Criticism of Italian Art reads: "All that remains of a event in general history is the
account of it in document or tradition; but in art, the work of art itself is the event."
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(i) Collection of material
(ii) Study and analysis of its character and consequent grouping and classification
(iii) Investigation of why the material has taken a particular form at a particular time and place
(iv) Estimation in relation to other material of its importance, historical certainly and
possibly aesthetic. 144
Each step in this progression, which began with a "material" collection and culminated in an
"aesthetic" judgment, was replicated in the making the Harvard Lists, as evidenced in the first set of
instructions that Sachs, Constable and Henken sent to contributors on April 5 ', 1943:
The specifications for listing are as follows:
1. It should be up to 50 pages long
2. The material should be listed by provinces and cities so that all the material from one
city or locality could be listed together and placed in order of relative importance.
3. The list should include: a. churches, b. secular buildings, c. sites of archaelogical,
historical importance d. shrines. ... e. works of art ... f. art collections ... g.
archaeological collections ... h. scientific collections i. libraries and archives.
4. The significance of the material in the eyes of the local population should be
emphasized, since its proper protection by the occupying forces would have an
important effect on the morale of the inhabitants. In special cases, a few lines might
be added stressing the place held by the particular item in local pride or religious
belief. 145
From these instructions, a neat correspondence can be drawn between the needs of the Army and the
method of the art historian: "collection" occurs in the 50-page lists; "classification" in the regional
grouping and later in the introductions, "estimation" in the ordering and later in the assignment of
stars. In war, however, the scientific coherence of the art historian's method was disturbed: these
steps were to be fulfilled out of order, with step (iii) taking precedence over the rest of the endeavor.
According to the Army the question "why the material has taken a particular form at a particular
time" was to be answered by a blanket statement of attachment between region and monument.
Arguments about "artistic merit" were to be suppressed, and the scientific method that supported
them was up-ended, but the judgments arrived at would retain their validity.
The ethical problems posed by this separation of scientific method from critical judgment
became dramatically evident as soon as the first Harvard Lists were sent to Colonel Shoemaker in
March 1943, and Shoemaker promptly returned them with a complaint that they contained "too
many discussions of an art historical nature." The main problem was that the lists had been
composed as ends in themselves rather than means to a military end. "It is not necessary,"
Shoemaker assured, "to argue for the artistic merits of the materials listed:"
144 W.G. Constable, Art History and Conoisseurship, 12.
145 Hencken to KUhler, 5 Apr 1943. ADHG / K6hler.
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Please refrain from instructing the army in art history... What is wanted is practical,
factual information ... [about] ... the ways in which recognition of any given item or of
the tradition centering around it can be utilized for our own selfish ends. 146
Through repeated admonitions, Shoemaker explained that aesthetic judgments should not be
didactically arrived at, but rather given as starting points. A new set of instructions devised by Sachs,
Constable and Hencken further pulled apart the four-fold distribution of the format (notably
introducing the use of "stars" and the need for an overall "introduction."'4 7 The editors also made a
list of what the art historians "are asked not to do," 148 including "talk down to the Army" and
"instruct the Army in art history." Finally, they rephrased Shoemarker's admonition, by declaring as
a given the autonomous value of art-historical judgement:
The Army will accept your judgment as to what items should be given priority, and it is
not necessary to argue for the artistic merits of the materials listed. 149
In other words, the Army was willing to "accept" art history as an autonomous discipline, capable
of arriving at its own judgments of value, as long as this autonomy could operate in the service of a
specific military policy, described as "our own selfish ends."
The new set of instructions produced considerable confusion over the meaning of the word
"monument," although they successfully conveyed the need for brevity. The resulting drafts of lists
are a model of hybridity. For example, uncertain as to what constituted a monument's legitimate,
but "not artistic" merit, Georges Wildenstein and Kenneth Conant resolved to append to each item a
single fact. While these facts were multivalent in their representation-age, meaning, architectural
features, form, beauty, style, popularity with tourists, usage by authorities, and even presence in the
literature-all were presented under the guise of a monumental "fame":
Bernieres (Loiret) Church with beautiful spire*, famous
Blois (Loire & Cher) Chateau*** remarkable for first-rate historic interest and architectural
form
Carnac (Finistere) Menhirs*** alignments*** etc. most famous of their kind
Champdeniers (D.S.) Church*, parts about 1000 years old
Chantilly (Oise) Chateau* and stables* famous and much visited
Chartres (Eure & L.) Cathedral***, unquestionably one of the finest of all medieval
146 Shoemaker to Paul J. Sachs, 4 Apr 1943. ADHG/ Sachs.
147 "The following are needed: 1. An introduction grouping various categories of items, explaining their religious,
political, or other importance in the eyes of the local population. 2. The outstanding items should be listed with an
indication of their relative importance (as by number of stars). ... 3. These lists should be arranged, first, by
geographical areas, and then alphabetically by towns or other localities under the larger divisions." Sachs to
contributors, 24 May 1943. ADHG
148 t4 1. We are requested not to "talk down" to the Army by telling them they must respect monuments ... 2.
We are requested not to make suggestions as to the conduct of military affairs ... 3. We are requested to avoid
seeming to instruct the Army in art history ... 4. We are requested not to include discussions of the artistic or
other merits of any items except insofar as these factors make it precious to the local populations." Sachs to
contributors, 24 May 1943. ADHG
149 The new set of instructions, sent by Sachs to K6hler, 24 April 1943,
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buildings
Chaumont (Hte.M.) Chateau* used by Pershing and GHQ of AEF
Chauvigny (VIenne) Chateau** and church* ensemble, very picturesque
Domremy (Vosges) Birthplace of Jeanne d'Arc*** French heroine; important for that
reason only
Josselin (Morb.) Chateau**, famous and rightly so; church
Le Dorat (The V.) Church*, bold and interesting design
Le Mans (Sarthe) Cathedral** very noble building, apse one of finest in Gothic style
Le Raincy (Seine) Parish Church**, one of the most interesting of the modern
French churches
Loches (I. etL.) Chateau*, well-known medieval building; church of St. Ours*,
curious 4-spired Romanesque building, unique in form
Morienval (Oise) Church***, widely known example of primitive Gothic, cited in
all books on the subject
The appendage of "fame" to the monuments in no way replaced scholarly evaluations, acting
instead an additional layer through which "purely artistic merit" was still visible. A similar effect of
didactic transparency resulted from the request to provide "a general introduction," as early drafts of
these introductions contained an explanation of the criteria that had been applied to the selection of
monuments. ("Monuments included in this list, have been selected on account of their economic
and cultural importance.") "0 This transparency reveals just the kind of methodical ethos that
Constable had prescribed in 1938. Yet Constable now found that, under the constrainst of war, "the
art historians had behaved rather foolishly," displaying an "extraordinary incapacity to grasp what
was necessary."15' In the face of this incapacity, it became the job of the list editors to provide "a
controlling idea" to the Harvard Lists.
Robbed of the discourse to which they were accustomed, and required to articulate a general
theory of monumental value, list editors Constable and Hencken resorted to making a general
argument about European people's attachment to their monuments. Rather than disclosing the
process by which monuments had been selected, they presented monuments as containers of value.
Rather than taking responsibility for this value, they attributed the judgment to "local populations."
And rather than appending this value to each item in the list, they applied it uniformly as the opening
sentence for every list's "Introduction":
To the Norwegians every kind of monument of the past ... is precious and valuable.
In short, the Belgian nation as a whole is highly conscious of the great significance of its
artistic heritage
0 "These have been chosen with a view to protecting structures valued by the people because of their economic and
historic importance." Milton Anastos' list for Rumania. ADHG / Koehler I.
s51 "The art historians have behaved rather foolishly. They have shown an extraordinary incapacity to grasp what was
necessary and an in many cases have tried to teach the Army its business and introduce, into what they submitted,
information doubtless of great interest and value to the student, but quite irrelevant to the purpose of the document
they were preparing. Mercifully, Alex Robinson has been working on the list for Greece and has provided a pattern."
Constable to George Stout, May 28 1943. AAA#3077.
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The Dutch people hold their monuments and the art of their past in high esteem. They
cherish the old towns and are proud of their famous museums...
Consciousness of their national artistic supremacy, of the value of their art treasures and
monuments ... is one of the distinctive characteristics of the French people.
The Hungarians are extremely proud of their nation, and all classes of people are deeply
interested in its history and culture.
Italy is a nation of art lovers who are intensely proud of their history and of the
monuments in which it is given visible evidence, and all classes of the Italian people
hold these tings in the very highest esteem.
The Austrian has a great respect for tradition, and is very retentive of habits and practices
sanctified by custom. Every respect should therefore be paid to his monuments. 5s2
From these introductions, the people of Western Europe emerged as a homogeneous mass, animated
by a generic attachment to their art. The application of this "pattern of argument" to the introduction
had the double effect of homogenizing European cultures while enabling America's exceptional
status as an objective observer, a collector of cultures.
Read collectively, these Introductions also reveal a disciplinary paradigm that recalls the
panoramic image used by Erwin Panofsky in 1953 to describe the emergence of an American
discursive model where "historical distance proved to be replaceable by cultural and geographical
distance":
Where the Europeans art historians were conditioned to think in terms of national and
regional boundaries, no such limitations existed for the Americans.... Seen from the
other side of the Atlantic, the whole of Europe from Spain to the Eastern Mediterranean
merged into one panorama the planes of which appeared at proper intervals and in
equally sharp focus. 153
Panofsky's description of the American art historian as a surveyor of transatlantic panoramas helps to
explain why, by the early 1940's, art historical method could be seamlessly integrated into a military
strategy based on "the command of the air": because both were based on the same paradigm of a
territorial and discursive totality punctuated with monuments. As the next section will show, on the
one hand, Panofsky's geographic metaphor stops being a metaphor in the case of the Roberts
Commission's work, which was dependent upon a literal perception of Europe as "one panorama"
from a Bomber's cockpit. On the other hand, this homogenization must be understood as a willing
"52 [Sigrid Unset], "Introduction," Civil Affairs Handbook, Norway. Section 17: Cultural Institutions (Army Service Forces: M 350-
17: 19 July 1944). [Jakob Rosenberg], "Introduction," Civil Affairs Handbook, Belgium, Section 17: Cultural Institutions (Army
Service Forces: M361 -17, 13 May 1944). [Ernst Kitzinger], "Introduction", Civil Affairs Handbook, Netherlands, Section 17:
Cultural Institutions (Army Service Forces: M357-17: 13 May 1944). [George Wildenstein and Kenneth Conant],
"Introduction" in Civil Affairs Handbook, France. Section 17B: Cultural Institutions. (Army Service Forces Manual M352-1 7B, 3
June 1944), vii. [Margaret Ames], "Introduction, " American Defense-Harvard Group, List of Protected Monuments in Hungary
by Margaret Ames. [Doro Levi], "Introduction," Civil Affairs Handbook, Italy. Section 17A: Cultural Institutions, Italy. (Army Services
Forces: M353-17A, 6 July 1944.), vii. [Otto Benesch], "Introduction," American Defense-Harvard Group, List of Protected
Monuments in Austria by Otto Benesch.
153 Erwin Panofsky, "Three Decades of Art History in the United States," in Meaning in the Visual Arts, (New York:
Penguin, 1955), 376
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war-time distortion on the part of emigres who saw their own exile as a symptom of the impending
danger to their own country's monuments, and the work of the Commission as a solution to it.
Indeed while the Army sent American art-historians-in-training to care for Europe's monuments, in
the US it was a team largely made up of European emigres that was charged with composing the
lists of monuments.
K6hler's Kunstwissenschaft: The geography of collaboration
The extent to which mass intellectual exile homogenized the study of European art history, as
described by Panofsky, and the extent to which the Roberts Commission contributed to this historio-
geographic phenomenon, can be verified by examining the role of Wilhelm K6hler (1884-1959) to
the production of the Harvard Lists. A German medievalist who emigrated to Harvard in 1935,
K6hler was the brother of "illustrious immigrant" and Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang K6hler. '4 (fig.
2.27) While Kbhler the psychologist is known for carrying an entire experimental tradition across the
Atlantic, K6hler the art historian more quietly personified the encounter, in Ackerman's words,
between the European "mastery of the empirical tradition" and the pragmatic institutions of
American connoisseurship. At Harvard, K6hler taught the under-represented art of the early
Byzantine Empire, a period then still known as the "Dark Ages." This narrow field of specialization
betrays K6hler's debt to the methods of the new Kunstwissenschaft, with its aim of systematically
undermining the traditional hierarchies between major and minor arts, regions and schools-one
period at a time. In 1941, K6hler was appointed the senior fellow at Harvard's new institute in
Washington, DC, the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection. This trajectory exemplifies
how a generation of German emigres found in the US an institutional setup that was paradoxically
better suited to the epistemological categories they had brought with them, since this setup was
controlled the "scientific" ambitions of America's new class of museum men like Paul Sachs. 55
What Sachs and K6hler had in common was the use of scientific rhetoric to liberate art history from
subjectivity, and while Sachs' "laboratory" method was more obviously informed by gentlemanly
Is4 A pioneer of Gestalt psychology, Wolfgang KUhler visited Harvard in the 1930s, delivering the William James
lectures in 1934 and befriending the ADHG's Ralph Barton Perry-this friendship might in part explain both Wilhelm's
emigration to Harvard and his early involvement in the ADHG's monument committee; documents show that he was
present at the very first meeting at Shady Hill. Wolfgang was an early and vocal critic of the Nazi regime, resigning
from Berlin's Psychologie Institut in 1935, and being appointed to Swarthmore the same year, where he created one of the
foremost American centers of psychological research. See Jean Matter Mandler & George Mandler, "The Diaspora of
Experimental Psychology: the Gestaltists and Others," in The Intellectual Migration, 371-419.
55ss The donation of the estate to Harvard had been Sachs' doing: he had lobbied his classmate Robert Woods Bliss for a
decade, and he oversaw its administration until 1956. Goodwin, 59. The Collection was opened on Nov 1,1940 and
donated to Harvard four weeks later, "to be administered as a resident institute of research." Berta Segall, "The
Dumbarton Oaks Collection" American Journal of Archaeology, (Jan - Mar 1941), 7.
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ethics, K6hler's collaborative "archiving" mechanism was no less ruled by a strict research ethic, that
was tested during the war as a military procedure.
Dumbarton Oaks has entered international history as the setting for the eponymous
Conference that led to birth of the United Nations in November 1944.'56 But the Institute's war-time
service actually began at the hands of the art historians who first came to inhabit it in 1941, under
K6hler's leadership. K6hler saw the hundreds of miles separating the Georgetown mansion from the
Cambridge museum as a space of opportunity-as he put it to the CAA in 1942, a way to add "a
kind of top story put upon the Graduate School of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences." "7 Despite its
collecting seriousness and technical exactitude, Harvard had for K6hler failed to produce a setting
suited to "advanced research and intellectual development" in art history. This critique was
surreptitiously aimed at Sachs's "laboratory" model: the real laboratory sciences were guided by
experimental procedures, while research in the humanities was still characterized by a "lack of
orientation," and this was particularly true of the field of research to which the new institute was
devoted, "the development and formation of Early Byzantine Art." K6hler identified "two lacunae in
the scholarly equipment" of the Byzantine scholar: philological disorder ("the written sources have
never been systematically collected") and overemphasis on small objects at the expense of
monuments ("the monumental material, consisting of structures, and of their sculptural and
pictorial decoration, has never been comprehensively investigated and coordinated.") K6hler's
remedy, the "backbone for the scholarly activities of the new institute," was to engage Junior
Fellows in a systematic survey project based on "the principle of collaborative research." The choice
of research topic was taken away from the individual, but the collective framework ensured a broad
interpretive perspective, and allowed, as a byproduct, the compilation of a comprehensive "Research
Archive" of "all available information about any monument important for the development of
Christian art," which could serve as "a guide both to the monument and its literature."s5 8
"'56 The conference took place between August 21 and October 7, 1944. According to 1990s institute director Angeliki
E. Laiou, "heat was one of the main reasons Dumbarton Oaks was chosen; ... it is one of the coolest spots in
Washington." Angeliki E. Laiou, "Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1944-1994: Remarks from the Opening Session," in
The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations 1944-1994, Ed. Ernest May and Angeliki Laiou, (Harvard, 1998.), ix.
The music room was temporarily transformed into the "Assembly Room," effectively making the institute the first
United Nations headquarters. Much architectural insight can be drawn form this typological continuity between private
institute devoted to quiet scholarly work and the island of optimism needed for this postwar planning. Elsewhere I have
argued that the architecture of parliamentary diplomacy was based precisely on this adaptation of a domestic "salon"
model to diplomatic needs. See Lucia Allais, "Monumentality by the Linear Foot: Carlu's UN and the Architecture of
Parliamentary Diplomacy."
157 Wilhelm K6hler, "The Dumbarton Oaks Program and the Principle of Collaborative Research," in Speculum (Jan
1943), 118-123. "A Paper read before the College Art Association on January 23, 1942, at a meeting devoted to the
discussion of methods of research in the Fine Arts."
"' K6hler, "The Dumbarton Oaks Program," 120.
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This collaborative scheme had been in place for barely 2 years when Dumbarton Oaks
became, for a summer, "a home center for the protection project." By the time the institute's closing
neared in May 1943, only "preliminary lists" had been sent to Europe and North Africa, and Kahler
proposed that the institute remain open through the summer to complete the work. "9 "An ideal
office and framework," he argued, "already exists at Dumbarton Oaks":
1) A group of competent scholars, our Junior Fellows, is available for this kind of work.
2) In the files of our Research Archives large portions of the pertinent material in North
Africa and in Eastern Europe has already been collected
3) Each Junior Fellow is well acquainted with the monuments of the region assigned to
him or her and (more important for the preparatory work than the knowledge of the
country itself) each fellow knows thoroughly the literature of his or her country.
4) The Senior Fellow in charge of research can be expected to coordinate the work of the
Junior fellows and to see that necessary degree of uniformity in the lists is achieved.' 60
The proposal was approved by Sachs' board, and lists for Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia were made at Dumbaton Oaks that summer under the supervision
of emigre medievalist Ernst Kitzinger .161 Later enlisted in the OSS to decode intelligence, Kiztinger
recounted a continuity between art-historical and strategic analysis: "the methods were the same he
used when he analyzed sources in his scholarly work; but ... the study had to be done within two
weeks, and at the end of it one would know with awful certainty whether the analysis had been right
or wrong."'62 Similarly, the analytical "backbone" of Dumbarton Oaks proved "an ideal
framework" for Kitzinger to oversee the Junior Fellow's work on the Harvard List, because it was a
system for deriving monumental meaning out of geographic analysis. In K6hler's 1941 words,
Junior Fellows took "geographically scattered" material to conduct "monographic investigation of
certain regional groups of monuments." In doing this, they had complete interpretive freedom, as
long as their research began by delimiting a "geographic unit," and ended by identifying
"monuments to be recorded according to a prescribed system." 163
In peace-time, this regional model of analysis was supposed to liberate the history of
Byzantine art from the unfavorable "Dark Ages" where Hegelian dialectical schemes had plunged it.
In war-time, this model facilitated the subordination of art history's science to an ethical framework
that projected nationalist pride onto monuments worldwide. The geographic assumptions that
1'9 By 24 April 1943 Hencken requested " whatever material you have already assembled dealing with material or
artistic and cultural importance in Tunisia, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Hungary, and the Balkans. This should be
marked, 'Preliminary draft - incomplete - subject to revision'." Hencken to K6hler. ADHG/ KI.
160 K6hler to Hencken, summarizing a discussion with Sachs the week prior. Undated, probably June 1943.
161 K6hler to Sachs, 26 May 1943. "Minutes of the Administrative Committee for Dumbarton Oaks." ADHG/K6hler
162 Laiou, x. Laiou references Kitzinger's list-making, telling an anecdote that some "tobacco and newspaper kiosks"
in Tunisia had been "carefully protected from bombing because somehow they were thought to be shrines."
'63 "Within the geographical unit assigned to him, the Fellow in studying the monuments is bound only by two
obligations: ... to record the monuments according to a prescribed system; and ... never to lose sight of the ultimate
goal to which the group research is committed." K6hler, "The Dumbarton Oaks Program," 120.
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underlay the development of 20th century art-historical categories, and the ethical dimension they
carried, have only recently received historiographic treatment. As Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann has
shown, European scholarship between the wars was motivated by a search for a system, producing a
plethora of historical explanations for the succession of styles that, whether formalist or
iconographic, were always also implicitly geographical. 164 Kaufmann distinguished between a
French branch of Geographie de F'art that analyzed land morphology over the longue dur& (an approach he
termed "possibilistic") and a German style of Kunstgeographie that attached collective value to art
through the psychology of various Vl6ker (an argument he deemed "deterministic"). According to
Kaufmann, the French tradition dead-ended in Focillon's departure to America, whereas "since the
mid-20th century the Germanic tradition of Kunstgeographie has continued to shape thinking about the
study of artistic geography."' 65
The diversity of geographic interpretations of art that European scholars brought as they
migrated to America would have been evident to anyone attending the lectures delivered at
Dumbarton Oaks's inauguration in 1941. Each lecturer followed a distinctly geographic line of
inquiry--among which Kaufmann would undoubtedly detect more "possibilistism" than
"determinism." Henri Focillon sought a geological connection between medieval and prehistoric
forms ("All great civilizations," he opened, "stand atop a rich undersoil of prehistoric traditions and
forms"),"66 while Russian historian Michael Rostovtzeff gave an account of "some traits of the
[Byzantine] mentality and its relationship to the environment," 167 and Charles Rufus Morey set out
to determine the provenance of the Institute's ivory collection. 168 As for K6hler, he began by leading
his audience on a tour of a French hamlet:
Ladies and Gentlemen, I invite you to follow me to one of the loveliest regions in
France, to Burgundy. You will see a little group of white buildings in rolling country,
164 Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, "From Kunstgeographie to Visual Culture: Geographical Ideas about Art from the First
World War to the Present," in Towards a Geography of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 68-106
165 Kaufmann, 85. In his telling, Paul Frankl's 1939 Das System der Kunstwissenschaft contains as "a summation of studies in
this area before the Second World War ... certainly the most sustained theoretical statement devoted to the question,"
although it stood as "a coda to such discussions rather than as a stimulus for further work."
166 Henri Focillon, "Pr6histoire et Moyen Age," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, November 2"d and 3rd, 1940 by Henri Focillon
Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff, Charles Rufus Morey, Wilhelm Koehler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1. Translation mine.
This echoes the opening line of The Art of the West, "The succeeding chapters of our civilization are each a product of a
particular geographical area, and rooted in their native soil." Henri Focillon, The Art of the West in the Middle Ages Volume I:
Romanesque Art. Trans. Donald King, (New York: Phaidon, 1963), 3.
167 Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff, "The Near East in the Hellenistic and Roman Times," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural
Lectures, 27. Rostovtzeff protested his assignment: "I cannot confidently speak of social and economic conditions as a
background for the evolution o other manifestations of human life.., we may speak of inter-relations between various
manifestations but not of dependence of one on the other..... Nevertheless the student of the history of art it may be of
interest to know, in general outline, under what social and economic conditions."
168 They "have been assigned to centers as far west as Italy and as far east as Antioch. The question of their provenance
is consequently something that early Christian archaeology cannot leave alone." Charles Rufus Morey, "The Early
Christian Ivories of the Eastern Empire," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, 43.
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the hamlet of Berz&t la Ville, a few miles from Macon. It looks like hundreds of other
villages in Burgundy, but one of the buildings, called the Chateau des Moines by the
peasants, contains in a chapel of modest size the most beautiful Romanesque wall
paintings in France. 169
By approaching the "most beautiful painting in France" through an anodyne hamlet, K6hler was
implicitly demonstrating the rigors of the Kunstwissenschaft system: only by being systematic could the
art historian uncover monuments of artistic "significance" even in the most "insignificant" of
locales. This ability to detect monumental value in unremarkable lands acquired a new role in war,
however, in the context of the Army's notion of geography as "the foundation for national power."
To argue in wartime that monuments had a collective value, distributed along regional lines,
was not only to use collective psychology as a pretext for artistic protection. It was also to introduce
monuments into a geographic model of national cohesion that pervaded the Army' Handbooks series.
An Army Manual titled Geographical Foundations of National Power explained this model in tectonic terms.
"National cohesion" was an "imponderable" factor of national power, which depended on the
ability of "certain human traits and abilities" to act as glue, holding together a "vertical" alignment
of "horizontal groups." 17 Wars occurred, then, when "vertical or horizontal cleavages" occurred in
this tectonic whole:
The ability to maintain national cohesion is perhaps the most important of the
imponderables... The existence of different human areas within a country may tend to
loosen its national cohesion, to make it crack apart along regional boundaries .... The
planes of cleavage might be regarded as vertical planes cutting through the social
structure of a nation. There are also horizontal planes of cleavage, separating social
classes, occupational groups, and political parties ... No comparison of the power
potential of different nations is valid until account is taken of their propensities to crack
along the vertical and horizontal planes. 17'
The Army's tectonic model of geography distributed populations in horizontal strata, as if "human
traits" were a substance that could be spread evenly along the earth's crust. Thus the same
psychological unity that the Harvard Lists described as being "contained" in monuments, was now
described by geographers as the very stuff of a country's cohesion: monuments and social structures
169 Wilhelm K6hler, "Byzantine Art in the West," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, 63.
170 "The essential fact that distinguishes the people of a modern nation from people who are merely inhabitants of a
country or subjects of a state is that the former are acutely conscious of their unity and common interests. They share
political ideals and ambitions as well as feel a patriotic devotion to their country. If they are free, they strive to
maintain their freedom; if subject to another state or divided among many petty states, their leaders agitate constantly
for independence and unity." "Nations and National Power," 3.
"71 "The essential fact that distinguishes the people of a modern nation from people who are merely inhabitants of a
country or subjects of a state is that the former are acutely conscious of their unity and common interests. They share
political ideals and ambitions as well as feel a patriotic devotion to their country. If they are free, they strive to
maintain their freedom; if subject to another state or divided among many petty states, their leaders agitate constantly
for independence and unity." "Nations and National Power," 3.
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were made of the same geological substance. Thus the importance of arguing for the meaning of
monuments in the value of the "local population" becomes clear: monuments were sites of
concentrated value, extruded from the horizontal strata of "national cohesion" below.
As the Lists were formalized, this geographic model came to complement the statements
about collective attachment to art that had opened the introductions. By June 1943, Sachs and
Constable had realized that "the request to omit considerations of art history [did] not preclude a
brief sketch of the main periods of art in the introduction," and that in fact, "this feature was
considered highly desirable."' 72 The outline of these "main periods in history" soon became the
place for a three-fold explanation: a geographic overview, an outline of national history, and a
detailed categorization of the "Monuments and Material to be Safeguarded," in each country. Thus
the introduction for France, which began, as we have seen, with the French people's "consciousness
of their own artistic supremacy," concluded by describing monuments arising from a distinctly
French "geographic and ethnographic synthesis":
Geographical position and physical characteristics make the climate and productivity of
France extraordinarily varied. There is not only a great variety in the monuments of its
art, but many materials belonging to the natural resources of the country ... have
contributed to the richness of the French artistic patrimony. The ethnographic and social
structure of France has also helped to determine the character of French artistic
production. ... Out of this variety of elements, however, a distinctive French synthesis
has been achieved. 73
The Army's tectonic model of geography supported the Roberts Commission's use of cultural and
historical arguments for the importance of monuments in national cohesion. In turn, and perhaps
more importantly, the Commission's description of monuments allowed the Army's psychological
arguments to pass for geographic ones, and vice-versa.
This wartime blurring of art-geography as "determination" and as "possibility" helps to
explain how Kunstgeographie continued to pervade art historical scholarship in the postwar, despite the
sharp retreat from any interpretation too close to the categorizations of Nazi eugenicists. The stigma
attached to collective interpretations of art in the immediate postwar was perhaps best captured in the
accusation of "myth-making" leveled at Riegl and Wickoff by Viennese 6migr6 Ernst Gombrich in
1954: "the habit of talking in terms of collectives, of 'mankind,' of 'races,' of 'ages,' weakens
resistance to totalitarian habits of mind."'"7 This critique had already been articulated in 1936 by
Meyer Shapiro, writing from exile in New York, who detected in "the new art history" the usage of
a "mysterious racial and animistic language in the name of a higher science of art." Unlike
172 Sachs to K6hler, 17 Jun 1943. ADHG.
173 "Monuments and Material to be Safeguarded," in Introduction, Civil Affairs Handbook: France; Section 17 B, xiv.
174 E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (Princeton University Press, 1960), 19.
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Gombrich, who pointed only to the concepts as "dangerous," Shapiro had made a connection with
nationalist recuperations of the built environment. It was artists' and art historians' responsibility not
to make artworks into monumental icons of the Blud und Boden ideology that fueled nationalisms:
Where else but in the historic remains of the arts does the nationalist find the evidence
of his fixed racial character? His own experience is limited to one or two generations;
only the artistic monuments of his country assure him that his ancestors were like
himself and that his character is an unchangeable heritage rooted in his blood and native
soil. 175
It is exactly this kind of "dangerous" connection between nationalist pride, monumental heritage,
and collective identity that the Army required of the Lists' Introductions . The value-judgment that
took the place of speculation-the step (iii) in Constable's method-connected "the form of
monuments" with "a particular locale" by way of "its value in the eyes of the local population."
Indeed the entire Commission's work was based on the assumption that monuments embody the
connection between the geo-political histories of nations and the "collective" descendents of these
histories. Insofar as the role of the introductions was to make this connection, the Roberts
Commission reinforced the impression that each nation had its own autonomous art, indeed its own
art history, which remained alive exclusively in the collective consciousness of its modern-day
inhabitants.
In light of this indictment, it is important to note that the nationalist "pattern" that had been
applied uniformly to the countries of Western Europe received a slightly modified treatment in
places where populations could not reasonably be described as homogeneous. The lists for the
Balkan peninsula, made under Kitzinger' supervision, began with a division of monuments into
categories, and proceeded to attach each category to a population group: in Albania, Kitzinger
recommended that "prehistoric and Illyrian remains" be protected because "The Albanians believe
themselves the direct descendents of the ancients Illyrians and pride themselves on having the longest
continuous national existence of all people in Europe," while "Churches and Mosques" were to be
protected because "79% of the population are Moslem, 20% are Orthodox , 10% Roman Catholic,"
and the "medieval citadels" were "frequently associated with memories of the Albanians' centuries
of struggle for independence from the Turks." 176 Even more dis-articulated was Kitzinger's list for
Yugoslavia, which began with a statement of regional variation ("Jugoslav monuments vary greatly
from region to region"), distinguished between five building typologies, and assigned each to an
175 Meyer Schapiro, "Race, Nationality and Art," in Art Front 2 (March 1936), 10. The same year Schapiro published a
critique of "The New Viennese School" in a review of Kunstwissenchafltiche Forschungen II. It was not clear "what Dr. Picht
means by his formal 'constants'... beyond attributing the constant to such indefinite entities as French art, Dutch art,
and Flemish art." "The New Viennese School" in The Art Bulletin, (Jun 1936), 258-266.
176 American Defense-Harvard Group: List of Monuments in Albania by Ernst Kitzinger.
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ethnic group for whom it represented nationhood. '77 Hence the "habit of speaking in terms of
collectives" could be more finely calibrated to account for mis-alignments in political and
architectural history. Yet even when described in this finer grain of collectivity, geography continued
to be the locus of a substitution: the judgment of an art historian was presented as being the
valuation of an entire population.
The limits of this monumental demagoguery become only too evident when one contrasts
the European Lists, where independence from colonial powers was treated as a source of "national
consciousness," with those of colonial territories, where popular attachment was reduced to
fanaticism. The opening line for Tunisia, for example, replaced the typical statement of collective
identity with a wholesale argument about tourism:
During the last three decades, Tunisia has become more and more a region favored by
European tourists. The economy of the country depends to a great extent on foreign
visitors. From these resources the population of Tunisia draws much of its subsistence.
While in Mitteleuropa the struggle for independence from Ottoman rule supported a narrative of long-
term national emergence, here a history of colonial struggle was altogether suppressed. It is not the
argument for tourism per se that makes Tunisia stand apart from other lists. Indeed Sachs had
suggested early on that tourist revenue be included in all lists to convey the "considerable economic
importance" of monuments.'78 What is significant is that the tourist was here posited as the primary
audience of the list, revealing the "pattern" of empathetic identification that underlay the lists: the US
soldier could only empathize with the touring European.
Where empathy was judged inappropriate, "fanaticism" was invoked. In Tunisia this was
outlined in religious terms:
Among the monuments the Mohammedan buildings are particularly important because
of their religious significance. The religious fanaticism of the Mohammedans is
notorious. 179
Similarly, the Japanese were depicted as "fanatical" about the very protective spirit that the
Commission was supposed to advocate:
Japan
177 " The monuments of groups 1,3,4, are important to the local population chiefly because they attract tourists ..
The monuments of group 2 belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church. Apart from their religious significance, they have
to the Serbs great national significance. ... The monuments of group 5 are also object of national pride, especially in
Northern parts of the country. Finally, the mosques should be protected out of regard for the Moslem population,
which is large in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro." ADHG, List of Monuments: Jugoslavia by Ernst Kitzinger
7as "It should be mentioned that the material to be listed has a considerable economic importance, since in peace-time
it attracts tourists, students, or excavators who spend money in the locality. In some cases, needless damage would
arouse resentment on the part of the population on these grounds alone." Sachs to Collaborators, 24 May 1943
'79 ADHG, Lists of Monuments for Tunisia by Wilhelm Idhler and Margaret Ames. ADHG/K6hler II. K6hler's "preliminary draft" had
left a space empty for an introduction; it was the Harvard editors that made it the opening paragraph.
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Although only a relatively few important cultural monuments exist in Japan as compared
with a small European country, the Japanese hold an almost fanatical reverence for even
the most humble shrine. It colors their entire way of life and it is this attitude which is
one of the most difficult characteristics for a foreigner to understand."18
Korea
It will immediately be obvious that the Koreans themselves (unlike their Japanese
conquerors) have no great interest in or knowledge of the relics of their own past.8"'
Where monument protection was described as a "model" in European countries, in Japan it was the
purpose of the US to moderate local fanaticism. Even in its aim of familiarizing the US soldier with
protective systems already in place, the Commission used mental-health vocabulary that encouraged
the GI to be objectively understanding, while refraining from empathy.
The Commision's use of a mental-health vocabulary suited the social-scientific tone of the
American Military Government, which itself had adapted neo-Freudian ego-psychology in its
arguments that Germany and Japan should not be "destroyed" but "cured."' 82 In so doing, the
Commission echoed the wartime work of American anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, who
relied on cultural particularism to argue that America's postwar mission was to be the mid-wife of
other nations' cultural reconstruction.
In contrast to proposals like Morgenthau's plan to "pastoralize" Germany into a pre-
industrial state'"8 , Mead argued that "Each culture cultivates some potentialities of mankind and
disallows others." In her 1942 And Keep your Powder Dry,' 84 Mead advocated that America "enter a pact
with the world, to build a world to which all of us ... contribute by having people embody our
different values." Thus the war was an occasion for America to find its identity, and Mead proposed
that, in the postwar, "America's special job [was] going to be analysis.""8 Crucially, what Mead
meant by "analysis" was the ability to discern which elements of other "cultures" should be
"eliminated":
We are to study and conserve the cultures of France and Albania, and Roumania and
India, so that we may learn from them, that there shall not perish from the earth
discoveries so basic that we may never make them again. At the same time, we are to
make demands of all of these cultures that they eliminate certain elements which are
incompatible with world order as we see it. 86
The surgical procedure Margaret Mead described in "cultural " terms was implemented in physical
terms by the Roberts Commission. If the spatial expression of Morgenthau's plan was a literal tabula
180 "Introduction," Civil Affair Handbook: Japan Section 17: Cultural Institutions M354-17 (24 July 1944).
181 "Korea", List of Monuments in Korea by Langdon Warner, draft.
182 See Richard Brickner's Is Germany Incurable? (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943), with an introduction by Margaret Mead.
"83 Morgenthau's plan was published in 1945 as Germany is our Problem (New York: Harper, 1945)
184 Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist looks at America (New York: Morrow, 1942).
85s Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 253.
186 Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 242.
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rasa, the Roberts Commission's job was to give Mead' particularism a territorial image-all the while
validating the art historians' judgments as a form of "analysis" and enabling America's status as a
nation of "editors."
It was the collaborative scheme of Dumbarton Oaks, with its the regional assignment of list-
making duties, that formed the support for this ethical transfer between the valuations of art
historians and the "cultures" of far-away populations. Just as, for Sachs, managing a card-index of
monuments substituted for caring for the monuments themselves, for K6hler managing a group of
scholars was a substitute for surveying localities. Before making lists of monuments one had to make
lists of scholars, and the many lists K6hler composed during the Harvard Committee's meetings
indicate a search for optimal geographic and historical coverage, expressed in people rather than
monuments. Each scholar stood atop his own region, embodying a "concentration" of monumental
meaning within a single point. (fig. 2.32) For example, the decision to include a list of manuscript
libraries, which were closed to the public and went unrecorded in tourist books, required an intricate
tabulation that forced a peculiar kind of intellectual autobiography on each scholar: describe himself
in a "starred" list of regionally-arranged libraries. (fig. 2.33) Before becoming surveyors of
panoramas, in other words, Panofsky and his colleagues stood as regional landmarks themselves, in a
panoramic survey where all periods and regions of European art history were rendered "in equally
sharp focus."
One unintended consequence of the application of a Dumbarton-Oaks-style collaborative
scheme to all the lists, is that a Byzantine uniformity emerged from even lists that would otherwise
have followed the strictly hierarchical rules of the Hegelian canon. Brown University classicist
Charles Robinson, who had coined the image of "the edited Baedeker," found that managing the 8
scholars composing the list for Ancient Greece meant re-thinking the assumed importance of certain
monuments over others. Facing a similar task of scholar-management for Italy, Princeton classical
archaeologist Doro Levi, saw the lack of homogeneity as resulting from discrepancy in "generosity
of stars":
The criteria followed by the collaborators are not always identical, and there must be a
final revision to bring in uniformity. ... For example, Bloch has been much more
generous of stars than everybody else; I cut or reduced for the balance of the whole ....
Every arbiter, when seeing the kind of "epitome" of history adopted generally ... might
have a suggestion to improve his own part. 187
187 Levi to Hencken, 8 Jul 1943. ADHG/ Levi. Levi's contributors were: Marion Blake; Herbert Bloch (Harvard Classics);
W.A. Jackson (Houghton); Clarence Kennedy (Smith College); Mrs. Clarence Kennedy; Renselaer Lee (Princeton
Institute); Doro Levi; Karl Lehman-Hartleben (IFA); EA Lowe (IFA); D. Randall-McIver (British Academy); Georg
Swarzenski (MFA, Boston.)
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The "stars" had become the visual index used by list editors to discern the quality of the lists they
received. ("Don't we need," Constable wondered, "more starred things in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and
Rumania?")'8 8 It was as if the collective "epitome of history" that lay latent in the disciplinary
structure of America's art history departments had manifested itself in a hidden pattern of "starred
things."
The concern with "uniformity," "balance," and "evenness" that pervaded the activities of
list editors reveals that the process of making lists was indeed a compositional project. This
vindicated the collecting impulses of the museum-men--stars were a way to grant the lists the
"overall sense of design" that Sachs had declared to be the hallmark of "any good collection." Even
K6hler was susceptible to this kind of appreciation, noting that the lists for the Balkans appeared
"sparse, sparser still than his own list for Tunisia."'8 9 This process of composition, however, became
problematic when the lists were shrunk from 50 to 25 pages, prompting "the original compilers to
want to re-write the whole list, and completely vary their system of stars." 90
Some compilers had, strategically, planned for the shrinking of their lists from 50 to 25
pages. Rennsselaer Lee, for instance, admitted that "the plan to prepare short lists from the 2- and 3-
starred monuments" had led him "to add stars here and there, particularly in large cites and in some
of the places in which the Army might not otherwise thing there is anything of exceptional
interest."' 91 To this admission Lee added, somewhat guiltily, that "monuments so starred" were still
indeed "interesting monuments." The guilt Lee felt at his own strategic starring reveals that an ethical
threshold was reached when the starring system, originally intended as quantitative, had become
qualitative. To resolve this dilemma Constable conducted the final reduction himself, "under slogan
'the best is the enemy of the good'."' 92 With this single Voltarian maxim, Constable revealed his
debt to the gentlemanly ethics of the connoisseur, with which he had proudly tempered what he
called the "wissenschaftlisch" zeal of the professional art historians.' 93
As significant set of ethical anxieties arose from the change in focus-from managing lists of
scholars to managing lists of monuments-in particular in the composition of the German List.
Germany differed from other countries in that the fate of its list was never assured: originally no list
was planned; eventually the Harvard Long List was sent to Allied Command, but never published as
188 Constable to Hencken, 23 Jun 1943. AAA #3077.
189 Henken to Constable, 25 Jun 1943. AAA #3077.
190 Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime," Jan-March 1944. AAA #3077.
191 Lee to Henken, 2 Sep 1943. ADHG/ Lee
192 Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime," Jan-March 1944. AAA #3077.
193 Hencken to Constable. 7 Mar 1942. AAA #3077
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part of the Handbook; although the Atlas Supplement was eventually published, it was printed without an
introduction; further lists were composed in the Fall of 1944, but few general statements survived in
these publications.'19 It is not that general statements were not prepared; K6hler took them on
himself, composing for instance a guide to "The German Organization in Charge of the
Conservation of Monuments (Denkmalpflege)" where he described "the immense task on which two
generations of [German] art historians have worked," namely, the comprehensive inventories of
monuments in publications like the Bau- und Kunstdenkm'dler. 19s Similarly, K6hler had composed the
Introduction for the Harvard List, applying to this work a personal zeal that was undoubtedly
inspired by from his own resentment at the Nazi regime. Ironically, this personal investment made
K6hler into a model of the interested collector Sachs was trying to form at the Fogg. Thus while
Constable had feared K6hler's tendency to be "too wissenschaftlisch," instead it was the German
emigre's personal motivations he found repeatedly "tempering." The first instance of this
intervention was the removal of "the parthenian shot at the Fiihrer" that KUhler had written in his
introduction. 96 The resulting Introduction, edited by Contable, retains some specificities ("The
richness of German libraries and archives in manuscripts and incunabula reflect the historical fact
that printing was discovered in Germany") but it is mostly a text composed of generic formulations
perfected elsewhere ("The cultural treasures of Germany are important to the German people not
only from a historical, artistic and national point of view but for economic reasons as well"). Where
other introductions culminated in a "synthesis," the German introduction ended with a prudent re-
exposition of the Commission's general mandate ("Whether included here or not, every one of
[Germany's treasures] is representative of the civilization which is ours. As such they must, so far as
war allows, receive consideration and respect"). 197
The second manner in which K6hler expressed a personal investment, rather than a scientific
authority, in the German list, was by refusing to partake in the starring scheme. More than the
censoring of his anti-Nazi introduction, it was his ethical stance on starring that led to him to a
serious crisis of conscience. When K6hler first produced a list without stars, the result, according to
Hencken, was "the best prepared piece of work that we have received." Indeed Hencken added "on a
194 A complete picture of what publications were available in ETO by the end of 1944 can be gleaned from Sumner
Crosby's "Memorandum on the Information available to and the Work Accomplished by the Monuments, Fine Art and
Archives Subsection US Group CC", 25 Nov 1944, Military Government Property Section. Crosby 1/3.
195 Wilhelm K6hler, "The German Organization in Charge of the Conservation of Monuments (Denkmalpflege)," Undated
draft, (Apr 1943?). ADHG/ K6hler II. This text was later replaced by "The Krautheimer Report," the Civil Affairs Guide.
31-112. Legal and administrative aspects of the protection of monuments in Germany and Austria. (Washington: War Department, 1944).
196 Hencken to Constable, 22 Oct 1943.
'97 Introduction for German List, undated draft of which page 1 is missing. K6hler's critique of the Nazi regime was
likely contained in the missing first page. This draft can be found in both Dinsmoor's papers (ASCSA V/1) and as
"Germany" in K6hler's handwritten notes (ADHG/K6hler).
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strictly personal" that he was happy to see that K6hler "gave such careful attention to prehistory and
early history as well as to later and more impressive monuments.""9 The lack of stars, however,
became a problem in the compilation of the Short List. Hencken eventually persuaded K6hler to
accept the suggestions he had made, "in pencil," for which monuments could become of "the first
importance." Yet K6hler was clearly alarmed by the shrinking of his carefully constructed list, and
incensed that the Italian list was seemingly allowed, in contrast, to expand indefinitely. In a final act
of desperation, and seized with remorse after the list had left Cambridge, K6hler wrote directly to
Col. Shoemaker to attempt an intercept before his list was published:
From the beginning I objected to such a radically abbreviated list in the case of Germany.
... My so-called 'long list' of Monuments in Germany ... already forms so radical a
condensation that it might truly be described as the equivalent of the 'short lists' for
other countries, for instance Italy.
Initially voicing his complaint in relative terms, K6hler concluded his letter with what amounts to a
fundamental disciplinary doubt about the "subjectivity" of his own classifications, and questioned
very validity of the process he had helped construct:
After having finished, I am more convinced than ever that any list reduced to such an
extent is completely arbitrary, subjective, and therefore open to thoroughly justified
criticism, and that in this two-fold process of elimination certain monuments of the first
importance have had to be dropped. In my opinion, it would be a fatal mistake to
publish in the handbook for Germany the 'short list' as submitted 199
Because the "dropping" of monuments from the list signified their potential destruction, K6hler
experienced as a personal tragedy the disciplinary mechanism by which he operated every day.
There is a double irony in the personal tone of Kohler's protest. The first stems from his frank
admission of "arbitrariness:" it never seems to have occurred to K6hler that a peacetime list, by the
standards of his own Kunstwissenschaft, was no less a "reduction" than a wartime lists, nor a 50-page-
list any less arbitrary than a 25 page-list. All the editors felt the same sense of removal from the
documents they had authored; even Doro Levi, who edited the (much longer) Italian List, expressed
some anxiety about "assuming responsibility for the publication" of the list in its "shortened"
format. 200 Similarly, the Dumbarton Oaks Fellows tried to "recall" their (much shorter) lists for the
Balkans, realizing at the last minute that they were "not quite of the same quality as others."' 20' But
K6hler's anxiety at the "radical abbreviation" of his list shows that he detected a more fundamental
conflict between the presumed autonomy of his art historical classifications and the instrumentality
of their application.
198 Hencken to K6hler, undated, probably June 1943. ADHG/K6hler II.
'99 K6hler to Shoemaker 17 July 1944. Emphasis in the original. ADHG, K6hler II.
200 Levi to Hencken, 8 Jul 1943. ADHG/ Levi.
201 Constable to Cairns, 27 Oct 1943. AAA #3077
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The lists had not been shrunk simply by "eliminating" certain monuments and keeping
others. Instead monuments, and the artistic singularity they represented, had been twice excised
from the context that gave them value and placed into another frame of reference: first, out of the
context of elite connoisseurship ("the world of art") 202 and into the realm of psychological warfare,
where they were granted the value of local sentiment; second, from the disciplinary frame of art
history into a cultural "epitome of history," 203 through the common medium of geography. Each
step in this two-fold re-positioning represented an ethical displacement, which was accompanied by
a slight but significant shift in disciplinary agency. As soon as a scholar was faced with an ethical
questioning of his own scholarly methods, another type of expert stood ready to take on the relay,
chaperoning the lists of monuments through further displacements. Thus when K6hler received
notice, in response to his letter from Shoemaker, that his list had already been "put to good use," 20 4
this meant largely that it had passed into the custody of William Bell Dinsmoor, who applied a
wholly different idea of scholarly integrity to his mandate-an archaeological one. The second irony
of KOhler's anxiety, then, is that yet more "radical reductions" to his list were still to come, and that
these reductions would only intensify what he had identified as their "arbitrary" nature.
Dinsmoor's Maps: Shrinking and proportion
The transformation of Dinsmoor's ACLS committee from a bureaucratic irritant into an
efficient map-making workshop was prompted by architectural historian and OSS analyst Richard
Krautheimer, who wrote a letter to the ACLS on July 19, 1943, the day of "Rome's first
bombing."2 05 Krautheimer reported that the Harvard Lists had been used in the bombing, as US Air
Force crews had been "briefed by means of maps and photographs on which primary monuments
to be avoided were marked." Krautheimer found these reports "encouraging," insofar as they
demonstrated "the army's desire to spare cultural monuments, so far as this is compatible with
military necessity." He therefore recommended that the ACLS produce maps from the outset, which
"could be prepared very quickly, and would have the advantage of presenting in concise and graphic
form the more important data, which the air forces could constantly relate to their projected
202 Paul Sachs particularly recommended that artists be literally transferred as figures in the "world of art" to the world
of nationalism: "Emphasis should be laid on the fact that Rembrandt is revered in Holland as a great Dutchman ... It is
not necessary to stress his general importance in the world of art." Sachs to Contributors, 24 May 1943. ADHG.
203 "Our lists should be made in terms of culture in general rather than in terms of art alone." E.g., "local festivals,"
"The birthday of Ludwig II in Bavaria" and "The Oberammungen Passionplay." Hencken to Kahler 6 Jul 1943.
z04 "The short lists have already left [the Commission's] hands, and ... they did not consider it desirable to change the
others, since they found that they already fully met the requirements of the Army." Hencken to K6hler 5 Nov 1943.
205 "Rail Centers Hit: San Lorenzo, Littorio Yards And Ciampino Airfield Targets No U.S. Planes Lost Religious Edifices
Marked In Red On Fliers' Maps To Be Avoided At All Cost. With Our Rangers And Paratroopers In Sicily Allies Give
Rome Its First Bombing. " Drew Middleton, New York Times (Jul 20, 1943), 1.
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targets." 206The Frick Committee immediately set out to follow Krautheimer's suggestion:
"shrinking" the Harvard lists to make them "indices" for points marked on a map, annotated with
numbers, coordinates, and stars, and published as "Atlas Supplements" to the Civil Affairs Handbooks.
(fig. 2.34-37) Where K6hler had assigned regions to rosters of scholars, Dinsmoor assigned scholars to
work on regional maps, and maps replaced lists as the primary medium of art historical "synthesis."
It is clear that Dinsmoor seized on this map-making opportunity because he sought to
achieve a more direct medium of intervention in an aerial war. Yet the passage from (Harvard) list
to (Frick) map should not be understood as removing all mediation between "starring" monuments
on paper and "avoiding" them from the air. The maps did facilitate the fulfillment of the
Commission's mandate, by providing easier communication between agencies and faster
identification of monuments. But these maps were, in Krautheimer's own words, to "be informative
only, and in no respect presume to be advisory," and did not eliminate the margin of contingency
that had been built into the lists. Note for instance that the bombing of Rome produced the first
major architectural casualty of the US precision-bombing policy. Where Krautheimer saw "the
army's desire to spare cultural monuments," the rest of the world saw the nearly-destroyed basilica
of San Lorenzo fuori le mura, hit by a bomb intended for the neighboring railyards. (fig. 2.38) In the
prolonged propaganda war that ensued, "monuments to be avoided" were only one in a long list of
"cultural" factors, including: the high proportion of Catholics in the Air Force, the large number of
civilian casualties, the dropping of leaflets, the chance given to pilots to "refuse the mission for
cultural reasons," the efforts of the Pope and US Cardinals to declare Rome an "open city." 207 The
sacrificial nature of the church culminated in the dramatic papal visit to the neighborhood of San
Lorenzo, now commemorated in monumental form by a statue on the site. (fig. 2.39) Yet for the
Allies, as for Krautheimer, even the destruction of San Lorenzo was to be read iconographically as
evidence of success-since the avoidance of the Vatican, of the city center, and the proximity of San
Lorenzo to the railyards, meant that the event could be read symbolically as an accident. Perhaps the
best evidence that the US policy of "avoidance" was not absolute, then, is that its inaugural example,
the Rome bombing, is one of notorious destruction.
206 "Any good city maps will serve as a basis. ... On these maps, the most important monuments of each city or locale
should be marked. ... An accompanying list gives a key." The list was signed by: Richard Krautheimer (senior research
analyst, OSS), Helen Franc (Target Information Branch- Intelligence Division), and Mr. John Phillips Coolidge, to
Wetmore (Smithsonian), 19 July 1943. ASCSA I/3. They wrote to the ACLS in response to Dinsmoor's questionnaire.
207 "Brereton's Fliers Also Raided Rome ... Many Crewmen Catholic." New York Times, (Jul 20, 1943), 4. "Rome Raiders
Rejected Chance to Decline Task," New York Times (Jul 21, 1943), 4. "Open City Status By Rome Doubted," New York
Times (Jul 21, 1943), 3. Daniel Brigham, "Pius Tells Of Plea: Says 'Reasonable Hope' of Saving Rome From Raid Was
Disappointed Mourns Ruin Of Church." New York Times, (Jul 22, 1943), 1.
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Nor should the appearance of maps in the Roberts Commission's work be understood as
marking a return from an ethics of objecthood to a concern for territorial continuity: the transfer of
monuments back onto maps did not signify their re-inscription into their urban contexts. Note for
instance this paragraph, from an early draft of the French introduction to the Harvard List, which
attempted to expand protection form monuments to "groups of buildings" and "ensembles" by
making a contextualist argument:
There are numerous groups of buildings in France, important not merely for the
individual buildings, but as ensembles. The French are particularly appreciative of
groups such as these. They have shown great skill in developing the setting for great
buildings by good design in the smaller ones round about. Thus while the cathedral of
Rouen remains nearly intact, the burning out of a picturesque quarter of mediaeval
houses nearby (the result of a tank battle) is understood as a tragedy for the cathedral,
since no modern setting can be as sympathetic as the old one."20
This attempt surreptitiously to extend monumental value to the urban context was suppressed when
the list was published in the Civil Affairs Handbooks, confirming that these were designed to present
monuments as qualitatively different from their surroundings. A year later, the Frick Maps
introduced a new visual nomenclature, which allowed scholars to indicate "characteristic streets" by
hatching them on city maps. (fig. 2.41) These "hatched areas," in combination with the stark
blackening of monuments, seem to convey a spatial bleeding of the protective boundary around
monuments-exactly the kind of monumental contextualism conveyed in the original introduction.
Yet in the lists accompanying the maps, what seemed like an imprecise hatching was rendered
precisely: the streets were treated as monuments, starred, numbered and counted. (fig. #)
Accordingly, although house-lined streets were allowed to appear in the Atlas introduction, they did
so not as "atmospheric" complements to monuments but rather as vernacular exemples in
themselves:
Most French towns and villages are dominated by the spire of a church. ... But the
individual character and atmosphere of nearly every French village does not arise
exclusively from its church. The houses that line its streets are not only picturesque, but
are often time of great artistic and historical value. Many of them are centuries old, and
are important examples of civil architecture."' 09
In this subtle distinction between a "sympathetic context" and a "picturesque example" lies an entire
ethical system which is dependent upon discontinuity and objecthood. It was only ever in
contradistinction with its non-starred adjacencies that the "starring" of urban elements-be they
208 "Architecture in France" Preliminary Draft, American Defense Harvard Group, (KG2 789), iii
209 Statement by the Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, in Civil Affairs Handbook: France:
Section 17B: Atlas Supplement.
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monuments or characteristic streets-could function. 2"0 Monuments were located on city maps only
after having been deliberately "excerpted" from the city, and they retained their value as
"excerptions" in the transposition.
The effect that map-making decidedly did have on the Roberts Commission's work was a
consolidation of monumental value through urban concentration. In part, this was due to the
decision to make maps only for towns with a certain monument density: "City and town plans,"
Dinsmoor reported, "were generally made only when there are at least 5 monuments of exceptional
importance to be indicated, or when fewer monuments are of exceptional importance but are
embedded in confused areas." 2 1 1 Thus monuments served to "clarify" urban confusion, reducing a
town to 5 points or fewer points. As a consequence, the Commission was able to expand its
"starring" logic to a territorial scale: by locating monuments on city plans, and locating these plans
onto national maps, entire countries became visible as territories punctuated by "starred things." (fig.
2.42) The Frick maps that were published epitomize this territorial punctuation: the Civil Affairs Atlas
Supplements all opened with a national maps peppered with numbered points and annotated with an
index of "cities with lists." (fig. 2.42-43) Thus entire cities became "starred things" themselves,
collected in a single index at the end of each Atlas. As the scope of the Commission's work
expanded, the number of starred "things" decreased while the average value of each "thing"
increased. Cities were progressively codified as objects themselves, formally legible as collections of
monuments.
Despite the immense effort that had been devoted to making art-historical knowledge more
"instrumental" to a hypothetical Army- or Air- man, neither Civil Affairs Handbooks nor their Atlas
Supplements ever became direct "instruments" of warfare. Instead, they served as a basis for the
construction of further lists and maps. Some of these later documents still bear the trace of the
Commission's authorship and can therefore be understood as "tactical" derivatives of its "strategic"
work. Others were completely re-constructed in various Theaters of Operations and re-authored by
various commissions. For instance, after the MFA&A moved to London under joint Allied Command
in May 1944, new lists for France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway were composed by
210 See also the Zone HandBook for Tuscany, which stated unequivocally that "The whole city of Florence must rank as
a work of art of the first importance. No requisitions should be made without reference to the MFA&A officers of the
A.C.C." List of Protected Monuments Italy. 4: Regions of Tuscany, Umbria, and Le Marche. Allied Control Division, Allied Military
Government, Sub-Commission for Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (30 Mar. 1944), 18.
211 Dinsmoor, "Statement of Material furnished by the American Commission for the Protection of Monuments in
Europe." 4 Jan 1944. ASCSA I/8.
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representatives of their governments in exile."1 But even as these several degrees of authorship were
placed between the US Commission and the protective mechanism it had set in motion, the
legitimacy of its Handbooks only increased, and the proportional idea that supported their
composition was validated, in a perpetual rehearsal of monumental arithmetic-counting "things,"
locating them on a map, and assigning them stars.
A further consolidation of value occurred when the Civil Affairs Handbooks arrived in Europe and
"military necessity" proved to be a proportional system itself-no longer an abstract idea of
contingency, but a set of specific needs that varied according to tactical circumstance. For example,
the first Frick maps arrived in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in January 1944, as
"conditions were defined under which alone certain outstanding cities could become a target."
Although this synchrony made the Atlases urgently useful, it also rendered them "hopelessly
insufficient in number and not suitable for the purposes required." Therefore the Mediterranean
Allied Air Forces (MAAF) flew a series of reconnaissance missions in Italy, over "79 cities and towns
where targets were known to exist or where tactical planning indicated that suitable targets might
develop." The aerial photographs collected were annotated with monuments, and published in
March 1944 as The Ancient Monuments of Italy use by pilots.213 (fig. 2.45)
The inscription of monuments directly onto Air Force aerial photographs appeared to
represent a position of absolute control over the horizontal field of war. Therefore, although not
authored strictu sensu by the Commission, this document granted the art historians their long-standing
wish of identifying "non-targets" in the horizontal field of war:
The Handbooks are of great assistance ...but cannot be compared with an aerial
photograph dipped upon the operational clip-board in the hands of the pilot as he
drops into the bomb run. ... For the purpose of aerial planning [the new document] is
much superior to the maps of the Civil Affairs Handbooks or the Cultural Maps since each
photograph dearly indicated terrain features and other essential information. The picture
itself clearly represents the area as the pilot and bombardier actually observe it.2 14
The MAAF's aerial photographs completed the chain of agency that had been imagined by the art
historians. Indeed when the Frick's map-making had begun, Dinsmoor had traveled to Washington
212 "The French naturally considered that they were better able than their allies to discriminate between their historic
monuments, and it was essential that they should have the last word on the subject .... The whole Norway list, the
Dutch and Belgian lists were ... furnished by representatives of those countries." Woolley, 45.
213 This was made clear in the introduction: "It is pointed out that only a selection, comprising what are considered to
be the most important Monuments in enemy-held ITALY, is given here. In all cases there are more Monuments in the
Towns listed than are shown. Nearly every Italian Town contains a number of important Monuments and it would be a
task of great magnitude to produce a complete list. More detailed and complete information can be obtained from the
town plans issued by the Frick Art Reference Library which should be available to A-2 sections." The Ancient Monuments of
Italy, Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Command. National Archives, Photographic Archives.
214 Sir Leonard Woolley, A Record of the Work Done by the Military Authorities For the protection of the Treasures of Art and History in War
Areas. Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Branch of Civil Affairs, War Office. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office,1947), 42.
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to attempt an integration into the Air Force's target-mapping activities, but had been told that his
committee should "use city plans available in recent guides, such as Guida d'Italia, Guide Bleu, Baedeker"
instead.21' Although disappointed, Dinsmoor eventually concluded that by supplying pilots with base
atlases, "we shall have gone as far as seems to be possible."" ' The ethical overtones of this statement
can only be understood in the context of the USAAF's decentralized structure, with its deferral to the
judgment of individual pilots. This intervention in the visual field of the bombing crew merely
activated of an ethics of personal intervention, predicated not only on a "total" penetration of enemy
territory, but also on the ability of individual pilot to exercise a personal judgment, in which the "the
training of the eye of the bombardier" was a crucial instrument.217 Although the technical means of
implementation of this ethic had little to do with the methods of the connoisseur, this was, in the last
instance, an ethic of personal comportment in which the "eye" played an important part in
formulating "judgment." Yet the finality of aerial photographs as instruments of total control in
aerial warfare was belied by the continued transformation of maps and lists well into the occupation
of Europe.
The system of relative valuation that helped to produce these photographs was repeatedly re-
calibrated for the purposes of ground troop occupation. As D-Day approached, the MFA&A
produced another set of publications, titled Lists of Protected Monuments, based on a re-expansion of the
lists and a re-introduction of stars. When these lists were sent to "Northern Europe" to select
buildings that could be requisitioned for the "billeting" of troops, these too had to be re-composed.
Here, unlike with aerial photography, it was not the tactical precision but the geographic "evenness"
of the lists that needed to be enhanced:
These lists were too uneven in density of monuments listed, and varied too much from
country to country to be used for precise military purposes. In consequence, it was
decided to make new lists. ... the decision was made that these new lists should be basic
lists, having the authority of a military order and not weakened by discrimination, as
between monuments included in them.218
215 Dinsmoor, "Report on Visit to Washington: July 21-23, 1943." ASCSA I/3
216 "As for the fact that the maps ... were ordinary ground maps rather than aerial maps, this was at first a
disappointment, but, as we talked the matter over, this seemed after all to be the most practical solution. The fact that
we should not be working exactly on the type of map employed by the Air Service seems almost immaterial, since the
ultimate type of map on which all information is concentrated is the target map, on which we should probably not be
allowed to work directly under any circumstances." Dinsmoor to McLeish, 19 Aug 1943. ASCSA
217 The emphasis on "the eye of the bombardier" is a trope of literature on the ethics of bombing in an aerial war In
this literature, the bombardier occupies an almost allegorical position, standing in for a technologically mediated
humanity whose by-the-minute calibration between ends and means was mediated by the new mode of perception
produced by aerial photography. The importance of the "crewman's eye" in the understanding of the horizontal plane
of war is crucial-and the ethical dilemma of bombing was often expressed as a conflict between the pleasure of
detecting target by depth within shadows, and having to destroy the targets--as if planemetric truths were revealed at
the moment of their imminent destruction.
218 "North West Europe / SHAEF / The Development of the MFA&A Branch." In Woolley, A Record of the Work... 41.
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Thus all "starring" was removed in order better to approximate "the authority of a military order"
through listing. The implication was that the Army would prefer to be given an absolute choice,
between monuments and non-monuments, and that any relative system "weakened" this distinction.
Yet when these new, "non-discriminatory", lists were sent to SHAEF a week before D-Day for
authorization, they looked "so formidably long" that SHAEF protested that "they would hamper
military operations by making it impossible to billet troops." Once more, the lists had to be
explained in "discriminatory" terms. This time it was a proportional analysis of architectural
typology that was delivered to SHAEF:
The answer took the form of an analysis: for the five dipartements of Normandy the list
scheduled approximately 210 monuments, of which 84 were churches, some were
Roman or mediaeval ruins, dolmens and prehistoric stone circles, fountains, belfries,
etc.; in the whole of Normandy it was unlikely that there were 35 buildings that might
be desirable for billeting troops and be denied to them by MFAA&A restrictions. The
official list was promptly approved."1
Even in their "non-discriminatory nature," these lists forced a type of art historical expertise based on
a sliding scale: 84 churches were subject to an overarching interdiction; statues, ruins and fountains
could not be occupied; therefore only 35 "monuments"-palaces, houses, museums, libraries,
etc.-were really being excerpted from occupation by troops in Normandy. When Woolley
repeated the anecdote at the end of the war, he still spoke of delivering "an analysis" but phrased the
story in terms of "moderation," concluding that the list was officially approved because "the
answer from SHAEF was that we had been astonishingly moderate." 220 Thus, insofar as the art
historians were asked to deliver not only "information" but also "analysis," this was one of based on
principles of moderation and proportionality.
From this repeated application of a proportional logic to the lists of monuments, there
emerged some measures of absolute value and a sense of ideal proportion. A comparison of five
Italian cities as represented in 5 successive documents, for example, reveals what one might call
KEhler's threshold of arbitrariness (in reference to his protest that "any list reduced to such an extent was
arbitrary"), whereby no major city was ever reduced below 10 monuments. (fig. 2.49) Similarly, a
comparison of ten Italian small towns over the same period shows that the same process left Italian
towns with no more than 5 monuments, a figure that one might call Dinsmoor's criterion (in reference
to Dinsmoor's decision to make maps only when "at least 5 monuments of exceptional importance
are to be indicated.") But while Dinsmoor had intended to invent a criterion for selection, this
19 Woolley, A Record, 41.220 Woolley, "Introduction," in Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary, xvii.
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criterion became an upward limit instead, which served to equalize disparate towns into a single
category. Similarly, "K6hler's threshold" was verified, but only as the lower limit of a range, which
defined Italian cities as locales with monuments numbering between 10 and 25. (fig. 2.s50o)
Between Spring 1943 and Spring 1944, this relative system was repeatedly deployed to arrive
at a greater uniformity between maps, through two moments of condensation: the USAAF
photographs condensed the Frick Atlases, in the same way as the Harvard Short list had condensed
the Long Lists. Thus, as the number of monuments decreased, their overall value emerged enhanced.
Dinsmoor's criterion and K6hler's threshold, then, were "arbitrary" only in the sense that any 5
monuments could have performed this function; moments of periodic "arbitrariness" served as a
moderating technique, so that the difference between Venice, Florence, Cesena, Saronno, etc., could
be gradually equalized. In addition, this transformation progressively evened out the distribution of
"stars" for all towns, tending towards an ideal proportion: by May 1944, all the cities had acquired a
pyramidal structure wherein the *** category was the smallest and the "unstarred" the largest. (figs.
2.46-47). Hence Venice, which had begun as disproportionately bottom-heavy, and Florence, where
each category of starring had been evenly filled, had begun to resemble Padova. (fig. 2.48) What had
been a qualitative hierarchy (*** are more important than **, etc) was now implemented
quantitatively: (*** are fewer than **, etc.). The value of monuments was now inversely
proportional to its availability in a given city-a logic of scarcity had been progressively applied.
By the time Dinsmoor traveled to Europe to witness the implementation of the Roberts
Commission's work, at least five versions of these lists and maps were circulating in various theaters
of war. What pervaded all these documents was a representation of monuments as regulated by
proportional logic, as located by a process of excision, and as anchored by psycho-geographic
rhetoric. The logic of scarcity that resulted from this depiction was dramatically verified as
Dinsmoor encountered the single greatest obstacle to the implementation of the US policy in the
European Theater of Operations: the British Royal Air Force, and its policy of nighttime carpet-
bombing. As early as October 1943, Army representative General Hildring had reported that "the
RAF night bombing made it difficult for them to utilize the information regarding the location of
artistic and historic monuments supplied by the Commission." However, he added that "the theater
commanders were trying to influence the British to make sure use of it as they could." 22' Over the
next few months, this "influence" spread through joint centers of aerial command, as the USAAF
demonstrated that precision bombing, including the information on monuments, could be adapted
"22 "Roberts Commission Special Meeting, Friday October 1943," AAA #3077
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even to the technology RAF pilots had in hand.222 It is also in this period that archaeologist Sir
Leonard Woolley was appointed "special archaeological adviser" to the British War Office,
becoming a liaison with the Roberts Commission and coordinating the British MFA&A troops. Yet no
overall mitigation of British "morale bombing" was forthcoming: Wolley was allowed into "the
military machine" only better to be subjected to its hierarchies, and the American model of a
civilian Commission was specifically rejected.223 The MacMillan Commission, appointed by
Churchill on May 4th 1944 as a counterpart to the Roberts Commission, was concerned purely with
postwar restitution, and it was perceived among British strategists as a propaganda project. It was
rather in his contacts with the Inter-allied Commission for Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material ("the
Vaucher Commission") formed in April 1944 as part of the Conference of Allied Ministers of
Education (CAME), that Dinsmoor confronted the conflict between carpet bombing and monument
protection.
The Vaucher Commission witnessed from London the advance of Allied troops through
Normandy. By July 10 th, this advance had caused such destruction that the commission composed a
resolution, summarized by Dinsmoor under the heading Carpet Bombing and the Vaucher Commission:
Despite the distribution of maps and lists of cultural monuments in France to the Air
Forces, the employment of the technique of "carpet bombing" has resulted in the
destruction of a considerable number of cultural monuments. The Vaucher Commission
and the MacMillan Committee were disturbed by the extent of the devastation in
Normandy and the prospect of further obliteration of entire areas in France by Allied
bombing. The Vaucher Commission passed a resolution ... to be forwarded to
appropriate governmental quarters, expressing the hope that (1) some alternative to
"carpet bombing" might be devised or (2) if modification of that technique were not
feasible, then a few areas containing monuments of outstanding importance be selected
for special consideration."2
In pointing out the contradiction between the existence of the monuments maps and the destruction
wrought by tactical air support through Normandy, the Vaucher resolution hoped to achieve one of
two objectives. The primary wish was to mitigate "carpet bombing" altogether; hence the first draft
of this resolution explicitly asked that techniques of "night-time precision bombing" be employed
222 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "Report No. 4: Description of Royal Air Force Bombing," 8.
223 "The suggestion that the American example should be followed was carefully considered and finally rejected on the
grounds that the necessary work in the field was essentially a military responsibility and could only be performed by
military personnel under the exclusive control of the Commander-in-Chief concerned; it required for its success direct
representation at the War Office, and the Archaeological Adviser, having military rank and being inside the military
machine, enjoyed every advantage over a civilian Advisory Committee." Woolley, A Record, 6. Woolley's high military
led to some considerable confusion of hierarchy with the American MFA&A troops: the US commissions had a much
broader power but its MFA&A troops were of comparatively low grade and subject to being ignored by their superiors.
Woolley did eventually form an advisory civilian panel "Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Panel" composed of
museum officials: Sir Robert Ardy, Sir Kenneth Clark, Sir John Forsdyke, Basil Gray, Sir Frederick Kenyon, Sir Eric
Maclagan, J.G. Mann, Major S. F. Markham, Dr. Eric Millar, K.G. Parker, and Sir Robert Witt. Woolley, A Record, 67.
224 "Committee Resolution: Carpet Bombing and the Vaucher Commission." Minutes from a Special Meeting of the American
Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe held July 27, 1944. ASCSA III/2.
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instead, to arrive at "results of remarkable precision and afford a corresponding degree of immunity
to non-military buildings in the neighborhood of the targets." This tactical modification, the
Commission argued, would "offer a prospect of saving for prosperity something more than a mere
remnant of the cultural heritage of Europe." Yet, as if it were clear that ethical absolutes could not be
implemented by purely tactical means, the resolution proposed another alternative which consisted
of a strategic shift in outlook. The second option was "frankly to recognize" the possibility of
destruction in a "new" elaboration of the issue, by inverting the notion of "immunity":
Alternatively, in case modification of the 'carpet bombing' technique is not tactically
feasible, the Commission would suggest that the problem of preservation be approached
anew with a frank recognition of the fact that every monument located in a theater of
military operations is more likely to be destroyed than not.
In effect, the Commission asked the Army to assume the destruction of "every monument" in order to
ensure its protection. Astonishingly, even in a "realist" reversal of ethical terms, the solution to the
problem of the totality of war continued to lie in the construction of a list.
The Vaucher Commission met with Dinsmoor on June 2 6th to construct a list of "the 25
most important monuments in all of France." Entrusted with this secret list, Dinsmoor wrote a
confidential communiquei to accompany it:
CONFIDENTIAL August 24, 1944
The positions marked in red on the general map of France (page vii) represent the 23
sites containing the 25 most important monuments of the cultural heritage of all France.
The responsibility for the section of the listed sites ... rests on the French themselves.
The list was drawn up by [the] French delegates ... and was personally handed to me by
them in London on June 26 under a promise of secrecy, in case it should be employed
for planning operations. I have, therefore, shown this list to nobody and have kept no
copy; I have transferred the information to the maps with my own hand without
permitting anybody else to see them. I have retained nothing pertaining to this affair
with the exception of a carbon copy of this letter.22s
Thus the Vaucher Commission shrunk the entirety of France to 25 monumental sites, in a final
rehearsal, at the national scale, of the listing logic that had been perfected by the Commission's
work. In this transfer, the projection of ethical responsibility "onto the French themselves" vindicated
a transfer of meaning and significance from Allied invaders to "local populations" which had
underlain the entire project. Perhaps more to the point, Dinsmoor used the Civil Affair Atlas: France as a
medium to convey this information, by marking the monuments on the national map found on
page vii. With a few strokes of a green crayon, Dinsmoor had crossed, at last, the elusive line
225 "Professor Paul Vaucher (Chairman) and "Monsieur d'Orange" and Lieut. (de Vasseau) Gilloux, French delegates to
the (inter-allied) Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material-created by the Conference of
Allied Ministers of Education." "The areas marked in green crayon, of course, represent the approximate areas occupied
by the Allied Expeditionary Forces up to today, and may be extended with the course of events. But it will be noted
that, as of today, only five (nos. 43A, 46, 47, 58, 60) of the 23 sites lie within the areas yet occupied by Allied forces,
though others are very close to the present line." William Bell Dinsmoor, ASCSA III/2
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between the "informative" and the "advisory," and his Atlas had finally become the art-historical
instrument he had been hoping to provide.22 ' (fig. 2.53)
Far from becoming increasingly differentiated from the field of war, monuments
progressively merged with targets, in a collapse of tactical means and strategic ends that seemingly
enacted the definition of the war's ethical-and now epistemological-totality. The form of total
war and the shape of art historical knowledge emerged connected in a way that reversed the
expectations. For example, K6hler had been correct in detecting a fundamental arbitrariness in list-
making, since his carefully constructed lists of monuments turned out to be modifiable at will. But
the arbitrariness lay not in the low numbers: the "radical reduction" of France to 25 sites shows that,
the shorter the lists had become, the more deliberate the choice of monuments: below a certain
number, subjective judgments of value had been replaced by objective prediction. The twenty-five
monuments had not been subjectively judged to be more valuable, but objectively designated "most
likely to be destroyed." In the last instance the monuments' lists became predictive of war rather than
autonomous from it.
A new conception of iconoclasm underlies this predictive conflation of monument and
target. Iconoclasm meant the deliberate destruction of aesthetic value-not because anyone intended
these 25 points' destruction (the way, for instance, that so-called degenerate art needed protection
from Nazi looting) but rather that because they were most likely to become emblems of
arbitrariness: the arbitrariness of total war made destruction the best criterion for choosing any 5
points on a map-be they targets or monuments. This convergence of targets and non-targets
occurred not in the abstract terms of total war but in the context of the summer of 1944, which
military historians identify as a turning point when "last instance" tactics were deployed. Recounting
the timeline that followed the invasion of Normandy would be too long here, two dates suffice to
situate this "radical reduction" in this timeline: the date Dinsmoor received the list (July 26th, 1944),
and the date he conveyed it to the US Army (August 24th, 1944).
Dinsmoor received the Vaucher "List of 25" at the Conference of Allied Ministers of
Education (CAME) on July 26th, in a relay that highlights the continuity in between wartime
commissions and the postwar international organization that would become UNESCO. This
continuity lies foremost in a set of actors: notably Commission member Archibald McLeish, who
accompanied Dinsmoor to London to attend the 9" meeting of CAME-the first such meeting to be
226 Dinsmoor kept his promise of secrecy and no record of the list exists in his archives. The five numbers he does cite,
43A, 46, 47, 58, 60 represent Paris, Versailles, St Mal6, Chartres and Fontainebleau. ASCSA III/2
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attended by an official US delegation, rather than mere observation team.227 MacLeish is now
remembered as having penned the famous opening line to the preamble of Unesco's constitution,
"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses for peace must be
erected."228 Already in Spring 1944, MacLeish had arrived in London having drafted the US
delegation's Recommendations on the Restoration of Art Objects and the Restoration of Basic Library Materials, which
stated unequivocally-and less poetically-that "it is not in the interest of the American or British
Governments to permit considerable areas of the world to be deprived of basic library materials
essential to the functioning of a modern society." 229 Upon arriving in London, MacLeish helped to
transform the Vaucher Commission from a sub-committee of CAME into "an international forum
for discussion. "230 As soon as it was formed on April 2 5 th, this commission resolved "to divide its
work into three main sections: An Index of Places; and Index of Persons; and an Index of Objects."
In this three-fold division of tasks, the index of places was the only "extremely urgent task," since it
was "designed to cover monuments which might be destroyed or damaged during the bombing or
the Liberation." As with the Roberts Commission's card file in the US, in the Vaucher Commissions
work the "index of places" (including monuments) had a "war-time" reality, whereas "people and
objects" were assumed to be only matters of "postwar restitution." The Frick Maps became the basis
for this index, and it is as a result of this urgency that the Commission wrote the Resolution Drawing
attention to the dangers to monuments caused by the employment of the technique of "carpet bombing" and that, the next
day, French delegates handed Dinsmoor their list of 25 French sites. Thus the creation, in extremis, of
"an index of places" as a result of a fundamental impotence in the face of war, coincides with the
moment when peacetime international organizations took on the task of creating a worldwide
inventory of monuments.
Dinsmoor did not transmit the Vaucher List to US authorities until August 24, 1944-the eve
of the Liberation of Paris, and a date that has done perhaps more than the CAME to disseminate the
idea that "the minds of men" are populated with monuments, by demonstrating that monumental
value could seemingly trump even a direct order from Hitler. Hitler had sent General Dietrich von
Choltitz to act as Commander of Grossstadt Paris, with orders to destroy the city rather than
surrendering it. Von Choltitz had earned his promotion to General by planning and enacting the
227 This change marked "the willingness of the US Government to take part in an international program for the
educational and cultural reconstruction of the war-torn countries."Walter Laves & Charles Thomson, UNESCO: Purpose
Progress Prospects. (Bloomington, Indiana Universty Press, 1957), 21.
228 In doing this MacLeish was acting as "Chairman of the committee to draft the Preamble and First Article of the
Constitution," and inspired by British P.M Atlee at Unesco's first meeting in Nov 1945, who denounced "the
totalitarian practice of drawing a curtain around the minds of the people." Laves & Thomson, 4; 359n.5.
229 ASCSA, III/2.
230 The Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material. Document AME/A/ 148. In Crosby I/7.
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1940 bombing of Rotterdam; he therefore understood the meaning of large-scale urban destruction.
But despite the nearing Allies and repeated admonitions from Hitler ("Brennt Paris?"), von Choltiz
never implemented the order, writing in a memoir that he had been motivated "by the love of the
city," and earning, from Paris' last-minute escape from destruction, his own escape from war
tribunals. Recent research has questioned the hagiography that has since been built around this act,
by showing that von Choltitz lacked the means to destroy a whole city and suggesting that he stalled
to fashion his heroic post-war legacy as "the savior of Paris."231 What clearly remains from the
episode, however, is the heroic status of the city of Paris, which emerged as a "monument" exactly
in the sense that the Roberts Commission had worked to apply to works of art and architecture
throughout the war. Certainly the statement released by President Roosevelt's about he Liberation of
Paris used the language that the Commission had invented for the use of monuments: "For Paris is a
precious symbol of that civilization which it was the aim of Hitler and his armed hordes to
destroy. "232
The analogy between monuments and cities as "symbols of civilization" was made visually
clear in a spread published by the New York Times on the same day, where "Paris, The Eternal City"
was depicted by views of its monuments, and an aerial panorama of the skyline. This view,
punctuated with monuments, was essentially the same panorama that Le Corbusier had sketched
from the Montmartre rooftops in the 1930s. But where Le Corbusier had polemically proclaimed,
"This is Paris!," the New York Times was able triumphantly to declaim that the prophecy had been
fulfilled: "This is the Paris that was-and the Paris that will be." (fig. 2.52) Even as Dinsmoor was
secretly transferring his carefully chosen sites onto his French Atlas, cities were publicly absorbing
the value that had once been granted to its individual monuments, fulfilling on two scales the spatial
order represented the Vaucher "List of 25."
Wilhelm K6hler would no doubt have protested so "radical" an abbreviation of any list
country to a mere 25 monuments, but Dinsmoor experienced few ethical problems in adopting this
synthetic point of view. His broad humanistic viewpoint allowed him to speak in terms of
civilizations, and his archaeological experience led him to a realist position on the inevitability of
231 Von Choltitz gave an account in daily editorials in the French Gaullist newspaper Le Figaro, between 3 and 17 October
1949, under the title "Why I did not destroy Paris" (Pouquoi je n'ai pas d6truit Paris). Re-publishing these in a German
memoir a year later, he claimed that he had originally offered the neutral title "How the German Commander saw the
last days of Paris," (Wie des deutsche Befehlshaber die letzten Tage von Paris sah) and would in any case have preferred "How did
Paris escape destruction?" (Wie entging Paris der Zerstirung?). See Dietrich von Choltitz, "Nachwort," in Brennt Paris? ... Adolf
Hitler. Tatsachenbericht des letzten deutschen Befehlshabers in Paris. (Mannheim: UNA Weltbucherei, 1950).
232 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Statement on the Liberation of Paris," August 24th, 1944. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters,
The American Presidency Project. University of California. (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 16547).
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destruction. As an archaelogist Dinsmoor was able to detect even in the smallest fragment the value
of a monument's whole. 233 This helps to explain why, even as he participated in the large-scale
planning activities of the Vaucher Commission, he also spent most of his European mission trying to
close what he called "the cultural lag"-a period of two weeks that separated the end of fighting and
the arrival of MFA&A troops to take care of monuments.
MFA&A reports had noted that a large amount of "avoidable damage" to monuments
occurred during this "cultural lag, when everything is disordered, morale of the troops has relaxed,
rather than as a result of fighting itself.234 Dinsmoor felt about this issue the way that Kbhler did
about starring the German List. He pleaded directly to the head of the Commission Judge Roberts
that this cultural lag be reduced. "The fragments of important monuments," he pleaded, "should be
rescued while on the ground before they are heaped up by bulldozer and used for utilitarian
construction." "Speaking professionally and from my own experience," Dinsmoor emphasized that
fragments were all archaeologists had to deal with anyways:
Military officers may not realize the importance of preserving characteristic fragments of
buildings and broken statues and may regard anything once broken as worthy only of
the dump heap, but many of us who have devoted entire lives to the reconstruction of
monuments from broken fragments can testify that the opposite is true.23"
Other classical archaeologists had already written this point into the Army's Handbooks: "The fact
that a building is in ruins," Doro Levi wrote in the Italian introduction, "in no way detracts from its
importance.""'36 Although Levi had intended to describe the "Roman ruins at Pompeii, Greek
Temples and Etruscan tombs," his statement soon became applicable to much of Europe itself.
The transfer of responsibility from art historians to archaeologists meant that the system of
aesthetic proportion once regimenting the work of protection turned into an archaeological system
of metonymy. While the art historians and connoisseurs placed value on the design of the collection,
archaeologists proceeded from the fragment to the whole. It was this archaeological eye that
233 Dinsmoor traveled to London in April 1944 and remained until June 1944, writing three "Reports from London"
(23 April 1944, 2 May 1944 and 3 June 1944). Francis Taylor also traveled to Europe and Crosby took over from
Dinsmoor (Mission to Europe (2-13 Oct. 1944; 8 March-10 June 1945)
234 "The MFA&A were held too far behind the lines and were not allowed to go forward until long after the advanced
echelon and the occupational detachments had gone ahead. I once estimated on the basis on incomplete data that there
was a cultural lag of about 2 weeks." Dinsmoor, "First Weekly Report: Sunday April 23, 1944, American Embassy,
London," 29. ASCSA III/3. This was confirmed by Scammel, who spoke at the same event: "Experience showed that a
large part of damage by troops occurred between the time when the combat troops moved forward and when reserved
and administrative units moved into an area." Major Joseph M. Scammel, "The Duties of Monuments, Fine Arts, and
Archives Officers" Paper delivered at the symposium "Europe's Monuments as Affected by the War" organized by the
Archaeological Institute of America at the Metropolitan Museum of Art (28 Dec, 1944), 8. ASCSA IX.
23s Dinsmoor to Roberts, 25 Oct 1943. Roberts responded that "the matter was presented to Asst. Secretary of War
McCloy, and he has authorized me to state that the art and monuments officers reach the affected areas at the earliest
practicable moment. It is impossible to have the arts and monuments offices accompany the troops because they are not
trained for combat work." ASCSA 1/6.
236 "Introduction," in Civil Affairs Handbook: Italy. Section 17A: Cultural Institutions Central Italy (M353-17A: 6 July 1944), vii.
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ultimately led Dinsmoor to a blunt visualization of the implications of his own agency. Upon his
return from Europe Dinsmoor delivered a report at a symposium titled Europe's Monuments as Affected by
the War organized at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on December 28 th, 1944. Here he explained
the effect of witnessing first-hand the work of the MFA&A troops:
I very much fear that, unwittingly, we have been engaged in a city planning program and
that some of the towns, in which the most severe fighting has occurred, now very
closely resemble our maps, with only the marked protected monuments now standing.
I began to acquire such impressions as I traversed the devastated towns between Naples
and Rome. An announcement of the French Ministry of Information, dated November 2,
1944, reporting on the results of the complete survey of the 17,000 monuments
historiques of France, stated that 8,000 of the 17,000 have been injured, thought most
of them in insignificant details and none, not even the cathedral of Rouen, in such a
manner that it cannot be restored. "But," it goes on, "the reports of the architects are
filled with astonishment in the presence of miracles, such as the Cathedral of Beauvais
upright and the Episcopalian Palace intact in the midst of a field of ruins, the Cathedral of
Amiens mutilated but still living among the debris, the Cathedral of Avraches intact at the
edge of piles of rubbish. The specially marked maps handed over to the liberating
bombardiers have been of remarkable efficacy."237
In his reconnaissance mission through Europe, guided by his archaeological eye, Dinsmoor detected
in the fragments the image of the maps he had spent so much time developing, and he also detected
in these few standing monuments "an urban whole" that represented the beginnings of "a planning
program." After touring Europe in ruins to advocate the basic archaeological principle that
"restoration can often be made from relatively minute fragments"238 Dinsmoor had detected in the
"minute fragments" of destroyed cities the indices of his own historical agency.
By recognizing in the destruction of cities his own hand in a "city planning program,"
Dinsmoor retrospectively assigned himself a role he had described, a decade earlier, as "the problem
of modern architecture." In the introduction to his seminal Architecture of Ancient Greece, Dinsmoor,
who had been trained as an architect, had offered his survey as a service to modern-day architects,
who should be supplied with a complete picture in order to perform their essential task, "choosing
the good and refusing the bad:"
In what way to use tradition is the problem of modern architecture. In earlier days an
architect's retrospect was bounded by the works of his grandfather, or at most by the
primitive arts of his own district. But now there is this difference, that it ranges over the
larger traditions of all of architectural history, choosing the good and refusing the bad,
and doubtless out of this selective use will come in the fullness of time a living art as
237 Dinsmoor, "Lecture on the Preservation of Monuments. Paper No. 2-Dinsmoor." Delivered at the symposium
"Europe's Monuments as Affected by the War" organized by the Archaeological Institute of America at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, on December 29', 1944. ASCSA IX/2.238 Dinsmoor, "Text For Lecture On Cultural Monuments. Final Draft." ASCSA IX/2.
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noble as Greek, more cosmopolitan than Roman, and perfectly characteristic of the age
we live in.239
Dinsmoor intended this description as a methodology of influence: through archaeological contacts
with architectural monuments, the modern architect was inspired to apply lessons learned from
tradition to the design of new architecture. In this process, the relationship between "the past" and
the monument was metaphorical-to "use the past" meant to acquire knowledge about
monuments. In contrast, the Roberts Commission "selective use of the past" had been altogether
archaeological: the metonymic relation of part to whole had been a made material-and thus
Dinsmoor was suddenly faced with the materiality of his own classifications. His knowledge, which
he had assumed to concern "all of architectural history"-which is to say, the totality of civilization
over the entirety of time-consisted in fact of a specific collection of monuments in a specific set of
modern cities.
"Unwitting City Planning": The MFA&A between damage and conspiracy
Did the Roberts Commission really shape the cities of Europe into the image of their
protection plan? As a historical claim, Dinsmoor's contention that his maps of monuments had
determined patterns of destruction must be tested beyond the veracity of an eye-witness account.
Dinsmoor's realization is in fact a three-part hypothesis-that there had been a "planning program,"
that it operated at an "urban" scale, and that the art historians had been "unwittingly" removed from
the consequences of their own actions-which is a useful guide for understanding how "military
necessity" mitigated not only the possibility for action, but the very idea of agency in war.
For instance, to take seriously the contention that the Frick maps performed "with
remarkably accuracy" one must examine the way bombing technology re-defined the notion of
accuracy. By the time the USSBS engineers surveyed bombing damage in 1945, they admitted that it
was difficult to distinguish between damage caused by "area raids" and "precision raids",
particularly in the last phase of the war, when the USAAF introduced "blind bombing" techniques
based on the use of the radar.2 40 85% of the total bomb tonnage dropped by the Allies on Europe
occurred after January 1944 and this period accounts for the greatest proportion of bombing
destruction in the whole war. By the USSBS's own admission, "in many cases bombs dropped by
instruments in "precision" raids fell over a wide area comparable to that covered normally in an
239 Dinsmoor, "Geographical Considerations," in "Introduction, " The Architecture of Ancient Greece, xvii
240 These "pathfinder bombs" were dropped to delimit the edge of a destruction area, giving subsequent pilots markers
with which to aim at specific strategic targets. See "The Bombsights," in Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the
United States in World War II: the Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2003), 123-141.
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'area raid'," and therefore after Spring 1944, any precision raid against an urban target "had the
practical effect of an area raid against that city."2 41 Certainly the French cities named by the Vaucher
Commission in its "Resolution against Carpet Bombing" had actually sustained damage from what
were intended to be precision raids. 242 Despite this progressive blurring, however, raids continued to
be recorded not according to the type of damage they inflicted, but "on the basis of the declared
intention of the attackers." In other words, the criterion of accuracy used to classify bombing
technologies by the end of war contained assumptions about the relationship between destruction
and intent. Foremost among the factors that complicate Dinsmoor's claim of "city planning" by
destruction, then, is the difficulty of distinguishing between destruction caused by precision and by
carpet bombing, despite the deep ethical divide that separated these two techniques in the abstract.
To this failure of precision-bombing instruments to perform with accuracy should be added
the overwhelming success of technologies that were designed to be imprecise, such as the
"incendiary bombs" used by USAAF and RAF to cause firestorms in German cities of more than
100,000 inhabitants like Hamburg, Darmstadt and Dresden. Here the USSBS laconically
acknowledged that these German cities had, by the end of war, "lost their central and business
districts and remained as suburban rings surrounding destroyed cores," and that "for residential
areas fire was the chief cause of the damage that resulted from bombing."2 43 Since most German
monuments marked on the Frick maps lay in these historic centers, to account for the high
proportion of monuments standing in these "destroyed cores," one must account for the tendency
of residential building types to bum faster than masonry monuments. To refer to the graphic
nomenclature of the Frick maps, one might say that "hatched" residential areas were generally more
vulnerable to fire than the monuments which had been "colored" in black. This material distinction
significantly modifies the terms of the physical "resemblance" that Dinsmoor perceived on his
European tour. For example, the MFA&A damage report from Mainz described that "the great part
of the old city ... is little better than rubble, with the towers of its medieval churches--the one part
241 "In many cases bombs dropped by instruments in "precision" raids directed against specific targets fell over a wide
area comparable to that covered normally in an 'area raid'." It is not that the intentions of the bombing did not count;
on the contrary the USSBS acknowledged that the greatest inaccuracy in its damage reports stemmed from the fact raids
were classified according to intention, rather than actual technology. "but on the basis of the declared intention of the
attackers it would go into the air force records as a precision attack on the transportation site" For this reason, "it
proved somewhat difficult to distinguish between the economic consequences of true area raids and raids of the kind
described USSBS, "The Attack on German Cities," 21/38
242 Similarly, the Cathedral of Beauvais, Amiens and Avraches mentioned both in the report and in Dinsmoor's talk, had
been the result of "precision raids" led by radar. (in final report: St L6, Coutances, Beauvais, Rouen.)243 "In many incidents ignition followed the use of high-explosive bombs .... But the principal weapon for setting fires
was the incendiary bomb." "Physical Damage from Bombing," in USSBS, 28/38
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of these buildings relatively undamaged--alone standing to mark what the city once was.""2 That
"the city" was still legible in its remaining towers supports Dinsmoor's story of a "city planning
program," but it also points to the imprecision of his realization: merely detecting that "towers had
survived" was not the same as finding that all monuments had been deliberately spared. Any part of
a surviving monument was a marker around which urban form could be approximated. For the
MFA&A officer this approximation was a trace of a bygone city; for Dinsmoor they were the basis
for a proportional gestalt of success.
Indeed Dinsmoor's fear of having partaken in a "city planning program" was based on a
single visual impression-that "the towns very closely resembled the maps"--which is itself a
hypothesis to be verified. This "resemblance" occurred to Dinsmoor as he visited bombed cities in
Europe, and he later tried to duplicate its effect for his colleagues at the Met, by showing slides of
monuments "standing intact in the midst of a field of ruins." Crucially, this genre of photography
also pervades the Roberts Commission's Final Report, published in 1946. Like Dinsmoor's lecture at the
Met, the Report gave a visual narrative of the war, beginning with map-making at the Frick, and
ending with views of destroyed city centers dominated by stone monuments. (fig. 2.55) It is through
this graphic narrative that a gestalt of historical agency and the impression of overall success were
disseminated-reinforced by the geographic range of the pictures, which showed monuments
"preserved" in Italy, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Austria. Unlike Dinsmoor's lecture,
however, the Report was careful to avoid claiming any overall credit, offering instead a detailed
account of the small-scale efficiency of MFA&A officers on the ground. Indeed a closer reading of
the Report's text reveals that this genre of photography was used to illustrate widely divergent damage
reports: from confident statements that whole patrimonies were safeguarded ("None of the great
national treasures of France, Belgium, or Holland were lost in the war" 245) to stories of fortuitous
survival ("More fortunate but far fewer were the [Austrian] towns and cities of which it was
possible to report negligible damage"246 ) and frank admissions of widespread destruction ("the
enormous damage visited upon Western Germany ... is exemplified in the 40-50-60-percent and
244 "The particular quality of this old town, its remarkably unity as an assembly of fine buildings from the 14 th to the
18th century, has gone for good." Final Report, 155.
245 Final Report, 101.
246 Final Report, 152. Austria was a case of "fortunate survival," as the British damage report shows: "Though some of the
larger towns suffered from bombing, there has been little destruction, or even damage, to historical monuments or
collections. ... The numerous country houses and castles ... have survived with proportionately very slight loss, though
few have suffered severely before our arrival.... The most vulnerable of the towns was Graz ... but by great good fortune
destruction was limited to things of minor importance. In the remainder of the worst-bombed towns,... the
monuments were of less consequence, but even so, few of them have suffered. To some extent this fortunate outcome is
due to the excellent measures taken by the Austrians themselves." Sir Leonard Woolley, "General Report on the British
Zone of Austria," Works of Art in Austria (British Zone of Occupation):Losses and Surivival in the War (London: HM's Stationery
Officer, 1946), 3.
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even, in many instances, in the 100 percent destruction of world-famous monuments in such cities
at K61n, Dusseldorf, Koblenz, and Trier.") 247 While the Final Report's photographs showcased
monuments that had survived, the text never claimed credit for their survival.
A distinctly conspiratorial tone resulted from this disjuncture between image and text, and it
was never dispelled. Even as photographs of surviving monuments in ruined cities were widely
disseminated, no direct claim of success on the part of the Commission ever came to accompany
them. Instead, they were embedded in a cautious but sustained tone of optimism that emphasized
how "miraculous" the survival of so many monuments had been. "The picture," the Final Report
concluded, "is on the whole enheartening." This miraculous narrative is so pervasive that it inverts
the terms by which we can question the "resemblance" posited by Dinsmoor: if the Frick maps
never became instruments, if bombing was inaccurate, and if it is only by reading patterns of
destruction that military action could be deduced-if, in short, the Allied protection plan was never
systematically implemented-why do the Commission's maps and the destroyed towns resemble
each-other at all?
The answer begins undoubtedly in the way the MFA&A troops accomplished their missions.
To understand the "resemblance" between Frick maps and damaged cities, we must recall that the
MFA&A troops held those maps in hand when they toured the cities, and used them as guides for
what damage to record and where to administer "first aid". The MFA&A's damage reports belong to
the same document family as the Frick Atlases-they are series of images appended with lists-and
it in this structure that any "resemblance" begins. Note for instance the double representation of the
city of Frankfurt in the Final Report: on the one hand, an aerial view of the city center depicts the Dom
among ruins, under the label of "Destruction in the area of the Cathedral.""24 8 (fig.#) On the other
hand, the text cites at length from a preliminary report made by MFA&A Captain Robert Posey, of
the 3rd US Army, when he visited the city on April 15th 1944:
FRANKFURT. Entire central portion of town devastated by air raid 22 March 1944. B-1: Dom, tower not
seriously damaged. All windows and most of tracery blown out. Right transept roof and vault destroyed. Ex-
cellent Kunstschutz protection for finest permanent side-altars prevented damage except where wooden
pinnacles stood above boxing. Wall paintings by Steinle, modem, damaged. Hatchments and escutcheons of
famous Frankfurt families damaged. Crucifixion group by Hans Backhofen of Mainz (1509), given elaborate
Kunstschutz protection. Good late Gothic free-standing Crucifixion, exterior apse-end, undamaged except for
the head of Thief on right, broken, now placed on coping. Sacristy and Chapel, undamaged. All portable works
seem to have been removed early in war. B-2: Schoppenbrunnen, 18th century stone, gilded fountain, undamaged.
B-3: Stadtarchiv, building destroyed. B-4: Stadtgeschichtliches Museum, formerly Historisches Museum, destroyed. B-5:
Rothschild House, destroyed. B-6: Baroque fountain (1759), near Dom apse, undamaged. B-7: Stadtbibliothek
destroyed, except for facade, some walls and pediment. Stucco neo-classic relief, destroyed. B-8: Nikolaikirche,
roof burned, vault intact. Elaborate Kunstschutz protection for organ, and room which at one time seems to
have been used as depot, entered by low metal door. Old wooden pulpit, removed. Kunstschutz protection for
247 Final Report, 153.
248 Final Report, Figure #
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monument on interior and carving on exterior. B-9: R6merburg, some parts of outer walls still stand. Buildings
on three sides of platz (Haus zum Riimer Haus Limpburg, Haus Liwenstein), gutted. B-10: Justitiabrunnen (1543- figure
modern), undamaged. B-11: Paulkirsche (1787-1855), walls only standing. B-12: Alte and Neue Rathaus (from
1400), some walls only, stand. B-13: Zoological Gardens, badly damaged, some deer still in enclosure. B-14:
Katherinnekirsche, 18'" Century baroque, gutted. B-15: Hauptwache (1730), handsome town-guard-house,
pediment and facade walls only, stand. B-15: Stadel Hochschule fur Bildene Kunst und Mode, gutted, B-16:
Museum fiir Kunstwerke, gutted. B-17: Opernhaus (1877), gutted, roof collapsed, walls standing, cellars intact. B-18:
Polytechnische Institut, gutted. B-19: Bibliothek fdir Neuere Sprache, Richard Strauss Sammlung, Museum fir Theatre-und
Musikgeschichte (in former Rothschild Haus). Building (early neoclassic 19th century) damaged, upper parts burned
some books and other materials now in cellar, Finer books and musical instruments had been removed. House
in use as rationing cellar. Book shelves usable. B-20: St. Leonhardskirche, restored, from 13th Century, roof
burned. Good Kunstschutz protection, particularly to side-chapel used for depot, and bricking up of
Romanesque portal on interior, Some wood-planking first-aid to leaking roof. Water enters from cracks and
holes in vaulting. Holbein The Elder's (?) Last Supper, cased and in straw, in chapel. Two fine late gothic altars,
stained glass , church furniture removed to chapel which now has temporary wooden plank roof. Chapel is dry
and safe. Organloft and organ burned. Stations of Cross, paintings (modern), damaged. Three bells fell and
melted. Church in custody of Sisters of Charity Recommended to Mil. Gov. Det. F2D2 first-aid be urged upon
Civil Government. B-2 1: Goethehaus, destroyed, cellar exists inhabited by Dr. Franz GOTTING, curator. Best
holdings exist, safe outside Frankfurt, 18th Century garden-figures and standing nude by Georg KOLBE, in
garden, undamaged. B-22: Liebfrauenkirche (14th-1 5'" centuries) gutted, south portal seriously damaged, scattered
sculptural fragments still attached to walls, which are badly cracked. B-23: Fountain (Schneidermiind, 1771), good
Kunstschutz protection of handsome red stone plinth, surmounted by gilt-bronze sunburst. B-24:
Eschenheimer Turm (early 15th century), no war damage. Action recommended: Contacted Capt Mil. Gov.
Det. F2D2, and requested that he interview Dr. Ernst BETTLER, Director of Goethe Museum, Dr. Franz
GOTTING, Conservator, Goethe Museum and Dr. MANOVSKY, Kunstgewerbe and Decorative Art, with view to
setting up directorate for Cultural Institutions in Civil Government.2 49
The same "destroyed area" that appeared to be an undifferentiated field of rubble in the Rerport's
photograph was methodically described in the text: starting from the Dom and unfolding outward,
quadrant by quadrant, with a textual density that echoes the relentlessness of the damage.
It should be noted that, already in wartime, the MFA&A's work was assessed as a very
mitigated success-crippled by serious problems of staffing, hierarchy, timing, and coverage.2 s0 In
their reports the MFA&A field officers conveyed a fundamental helplessness in the face of large-scale
destruction, insufficient resources, and lack of military authority, and all are peppered with stories of
249 Final Report, 151-153.
zs0 Of particular interest is the fact that regional assignment of MFA&A officers had been counter-productive,
immobilizing capable hands in theaters where they were not needed.
Although the MFA&A officers stood the most literal force of "implementation" of the Roberts Commission, the civilian
affiliation of the Commission and the military nature of the MFA&A was eventually understood to have been a major
conflict. Colonel Newton, an architect who was appointed to head the MFA&A, had to accept a demotion from general
to Colonel in order to be assigned to the European Theater. He did not have any authority to issue orders. Newton
expressed this difficulty in a letter written to Sumner Crosby from London in late 1944: "Don't permit yourself to
become too optimistic, since from this "worm's eye" viewpoint, there isn't any cause for optimism. In your cable,
you stated in part "he requests these be forwarded to G-5 SHAEF." Be very careful of how you word your cables,
remember, I can't state anything. You have to make your recommendation as if it emulated form you. This is very
important, since I feel that the War Department would rather have me over here than in Washington for reasons well
known to both of us." Letter from Newton to Crosby, 4 Dec 1944. Crosby papers, I/3
What Newton did have, through the Commission, was a direct channel of influence with the War Department, and on
several occasions he was able to produce a decree directly from Eisenhower. See Stratton Hammon, "Memoir of the
Ranking Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Officer in the RTO during World War II, in Military Affairs (April 1988),
61-68. Another common trope of the correspondence between MFA&A and the commission was the expression of
frustration about the British organization, Woolley in particular, by using cognates of the word "wool." ("it's just
another one of those "wool pulling" episodes"; "these are woolley times!")
222
2. Protected Monuments
compromises that vary from the anecdotal to the systemic. 251 MFA&A officers, who were either
architects or curators, found that their expertise was not always suited to the particular type of
monument-building or painting-their units encountered.2s2 As summarized in the Final Report, the
MFA&A's problem was largely a proportional one:
The enormity of the task of inspection can be seen from the following brief statistics.
The areas covered by the MFA&A officers grew, within a very short time, to such an
extent that it was practically impossible to inspect and report on all the officially
protected monuments, much less those not mentioned on the official lists. Up to
December 1, 1944, during the first 4 months of operations within Headquarters
Communications Zone alone, a total of 1,240 sites and 597 towns were visited by an
average of 2 1/2 MFA&A officers in the field. This amounted to 125 sites and 60 towns
per man per months. A recapitulation of the official lists for France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany reveals a total of 3,415 items. For the major
part of operation, the MFA&A officers in the field averaged 10 in number... This meant
341 /2 officially listed monuments per officer, and did not include the several thousand
other structures eventually to come within their puerview, or the approximately 350
known repositories of works of art which were to come within the area of US forces in
Germany by May 7, 1945.253
Despite this lengthy statistical disclaimer the Final Report went out of its way to connect, in its overall
conclusion, the fortuitous "proportion" of surviving monuments with the "disproportion" of
MFA&A officers in their fight against "military necessity":
The picture ... is on the whole quite enheartening. ... And the successful activities of
these few men is out of all proportion to their number and their position within the
military machine. ... Always striving against the demands of military necessity, this group
was able to accomplish a task of great magnitude. The task was nothing less than to
preserve as much as they could of man's creative past.
The conceptual analogy between the disproportion of the MFA&A officers and their ability to
"temper" destruction reveals that another crucial ethical transfer had occurred, between objects and
subjects. The exceptional value of monuments among targets was vindicated by the disproportionate
minority of MFA&A troops among military men. In spite-or perhaps because--of this basic
proportional disparity, it is also clear that the arrival of MFA&A officers in any damaged town, and
2s51 See Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary (London: Robert Hale, 1946); John Skilton, Jr., Ddfense de l'Art Europ&en, trans;
Jacqueline de Gromard (Paris: Editions Internationales, 1948); James Rorimer, Survival: The Salvage and Protection of Art in War
(New York: Abelard Press, 1950); Frederick Hartt, Florentine Art Under Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949);
Henry LaFarge, ed., Lost Treasures of Europe (New York: Pantheon, 1946).
252 Typical of an "anecdotal" approach is Stratton Hammond's complaint that "architects, especially those who had
been in the army for years, were better at convincing the artillery to miss important targets." More systemic is his
follow-up observation on steeples, that "in the case of churches with steeples, this could not often be accomplished."
Hammon, 62. Similarly Woolley summarized that "In Belgium ... the damage or destruction of buildings assumed
serious proportions and occurred on a more or less well-defined line. That line was punctuated by churches whose
towers constituted the only useful observation posts in a flat country." Woolley, A Record,S 1.2s53 Final Report, 105-106.
254 Final Report, 160. The proportion was described numerically by Charles Kuntzman: a total of 185 personnel, of which
17 were British; they were to cover 560,000 square miles of territory with an official list of 3,415 monuments. "By the
first of December 1,240 sites had been visited bin 597 towns by an average of two and a half MFAA officers." 57.
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their implementation of a curatorial regime of "first aid," instituted a clear distinction between
monument and not-monument which, as we will see, had long-term consequences in the unfolding
of the reconstruction.
If MFA&A officers were too few and powerless to act as an implementation force in
Dinsmoor's hypothetical "city planning program," they did however usher a smooth transition from
lists of monuments needing protection, to lists of monuments needing repair. This was
accomplished by translating a sliding scale of protection into a sliding scale of destruction. Hence
four-part nomenclature introduced by the MFA&A to record destruction in its so-called report-cards
of destruction ("Intact or slightly damaged/ Damaged but repairable / Seriously damaged/
Destroyed" 25 5 ) echoed the four-part starring system that had been appended to monuments in the
Harvard Lists. Just as the starring system had facilitated the transfer and transformation of the
Commission's list and maps from committee to committee, so the sliding scale of destruction
facilitated the Civil Affairs' transfer of power over monuments to local authorities.
The MFA&A's damage reporting system became a lingua franca of national art-protection
administrations as they recovered their mandates in the aftermath of liberation. France's Direction des
Monuments Historiques, for instance, published its "War Damage Report" using a numerical system that
assigned to each monument an index of destruction, from 0 to 4: " [0] destroyed; [1] very severely
damaged; [2] severely damaged; [3]; moderately damaged; [4] lightly damaged.""'s6 While this
numerical representation was a highly abbreviated report, it also provided a shorthand of what
proportion of each monument had been left standing-in the words of archaeologist Jean Verrier,
an "all too dry but, alas, all too eloquent" depiction of the archaeological record of war. The
widespread destruction wrought on the Normandy city of Caen, for instance, can be discerned as a
pattern of zeros in a densely packed inventory of names and numbers:
Calvados. - Airan, 6glise (C)[1]; Aizy, 6glise (C)[2]; Amblie, portail de l'6glise (C) [4];
Auigny, chateau (I) [4]; Audrieu, eglise (C) [2]; Authie, 6glise (C) [2]; Banneville-sur-Ajon,
chapelle (C)[4]; Baron, clocher (C)[0], Beaumais, 6glise (C)[4]; Bernieres-sur-Mer, eglise
(C)[3]; Biville-sur-Ornes, eglise (C)[3]; Billy, 6glise, (C)[3;]Bougy, 6iglise (C)[3];
Bourguebus, eglise (I) [3]; Bretteville-sur-Laize, 6glise de Quilly (C) [3]; Bricqueville, 6glise
(C)[3]; Caen, chapelle du Saint-S6pulchre (C)[3], 6glise Saint-Etienne (C) [4], Notre-
Dame-de-la-Gloriette (C)[4], St- Gilles (C) [1], Saint-Jean (C)[2], Saint-Michel-De-
Vaucelles (C) [4], Saint-Nicolas (C) [4], Saint-Pierre (C) [2], Saint-Sauveur (I) [4], La Trinite
2ss See for instance "Appendix A: reports on Archives and Tables Showing the State of Historical Monuments in North-
Western France, Arranged Alphabetically," in Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary (London: Hale, 1946), 200.
256Nous nous sommes contentes de faire suivre chaque nom d'une initiale, (C), class&, ou (I), inscrit, et d'un numero
[0] ditruit; [1] dommages tr&s graves; [2] dommages graves; [3] dommages moyens; [4] dommages 16gers." Jean
Verrier, "Les dommages de guerre aux 6difices classes parmi les monuments historiques et inscrits A l'inventaire
supplimentaire." Bulletin Monumental CIV (1946), 207.
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(C) [3], 6glise du Vieux-Saint-Etienne (C) [2], chateau (C) [3], h6tel d'Escoville (C) [1],
h6tel de Montrainville (C)[2], h6tel de Than (C)[2], h6tel des Monnaies (C)[0], lyc6e
Malherbe (C)[3], maison des Gens d'armes (C)[4], maisons 19, 37, 94 rue Saint-Jean,
10, rue Montoir-Poissonneie (C)[0], tour des Morts (C)[0] ...2
The advantage of this statistical accounting is that it could easily be tabulated into a national
summary. Verrier offered a tentatively optimistic conclusion, that "the war has affected ... 1,700 of
8,000 classes monuments and 12,000 inscrits, which is to say, 2% of French monuments," most of
which "could be reconstructed" given the appropriate resources. Within ten years, Verrier
confidently asserted, France would "regain the architectural sheen [parure] worthy of the quality of its
historic monuments."2s8 By ensuring that damaged monuments received more immediate attention
than the rest of damaged, the MFA&A connected the proportional likelihood of monuments to
remain intact with the archaeological tendency of these monuments to be reconstructed.
This connection between the urban aerial view of the Commission and the archaeological
"worm's eye" of the MFA&A on the ground was theorized by Sir Leonard Woolley in November
1945, in an informal talk to the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA). Woolley's talk was the
equivalent of Dinsmoor's AIA lecture at the Met, and was similarly illustrated by images of
"Cathedral[s] undamaged in the centre of an almost totally destroyed area.""'2 Because he was
subject to stronger propaganda pressures than his American colleague, Woolley spoke more
explicitly than Dinsmoor of "the success of the scheme." For example, when his talk was published
in the RIBA Journal, he unequivocally labeled his images "Examples of notable buildings saved from
destruction by the careful briefing of British and American gunners and airmen." (fig. 2.56) Yet even
Woolley eschewed specific stories of salvage in favor of an overall, proportional reading. In
particular, he recommended erasing the identity of individual monuments, in order to temper the
impression of an "orgy of destruction." 260
Thinking of destruction in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, Woolley argued, was the
only way to numb connoisseurial recognition of "familiar names":
The record of damage makes sorry reading-it is bound to do so. If we list the buildings
that have been destroyed or damaged, it might well appear, as one familiar name follows
another, that little has survived from the orgy of destruction. It is necessary to look at
things in a better perspective. In the first place, damage is more often than not
reparable.... The total number of buildings destroyed beyond hope of repair is
relatively small. What we ought to do is to take the total number of historic monuments
zs7 Verrier, "Dommages de Guerre," 211.
2s8 Verrier, "Dommages de Guerre," 208.
259 Wolley, in RIBAJoumal, 38. Center of Argentan, Worms Cathedral, Cologne Cathedral, Mantes cathedral.260 Woolley, RIBAJournal, 40.
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in any one area and see what percentage has disappeared or as been irretrievably
damaged. 61
Woolley gave three examples of this statistical reporting of damage, which echoed the proportional
logic that had informed the listing of monuments in war: only one monument in the French list of
25 had "suffered serious injury"; only 25 of the 210 monuments listed in Normandy were
described as "destroyed,' 'badly damaged' or 'gutted',"; and "less than five percent [72 of 792 listed
monuments] in Tuscany have perished utterly or been so far destroyed as to have lost their character
and their interest." In other words, insofar as the Commission had succeeded, it had done so by
ensuring destruction was legible in proportional terms-the same proportional logic that had
regimented the design of its lists and maps. 262
By the time the Commission issued its first trans-national reports, Woolley's statistical
approximation had been integrated into a sense of impending European reconstruction. In the 1946
edited volume Lost Treasures of Europe, ex-MFA&A officer Ernest Dewald adopted a passive tone:
Destruction there was bound to be," he wrote, "no matter what precautions were taken.
It is difficult to state dogmatically that any one single form of action caused the greatest
destruction. It is difficult even to state that air raids in general were more obliterating
than ground action, except in instances of concentrated fury visited upon Germany.263
Rather than read in this "concentrated fury" any iconoclastic intent on the part of military
authorities, DeWald concluded with a Benjaminian turn of phrase that implicated the entirety of
mankind in an escatological enjoyment of its own destruction. "The spectacle of man's destructive
fury against himself and his achievements lies before us," he wrote. Yet even in the face of this
totality DeWald confidently proposed that, much as monuments worldwide had "survived past wars
and devastations," so the "burned-out hulks of buildings, the facades and walls of which are still
standing, are nuclei for attempts at reconstruction and contain much historical and architectural value
261 Sir Leonard Woolley, "The Preservation of Historical Architecture in the War Zones." Journal of the RIBA (December
1945), 40.
262 The only qualitative concession Woolley made was in an architectonic interpretation of the fate of the Baroque:
"What has suffered the most," he ventured, "has been baroque architecture. Owing to its nature, the elaborate
decoration and so on, it has suffered a great deal." Charles Rufus Morey had offered similar story at the Met
symposium, in his account of Medieval Art and the War. "The baroque got it," Morey said, quoting an MFA&A officer.
Morey attempted to use monumental style as a predictor of destruction, but his interpretation was the opposite of
Woolley's: "this result might have been expected ... since the larger monuments of the Renaissance and the Baroque
periods made larger targets for bombs and shells." Charles Rufus Morey, "The War and Mediaeval Art," in College Art
Journal (Jan 1945), 75. While Wooley blamed the frailty of the baroque, Morey sought to read iconoclastic intention in
destruction. In contrast to this early search for iconoclastic meaning, the Commission's reports of destruction
progressively lost any specificity as they became more comprehensive.
263 DeWald had been director of the MFA&A operations in Italy and in Austria. Ernest T. deWald, "Introduction" in
Henry LaFarge, Ed., Lost Treausres of Europe (New York; Pantheon Books, 1946), 8-9.
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for the future." By inspecting monuments mere 10 days after they had been damaged, the MFA&A
had helped to curate them as "nuclei for reconstruction." 264
The passage from protected lists to damaged lists is a useful way to understand the legal re-
definition of the concept of "heritage" as international property. Far from an abstract universal, the
appurtenance of monuments to "mankind" was understood as a specific form of military custody,
which included not only the obligation to safeguard monuments in wartime, but also the
opportunity to return them to local authorities, in whatever state, upon war's end. In this sense it is
not only the two-week delay between the end of fighting and the arrival of MFA&A troops that
constitutes a "cultural lag" but also the entire MFA&A operation itself. This lag is another reason why
it is difficult to verify the efficacy of the Roberts Commission's work as a cohesive "program."
Indeed as monuments were returned to local and national authorities who devised various "plans"
for their reconstruction, the general idea that protection had itself been "planned" began to fade.
It is all the more important to note, then, that as damage reports became more statistical and
the identity of individual monuments disappeared from them, members of the Commission began
to emphasize the consultative nature of their work. Two years after Dinsmoor and Woolley gave
their triumphant lectures with pictures of "saved" monuments, British and American Commissions
published their final reports, which turned away from claiming success in any kind of "plan." The
US report emphasized not that monuments had been saved but that "information" had been
"supplied":
At least 95 percent of the damage inflicted to major monuments was caused by air
bombardment, It is difficult to estimate how far the comparative immunity of the greater
cathedrals of France from damage was due to the efforts of the Allied Air Forces based
on information supplied by SHAEF, but certainly such information was sought by the air
staff and supplied.265
Similarly, the British report repeated the figure of 95% and retrospectively recast the entire work of
the MFA&A, from a mission of "immunity" into a mission about "ignorance:"
At least 95 per cent of the damage inflicted on major monuments by the Allies was
caused by air-bombardment. The clear task of the MFAA Sub-commission was to ensure
that at least no part of this destruction should be wrought through ignorance of the
existence and importance of individual monuments. 266
264 "Yet the burned-out hulks of buildings, the facades and walls of which are still standing, are nuclei for
attempts at reconstruction and contain much of historical and architectural value for the future, as is the case
with the Parthenon, the palace of Theodoric at Ravenna, or the many ruined abbeys of France and England
which have survived past wars and devastations. In such guise the present shells of many a Romanesque church
in Pisa or of the palaces at Genoa may resume significance for the future."
265 "Except for Rouen, the great Gothic monuments of France have escaped comparatively lightly" Final Report, 99.
266 Woolley, A Record..., 27
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Instead of affirming that monuments had been saved, the US and UK Final reports merely stated that
information had been transmitted.
The more clearly a picture of the "comparative immunity" of Europe's monuments was
delineated, the less it was portrayed as a result of the Commission's work, and rather as an indirect
consequence of the availability of "information. "267 In some sense, this turn of events enacted the
disclaimer that had been stamped on the inside cover of every list and atlas, certifying that the
"Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbook" was not to imply "action" but to supply "basic factual
information":
The Handbooks do not deal with plans or policies. It should clearly be understood that
they do not imply any official program of action. They are rather ready reference source books
containing basic factual information needed for planning and policy making."68
Because its work was exempted from carrying the weight of "any official plan of action," the
MFA&A was relieved from any evaluation at war's end. Clearly the emphasis on the provision of
"knowledge" was intended to evade any accusation of deliberate destruction-as Col. Geoffrey
Webb wrote in a 1944 report, since military authorities had been informed of the location of
monuments, "it is satisfactory to note that up to date so little damage is attributed to wantonness or
ignorance on the part of Allied troops."2 69 Yet the emphasis on disproving "wantonness"
paradoxically reinforced the overall narrative of a "miraculous" survival of monuments, and helped
military authorities to avoid the delicate question of whether monuments had been preserved at the
expense of human lives.
Still today, an anecdotal tone pervades historical accounts of war damage to European
monuments. While the disproportionate destruction wrought onto Germany is commonly
acknowledged, it is treated as an "exception" that supports the theory that protection and iconoclasm
were both idiosyncratic. In Nicola Lambourne's words, "if definite instances of the intentional
targeting of historic monuments are rare, indisputable cases of intentional avoidance of the buildings
are equally elusive.... In the absence of a positive stated Allied policy of bombing buildings of
historic and cultural importance in Germany, the strongest impression given is more that of a lack of
interest in avoiding them on the part of air forces and governments except towards the end of the
war, when a succession of historic cities were devastated."270 The continued habit of presenting the
preservation of monuments as contingent to the real narrative of war betrays a belief in the
267 Similarly, in September 1944 Colonel Webb was able to report "it is satisfactory to note that up to date so little
damage is attributed to wantonness or ignorance on the part of Allied troops." Webb cited in Woolley, A Record..., 48.
268 "Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbook" Printed as page iii of all volumes of Civil Affairs Handbooks.
269 Cited in Woolley. 20.
270 Lambourne, 163. For a pointed critique of this conclusion see J. Diefendorf's review in The Journal of Military History
(Oct., 2001), 1151-1152.
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autonomy of monuments-the very autonomy that it would be possible to verify with systematic
analysis of damage. Now that a variety of historical taboos about military agency in an age of total
war have been lifted, why has there not been more interest in verifying the efficacy of the
Commission's work?
A half-century after the Commission issued its own evasive report, it is entirely possible to
verify both the "resemblance" of Frick maps with patterns of destruction in individual cities, and the
"efficacy" of the overall policy in the European war. A comprehensive study comparing all the
monuments "protected" by Frick maps, "damaged" by aerial bombing, and given "first aid" by the
MFA&A, would yield a transnational statistical range of efficacy with which the success of the
Commission's work could be assessed-by the standards of Woolley's statistical method. Such a
comprehensive study would undoubtedly verify the hierarchy between theaters of operation that was
already evident in wartime-elucidating, for example, whether the passage from "testing" the
protection policy in Europe to "applying" it in the Pacific yielded increased efficacy or a more
perfunctory attitude. Similarly, monuments in the Eastern sectors-those the Roberts Commission
omitted from its maps, and/or which were ultimately passed in the hands of the decidedly less
interested Soviet authorities-could serve as a control group against which to test the Allied policy.
This kind of comprehensive analysis would need also to account for the protective efforts of the
German Kunstschutz, investigating whether a cumulative effect resulted in places where monuments
were subject to both German and American protective mechanisms.
These large-scale statistical analyses lie clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation. (For
Germany alone, the massive inventory published in 1988 as Kriegschicksale Deutscher Architektur: Verluste-
Schidden-Wiederaufbau involved the collaboration of 65 scholars working in archives scattered across the
country.) 27' In lieu of a general survey, however, some general lines of interpretation can be
proposed by contrasting three countries for which comprehensive damage reports have been
compiled: in Italy (where 5% of monuments were affected by war but the MFA&A's work is
presented as a resounding success), in France (where all but 2% of monuments emerged intact and
this survival is seen as "miraculous") and in Germany (where over 20% of monuments were
affected, a statistic that is subsumed in a larger narrative of urban destruction). Each of these national
surveys carries the statistical evaluations made by the MFA&A at war's end, but subjects them to
proportional readings that reflect the morphology of destruction in each country. Despite the varied
states of destruction in which the three countries found themselves at war's end, all three countries
began reconstruction by attempting to draw historical conclusions from the damage itself. This
271 Hartwig Beseler and Niels Gutschow, Kriegsschicksale Deutscher Architektur: Verluste-Schiiden-Wiederaufbau (Karl Wachholtz
Verlag, 1988), XI
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reverse iconoclasm remains prevalent in reconstruction historiography today-as if the level of
contingency involved in psychological warfare could only be surpassed by finding meaning in the
shape of destruction, deducing from ruins both the military "intention" of attackers and the
prescriptions for a civilian "morality" for national reconstruction.
Before addressing these national reconstruction narratives, however, there is one historical
synchrony in the last year of war that can be addressed to help explain the increasing reluctance of
the Roberts Commission to claim any kind of protection "plan": namely, the coincidence between
the drastic escalation of Allied bombings in Germany and the dramatic discovery by MFA&A troops
of the Nazi Art looting operation known as the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg fiir die Besetzen Gebiete (ERR).
As soon as MFA&A officers entered German soil in the Fall of 1944, they encountered the hundreds
of Nazi repositories of art-"castles, monasteries, cathedrals, private residences, farm houses and
barns, office building basements, various mines and air-raid shelters"272 -containing thousands of
movable cultural objects, from confiscated "ownerless" Jewish collections, to artworks requisitioned
for Hitler's and G6ring's personal collections, to furniture evacuated from state museums. The
encounter with these repositories led the MFA&A to uncover the vast "Looting operation" that the
Nazi party officials had planned, and the extent to which this looting had been successful. These
events were "full of melodrama" and took over the entire MFA&A division. 273 As the Final Report
frankly admitted, "The recovery, care for and return of portable objects of cultural value had priority
of interest and activity in Germany and Austria. All other operations were curtailed owing to this
overriding demand for attention."274 While this diversion of manpower was commensurate with the
scope of the looting plan, the inventorying and protection of these collections also had the effect of
diverting preciously few MFA&A troops away from giving "first-aid" to monuments in German
cities, at precisely the moment when Allies Air Forces delivered their most destructive blow to these
cities.
The MFA&A troops experienced this diversion-away from Germany's cites and towards
repositories on far-away hilltops and in underground salt-mines-as an unexpected change of
course, a sudden shift of attention from buildings to objects. This is no small point: MFA&A leaders
considered that they had "tested" their policy in Italy and "perfected" it in France; Germany was
therefore to be the third phase in the transformation of an ad-hoc system into a normalized
272 Charles Kunzelman, "Some Trials, Tribulations, and Successes of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Teams in
the European Theater During WWII," in Military Affairs (Apr 1988), 57.
273 "The action around these mine-repositories was filled with melodrama." Final Report, 140.
274 Final Report, 151.
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policy.27 ' The simultaneous bombing escalation and discovery of the repositories went against their
plan not only by dispersing the troops but also by radically separating "movable" and "immovable"
monuments, and thereby undermining the logic of containment that, as we have seen, lay at the
heart of the Allied definition of "monuments" This separation helped to spark a propaganda battle,
that was sustained until the end of the war: between MFA&A officers exhibiting "looted" art works
as evidence of Nazi cultural greed, while German propagandists brandished bombed city centers as
evidence of Allied barbarism. (fig. 2.54)
Clearly German troops had removed cultural objects to repositories in part to exempt them
from Allied bombings. Paradoxically, when the MFA&A troops took over these repositories and
Allies proceeded to bomb the city centers whence much of this art had come, they were able to
argue that they were protecting the art from Axis forces. In fact, MFA&A officers guarding
repositories were charged not only with protecting the art, but also with collecting from these
repositories "a large collection of documents" pertaining to the looting operation itself, which
methodically detailed the movement and provenance of each artwork. In part, the point was to be
able eventually to plan for the works' eventual "restitution" to original owners. But they also
gathered these documents into a dossier titled "The Plunder of Art Treasures, "'2 contributing to the
building of the Allied charge of "conspiracy" against Nazi party officials at the Nuremberg Trial. In
other words, if the last year of war diverted the MFA&A away from their protection "plan," it is in
large part because they encountered the spoils-and began to accumulate evidence-of Hitler's own
sinister plan for Europe's art."7
The weight carried by art-looting in bringing a charge of "Conspiracy" against the Nazi
regime at Nuremberg was small, but the central role played by the idea of hatching a "common
plan" in the trial, and the spatial dimension of this plan, should not be underestimated. Before being
indicted for three most infamous counts--Crime against Peace, Crimes of War, and Crimes against
Humanity--Nazi party officials were accused, and some indicted, for having "conspired" to
commit them:
275 For the most blunt usage of the terminology of "testing" and experimentation see Woolley, 19. There is evidence to
show that the MFA&A itself realized that "the scattered and often isolated character of repositories" was keeping them
from dealing with "the extremely severe destruction, especially in the northern part of the Rhine Province, the
confusion" making it difficult to "initiate first-aid repairs to monuments" Webb, cited in Woolley, Final Report, 52
276 "Chapter XIV: "The Plunder of Art Treasures." In Office of the United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume I (Washington, DC : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 109.
277 As James Rorimer reported, "efforts concentrated on safeguarding the larger repositories of cultural resources and
particular those in which "looted" items from foreign countries predominated." Rorimer, in Final Report, 137.
231
Lucia Allais
The Charter provided that those participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes would be held responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.278
The count of Conspiracy required the court simply to show that the defendants had hatched "a
common plan," and from this line of argument a new definition of "a plan" emerged: "A plan in
the execution of which a number of persons participate is still a plan, even though conceived by only
one of them; and those who execute the plan do not avoid responsibility ... if they knew what they
were doing."2 79 After the court established that the "central core" of the conspiracy was "the Nazi
party itself," it went through the main points of Nazi ideology, including its spatial dimension, the
idea of Lebensraum. It is in this context, that documents about the ERR were introduced, to demonstrate
that the cleansing of Lebensraum through bombing and genocide was a long-term plan for dispersal of
Teutonic culture and cultural objects.28 0 Indeed as soon as the MFA&A began inventorying the works,
they instituted a distinction between objects which had been put away and objects which had been
looted, and to note that, even if "the Germans abstained from attempting to secure works of art from
public collections" it was because "such action would have conflicted with their propaganda for a
'New European Order.'"281 Once the Niiremberg trial got underway, the MFA&A used this
information as "Evidence that Seizures [of art] Were not Merely for Protective Purposes,"282 to
show that the ERR was not an improvised wartime loot but rather a long-term "plan" for the
occupation of territory.
The idea that merely "conspiring to wage war" was grounds for the legal indictment of an
entire regime marked a significant turning point in the way ethical responsibility was conceived in
the age of total war. As the German defense team pointed out in the trial, "the concept of
Conspiracy, as used by the Prosecution, [was] entirely unknown to German law" and to the entire
civil law tradition.283 Yet the convictions that the United States secured on Count One set both the
tone for the entire trial, and a precedent for postwar international law. It is significant for instance
that the bombing of cities was excluded from the Niiremberg procedures, because it would have
278 Harold Leventhal, Sam Harris, John Wools72ey, and Warren Farr, "The Nuernberg Verdict," in Harvard Law Review,
(Jul 1947), 858.
279 HLR, 870.
280 Discussion of Lebensraum at the trial can be found in Chapter XII: "Means Used by the Nazi Conspirators in Gaining
control of the German State," Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 184.
281 AME / A/ 148 "The Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material," Cosby Archive I/7.
282 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol.1, 1117.
283 W. J. Wagner was prompted to write in 1951 on "Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries," which began "It was
revealed, at the Nuremberg Trial, that the approach to the problem of conspiracy in common law and in civil law
countries is different." The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science (Jul-Aug 1951), 171-183.
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implicated both Allied and Axis leadership,284 but that by the standards established by the Court,
morale bombing as deployed by both RAF and Luftwaffe would qualify as a war-crime today. After
the Nuremberg trials, in other words, "the crucial question" in war criminality became not
"whether one had committed crimes" but whether one "knew or was chargeable with knowledge"
of these crimes.285
In light of this conspiratorial redefinition of a "common plan," and its effects on ethical
responsibility in war, one can return to Dinsmoor's deliberate characterization of the Allied
protection policy as "unwitting," and to the insistence of British and American Final Reports that there
was a gap of uncertainty between the provision of "information" about monuments and the
deployment of "damage" in the Allied Offensive. In particular, if the Commission became so
reluctant to claim any kind of "success" in its protection plan, it was not in fear that the plan might
be revealed a failure, but rather for fear of revealing that there had been an Allied "plan" at all-lest
it be seen in the same conspiratorial terms as the ERR.
Certainly the discovery of the ERR's repositories raised the stakes of the Roberts
Commission's work and triggered the personal involvement of high-level "art politicians" who had
hitherto only been nominally involved, such as National Gallery Director Francis Taylor. In 1944
Taylor traveled to Europe to visit the German repositories, publishing upon his return an article titled
"The Rape of Europa" that used the art works and documents found in the salt mines at Alt-Hauss~e
as evidence that Hitler had planned an "organized and methodical pillage" of cultural objects.
"Obviously," Taylor wrote, "such a military program could not have been undertaken without
many years of preparation." In contrast, Taylor described the Roberts Commission as a reactive
measure whose level of success had surprised even its own protagonists: "In August 1943, when
President Roosevelt appointed the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic
and Historic Monuments in War Areas, no one dared to hope that the art of Europe would get off so
easily as it has."286 In part, this was an accurate depiction-both of the reaction nature of the
Commission, which amended its title to include "the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material",
and of the stealth with which a small group of academics had come to influence the conduct of war.
Even MFA&A officers had been surprised at the rapidity by which "a job [which] started as a strange
and almost ridiculous undertaking... was now accepted down the line.""'8 By all accounts, the
protective policy had been pushed by the art historians, and accepted by the War Department only
284 The Nazi defense included the bombing of Hamburg and Hiroshima in their defenses. Garrett, "Final Reflections,"
in Ethics and Airpower in World War II, 199-200.
285 The defense's citation is taken from HLR, 871.
286 Francis Henry Taylor, "The Rape of Europa," in The Atlantic Monthly (January 1945), 53.
287 Stout to Constable, 30 March 1945. Constable Papers AAA #3077.
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"on the understanding that it would not impede military necessity."28 What Taylor never addressed,
however, was how smoothly this work had been incorporated into Allied plans, and how easy it had
been not to "disturb" the proportional ethic of military necessity. What are we to make of this
seamlessness?
Clearly the art historians of the Roberts Commission did not "conspire" to preserve Europe's
monuments by bombing the cities around them-not, at least, in the same sense as Nazi party
officials "conspired" to empty Poland of its population, clearing a Lebensraum to be populated with
German people and European cultural objects. But can it therefore be said that there is no connection
between "what the art historians knew" and the spatial regime that resulted from the war-between
the form of their knowledge and the shape of destruction? As our analysis of the disciplinary
structure of the Roberts Commission has shown, it was the very structure of their discipline that
allowed the scholars to participate seamlessly in the conduct of war. What, then, is the historical
connection between the scholars composing maps and the cities that sustained damage as a result of
them? What is, for example, Erwin Panofsky's responsibility to the 12 maps of German cities that he
helped to compose? (fig. 2.57) What, more precisely, is the role played by city maps in the spatial
development of the Allied protection plan? The Allied devised the image of "custody" partly in
reaction to the image of a Nazi "conspiracy." To conclude this chapter, I look at the way this idea of
custody was transmitted to the civilian affairs officers whose job it was to implement it. As with
"conspiracy," the question to ask of these Allied actors is "what they knew." Unlike "conspiracy,"
however, the test of this knowledge is not whether it was "implemented" as a "plan," but whether it
provided a form of custody to usher monuments in the transformations undergone by cities during
and after the war. For this reason, I examine the spatial paradigms that these custodial schemes relied
on, and how these were used at the end of fighting to insert monuments in damage morphologies,
psychologies of reconstruction, and reconstruction plans in Italy, France and Germany.
Italy: Custody and restoration
If Italy had been the theater where the Allies had explicitly "tested" their protection policy
during the war, it also became the site for a deliberate demonstration of the concept of monumental
"custody" during reconstruction. As soon as they were able, MFA&A troops and Roberts
Commission officers engineered the very public "return" of artworks to Italy, showcasing
288 "While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not expect any military advantage from the proposed agency, they agreed to
have American commanders cooperate with it in ways that did not interfere with military necessity." Ronald Schaffer,
Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 48.
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"salvaged" works in re-opened galleries and organizing impromptu "museums" at key collecting
points.2"' (fig. 2.54 & 58) In keeping with this curatorial mentality, a few months after the
Commission was dissolved key members transitioned into a post-war restoration project:
transferring their efforts-and their budget-into the American Committee for the Reconstruction of Italian
Monuments (ACRIM).290 Using their contacts with Italian arts administrators and picking up directly
where the Allied Military Government's financial support for the MFA&A ended, the ACRIM spent
1946 organizing exhibitions to raise funds for the restoration of monuments damaged by the Allies:
the first titled Fifty War-Damaged Monuments, the second War's Toll of Italian Art. (fig. 2.61) These exhibitions
effectively showcased the work of the Roberts Commission. War's Toll on Italian Art, for instance, was a
photographic narrative in three sections: "Protection and Prevention of Damage", "Damage" and
"Repair and Reconstruction," a sequence clearly designed to demonstrate that the ACRIM could
extend the MFA&A's mission into the postwar.
It must be noted that in Italy the statistic that 5% of monuments were affected by war was
placed into a larger analysis of destruction as shaped along a clearly legible path of war. In the
words of one archaeologist, the war had created a "frightful via crucis" that had traversed certain cities
like Naples but left others like Venice intact.291 In this context, the damaged works of art and
architecture were considered the cultural price Italy paid for escaping other encounters with the
totality of war. By this logic, even those restoring damaged monuments saw their work in sacrificial
terms. For example, the Associazione Nazionale per il Restauro dei Monumenti Danneggiati dalla Guerra (National
Association for the Restoration of Monuments Damaged by War) introduced its 1945 "Exhibition of
Italian Art" at by distinguishing two types of destruction, each with its own morality:
Many are the ruins today upon which Italians are forced to cry, or, better yet, to mediate.
They are moral ruins and material ruins. But for some of these ruins, time-by which is
meant here a complex and varied set of forces-can bring rebirth and reconstruction.
There is however, one kind of destruction for which neither time nor goodwill of men
can do anything: the destruction of a work of art.292
289 For a play-by-play of this "return", see Frederick Hartt, Forentine Art Under Fire (Princeton, 1949), 96-1 10.
290 Including Harvard members like Sachs and Constable, ACLS members like Crosby and Morey, and MFA&A officers
like Dewalt and Hardt.
291 "Che grande sono stati i danni patiti dall'arte italiana in questa guerra: da S. Chiara di Napoli al Camposanto di
Pisa, da Montecassino al Tempio Malatestiano, dalle chiese barocche siciliane alle architetture civile di Verona, di
Vicenza, via via, da sud a nord e tutta una spaventosa via crucis ... " in Associazione Nazionale per il Restauro dei
Monumenti Danneggiati dalla Guerra, Mostra d'Arte Italiana a Palazzo Venezia (Roma: 1945), no page.
292 "Premessa," in Mostra d'Arte Italiana a Palazzo Venezia. The Associazione was directed by cultural minister Umberto Zanotti
Bianco and composed of arts administrators Giorgio Castelfranco, Aldo de Rinaldis, Mariaroa Gagliardi Gabrielli, Enrico
Gagliardi, Luigi Grassi, Federico Hermanin, Giovanni Incisa della Rochetta, Emiglio Lavagnino, Valerio Mariani, and
Ruggero Schiff Giorgini. Cesare Brandi, of later Unesco fame, was invited to participate for his expertise in Sienese
medieval art.
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In accordance with this sacrificial psychology, the anonymous figure of 5% was suppressed in favor
of the absolute quantity of 2,500 monuments. Of these, the most important were cited by name, as
recognizable losses against the backdrop of what Woolley had called the "orgy of destruction."
The ACRIM exhibitions echoed the themes of its Italian counterpart, but leveraged them into
an expiatory exercise for the Allies. Where the Associazione had opened with a morality tale, the
ACRIM catalog began with a text, by Italian Director of Antiquities Bianchi-Bandinelli, which
described for an American reader the spatial disposition of Italy's heritage: "Buildings of artistic
value in Italy are not, as in other countries, gathered in the most important cities in groups of
constructions that were carried out according to a pre-arranged plan.""29 The shape of destruction,
then, was explained not by the random path of war but also by Italy's regional monumental history.
The task of connecting Italy's dispersed monumental landscape to the psychology of total
war, then, was left to philosopher Benedetto Croce, who contributed a preface to the ACRIM
catalogue. Croce's text both confirmed the religiosity of the situation ("these losses are the outward
aspect of the age that has come upon us in an abasement and bewilderment of moral and religious
forces overcome by forces of blind and brutal power, unchained by destiny, which yet will have
their own unfamiliar justification, in the hidden plans of Providence,") and its connection with
psychological warfare ("it is childish to expect tumults and revolts for peace from supposed terror
since in these cases a new psychology appears, which is different from the psychology of tranquil
and ordinary life, dominated by resignation and possessed of a kind of tranquility.") 294
Following these Italian statements of spatial fortuity and psychological resignation, came an
introduction by the chairman of ACRIM's "planning committee," Millard Meiss, that relieved Allied
and Fascists alike from any responsibility: "Despite the intelligent efforts of the Allies and the Italians
to prevent and repair damage, without which the losses would have been much worse, the war
waged through the Italian peninsula battered or destroyed some 2500 works of artistic and historic
interest, among them a number of masterpieces." '29 While the exhibition catalogue implied that any
of the exposed works might be the object of American help, in private meetings the ACRIM decreed
that funds should be used "to preserve permanently what has been saved by the initial work of
salvage and protection."' 96 The role of the ACRIM, even in the postwar, was to defy contingency.
293 Ranuccio Bianchi-Badinelli "Foreword," in Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy, trans. Sara T. Morey (Istituto
Poligrafico dello Stato: Roma, 1946), ix. Also in cited War's Toll of Italian Art, iv.
294 Benedetto Croce, "Foreword," Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy, v-vi. The somewhat obscure text is partially due to
the translation by Sara T. Morey.
295 Millard Meiss, (Co-chairman, Planning Committee, ACRIM), "Foreword," in War's Toll of Italian Art: An Exhibition
Sponsored by the American Committee for the Restoration of Italian Monuments (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1946), i.
296 Meiss to Constable, Jan 2 1947. Constable Papers, AAA #3078.
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The work of the ACRIM can be seen as a final show of disciplinary cohesion on the part of
art history in the face of total war. But it should be noted that the ACRIM also re-injected art-
historical "judgment" with the hierarchies that had suspended during the war--especially once it
became clear that certain monuments would have to be chosen to receive American financial aid. By
the time funds had been collected from the exhibition, the Italian Ministry of Fine Arts made clear
that "the time for first-aid repairs was over,""' and provided a list of monuments that were
candidates for more serious restorations. (fig. 2.60) These were organized in a hierarchical system that
weighed "urgency of repair" against "artistic importance":
Class 1. Monuments of absolutely first artistic importance, seriously damaged but not
involving prohibitive sums
Class 2. Monuments of great artistic importance, so badly damaged that enormous sums
will be necessary for their repair or restoration
Class 3. Monuments of considerable importance and medium expense, but not of the
absolute supremacy or urgency of class 1.298
The American art historians accepted the Italian Government's list of suggested monuments, but
found that this three-part classification oversimplified the relation between the monetary value of
repair and cultural value of reconstruction. Instead a special sub-committee of ACRIM was formed,
chaired by Sachs and Constable, to devise a set of criteria for selection. Sachs and Constable
unequivocally re-instated art historical judgment to the place whence it had been removed during the
war: "The primary criterion of choice should be artistic and historic importance," they decreed.
"Subject to these overriding criteria, considerations of geographical distribution, American interest,
and urgency or repair should be taken into account.""99 Following these criteria, the members of
ACRIM conducted a "vote" to decide which monuments would receive financial aid. The winning
monument, the CampoSanto in Pisa, received $15,000. Later, $50,000 were spent on the Tempio
Malatestiano in Rimini, leaving a total of $25,000 which was eventually allotted to smaller
projects.3"'
297 "Ma se Voi mi permettete di parlare liberamente Vi dir6 con tutta franchezza il mio pensiero. Oramai per le opere,
come dite di first aid, e alquanto tardi." Ettore Modignani (Sovrintendenza All'Arte Medioevale e Moderna delle
Provincie Lombardi, Milano) to Constable 2 Dec, 1946, Constable Papers, AAA #3078.
298 ACRIM, Report given by Frederick Hartt, November 1946. Constable Papers AAA #3078
299 ACRIM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on Monuments at the Meeting on November 30th 1946." December 15,
1946. This committee was made up of Paul Sachs and WG Constable, co-chairmen, along with Perry Cott, Sumner
Crosby, Ernest deWald, Frederick Hardt, Richard Krautheimer, and Robert Lehman. AAA #3077300 Lee to Constable, 13 Nov 1947. Constable Papers, AAA #3077. On April 13 1948 Meiss gave a final accounting:
8,000 including Cincinnati money raised for Milan: for the Portico of Bramante
5,000 for the basilica of Vicenza (this is sufficient to repair the Palladian arcades, the part of the building which are of
course, most interested.)
2,000 for complete restoration of one house at Pompei, specific house to be selected by Maiuri
5,000 to the villa Falconieri, Frascati; as well as some funds to the Motion Picture Association of America."
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With this vote, the ACRIM completed the transition from preventative to restorative selection,
and began to articulate the principles by which these "choices" would become visually legible in the
built environment, both in individual monuments and at the level of archaeological fragments.
When 5,000 Lira were attributed to the restoration of the Basilica of Vicenza, this amount was judged
"sufficient to repair the Palladian arcades, the part of the building which are of course, most
interested." The differentiation between "intact" and "restored" was then carried over into a
restoration ethic, in keeping with the principles that Ranuccio Bianchi-Bandinelli enunciated in the
ACRIM catalog:
The new must be distinguishable from the old; but at the same time the work of art
must give again to whoever looks at it the same sensation that it gave in its original
form. The sensation is stronger the more clearly the original part can be distinguished
from the restoration.
As we will see, this practice of distinguishing the "old" from the "new" exemplifies the principle of
"integrity" that Unesco would develop in the postwar. Here this restorative principle was connected
to the idea of a two-part morality, and a compromised set of principles for action.
No documents better demonstrate the hybridity of the Commission's agency in this
transitional climate than this "postal vote." (fig. 2.59) What this list conveys is the power to make a
judgment of aesthetic value (that damaged monuments should be restored) based on an ethical
obligation (to devote American funds monuments damaged by American bombs), but only as
suggested by Italian archaeological expertise, and as subjected to the bureaucratic procedure of a
"postal vote." 30"' Clearly the effects of this vote on the reconstruction of Italy as a whole were small,
and the "drama" with which the MFA&A activity in Italy continues to be recounted as a resounding
success is chiefly due to the because it is the place where the Roberts Commission most dramatically
continued to implement its idea of "custody" in the postwar. Yet it is there is no doubt that this
bureaucratic procedure became a blueprint for postwar international cultural action. The meaning of
"custody" in the Italian case point us forward to the next chapter, and to a decade when Unesco took
the idea of "custody" to a principle of international bureaucracy.
Already in the immediate postwar, some members of the Roberts Commission became
involved in institutional reconstruction, ensuring art-historical continuities in a moment when Allied
policies would otherwise have mandated institutional ruptures. The most notable example is Charles
Rufus Morey, who became cultural attache to the US Embassy in Rome and as such engineered the
survival of "the ex-German Library." The Library was threatened by dissolution following the
Potsdam agreement, according to which "German assets in Italy should be sold and the proceeds
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disposed of for reparation to the 3 powers." Morey's proposal to form an International Union of
Archaeology, History and History of Art in Rome received the support of a Unesco grant, to purchase the
Library and ensured its continued existence as an institution under Morey's directorship.30 2
As the scholars transitioned into these reconstruction projects, their lists and maps of
monuments themselves experienced a significant afterlife-especially as their potential value in the
development of postwar tourism became apparent. Already in early 1944 Sumner Crosby had
inquired with Archibald MacLeish about "the possibility of copy-righting the maps," to prepare for
the possibility that these might be "published as a sort of guidebook," at war's end.303 This scheme
was fulfilled in a 1946 proposal by Gladys Hamlin to construct An Art Guide of Italy, With Notes on War
Damage based on the entire volume of material produced by the Commission, from Civil Affairs
Atlases to MFA&A Reports.304 Although this guide was never published, its popularizing intent
vindicated the work that had been put into formatting art-historical expertise for a broad audience-
in Constable's words, the continued efforts to address the lists to "Captain John Smith from
Kalamazoo, in real life a bond salesman," by continuing to cater to him in the postwar.30"' Others
participants sought to leverage the unprecedented scope of the collaboration that had been
undertaken during war, to pursue postwar scholarly ends. For instance, in 1948 Dinsmoor submitted
a proposal to use the Roberts Commission's Card File as the basis for building a comprehensive
"Photographic Archive of Works of Art" in America. While the members of the CAA panel assigned
to evaluate Dinsmoor's proposal found it unrealistically ambitious, they did offer a counter-proposal
of their own: to conduct a survey of the photographs already held in personal and public collections
in the US, and to use the results to gather financial support and thematic direction for building the
CAA's library of slides by sending "photographic expeditions" abroad. 30 6
Each of these proposed uses of the lists can be understood as early versions of "custodial"
projects later taken on by UNESCO: "campaigns" devoted to the salvage of specific monuments,
"missions" to enhance the tourist value of others, and construction of circulation of global
inventories of monuments in the place of-and to encourage-the worldwide circulation of people.
There also exist some specific continuities between the Roberts Commission and the staffing of the
US delegation who helped to draft the Hague Convention for the Protection of Monuments in War Areas. As a
302 Morey to Constable, 16 Feb 1949, Constable Papers. AAA#3078.
303 Crosby to MacLeish, 14 Jan 1944. "We should like to protect ourselves as well as the right of the our collaborators
and also be in a position to supervise or control any such future publication." ASCSA 1/8.304 Hamlin to Dinsmoor, 21 Feb 1946. The proposal, attached, which was "designed to meet the needs of the tourist."
305 Constable, "Works of Art In Wartime," 38. Constable Papers, AAA #3077.306 Julius Held, Grace Morley & Craig Hugh Smyth, Chairnman, "Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the
Proposal for a Photographic Archive made by Professor Dinsmoor of Columbia University." [Jan 1948?] Crosby Papers,
V/49.
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delegate in this group, Sumner McKnight Crosby was charged in 1954, for example, with
consulting former members of the MFA&A troops on the proposed language of the Convention. Their
comments, perhaps not surprisingly, bore mostly on the way the question of "military necessity"
was summarily mentioned at the beginning of the text, but never addressed as a particular modus
operandi of the implementation procedure. "It is assumed," one of them wrote, "that warfare is still
conducted on the high level of diplomatic courtesy which existed before 1914."307 While most
found the drafting of a convention a sign of "a marked improvement," over the ad-hoc system they
had experienced, and others saw in the effort, however failed, a symptom that the issue had reached
appropriate levels of power ("Perhaps such an elaborate spelling out of the polite and complex
movements of diplomatic negotiations is useful to elevate the problem to a high level of diplomatic
thought and recognition"), most voiced the same skepticism at the very idea that "avoidance" could
be implemented by "inspectors." 308 This overwhelming skepticism at the idea of immunity itself
undoubtedly stemmed from having experienced first hand the flexibility of this notion during the
War.
France: An urban tour of cultural treasures
Even as the members of the Roberts Commission wielded their lists as instruments of
restitution politics in Italy, they continued retrospectively to recast their wartime work as a mission
of "information," rather than "protection." It is for instance in his introduction to War's Toll of Italian
Art that Charles Rufus Morey summarized his participation in the "mapping" of monuments as a
form of information-gathering: the goal was to "gather all information we could that might be
useful in repairing what damage was done." Crucially, in this post-facto re-calibration of the
Commission's ambitions, Morey emphasized the graphic portion of the Commission's work.
Monuments had been "protected," he implied, not by being "avoided" but by being "mapped."
This allowed Morey to claim that all monuments had been equally protected, since all countries had
been mapped: "To us a cultural monument was a cultural monument, wherever it happened to be,
and we mapped in Germany and Japan as busily as anywhere else."309 Yet as we have seen, there
was a quantitative and a qualitative difference in the way these three countries had been "mapped":
307 "Comments by Certain Former MFA&A Officers on the Unesco Draft Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict." In an accompanying letter to Max MacCullough on 2 Apr 1954, Crosby
explained: "I have consulted with a few representative people on this problem who were also very active in this same
matter during 1943-1946. In general, reactions are enthusiastic at least in regard to the real progress such a document as
this indicates. On the other hand, given this particular moment in our civilization, there is, quite naturally, a good deal
of pessimism." Crosby Papers, XII/129.
308 "Any damage which the appointment of ... inspectors is meant to avoid will long since have been perpetrated."
309 Charles Rufus Morey, "Foreword," in Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy, vii-viii.
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while Italy was comprehensively described in detailed regional inventories, the German atlas
consisted exclusively of city maps, while all the monuments in Japan had been fit legibly on a single
country map. While it is true that all three countries had been mapped, a crucial ethical hierarchy
had been implemented by the scale of the map itself.
Far from a neutral medium, the geographic paradigm of a map punctuated by monuments
was a crucial instrument for the transmission of "what the art historians knew" to the Army, and the
dissemination to MFA&A officers of an ethic of proportional selection. Morey played a major role in
devising this framework: not only by composing the maps, but also by authoring the "Lecture on
Preservation of Cultural Treasures" for Civil Affairs Officers training in a universities across the
country. This lecture reveals with particular poignancy the spatial principles used to convey the idea
of "custody" of monuments, and shows that the Commission's maps carried not just inventories of
monuments but an entire spatial paradigm of cultural history.
Written over a few months with periodical input from Dinsmoor, the "Lecture on
Preservation of Cultural Treasures" began by inviting officers to see architectural monuments
landmarks of the "enlightenment of mankind":
The history of civilization and liberty is written in the artistic and historic monuments of
Europe ... The churches and monuments, the sculpture and painting, of the countries
the Nazis have invaded are ... the tangible and visible documents of ... the
enlightenment ... of mankind.3 1 0
For the sake of synthesis, Morey and Dinsmoor then condensed this entire history into five national
phases, each of which stood to represent both a stage in the historic progress and a region in
geographic coverage of all of Europe:
Greece introduced into Europe the rational habit of mind which has been the norm of
thinking in the western world ... Rome spread classic culture throughout the shores of
the Mediterranean, and kept it alive in its Latin form in the dark days of the early middle
ages. ... In Italy began the revival of learning and science known as the Renaissance. ...
France in the Middle Ages organized and codified the Christian faith, and the theology of
Thomas Aquinas of the 1 2 th century is still the core of Catholic teaching today ... In
Poland monument after monument commemorated-or did before the Nazi invasion-
the heroic struggles of that nation to keep itself politically free and intact, and to preserve
its religion and rich culture.31'
Dinsmoor and Morey perfected this sequence of countries in order to arrive at a universal and
teleological representation of "nationhood." Aside from the notable absence of Germany in this
history, the result was a rather banal illustration of the cultural geography of Europe in the lecture's
310 Charles Rufus Morey and William Bell Dinsmoor, "Text for a Lecture on Cultural Monuments, Final Draft," 1.
ASCSA IX/ 2
311 "Text for a Lecture 
... ," 3.
241
Lucia Allais
first four slides: the Parthenon, Michelangelo's Pieta, Amiens's Cathedral and the Wiskiewicz statue
in Cracow.
The lecture's innovation lay in what followed: its explication of the categories of Monuments
to be protected.3 " Here too the lecture proceeded by example, illustrating each of the four categories
with a "famous building." But while the first drafts of this lecture used examples from a variety of
countries-a Florentine church, a Loire Valley castle, a Greek ruin--subsequent drafts progressively
streamlined the lecture to contain only French examples, and to use a sequence of "pairs of slides,"
each pairing a nationally known example ("a very famous building"), with a local equivalent from
the city of Dijon:
To explain these classifications, I shall show you a very famous building in each category,
and along with it a parallel example taken from a French town of the type that might
quite possibly be your specific assignment. Let us suppose that the town is Dijon in
eastern France.
Churches are the first category because they are on the whole the foremost cultural
treasures in the consciousness of the inhabitants of any European city or town.
Notre Dame at Paris, a masterpiece of Gothic architecture and probably the most famous
architectural monument in France. But the importance of this smaller church of the same
name at Dijon, for Dijon, is just about as great.
Palaces in Europe have a broader and less romantic significance than with us... The
chateau of Chenonceaux ... is a well-known example of these fortified residences. ... At
Dijon there is a structure in the same category-now converted into a museum for half
of its considerable extent, and into the town-hall for its other half.
The Louvre in Paris is what comes to mind when the word "museum" is mentioned, it
is the richest museum in Europe ... Dijon's museum is in the ducal palace is full of relics
dating from the days of Burgundian glory.3"3
Using the Dijon map from the French Handbook as a key, the lecture explicated both the meaning of
the word "monument" and its manifestations in Europe, through an analogy between intellectual
"consciousness" and spatial disposition-as if an urban promenade through a French city was the
standard experience of the history of mankind. Thus every French town had its own Louvre, its own
Notre Dame, its own laboratory, etc. Not only did France become a cultural blueprint for Europe as a
whole, but Dijon became a metonymic representation of France. The result of this parallel was that
the cultural geography of Europe was contained in the single urban plan of a mid-sized French town.
312 ""'Artistic and Historic Monuments,' or 'Cultural Treasures'," the lecture continued, "are very comprehensive terms,
and are intended to be. The rough classification so far followed by the Commission divides "cultural treasures" into (1)
churches; (2) palaces, chateaux and houses; (3) monuments, under which heading are included not only
commemorative monuments, but remains of ancient structures, buildings of historic or artistic importance (other than
churches and palaces), open-air works of art such as fountains, etc., and (4) cultural institutions, which include
museums, university buildings, libraries, archives, scientific collections, laboratories, and the like." "Text for a
Lecture...," 4.
313 "Lecture on the Protection...," 5-7.
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While the city maps conveyed specific information, this lecture conveyed an overall urban
thinking that might help to edit this information in the face of contingency. If certain "marked"
monuments were going to have to be sacrificed to "military necessity", the operative principle
behind the policy as a whole was that any European town plan contained at least five monuments.
By the emerging standards of international law, one might say that the scholars "knew what they
were doing" when they structured this lecture around an urban promenade, teaching military
officers to think in urban terms, that urban plans are monumental metaphors of the intellectual
history of European civilization.
One of the things that this lecture helps to explain is the central-indeed paradigmatic-
position that France occupied in the Allies' perception of the overall fate of European monuments.
The story of a "miraculous" survival of monuments was largely based on the French figure of 2%,
released in 1944, which continued to be disseminated in the postwar decades.31 4 In contrast with
Italy's trail of destruction, in France the morphology of damage was dispersed and variegated-
product of several waves of destruction, caused by diverse forms of fighting, from both sides, in
urban, coastal, and rural sites. Surviving monuments were therefore incorporated into a version of
total war as a game of chance. This version was also supported by the narrative of "resistance"
mythologized by the Gaullist regime starting in 1945: like the Risistance, French monuments had
survived attack against immesurable odds. Against this narrative, subsequent research has found that
measures implemented by the Vichy regime as early as 1941 worked to affect the conduct of war,
including the way monuments were administered."' Yet specific coincidences between
monumental survival and destruction-such as the fact that France was a major focus of Kunstschutz
activity--have not been investigated. Thus it remains unclear whether what continues to be perceived
314 By 1948 this figure had become so nominal a marker of "comparative immunity" that Sumner Crosby mistakenly
cited the figure as 12%, but still used it as evidence that France had been "singularly fortunate." "Although
approximately 12%, or over 1700, classified historical monuments throughout France were damaged in varying degrees
during the war, it must be admitted that, except for certain areas in Normandy and in Alsace and in Lorraine, France
Sumner McK. Crosby, "Report on Conditions Relating to Research and Study in the History of Art in France," in College
ArtJournal, V. 7, N. 3. (Spring, 1948), 202-204.
1s Notably, Danible Voldman argued in La reconstruction des villes frangaises de 1940 a 1954: histoire d'une politique. (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 1997), that "la rupture de 1944-1945, 6vidente sur le plan politique et militaire s'6stompe dans le
domaine urbain pour trois raisons au moins" : first, the importance of cities as strategic units in total war; second, the
continued validity of the legal framework setup during Vichy, and third, the continued desire for a statewide policy
and bureaucracy even after the change of hands. Voldman, "Avant-propos," 7-15. See also Voldman's edited Images,
Discours et Enjeux de la Reconstruction des Villes Frangaises apris 1945, Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Pr6sent 5 (Jun
1987) and her "La France aprbs les ruines," in Vingtisne Sidcle. Revue d'histoire 30. (Apr - Jun 1991), 103-104, where she
reviews the 1991 exhibition Reconstructions et modernisation, La France apris les ruines, 1918... 1945..., at the Mus6e de l'histoire de
France (Paris: Archives Nationales, 1991).
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as a "happy accident" was in fact the cumulative effect of having three protective policies (German,
French and Allied) operative in one place.316
Consider for instance the Northern city of Beauvais: when the war broke out the city was still
undergoing reconstructions from World War I; it counted 80 monuments inscrit or classes. The city
sustained German bombings in 1940 and Allied raids in 1944; while 80% of the center-city was
destroyed, the 13 monuments that had been marked on the Frick map emerged "intact" by the time
Dinsmoor visited them-no doubt in part because throughout these successive destructions, they
were consistently under some form of protection. Placing the Frick map of Beauvais in a sequence
with pre-war and post-war plan of the city, demonstrates visually the urban nature of the notion of
"custody" in France. (fig. 2.62)
If Morey and Dinsmoor were able to structure their lecture as a walking tour of a randomly
chosen French city, it is because a regional policy of monuments protection had been in place in
France since the early 19 th century. Inaugurated in 1830 the Service des Monuments Historiques had been
devised by Guizot as a "custodial" system itself, which appropriated monuments once belonging to
the aristocracy in an inventory maintained by a republican administration on behalf of the patrie.317
By the middle of the 20 th century, this custodial system had been propagated along regional lines,
producing the nested heritage categories used in their lecture: to every town its churches, palaces,
museums, city halls, etc. Notably, a 1913 urban law had been the first to implement monumental
protection at the urban level.
The visual exercise of placing Frick maps in a sequence between pre- and post-war urban
plans can be repeated for any French cities that underwent significant destruction. (fig. 2.63) This
pattern shows how consistently the MFA&A implemented a French custodial regime that had been
temporarily suspended in war. Perhaps more importantly, these sequences also reveal a striking, but
generally untold, aspect of the French reconstruction: that France rebuilt its cities around its
monuments. Orthodox histories of the French reconstruction distinguish three tendencies in city
planning schemes in the first postwar decade: "identical reconstructions," (some, like Gien, begun
during Vichy), "tabula rasa" (dreamed by modernists and seldom implemented, except at Le Havre
and Maubeuge) and "reasonable modernizations" (most common and seen to result from a
compromise, as at Beauvais and Rouen).318 Despite the ubiquity of monuments in all three types of
316 For the MFA&A's own report of the Kunstschutz's activities in France, see Marvin C. Ross, "The Kunstschutz in
Occupied France," in College ArtJournal (May 1946), 336-352.
317 For an analysis of "The Guizot moment," see Dominique Poulot & Richard Wrigley, "The Birth of Heritage: 'Le
moment Guizot'," in Oxford ArtJournal Vol. 11, No.2 (1988), 40-56
318 These categories belong to Anatole Kopp, L'Architecture de la Reconstruction en France 1945-1953 (Paris: Moniteur, 1982),
"Projets et Realisations," 103-128. A similar distinction, in abbreviated form, is given in the first chapter if Trente-cinq
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reconstructions, their role in the "moderation" of "radicality" that is presumed to have emerged
from the reconstruction has not been examined. (fig. 2.63-67)
The ubiquity of monuments in French reconstruction urbanism, and the silent role they
played as anchors in the "reasonable modernization" of French cities, must be understood in light of
the way the reconstruction reorganized the French architectural profession into a hierarchical system,
which centered both architects and their commissions in nested urban scales. The Charte des Architectes
issued by the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1945 recommended a zoning strategy that was based
loosely on the four functions of the Athens Charter. But despite its embrace of modernist rhetoric this
system effectively promoted an academic view of urbanism as "architecture on the large scale," by
encouraging Beaux-Arts compositional thinking at the level of the city block ("ilot"). In
combination with the fiscal re-structuring of private property around block-wide collectivities, this
scaling system produced an urbanism of islands, which tended to be "composed" around surviving
monuments. 319 (In fact, as with the Athens Charter's own concession to "historic monuments," the
Architects' Charter included a provision that some ilots could be left as historic islands, "curated" into
"veritable open-air museums."'"3 ) Furthermore, the Ministry kept in place a law passed by the Vichy
regime in 1943, dictating that all monuments be surrounded by a 500-meter "diameter of
visibility." This diameter gave architects of the Service des Monuments Historiques a say in the disposition of
all buildings neighboring monuments-effectively giving them an invisible hand in reconstruction
schemes nation-wide. 321 Thus the authority of the Monuments Historiques was quietly built into the legal
and bureaucratic framework of the reconstruction, ensuring first, that any monument protected by
the Allies was adequately "curated," and secondly, that monuments became the "elephants in the
room" of French reconstruction urbanism.
Six years after having inventoried monument damage in the Bulletin Monumental, Jean Verrier
assessed the effect that the reconstruction-and in particular the 1943 "visibility law"-had
transformed the relation between "Ancient Monuments and Urbanism" since the war. 322 Verrier's
ans d'urbanisme (Paris: Conf6d6ration Frangaise pour l'habitation et l'urbanisme, 1985). Voldman's categories are more
sublte since she follows a progressive transformation but the idea that reconstruction was a "compromise" remains.
319 On the rules of re-membrement and their impact on the morphology of postwar cities, see Jacques Lucan's text.
320 <<Rien n'est plus honorable pour un urbaniste et un architecte que de rialiser le "curetage" d'un beau vieux quartier
plein d'histoire et de beaux vieux immeubles de haute qualit6 artistique. Ces ilots conservs pourront constituer de
v~ritables mushes vivants, tandis qu leurs rues, itinbraires archa~ologiques et historique offriront au touriste et au
promeneur le charme et le visage r6el des maisons du pass&. > Ministere de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme, Note a
MM. les Urbanistes (Paris: 15 Marc 1945).
321 See P. Verdier, "Monuments historiques: administration-legislation-financement," in Techniques et Architecture Vol.9,
No. 11-12, Conservation et Crdation (Nov 1950), 71-73.
322 The purpose of the publication was evidently to re-normalize preservation discourse; most articles inscribed the
advances, projects or debates produced by war into a long-term history of French preservation. For example, Jean
Trouvelot's introductory survey, "De la restoration des monuments historiques," began with a long list of
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article appeared in a special issue of Techniques et Architecture titled Conservation et Cre&tion. Much like
reconstruction urbanists, Verrier saw the reconstruction as a compromise. In some cities this had
been a positive result: when "monuments imposed a certain urbanization," (as at St L6), or where
monuments had been "re-aligned" to fit within circulation schemes (as with Beauvais's Th6atre de la
Ville whose facade had been set back stone by stone). But Verrier also bemoaned that the law had
too often been understood as an obligation produce a "d6gagement" (unecumbering) around
monuments, learning the worst lessons from the 19h century debates. Most French monuments,
Verrier added, were meant to be embedded in a medieval city fabric that hugged their base and
forced an intimate experience of their intricate sculptural details. Instead, Verrier bemoaned, an
excess of space had been built around too many surviving monuments-as if the friction Verrier
between the "architecte-urbanistes and the architects of the Monuments Historiques" had grown a new
type of urban space around monuments-resolving a professional discomfort by leaving awkward
adjacencies. Elsewhere in the issue, another contributor summarized the neutralizing effect this had
on monuments: French cities, he wrote, had been effectively "Haussmannized.""323
Verrier's analysis confirms that monuments-and those in whose custody they lay-played
a crucial role in the "reasonable modernization" devised by the French Ministry of Reconstruction.
That this was a form of "moderation" is perhaps best seen in contrast with the article contributed, a
by Le Corbusier to the same issue, under the title "Urbanism and respect of heritage," which took up
his Parisian vignettes of the 1930s, and added other European cities, to illustrate the point that
"everything is continuous: traditions and revolutions" and to argue that "there is no need to anihilate
the sacred heritage of the past. "324 (fig. 2.64) He demonstrated the point by including two ruined
churches on the edges of his famous scheme for the reconstruction of St-Die. (fig. 2.65-66) Yet this
didactic positioning of the churches, as romantic portals on either end of the modernist scheme,
constituted a clear a departure from the more integrated Plan Voisin scheme of the 1930s. There,
monuments had been sprinkled throughout, closely framed by modernist typologies, here a
"deteriorating factors", both natural and man-made, that contribute to monumental wear and tear. Similarly, Verdier's
inventory of legislation unproblematically inserted the laws passed in war--including the visibility law, into a long-
term narrative beginning with Guizot in 1830. Jean Verrier, "Monuments Anciens et Urbanisme," in Conservation et
Creation, 81-82.
323 This argument was made by Henri Vergnolle, as part of a larger advocacy for the creation of some "quartier de
pierres" (stone neighborhoods) assembled out of monuments (like "puzzle pieces")-literally moving them to make
way for the destruction of the "quartiers insalubres" that surrounded monuments in city centers. Vergnolle cited an
American precedent in support of this scheme: "ce n'est pas une chose nouvelle. Depuis longtemps les Ambricains nous
ont instruit du proc6d&: combine de vieux chiteaux, de vielles chapelles, de morceaux d'architecture n'ont-ils pas
d6pos6s, num~roths, transportis et r6difi6s sur le sol du nouveau continent!" Henri Vergnolle, "Du quartier de tauds au
quartier de vieilles pierres," in Consercvation et Criation, 83-85. Ironically, this "island" scheme is closer to the post-war
proposals Le Corbusier had turned to by 1950; in this sense Verrier constitutes the middle-ground position in the issues
three articles about monuments in city planning.
324 Le Corbusier, "L'urbanisme et le respect du patrimoine artistique," in Conservation et Criation, 86-90.
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deliberate white space lay between city and heritage, as if the middle ground between past and
future had simply been removed. What this also demonstrates is that, unlike the MRU's
reconstruction urbanism, Le Corbusier's utopia was not scalable.
The scalable character of the Roberts Commission's custody program is what makes its
"Lecture on the Protection of Monuments" significant as an overall conceptual scheme, beyond its
premonition of postwar French urbanism. Indeed this use of the urban plan as a model of cultural
history was crucial in helping Commission members like Morey legitimize the leap from supplying
descriptive information to making prescriptive recommendations. Certainly an unresolved link
between "monuments" and "civilization" had been latent in Morey's work in the 1930s--note for
instance a lecture he gave to explain "The Arts in Relation to History," answered the question, "What
is the Function of Art History?" with the single statement, "Art is a function of Civilization."325
Presenting European cities as monumental metaphors of the history of civilization was a way to solve
the philosophical problem of this circular "functionality." But it was the war that prompted Morey
to make the further leap, from using cities to describe the history of art, to using monuments to
defend cities.
As the Allies approached Paris in the summer of 1944, Morey broadcast an appeal to spare
"Paris, and its Cultural Treasures" by giving listeners a tour of the city's monuments. Like the
general Lecture, this tour presented Paris as a storehouse of European civilization:
Will Paris be besieged, as it was in 1870, and suffer the tenfold greater damage which
modern bombardment may bring, no matter how carefully our aviators be briefed and
our gunners informed about the irreplaceable treasures of architecture, art and history
which are housed in this City of Light? Paris has borne this name of "City of Light" for a
century of two, as the focus of European culture, the Athens of the modern world. She
well deserved the title, for there is little that these centuries added to our store of
literature and art that did not have its beginnings in the capital of France.
Morey then recounted its development from antiquity and, as he proceeded towards modern times,
what had begun as a tour of existing monuments became a tour of a city that might practically
disappear. "The list of Parisian structures, monuments, memorials that the world cannot afford to
lose is long." Yet he offered amazingly, that if any monument had to be "sacrificed to war's
destruction," it would be the column of the Place Vend6me. As a monument to modern
indutrialized warfare ("consecrated to the record of Napoleon's victories that made France the
mistress of Europe,") which was made of melted German artillery, it deserved to be destroyed "a
325 Charles Rufus Morey, "Art in Relation to History," Lecture Notes Morey Papers XII/A.
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relic of the epoch of power politics and aggression which this war will bring to an end").326 By
1944, Morey had not only accepted that some listed monuments might disappear; he had also
become ready to "select" which monuments had become expendable because they were "least
characteristic of a capital of culture." This idea that removing a monument might help to edit
European history for a better future, marks a crucial turning point in the urban thinking of the
Commission: the moment when the "function" of monuments stopped being explicative of history
and became instrumental instead. At the moment when the art historians realized that their plan was
imperfect, "however carefully our aviators be briefed," the protection policy became a "witting"
urban planning program. Since selecting monuments for preservation might not preserve them, it
was better to select those monuments "that might be least regretted" instead.
Germany: The urban utopia of "re-orientation"
Morey was not the only member of the Commission to use an abstract urban image to argue
for the preservations of monuments as markers of civilization. Since 1934, WG Constable had been
at work on a text explicating "the function of the arts in society" by using an urban image he called
a "utopia." In the span of a decade and in the face of war, Constable turned his theory of the place
of art in the university into a theory of the place of monuments in a modern city. The lecture began
as a lesson on "Art Schools and Community," given when Constable was still in England, at
Coventry in 1934. "That art is an indispensable element in a great civilization," Constable argued, "is
suggested by history." He then conjured an image of an urban Utopia to prove the point:
Everybody probably has a Utopia in his minds, some vision of a perfect organization of
society. Think of a great city in such conditions. Such institutions as the Treasury, and all
the countless buildings occupied with law, finance, and war, would disappear. [They
represent means not ends] Some of them perhaps might be retained as fine buildings in
themselves.
Later that year, Constable modified these notes for the sake of an American audience, replacing "a
great city" with "Washington," and continuing: "But whatever else disappeared, such institutions as
the Library of Congress, the National Gallery, the cathedral, the Smithsonian institution, places
devoted to the arts, the pursuit of knowledge, the practice of religion, would be retained. Such a
vision is an effective measure of the necessity of art" 327 In other words, "art" was what distinguished
between institutions that might become "monuments" and those which would simply "disappear."
326 "There are a few of the cultural treasures of Paris for which all must devoutly hope a safe survival through the hazards
of war."Charles Rufus Morey, "Paris and Its Cultural Treasures," Transcript of a Broadcast in Summer 1944. Morey
Papers, XIII/O.
327 W.G. Constable, "Art Schools and Community" Lecture, Coventry, 1934. Constable Papers, AAA #3071.
248
2. Protected Monuments
As we will see, the removal of institutional "superfluities" and the reconstruction of cities around
monumental shells would later become the central component of "the cultural reconstruction" of
Western Europe.
By using the image of the utopian city, Constable was able to conflate monumental
architecture with the institutions contained within it, a conflation he repeated in his 1938 Art History
and Conoisseurship, using the image of London as a "reasonable utopia":
It may be noted that in any reasonable Utopia, most of the buildings in Whitewall would
become distasteful superfluities; but the National Gallery at one end and Westminster
Abbey at the other would be possessions even more cherished than today.328
In the face of war, Constable grew more apologetic about the need to conjure a utopia at all. By
1942, Constable had transformed his peace-time advocacy of "the function of the arts in
civilization" into a war-time lecture on the need to think of the arts to act as "ends" in a postwar
future.329
Constable put his distinction between "means and ends" to use by giving his utopia a
teleological element, in a Radcliffe lecture titled Art: Its Place in a Changing World. "It is my belief that art
can make comparatively little direct contribution in carrying out the war... but on the other hand the
arts can play a vital and indispensable part in the society we hope to build in the future." Having
introduced a distinction between the "immediate present" where the war was unfolding, and a
conceptual "today" where a utopia could be imagined, Constable began including in his
hypothetical "ideal city" not only its great monuments but also the mechanisms for preserving
them. Crucially, he invoked Charles Eliot Norton to make the point:
I am not concerned with the war-torn world of the immediate present. ...The relegation
of arts to secondary position is a confusion of means and ends.... All of you who cherish
a Utopia-then imagine Washington in terms of its cathedral, national gallery, library of
congress-all would be preserved [while the] rest, except as monuments, disappeared.
This emphas[izes] CE Norton's dictum, that the mark of high civilization is extent to
which the arts are preserved and cultivated.""33
Thus at the heart of Constable's utopia we find Norton's utilitarian dilemma: the problem of art ("an
end") residing in institutions (which are "means"). Constable resolved this dilemma by proposing a
utopian image where the "arts" function urbanistically. As Constable transformed his lecture on the
place of the arts in civilization into a plan for art institutions in a post-war society, he increasingly
borrowed patterns of argument from a lineage of utopian urban thought: bemoaning that "art and
life had become divorced in the 19th century," positing that "the problem is how to integrate
328 W.G. Constable, "Art History and Conoisseurship: Their Scope and Method" (London: Cambridge, 1938).
329 There exist several drafts of the 1942 lecture; "Art Schools and Community" at Coventry in 1934 was slightly
modified version of "Importance of art in life and function of art school," in 1942. AAA #3071330 W.G. Constable, "Art: its Place in a changing World" Lecture at Radcliffe, 1942. Constable Papers, AAA #3071
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them", and advocating as a solution the creation of "a fine and dignified physical environment for
daily life." The best evidence that an environmental utopia, would work, Constable wrote, was the
"immense success and value of such public undertakings as the great national parks and various
schemes in city planning."3 3 ' By the year 1942, in other words, Constable had arrived at a
functionalist theory of urbanism.
In 1948, Constable was given the opportunity to implement his utopian vision of the urban
functionality of art when he was recruited as an "Art advisor" by the Education and Cultural
Relations (ECR) Division of the US Military Government in Germany. The self-described task of the
Division was "the re-orientation of the German mind;" Constable's mission was to tour Germany's
museums and cultural institutions for three months, making recommendations for their future.
Despite this narrow mandate, Constable began his final report, Art and Re-orientation, 33" by stating an
astonishingly broad ambition: to use art "to induce a more liberal temper in the German mind, by
involving ... every problem of German life." Accordingly, Constable's report began with a proposal
for the "Reconstruction of ruined cities and buildings," and ended with a scheme for "Arts
Education" in Germany.3 3 3 (fig. 2.68)
As with Constable's "urban utopia," Art and Re-Orientation projected the image of a new world
in which most of the built environment has disappeared, and only selected monuments remain as
anchors for reconstruction. Constable's report began with a list of "Basic Assumptions" re-iterating
the curatorial role that America should play in cultural reconstruction. Rather than attempting any
"substitution" of Germany's " long and vigorous cultural tradition," Constable wrote, American
efforts should follow a logic of "selection," by learning
... to select and emphasize those elements in the German tradition which are most in
consonance with American aims. I have found, for example, ... that to quote the example
of (say) Diirer, Bach or Goethe, or even the Bauhaus, changes the whole atmosphere of
discussion.334
Here Constable enacted what Margaret Mead had identified as America's postwar duty: applying the
skill of "analysis" to the postwar world. Most of Constable's recommendations involved "re-
orienting" cultural institutions in a basic propaganda scheme to re-present chosen German
"elements" within a new cultural framework: opening museums to the public, sending curators for
training in America, producing traveling exhibitions of art and architecture, etc., in order literally to
expose German minds to "democratic aims." But it was in his recommendations for "The
331 "Art, Its Place in a Changing World," AAA #3071.
332 Constable's position was that of "Visiting Expert on the Project, Art Historian." He served for ninety days.
333 Constable, "The German Problem," (1950), Constable Papers AAA#3 073.
334 Constable, Art and Re-Orientation: Status and Future of Museums and the Teaching of Art in Western Germany (Educational and
Cultural Relations Division, Office of Military Government for Germany, US, Sept. 1949), 2.
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Restoration of Historic Structures and Monuments" that Constable was most explicit about what it
meant to the select "elements of German culture," by using the reconstruction of damaged
monuments as an example of this selection process.
In contrast to the "Reconstruction of Italian monuments," the "Re-orientation of the German
Mind" was far from an expiatory exercise. Indeed Constable returned from Germany emboldened
to take a critical stance on how reconstruction was unfolding, and particularly on the continued
power of "an elderly officialdom whose ideas are often completely petrified." This ideological
petrification, Constable thought, was evident in "the marked inclination towards brick-by-brick
reconstructions, not only in historic monuments, but in such buildings as museums." When
modernist alternatives to brick-by-brick reconstructions were available, as with the railway station in
Munich, Constable favored the "modern ideas" proposed by "younger architects" over the
traditionalist solution eventually chosen. Yet it was not the issue of authenticity that moved Constable
in his opposition to identical reconstructions: "the moral and esthetic objections to producing in the
case of historic buildings what are virtually fakes," he conceded, were "hardly a concern of Military
Government." Instead, he argued that the wrong criteria were being used to choose reconstruction
projects. For example, Constable objected to the reconstruction of Goethe's House in Frankfurt, on
the grounds that it was "a rallying point for extreme nationalistic feeling."335 Similarly insisted that
the rebuilding of ecclesiastical buildings was a fueled by excessive religious fervor, that drained
funds away from more urgent projects.3 36
Throughout these recommendations, Constable adhered to the urban vision of monuments
he had outlined in his "utopia," applying its principles to the problem of German reconstruction. For
instance, he argued that the gutted shells of secular monuments should resume their urban identity
while undergoing a cultural rejuvenation from the inside. In Munich he objected to the plans to
"rebuild the gutted Residenz ... without knowing whether it is to be used as a museum as public
offices, or as a seat of legislature, each of which would require different interior planning."337 (fig.
2.69) In the case of museums, Constable legitimized interior modernization by the need to update
German curatorial environments and teaching facilities, to American standards. He called this
"rebuilding on lines to suit modem needs and democratic policies" indispensable for "humanizing
3s Constable visited Germany at the moment that this controversy over the reconstruction of the Goethe House was
raging; he had a very self-consciously interpretation that "the legend was that it was deliberately destroyed because it
was a symbol of German nationalism." Interview at MFA, 23 Jun 1949. Constable Papers, AAA #3078.
336 For example, he bemoaned the "millions of marks that have been poured into the restoration of Cologne Cathedral
(in any case built largely in the 19 th century), while the whole housing program of the city has been postponed."
33' Constable, Art and ReOrientation, 6.
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and liberalizing museum work.""338 Crucially, Constable also saw interior modernization as an
opportunity to reconfigure German art collections dispersed by war. In Munich he suggested, much
to the horror of local curators, that objects from the Alte Pinakotek be relocated in the Glyptotek. Cultural
institutions were to be reassembled to reflect the radical spatial re-ordering that Europe had
undergone in war. Only those institutions would remain, which had learned the spatial lessons of the
tabula rasa-including the dispersal of cultural objects, and the re-positioning of urban "elements" in a
new cultural frame.
Constable's recommendations were never implemented as a whole, largely because he issued
his report before the Marshall Plan came radically to modify the terms of Germany's reconstruction
and set in motion its "economic miracle." 3 9 However, the attitude of the American Military
Government towards culture in postwar Germany did follow the broad lines of Constable's
"utopia": emptying cultural institutions and re-organizing them as institutional kernels of
democratic planning. Certainly the network of Amerika Haiiser-cultural centers established by the
USIA in the center of major Western European and Austrian cities-constitutes a system devoted to
institutional "re-orientation." In Munich, where Americans "played a role in shaping the face of the
city," the AMG "encouraged the rebuilding of major historic monuments, ... and mandated the
destruction of several Nazi-era buildings." Significantly, despite its Nazi-era architecture the Haus der
Kunst was rebuilt, since it predated the Nazi regime and was therefore deemed suitable for the kind of
institutional "re-orientation" recommended by Constable.340 Similarly, Constable had recommended
that Germany "follow the Italian example" of ACRIM by soliciting international help and, "in
cooperation with foreigners, select a few buildings which are capable of restoration, and have an
international significance.""' While this international appeal was never realized, the reconstruction
of many of Germany's churches was achieved by soliciting religious networks for international
contributions. Constable's recommendations also point us to the next chapter, to a decade when
Unesco took on the reform of cultural institutions on a global scale. But while all these specific
connections-between Constable and the American occupation of Germany and later the policies of
338 "Not only are out-of-date gallery types and lighting systems being perpetuated; but provision is rarely being made
for such things as an auditorium, special exhibitions galleries, and educational facilities, all of which are indispensable
for humanizing and liberalizing museum work."
339 A disclaimer printed in the preface made clear that "some recommendations are no longer valid." In particular, his
"The Use and Maintenance of Historic Structures," addressed the Land Reform Law of 1946, which "affected
landowners' ability to provide financially for the maintenance of monuments." Constable recommended a two-fold
fund-raising scheme: on the one hand, a decentralization of the financial responsibility to maintain monuments to
regional populations, in the manner of the Society of the Preservation of New England Antiquities. On the other hand,
he suggested an international appeal.
340 Jeffry Diefendorf "The Role of Historic Preservation," In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 94.
341 Constable, Art and Re-orientation, 12.
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Unesco-a more fundamental connection can also be sought, between Constable's 'utopia' as a
system of urban "custody," and the fate of monuments in the radical transformation of German
cities before, during, and after the war.
In contrast to France and Italy, the scale of destruction in Germany was such that the only
image of total war that seemed available was one that drew a literal connection between the ethical
extent of war's totality and the physical ubiquity of the rubble. Yet only recently has the urban
destruction been examined historically as a direct consequence of Allied military action and
policies.42 Recent studies have suggested, to sometimes scandalous effect, that the escalation in
Allied bombings in the last year of the European War was based on a decidedly Douhetian
calculation that more bombs would yield a faster and more "unconditional surrender" from
Hitler.343 This douhetian hypothesis has been supported by painstaking compiled inventories of
destruction, which rely on extensive tabulations, in the manner of the USSBS, of the effects of
"round the clock" bombing on German cities--bomb tonnage dropped, lives lost, civilians
dehoused, dwellings destroyed, pounds of rubble, etc.-in the apparent hope of deciphering the
sinister formula that was used by the Allies to choose targets in this escalation.344 But this statistical
accounting only ever treats cities as containers of civilian lives, committing in some sense the same
interpretive mistake as Douhet and the USSBS.
3'2 During German reconstruction the abstraction of "total war" erased the agency of the Allies in bombing cities; add
to this the overwhelming tendency of postwar historiography to implicate all of Germany in the emergence-and
therefore the crimes-of the Third Reich, the fate of German cities in war remained for many decades un-examined.
343 The case for the Allied offensive on Germany as a textbook example of Douhetian "total war" has most convincingly
been made by an American, Ronald Schaeffer in Wings ofJudgment. He summarized in a chilling single sentence the
various forms that this "proportional" ethic took: "The most important factor moving the AAF toward Douhetian war
was the attitude of the country's top civilian and military leaders. Arnold... despite his preference for selective
bombing, sometimes promoted less discriminate forms of attack; Eisenhower ... would do anything to bring a speedy
end to the conflict; Marshall... wanted to ... show the Germans fleeing to Munich that their situation was hopeless;
Lovett, ... felt the war should be painful and unforgettable to the German civilians; Stimson, defended participation in
the Eastern raids, yet did not inquire carefully into the way American air power was actually used; and Franklin
Roosevelt... recalling what had happened after the First World War, believed the German people must be compelled this
time to recognize their defeat and accept responsibility for the horrors their country had inflicted on the world." Wings
ofJudgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford, 1985), 106. For a view from the bombed civilian's
perspective, see Friedrich Jiirg, Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945 (Berlin: Propylien Verlag, 2002).
344 See for instance the table on "Number of Air Raids / Dead / Dead per 1000 inhabitants / Homes destroyed or
damaged / Total destroyed homes / Number of bombs dropped / Percent of homes destroyed compared to 1939."
(Zahl der Luftangriffe / Gefallene beurkundet oder geschatzt/ Gefallene je 1000 Ew./ Gebaude-schaden zerstart und beschadigt/ total zerstorte
Wohnungen/ v.H. des Bestandes 1939/ Anzahl des geworfenen Bomben) in Maximilian Czesany, Allierter Bombenterror: Des Luftkrieg die
Zivilbevolkerung Europas 1940-1945. (Ulm: Druffel-Verlag, 1986), 649. The calculation of "pounds of rubble" is found in
reconstruction accounts, for instance in Jeffry Difendorf includes a table of "Cities with Largest Amounts of Rubble", as
well as a "Rubble per Capita in Large Cities." He also includes a table of "Damage to public buildings in Hamburg",
detailed as "Religious buildings / Medical Buildings / Schools / Cultural Buildings." In the Wake of War: the Reconstruction of
German Cities after World War II (New York: Oxford, 1993), 17, 29.
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Adding a "monumental" factor to this statistical calculation was, until recently, made
difficult by the lack of any accurate estimate of damage to monuments alone. In 1947, the AMG
assessed that 54% of the monuments listed in its sector had been affected by war, but this figure
could not be generalized to other zones, where bombing had been lighter. As Hartwig Beseler noted,
"no single statistic of German monuments lost in war had been compiled" until he arrived at his
estimate of 20% in 1988.34 Yet insofar as damage to German monuments has been systematically
compiled, little insight has been drawn from the concentration of historic structures in city centers
and the importance of these centers as targets in the escalation towards "unconditional surrender."
The destruction of monuments continues to be seen as an exacerbated form of morale bombing.34 6
Reading the shape of Germany's urban destruction has been further complicated by the so-
called "Second Destruction" of German cities-a term coined by historian Erwin Schleich to
describe the radical reconfiguration of cities in the rubble-clearing phase at the end of war.347 Indeed
initial clearing efforts soon revealed that damage to German cities appeared quantitatively worse than it
qualitatively was. If the ubiquity of rubble "had the uncanny effect of making destruction look
normal,"3 48 taken individually many urban structures were more likely to be "partially damaged"
than "totally destroyed." (fig. 2.73) Yet many still-partially standing structures were demolished to
make way for city planning schemes; as Bundesprisident Walter Scheels admitted in 1975, "in
Germany, more buildings worthy of preservation were destroyed after the war than during the
war." 349 From the point of view of preservation, even the authorities of the Denkmalpflege deferred
to the imperative to rebuild. As Niels Gutschow concisely summarized, "city planners acted not as
monument restorers but as "surgeons of the homeland" [Chirurgen die Heimat] who could, first and
foremost, create a new 'cityscape' with improved living conditions."3 s0
345 Beseler, Vol. 1, XXIV.
346 For example, Beseler makes a connection with Hitler's biography: Hitler reacted to the first Allied bombings by
instructing party officials to leave monuments in ruins, as emblems of the Allies' inhumanity. This order was issued on
20~ July 1944, the date of the failed assassination attempt on Hitler. Beseler therefore locates this date within a
chronological table of the bombing of city centers where "historic monuments were concentrated," and speculates that
most of the destroyed monuments might have been spared if the assassination had succeeded. While this coincidence
undoubtedly connects the timeline of bombing with monumental damage, it accepts the conventional definition of
total war, both in its identification with Hitler's wantonness and in speculation that the war might have ended
sooner-therefore doing nothing to explain how monuments actually acted, themselves, as agents of psychological
warfare. Beseler, Vol. 1, XI.
34 7 Schleich, Die Zweite Zertbirung Miinchen (Berlin: 1978).
348 This observation is from Constable's lecture, "The German Problem", 1950. AAA #3073
349 Scheels was speaking on the Year of Architecture in 1975. Cited in Beseler, XI.
350 Gutschow cites Bremen city planner Hermann Deckert in 1947: "The only parts of the old city that must be rescued
from the rubble are those that with which the new city will become 'homeland' again." Niels Gutschow, "Die
Hitorische Stadt im Stidtdebau der vierzige Jahre," in Kriegsschickale Deutsche Architektur, XLIX. The term "homeland" is
clearly a poor translation of the German Heimat. See Celia Applegate, A Nations of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
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That this "surgical" selection was the same as the process devised by the Roberts
Commission can be demonstrated by inserting Frick maps in sequence with reconstruction plans to
show they had been instruments of "unwitting urban planning program." For example, a
comparison of the Frick and damage maps of Frankfurt reveals that the Dom was salvaged while most
of the structures in the hatched areas were not-except in individual cases when an argument was
made, like the Goethe Haus (fig. 2.70). The wartime "hatching" of the Altstadt acts as a premonitory
key to how the "second destruction" eventually unfolded: "hatching" designates portions of cities
where a selection had to be made.
Reconstruction historians have chronicled the debates over individual monuments, deriving
"memorial" meaning from each controversy and concluding that the reconstruction was achieved as
a progressive mitigation of "extremes."35 ' Few have noted that there was an aesthetic significance in
this pattern of selection itself-which helped to implement the kind of "reasonable utopia"
promoted by Constable. Norbert Huse, for instance, has noted that conservators often made
concessions to modernizers by invoking a vague criterion of "proportion" [MaBstdblichkeit],
paradoxically turning moderation into an "absolute measure." In the 1947 words of one
conservator, "the right solution lies in an absolute adherence to a system of proportion."35 2 Yet this
concept of proportion was vague, not only because it allowed considerable latitude in destruction,
but also, and more importantly, because it collapsed a formal prescription (subjecting modern
architecture and urbanism to rules of height and size derived from historic architecture) with an
ethical one (that the postwar German citizen, planner and inhabitant alike, should behave with
moderation). Thus the same criterion that Italian conservators applied to the restoration of
monumental fragments was applied, in Germany, at the urban level. "The old" was made
"distinguishable from the new", but the overall "effect" was retained. In this sense "hatching" can
be seen as a form of cultural influence: if the Altstadt itself disappeared, the "effect" the Atlstadt would
continue to be felt, in moderation.
It should be noted that this "second destruction" phenomenon is usually interpreted as
evidence that the reconstruction of West-German cities was a moment of pragmatism, which got
under way only after initial impulses for "utopian thinking" had passed. Rudy Koshar puts it this
way: "after utopian ideas about the future of German cities were passed around and dropped ... the
emphasis was on practical measures rather than on painful reflection."3 s s Koshar's two example of
s51 The argument is laid out most synthetically in Diefendorf's In the Wake of War, most extensively in Triiume in Triimmern.
352 Norbert Huse, "Denkmalpflege und Wiederaufbau," in DenkmalPflege: Deutsche Texte aus DeriJahrhunderten (Mfinchen: Beck,
1984), 193.
3ss3 "Commemorative Noise," in Rudy Koshar, Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century
(Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 204.
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utopias are characteristically pastoral ("the utopian idea ... to leave Rostock's many ruins in place,
allowing a garden city to grow over the devastation," or "the utopian plan of rebuilding Wiirzburg
in a different place.") Yet as we have seen, by war's end the project of turning cultural institutions
into "practical measures" for urban reconstruction had achieved the status of a "utopia"-in the
sense of a parallel and imaginary universe that accompanied military policies as they were
developed, while never being the subject of "action." While Koshar acknowledges the role played by
the Allied commission in selecting which monuments were prevented from this "second
destruction," he fails to detect in this process of "selection" the "utopian" dimension with which the
Allied had imbued it.3 54
Placing Frick maps of German cities after the damage maps and before their reconstruction
plans provides an uncanny image of the "utopian" dimension that was latent in the "second
destruction," even if reconstruction plans never articulated it as such. (fig. 2.74) Similarly, the
decidedly post-utopian circulation plan for Liibeck, featuring only roads and monuments, provides a
convincing image of what Constable might have imagined as his "utopia" (with perhaps a few
churches replaced by museums). (fig. 2.72) Neither a pastoral regeneration nor a new industrial birth,
this was to be a utopia of the cultural realm: an urban regime dependent upon fragments but still
reliant on a proportional effect to diffuse a totalizing "moderation."
What, then, is the relation between monuments as "proportional" anchors for cultural
reconstruction and cities as targets in the "proportional" ethic of total war? To ask the question in
graphic terms, what is the relation between the Frick maps and the famous map of "The Destruction
of German Cities" that has become the obligatory starting point for all accounts of Germany's
reconstruction?3ss (fig. 2.75) The map represents cities with precision (in their correct location and
proportionately scaled) but also as statistical abstractions (pie-charts expressing a percentage of
destruction). In this sense the map demonstrates the similarity between the Roberts Commission's
"balanced" selection of monuments in a city, and the concern for territorial evenness that
regimented the Allies' bombing of Germany--leading them to attack even mid-size German cities
like Wiirzburg, because to have left them standing would have been conspicuous.3s6 Indeed the
"4 "The obstacles to preservation were overcome somewhat by the fact that the Allied occupiers had an organization for
protecting monuments and works of art, modeled after that of the German army, that helped to guard important ruins
until clearance or reconstruction could take place." Koshar, 210.
3s- This map was originally compiled in G.W. Harmssen's report to the Allied authorities on reparation, Reparationen,
Sozialprodukt, Lebensstandard: Versuch einer Wirtschaftsbilanz Vol. 3 (Bremen: Trojen, 1948), 149, and re-printed in Triiumen in
Triimmern, XII. It was then re-drawn in Werner Duth and Niel Gutschow's Triiume in Triimmern, 1. Konzepte (Wiesbaden:
Vierweg & Sohn, 1988), 143, and without even a title in Hartmut Frank, "The Late Victory of Neues Bauen: German
Architectus after World War II," in Rasegna 52/2 (June 1993): The Reconstruction in Europe after World War II, 58-67.
35s6 Ross, "The Five Cities," in Strategic Bombing by the United States, 176-194. Mid-sized cities suffered less absolute damage,
but greater proportion of destruction than the more iconic examples of Dresden and Hamburg. Wfirzburg is the object
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entire American strategic bombing offensive was premised upon a representation of the German
economy as having been "designed" for war, a representation wherein German cities stood clearly
as "icons" of Hitler's war machine. The Bomber's Baedeker showed that any built-up area could be
quantified in terms of Germany's industrial geography. In fact, postwar research has shown that
Hitler had not actually pursued as "total" an "economic mobilization of Germany" as the Americans
had imagined, and that more integrated "Designs for Total War" had been available to him. This
research has raised the possibility that American analysts fundamentally misunderstand the economy
of Nazi Germany, and reinforced the historical thesis that the Allies attributed a strategic value to
German cities that was based as much on iconographic reading as on empirical fact.357
It is all the more important to note, then, that the graphic nomenclature of representing cities
as pie-charts derives directly from the system for inventorying damage devised by Albert Speer's
ministry of reconstruction. 35 8 (fig. 2.65) Designed to standardize the damage reports sent by city
architects to the Ministry, this system translated (both graphically and conceptually) the iconography
of city centers as "targets" into a statistical view of destruction. The first person to put these pie charts
on a map was Senator G.W. Harmssen, who was commissioned by the Allies in 1947 to assess the
state of Germany's economy and plan for "reparations." Harmssen produced a memorandum
(Reparationenen Sozialprodukt Lebensstandard) that attacked the "fettering of Germany's economic capacity
and on the imposition of excessive and long-drawn reparations." Harmssen argued that Germany
had already repaid 6 Million Dollars to the Allies, including in his calculation controversial forms of
"expenditure," such as the deportation of populations to Eastern territories, the confiscation of
industrial assets, and the destruction of city centers." 9 In so doing, he exposed an entire project of
"intellectual reparation" that the Allies had hoped to keep a secret: "Project Paperclip" which mined
the German scientists, engineers, patents, and technologies, that had fueled German's war machine,
and brought them back to the US to enrich America's own industrial and military capacity. As a
1947 intelligence statement summarized, "the government is using vacuum-cleaner methods to
acquire all the technical and scientific information that the Germans have. The value of this
of a study that compares intended bombing with actual destruction, draws conclusions about the relative precision of
USAAF and RAF raids, and accounts for the MFA&A's role in first-aid and reconstruction. Hermann Knell, "Loss of
Cultural Assets," in To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and its Human Consequences in World War II (Cambridge: DaCapo Press,
2003), 296.
3s7 Berenice Carroll, Design For Total War: Arms and Economic in the Third Reich (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), for instance,
studied General Georg Thomas who pursued the "total economic mobilization" of Germany. Peter De Mendelssohn's
1947 Design for Aggression: The Inside Story of Hitler's War Plans (New York: Harper, 1947) can be taken as an example of the
orthodox theory that Hitler's war plans and his economic plans had always been one.
358 See "Schadensblianz," in Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, Triiume in Trfimmern: Planungen zum Wiederaufbau
zerst6rter Stidte im Westen Deutschlands 1940-1950 (Wiesbaden: Vieweg & Sohn, 1988), 63-67
359 For a full exposition of the project, see John Gimbel, Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar
Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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information to the United States will probably far exceed any cash reparations."3 60 Thus the
Harmssen memorandum was vehemently rejected by the Allies and attacked as "a Minor Mein
Kampf"' by the Allied press.361 What the Allies found objectionable was its "utter lack of appreciation
of Germany's moral responsibility for the war," and the presumption that moral reparation could be
settled statistically--the way Speer's statistical accounting of city damage had helped him to clear
enough rubble for the war to continue, but leave enough ruins to represent Allied wantonness in
Nazi propaganda.
"Project Paperclip" can be understood as the "second destruction" of Germany's industrial
capacity. 362 Just as, in German cities, an urbanism of "surgical selection" followed the actual
destruction and became the basis for planned reconstruction, so at the national scale this extensive
looting of industrial knowledge followed the targeting of Germany's industrial centers, and became
the basis for economic recovery under the Marshall Plan.3 63 The idea that Germany's "moral
responsibility for war" was to be avenged by secretly conducting "intellectual reparations" shows
how integral civilian knowledge had become to the totality of war. Insofar as it "failed to distinguish
between war booty, reparations, and loot," the industrial depletion plan is strikingly similar to the
"conspiracy" for which the Nazi regime was indicted at Niiremberg, including its art looting
component.
The importance of Project Paperclip for understanding the Allied definition of "custody" can
be evidenced by another "intellectual reparations" project conducted by the US in this same period:
the controversial "Exhibition of German Art" organized at the National Gallery of Art in
Washington, to exhibit of works "recovered" in the salt mines by the MFA&A. These works were
brought to the US under the pretext of providing safe haven for them until German institutions
became safe curatorial environments. Despite the involvement of some Roberts Commission
members in this exhibition, the whole episode drew accusations of "looting" on the part a petition-
full of Roberts Commission collaborators and former MFA&A officers.3 64 "It is impossible to
360 Proposed press release on "Project Paperclip," Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, 14 March 1946, cited in full a an
"Appendix" in John Gimbel, Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1990), 187-189
361 "A Minor Mein Kampf," The Economist (Mar 13, 1948), 59. More measured reviews were written by E. Rosenbaum, in
International Affairs (Apr. 1949), 213-215. And Herbert Furth in American Economic Review, (Dec 1948), 924-932.
362 According to its chroniclers, it "grew out of a wartime intelligence operation and may perhaps be seen as a logical
result of modern, total war." Gimbel, 158.
363 It goes without saying that much of the literature on the Marshall Plan and the ERP also include lengthy discussions
of the meaning of the word "plan". This is clearlt not the place to address it; a summary view is offered in "Paths to
Plenty: European recovery planning and the American policy compromise," in Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America,
Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
364 The controversy over the show caused some art historians to resign from their posts in the commission, but the
show proceeded anyways. Material on this exhibition can be found both in the Roberts Commission's files, Sachs'
archives, Constable's archives, and is chronicled in Lynn Nicholas' The Rape of Europa.
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defend," the petition read, "on technical, political or moral grounds the decision to ship to this
country two hundred internationally known and extremely valuable pictures belonging indisputably
to German institutions." The signatories decried the "the subterfuge of 'protective custody"' that had
been used to organize the exhibition, notably comparing it to the Nazi art looting conspiracy they
had worked hard to prevent:
The moral foundations of our war effort and final victories will be subtly undermined if
we, who understand the implications, pass over in silence an action taken by our own
officials that, in outward appearance at least cannot be distinguished from those,
detestable to all right thinking people, which the Nazis' policy of pillage inspired and
condoned. 365
With this final distortion of the concept of "custody", the ethical dilemma that had been circulating
since 1943 among the expert circles of the Roberts Commission finally came to haunt its most
weathered collaborators-the MFA&A officers. The German paintings were eventually returned, but
the institutions had been emptied of their contents, demonstrating with geo-political pomp that the
iconographic link between interior and exterior that had been so central to the Commission's
definition of monuments had been definitively severed.
What these two episodes demonstrates is that postwar Allied "custody"-be it of paintings or
of industrial equipment-had to be supported by a very careful spatial regime in order to
differentiated from the Nazi conspiracy. Where the Axis powers had planned to radically change the
geography Europe by designating some of it as lebensraum, the Allied plan was to "dial down" the
industrial capacity of German cities, one by one, reducing their importance by "vacuuming" out
their expertise. Indeed if the pie-chart map of "Destruction of German Cities" is to stand as an iconic
image, it an image of how "destruction" was followed by "surgery" and "vacuuming." This
proportional mining was crucial to the stealth of the scheme, and led to a massive decentralization of
German industry. City centers were left as monumental cores, and each monument saved became a
marker for a pie-chart city-a proportional monument. It is through this "second destruction" of
German cities that a monumental factor was finally added to the statistical accounting of destruction
characteristic of total war. If the USSBS failed to devise a proportional ethics of wanton destruction
365 The petition invoked the MFA&A: "the Monuments Officers attached to our armed forces with their specialized
knowledge of the practical risks involved unanimously condemned the decision. Those Americans whose profession it is
to study and preserve old paintings deplore it. On ethical grounds it is disapproved by the opinion of enlightened
laymen." Petition sent to Crosby, Constable, Sachs and others, April 22, 1946, on Whitney Museum Stationary. Crosby
archives, 1/7. Along with MFA&A officers and Roberts Commission member, the petition was signed by over 80
scholars, curators and museum directors, including: Alfred Barr, Mortimer Clapp, Wlater Cook, Sumner Crosby, Charles
Cunningham, Juliana Force, Lloyd Goodrich, George Hamilton, Talbot Hamlin, Joseph Hudnut, Horace Janson, Edgar
Kaufmann, Sheldon Keck, Lincoln Kirstein, George Kubler, Rensselaer Lee, Everet Meeks, Millard Meiss, Grace Morley,
Chandler Post, Marvin Ross, Baldwin Smith, Gordon Washburn, and Lewis York.
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during the war, it was with an urban aesthetic of "moderation" that the victors' proportional
reckoning was eventually delivered.
Epilogue: Ethics of Proportion and Aesthetics of Moderation
My goal in this chapter has been to point out that, if World War II made cities into
iconographic elements of modem warfare, the role played by experts of iconography-art
historians-in this transformation should not be underestimated. I argued that a new kind of
historical responsibility, somewhere between bureaucratic power and academic authorship, can
reasonably be attributed to the art historians of the Roberts Commission in determining the fate of
Europe's monuments. Clear attribution of "responsibility" in this episode is made difficult by various
factors--the elusive quality of any policy subject to "military necessity", the collaborative nature of
expertise that distributes knowledge amongst committees, and the changing nature of urbanism that
became a bureaucratic form of design. Perhaps most tellingly, the art historians themselves were
skeptical of their involvement, and disturbed by its ethical implications-although they tended to
express this skepticism by attacking their colleagues. When Dinsmoor critiqued the work of the
Harvard group as amateurish ("suitable for doughboys on leave"366) and Constable replied that the
ACLS was idealistic-its maps "conceived as a kind of Emily Post's Guide to good behavior when
bombing,"' 67 the exchange revealed an overall unease about the possible connection between efforts
to preserve monuments and "allied" efforts to destroy city centers. These art historians spent much
of the war trying to pre-empt this connection, inventing an aesthetics of contingency to encompass
it.
Protected monuments and damaged cities emerged connected, I have argued, in two ways.
First, through memorialization: since the same psychological substance that was projected into city
fabric to justify its destruction was also injected into monuments to justify their preservation,
monuments preserved inevitably served as memorials to lives destroyed. Second, and more
importantly, psychological warfare also produced an iconographic correspondence between ethical
and aesthetic realms, through the concept of "proportion." For the wagers of psychological warfare,
a small amount of destruction was inherent to demonstrate arbitrariness; for a professional class of
experts, a narrative of proportional helplessness in the face of destruction was necessary to maintain
academic autonomy. The contingency of one became the "necessity" of the other.
366 Dinsmoor to Brigadier General Cornelius Wickerman, 7 Jun 1943. ASCSA I/2.
367 Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime" (Jan-March 1944), 48. In fact Contable meant this as a compliment to the
Harvard work: "Although initially conceived as a kind of Emily Post's guide to good behavior when bombing enemy
cities, these maps ultimately became valuable punctual supplements to the Harvard lists."
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The reason this notion of proportion is crucial is that war ethics are characteristically seen I
proportional terms (military means must be proportional to the stated ends) and of intention (one
must not "intend" to kill the innocent). While the ethics of World War II were clearly proportional,
as early as 1941 "means" and "ends" began to reside both in civilian and military realms, making it
difficult to distinguish between what was intentional and what was wanton. Therefore another idea
of proportion-an aesthetic proportion-intervened to "represent" an ethics of un-intention.
This convergence was in some sense facilitated by previous intersections between ethics and
aesthetics. For instance, the tradition of connoisseurship accepted the idea that art was a guide to
personal comportment, a guide that could be described in terms of "temperance" and
"moderation." By this logic, the repeatable ethics of behavior could be modeled on the unique value
of art. In contradistinction with this Romantic aesthetics of morality, there was also a humanistic
ethic of autonomy inherited from idealist aesthetics. According to this logic, the exceptional and
autonomous value of the work of art must be continually enacted by its keepers. To understand how
these contrary philosophies of art were able to co-operate, we have to understand the physical form
that allowed them to be exceptions to one another: cities. For example, while the romantic idea of
composition' was embodied in the city as a collection of objects, an idealist aesthetic autonomy was
granted to each of the monuments. Whether in their utopian descriptions or their mapping of cities,
the Roberts Commission always depicted cities as environments where temperate men experienced
autonomous objects. Similarly, while the idealist notion of monuments "containing" traces of the
history of ideas was progressively turned into a public creed for the Commission's work, the actual
monuments were progressively emptied of their contents, negating the more pragmatic vision of
institutions as containers of morals. By allowing this seamless transfer between aesthetic objects and
ethical men, architecture provided a crucial support for the confusion of means and ends, objects
and subjects. The ethical problem of total war--that it redefined the ethical proportion of means to
ends-was given an temporary aesthetic solution: making the means (lists and maps) look like ends
(the world of art).
This transfer of ethical value fundamentally calls into question any claim of monumental
autonomy that has been made about the structure of European cities in the postwar. In their 1978
plea for a "museum-city," for instance, Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter took the now-infamous
Munich Residenz as the first and paradigmatic example of an "Ambiguous and Composite Building," a
building whose hybrid plan produces an urban politics of moderation. (fig. 2.77) The language they
used to describe their favorite monumental architecture resonates unmistakably with the Allied
propaganda that had turned monuments into seeds of "re-orientation":
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They, all of them, oscillate between a passive and an active behavior. They, all of them,
both quietly collaborate and strenuously assert. They, all of them, are occasionally ideal.
But, above all, this series is highly accessible to a present sensibility and, of its nature, is
capable of almost every local accommodation.368
Rowe and Koetter sought to discover the ethical dimension of "Gestalt," but the plans they insisted
on reading formally, as autonomous aesthetic objects, had already been imbued with an ethical
mandate. (Indeed, one might even say that their "Gestalt" method had already been employed by
the art historians who preceded them by 25 years). Their post-modem, post-utopian attempt to read
city plans as icons of temperate behavior can only be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy--the "second
destruction" of a monumental autonomy that, having been "unwittingly" dismantled by total war,
could now be "deliberately" rediscovered.
368 "Ambiguous and Composite Buildings," in Collage City, 168.
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FIG. 2.01 Roberts Commission, Organigram. (Drawing by Author, data from Roberts Commission: Final Report of the American
Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, 1946). Color is used as index of
institutional affiliation, using university colors. Yellow is used for museums and galleries not affiliated with universities.
FIG. 2.02 ADHG Monuments Commitee, Organigram (Drawing by Author, Information from Roberts Commission: Final Report, 1946)
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FIG. 2.03 ACLS: Monuments Committee, Organigram.
(Drawing by author, information from Roberts
Commission, Final Report, 1946)
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FIG. 2.04 Civil Affairs Handbook: Section 17A
Cultural Institutions, Italy (July 1944)
FIG. 2.05 Civil Affairs Handbook, Atlas
Supplement: Section 17A: Italy (July 1944)
FIG. 2.06 Allied Military Government: List of
Protected Monuments, Italy 2,3,5, 7 (1944)
FIG. 2.07 War Department Pamphlet No.31
103: Field Protection of Objects of Art and
Archives (May 1944)
O IEliT ISTEffl0\0
---: : ~ :fi~lllil~g
WAY 1 t'kYA;YMY I N ý 2ý MAY ""
265
i'
'''
i::
"
:
''
:i'
":
:
":
: :
~rfl. · · c~l-··*···n~~;a~~~ i i i
-~a·
~*~:.~*~~~~~il:~~!~i~i~i~i~ i -:i
~~~M:··~·~W:~C~n·~rr*~~~-~,di~acxi .-. . : -
-·-:;--~--:-I-------~
Lucia Allais
ow to Miss Cultural Sites
lien hombing establishlts rail bloek, between rear areas and
ront, it is part of the broad plan of the MAAF• to go back
o:nmb pile] up traffic. loitng after the yards in the larger
is eompltiiated hbecausne olf the effort that is made to
hi ttifng structures of historical or cultural interest, many
lici uosmally are in the neighborhood of the railway sta-
I This is exemplified by the situation at Floreice, shown
V moIfSai used to brief bombing crews (right). The main
Sare immediately adcjat lntto thew area in whieh all the
)ing that must be Tissed are grouped.
BLEM MAPPED for bomrb:ardiers is that of hitting V
Florence railway yards antd missing cultural monl-
as amnotated. These are classified as first, second, or
degree in importance. Two of first order, elosest to
yards (B) are the Santa Maria Noella (8) and the San
nao church and New Sagrestria lilbrary (9). Other prime
t•" are (16) the Baptistery, (17) the Cathedral, (32)
sra PIalacs and National Museum., (41) Old Palace, (42)
elh of Santa M'aria Del C'amnnne, (413) Santo Spirito
Ah, (47) Ufftizi Palace and Royal State Archlive, (50)
A National Central Library, (54) Pitti Palace and Boboli
lts Secondary railroad yards (A), is also a target.
FIG. 2.08 "How to Miss Cultural Sites" Annotated aerial photograph of Florence. Impact: Air Force Journal (1944)
FIG. 2.09 (Below) US Air Force: Aerial map of Padova, with monuments marked. The Ancient Monuments of Italy (March 10, 1944)
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FIG. 2.10 Le Corbusier, Plan Voisin: Collage.
Urbanisme (1925)
FIG. 2.11 Le Corbusier, Plan Voisin: Diorama.
Urbanisme (1925)
FIG. 2.13 Le Corbusier, "Ca, c'est Paris!" Pr6cisions
sur I'Etat de I'Urbanisme Francais (1930)
FIG. 2.14 Colin Rowe & Fred Koetter, "Gestalt
Diagram" of Plan Voisin, Collage City (1978)
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FIG. 2.15a, b, c (Top Left) "The Attack on Morale", United
States Strategic Bombing Survey (1945)
FIG. 2.16 a, b (Above) Milan bombing by RAF Bomber
Command, 1942: Bombing Sorties and Aerial Reconaissance
photograph.
FIG. 2.17 (Left) Aerial View of Rotterdam after bombing by
Luftwaffe (1941)
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FIG. 2.19 Enemy Branch, AMG: The Bomber's Baedeker:
Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and
Cities. Part I: Aachen-Kiistrin (1944)
FIG. 2.20 Karl Baedeker. Baedeker's Guide: London and its
Environs (1937 edition)
FIG. 2.21 Coventry after "Baedeker Raid", 1943.
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FIG. 2.22 Civil Affairs Guide Central Italy. Section 17A: Cultural Institutions. Army Service Forces Manu M353-17A (6 July 1944).
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FIG. 2.23 (Left) Bernard Berenson, "Index
of Places'," in Italian Painters of the
Renaissance (1928)
FIG. 2.24 (Below, Left) Paul Sachs' Museum
Course at the Fogg Museum (1930s)
FIG. 2.25 (Below) William George (WG)
Constable, 1930s
FIG. 2.26 (Bottom Left) Paul Sachs (1930s)
FIG. 2.27 (Bottom Middle) Wilhelm K6hler
(1930s)
FIG. 2.28 (Bottom Right) William Bell
Dinsmoor (1940s)
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FIG. 2.29 (Above) Blank index card used in the Commission's Card
File, 1943
FIG. 2.30 (Right) Lincoln Kirstein poses as a MFA&A officer asking
local civilian for information in Italy, 1943.
FIG. 2.31 (Below) George Leslie Stout, First Aid Protection for
Art Treasures and Monuments, Leaflet distributed to troops by
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives; Chance Find of Object - Field
Record' used by Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives officers.
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FIG. 2.32 (Above, Left to Right) Wilhelm K6hler: Sketch Lists of Scholars, Germany; Sketch List of
monuments, Germany; List of Scholars, Balkan Countries; List of Monuments, Bakan Countries
FIG. 2.33 (Below, Left to Right) Erwin Panofsky, "List of Libraries in which I have studied"; "List of
Manuscript Collections by P.O. Kristeller"; Dinsmoor, List of Scholars for Illuminated Manuscripts
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FIG. 2.34 (Left) The Frick Committee poses for the OSS
to demonstrate "map making"' Dinsmoor is at left. Roberts
Commission, Final Report (1946)
FIG. 2.35 (Bottom, Left) Frick Committee, Base Map for
Lombardy & grid overlay
FIG. 2.36 (Bottom, Right) Frick Committee, Final
photostatic map for Tuscany, Detail
FIG. 2.37 (Below) WB Dinsmoor, List of Lists, ACLS,
Minutes of Final Meeting (1945)
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2. Protected Monuments
FIG. 2.38 a,b,c (Top, Left to Right and Left) San Lorenzo
Fuori Le Mura. 1920; Allied Damage to San Lorenzo. 19
July 1943; Aerial Photograph of Damage
FIG. 2.39 a,b,c (Below, Left to Right). Pope Plus XII visits the
nieghborhood of San Lorenzo. 20 July 1943; San Lorenzo
restored, without frescos; Statue of Pius XII commemoratirg
his visit to the site.
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FIG. 2.41 (Left) Detail: Frankfurt City Map
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Civil Affairs Handbook: Germany Section
17. Atlas on Churches, Museums,
Libraries and Other Cultural Institutions
in Germany. August 1944.
FIG. 2.42 a,b,c,d (Bottom) Maps of
Kyoto and of Japan from two successive
editions of the Civil Affairs Handbook:
Japan: Section 17S: Special Maps (1 2
August 1944); and Japan Section 17A:
Cultural Institutions ( May 1945).
~sta d 19th cenry sothi at thir aWa
8tpellh sc alfwt-, alta*r, t mstam, Utb-
18tb cetrtt **j Daratim Altar, sum, 15$ 1s
ctistr, bawwwr wit-1 pertol, 14W, *ad otlkr
40rwaixtenlm 180, t7 m Se adekfsa; ramo VrMu. Deatrisdhaf, Domphts. I~ i ij I
iI i :i~ti·dr ip: i I
:·.·r' j
I
/ I
i '
j~- I -i·.i
ir -i
::i
i i
-""~-:^·-i··::-··- -i'i
·;I-·-· :.i
";.
i
r-. I. i
i
i
7i77~>
EMIE EJAA
276
0
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FIG. 2.43 (Left) List and Map of Monuments for Venice. Civil
Affairs Handbook Italy. Section 17: Supplement. 4 January
1944.
FIG. 2.44 (Above) National map of Italy, with list of "Cities with
Lists", Civil Affairs Handbook Italy. Section 17: Supplement. 4
January 1944.
FIG. 2.45 (Below) Aerial photograph and list for Venice, from
the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), The Ancient
Monuments of Italy (March 1944)
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ADHG Long Lists 06/43 1 no star 1!ii * :*:::
VENICE MILAN FLORENCE GENOVA
MFAA Lists 03/44 X no star il• *
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Padcova
VENICE MILAN FLORENCE GENOVA PADOVA
FIG. 2.46 (Top) Distribution of stars in 5 Italian cities in the Harvard
Long Lists (June 1943).
FIG. 2.47 (Above) Distribution of stars in 5 Italian cities in the MFAA
Lists of Protected Monuments (March 1944).
FIG. 2.48 (Right) Number of Monuments and Distribution of Stars in
5 Italian cities and 5 document. May '43 to Mar '44.
LEGEND 1: Harvard Long List / 2: Harvard Short List / 3: Civil Affairs
Atlas / 4: AAF Aerial Map / 5: MFAA List of Monuments
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2. Protected Monuments
FIG. 2.49 (Top) "K6hler's Threshold": Monuments/Town in
5 Italian Lists. May '43 to Mar '44.
FIG. 2.50 (Bottom) "Dinsmoor's Criterion": Monuments/
City in 5 Italian Lists. May '43 to Mar '44.
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Italian Towns
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FIG. 2.52 (Above) "Paris the Eternal" New York Times 24 August 1944
FIG. 2.53 (Right) Civil Affairs Handbook, France. Section 17:
Supplementary Atlas on Churches, Museums, Libraries and Other
Cultural Institutions (1944). Shaded area duplicates Dinsmoor's "green
crayon", with 5 of the "25 most important sites"
FIG. 2.54 (Below & Right) MFA&A Troops in action. "Keep Off" sign in
Pompei, Manet painting in the Salt Mine at Alt-Auss6e; "Golden Arrow
Art Museum" improvised by the 8th Infantry Division.
280
I Pais he Eern
U~aUICI III~·I·Y~Y·YXI1 ~-~IU-dli ·-~II~
ii
2. Protected Monuments
Fiure 2 ; Fiu2rr •8
Figure 40
FIG. 2.55 (Above) "The towns very much resemble
the maps": Sequence of Illustrations from the Roberts
Commission, Final Report
FIG. 2.56 (Right) "More examples of notable buildings
saved from destruction by the careful briefing of British
and American gunners and airmen." Sir Leonard Wolley,
Article in the RIBA Journal, December 1945
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FIG. 2.57 Panofksy's twelve cities. Civil Affairs
Handbook, Germany: Section 17. Atlas on Churches,
Museums, Libraries and Other Cultural Institutions in
Germany. August 1944
2. Protected Monuments
FIG. 2.58 (Below) US Army truck marked "Florentine
Works of Art Return from Alto Adige'," 1944.
FIG. 2.59 (Below right) American Commission for
the Reonstruction of Italian Monuments (ACRIM):
"Postal Vote by members of the Subcommittee on
Monuments to which immediate assistance should
be given."
FIG. 2.60 (Right) "Elenco dei Monumenti Daneggiati"
(Inventory of the damaged monuments, for ACRIM)
FIG. 2.61 (Bottom) "War's Toll of Italian Art"
Exhibition Catalogue organized by ACRIM
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FIG. 2.62 (Left) "Reasonable Modernization of the
area around St. Etienne in Beauvais: 1939 plan /
1945 plan / 1943 Frick map
FIG. 2.63 (Right) "Reasonable Modernization of the
right bank in Rouen: 1947 plan / Frick map
A
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FIG. 2.64 (Above, right) Le Corbusier: "Paris,
1922-1950" in Conservation - Cr6ation
FIG. 2.65 (Above Left) Le Corbusier, View
of St Did from the ruins of the Cathedral "La
Cath6drale t6moigne"
FIG. 2.66 (Right) Le Corbusier, Plan for St. Die,
in Conservation - Cr6ation
FIG. 2.67 (Below) Reconstruction plans by
Andr6 Lurgat in Maubeuge (right); by Auguste
Perret in Le Havre (left).
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FIG. 2.68 (Above, Top) WG Constable, Art and
Re-Orientation, Allied Military Government:
September 1946.
FIG. 2.69 (Above, bottom) Munich Residenz,
damaged in 1945.
FIG. 2.70 (Right) Frankfurt's Altstadt: 1939 plan
/ Frick map / 1948 plan
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2. Protected Monuments
FIG. 2.71 (Above) Hannover:1939 plan; 1944 Frick map; 1945 damage
map; 1947 plan.
FIG. 2.72 (Right) LUbeck:
circulation proposal by Emil Steffan, 1946
FIG. 2.73 (Below) Reichsministerium Speer, Arbeitsstab
Wiederaufnauplanung zert6rter Stadte, "Schadensgruppen und
Fortschreibende Schadenskarten,"' 1944. Darker is more damaged.
FIG. 2.74 (Bottom) Hamburg (top row) and MOnster (bottom row): 1945
damage map / Frick map / 1947 plan
0
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FIG. 2.75 (Left) "Kriegszert6rungen in
deutsche Stadten'" in G.W. Harmssen,
Reparationen, Sozialprodukt,
Lebensstandard, 1948.
FIG. 2.76 (Below left) Reichsministerium
Speer: damage reports from Libeck,
Rostock, Kiel, Bremen and Wilhelshaven on
December 1944.
FIG. 2.77 (Below right) Monchen: prewar
figure-ground plan, from Collage City; with
plan of Residenz.
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Functional Monuments
Heritage Missions, HQ Architecture, and Museum Space 1949-1960
When Italian architect Ernesto Rogers recalled his involvement in the design of the Unesco
House in 1959, he offered his recollections as a tragic political lesson for modernism. "The problem
of Unesco House," he wrote in the pages of Casabella, "is to a large extent the drama of democracy."
Throughout the decade Rogers had served as one of "the Five," an architectural advisory group
appointed by Unesco to help guide "the Three," another group of modern architects charged with
the design of the organization's Paris Headquarter. (fig 3.01) Together these eight figures were some
of the most illustrious personalities of the CIAMs, yet as Rogers recalled, a protracted bureaucratic
process had yielded a compromised solution and "mediocracy" had prevailed. "The drama of
democracy" was that political institutions had imposed procedural norms onto modernism's own
collaborative ethos.2 "It is difficult," he lamented, "for anyone who has not witnessed one of those
international panels to imagine the extent to which the respect of formalities (dangerously
approaching an empty formalism) rendered difficult any agreement on even the simplest of
concepts." Modernism had lost the political battle between cooperation and collaboration, and this
failure was legible in the architecture itself: the building was "a noble office building that makes a
broad, organic gesture in the city," but its interior space "failed to elevate or to provide an escape."
This lack of spatial differentiation was emblematic of the "imperfection of democracy," its sacrifice
of individuality to "the harmonious consortium of humanity." Similarly, instead of being a
"Monument to World Culture" the Unesco House merely provided "the competent application of a
common language," an architectural version of the organization's bureaucratic tongue, devoid of
"accents and inflections." Thus the "formality" of international cooperation had reduced
modernism to a meaningless "formalism."
Rogers' political lesson to naive architects was meant to pre-empt the expectation that the
Unesco Headquarters would consummate the long-latent romance between architectural modernism
and international organizations. This expectation, and its disappointment, was expressed a year later
by Lewis Mumford in a scathing review of the building as a collection of "cliches." Mumford saw
Ernesto Nathan Rogers, "11 Dramma del palazzo dell'Unesco," in Casabella Continuit6, (Apr 1959), 2.
2 "One of the characteristics of democracy is the dialectical contrast between institutional structures and the procedures
that are necessary to correlate its various parts." Rogers, 4.
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the "elephantine mediocrity" of Unesco House as a fitting end to a tragic timeline beginning with
the fiasco of the League of Nations Competition in Geneva in the 1920s and continuing with the
compromises of the UN headquarters of 1940s New York. Mumford agreed with Rogers that "the
failure was an instructive one" but made the point through an analogy with the museum:
The result is a Museum of the Antiquities of Modern Art and Architecture. In this
museum, the scholarly curators have, as if for historical completeness, preserved with
excquisite zeal the mediocre, and the bad, as well as the excellent, and have place them
all on view at once.3
Mumford's museological image was partly inspired by the extensive sculptural and mural program
of the building, but it also sealed the critical fate of the headquarters as an architectural work;
subsequent critiques followed his lead, perpetuating the basic argument that Unesco's political
malfunctioning was reflected in the staleness of its architecture.4 The Unesco House therefore entered
the history of architecture as a symbol of the institutional death of modernism, and it brought along
the three analogies between modern architecture and international political discourse which had
been used to make the point: the linguistic analogy (that the building's international style was a
bland Esperanto), the spatial analogy (that its lack of spatial differentiation reflected Unesco's
demoagoguery), and the museum analogy (that the collection of modernist tropes signified their
death and mummification)--all of which (along with the failure of modernist collaboration to
trump bureaucratic procedure) represented the tragic political "institutionalization" of modernism
itself.'
The image of the museum as the destination of a dying modernism had in fact been used by Roger
later in 1959. It was not only the language of modernism that belonged in a museum but its
primary modus operandi, the CIAM, which had been "condemned by its own success, its own
vulgarization."s The museum-the site of its last meeting in Otterlo-was a fitting destination for an
avant-garde that had been institutionalized into obsolescence. Yet the connection between the death
of modernist collaboration and Unesco's own international cooperation has remained unclear, and
other places where modernism and cooperation interacted in Unesco have remained unexplored. In
this chapter I argue that the focus on the collaborative aspect of the CIAM-Unesco encounter has
3 Lewis Mumford: "Unesco House: Out, Damned Cliche!," (1960), in The Highway and the City (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1963), 70.
4 To cite a recent summary, "Descriptive accounts ... have seldom refrained from delivering negative verdicts. Criticism
has not been restricted to the architectural syntax of the forms alone-which, despite many individually impressive
solutions, have generally been found wanting as a unity. Discussion has also focused on the cooperation between artists
and architects, compelled, in the course of their close collaboration, to accept an excessive number of compromises."
G.D. Growe, "The Paris Unesco Complex," Marcel Breuer: Design and Architecture (Vitra Design Museum, 2003), 334.
s Ernesto Nathan Rogers, "I CIAM al Museo," in Casabella (Oct 1959), 4. Translation mine.
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distracted from a more fundamental kinship between the design of Unesco house as a late-CIAM
project and the principles of architectural modernism that were being developed within Unesco in
the 1950s. The chapter chronicles Unesco's encounter with modernism through the formation of its
Monuments Committee (MonCom), which codified the space of the museum, as paradigmatically
modern space, carrier of a political agency. I examine the ten volumes of the manual series Museums
and Monuments which were published between 1949 and 1960 in conjunction with the International
Council of Museums (ICOM). The title of these manuals reveals in itself the breadth of endeavor
taken on by this committee: if World War II had demonstrated that monuments could be
"protected," the other nine volumes showed that the problem of protection did not end there, that
monuments also had to be "problematized," "reconstructed," "surrounded," "preserved and
presented," "exhibited" and, perhaps most importantly, "organized." (fig 3.02)
Culture as Function
The primary difference between Unesco as one of the United Nations "Specialized Agencies"
and the IICI as an organ of the League of Nations is that Unesco was assigned a specific function,
"culture," which implied a certain constituency. The United Nations system was designed during the
wartime as a "practical" alternative to "more elegantly designed" systems, including proposals for
federations of states and constitutional world governments. As described by its most influential
proponent David Mitrany, the "functionalist theory of politics" was "an attempt, after looking
squarely at the lessons of history, to offer a practical line of action."6 This line of action involved
gradually integrating international constituents into a world community by achieving specific tasks,
rather than pursuing international unity as a goal in itself. In a memorandum titled "Territorial,
Ideological or Functional international Organization?" submitted to the Foreign Office in 1941,
Mitrany described functionalism as "the organic elements of federalism by installments."7
Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a
function. ... By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command over
the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old
authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about
a translation of a new seat of authority.8
6 David Mitrany, "A War-time Submission: Territorial, Ideological, or Functional International Organization? (1941)"
in Functional Theory of Politics, 118. This theory was based partly on a critique of the League and its lack of a mechanism to
allowed states, such as the US, to partake in specific projects without having to belong to the organization as such.
7 David Mitrany, "A War-time Submission," 120.
8 David Mitrany, "A Working Peace System (1943)," in The Functional Theory of Politics (London School of Economics / St
Martin's Press, 1975), 128. On Mitrany see also Cornelia Navari, "Functional Internationalism," in Thinkers of the Twenty
Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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This was an organic analogy that focused on processes of transformation. In Mitrany's words, "the
virtue of the functional pattern is the virtue of technical self-determination." In 1943 Mitrany further
elaborated the model by describing functions as flexible, autonomous and self-evolving:
The function determines its appropriate organs. ... The function, one might say,
determines the political instrument suitable for its proper activity. And by the same
means provides for its reform and every stage. 9
The organic analogy was particularly well-suited to technocratic endeavors; accordingly,
functionalists' favorite examples of integration were large technological endeavors in culturally
homogeneous regions-the Tennessee Valley Authority in the pre-war, the Middle East Supply
Center during the war, and eventually, the European Coal and Steel Community. At the level of
international organization, however, the organic analogy was abstracted to the level of the
international body politic, with "health" "labor" as favorite examples of organs. It is as one such
'organ' that we have to understand the "Mind" in Unesco's creed, that "since wars begin in the
minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses for peace must be erected."
Insofar as political functionalism was a system for changing the relations between states, rather
than establishing or maintaining them, its approach to cultural matters was focussed on education from
the start. Mitrany had cited "culture" as one of the system's functions as early as 1941,10 but it was
out of the Conferece of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) that Unesco was created, in a move
that was specifically described as a merging of the IICI with the International Bureau of Education.
As we have already seen, the IBE had been explicitly excluded from the League by governments
eager to maintain ideological control over their educational policies. Now "education" and "mass
communication" were Unesco's primary concerns, and it was undoubtedly the "E" in the acronym
UNESCO that gave Unesco its constituency. Whereas the publications of the IICI had been semi-
academic, publications, printed in limited runs of less than a thousand numbered copies and
displaying objects ad sites, the Unesco Courier was a mass-produced glossy magazine whose pages
were populated by people-children, teachers, cultural figures past and present.
Between 1946 and 1950 a plethora of books popularizing "The Cultural Approach to
International Relations," were published, triggering a wave of pointed critiques on the part of realist
political thinkers."1 Hans Morgenthau, for example, devoted an entire chapter of his 1949 Politics
9 Mitrany, "A Working Peace System," 129.
10 "In the field of positive active functions" Mitrany identified the fields of "economic, social, cultural" Mitrany, 120.
" Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, The cultural approach, another way in international relations (Chapel Hill, UNC Press, 1947).
Some were republications of wartime works, like Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed., Freedom and its Meaning (London: Harcourt,
1940) and Alain Locke, and Bernhard Stern, eds., When Peoples Meet: A study in Race and Culture Contacts (New York: Hinds
Hayden & Eldredge, 1946). Unesco was a major part of this publishing wave; see David Hardman, Reflections on Our Age:
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Among Nations to the newly-created Organization, endorsing the functionalism of the UN but singling
out Unesco for being an organization with no real mandate. Morgenthau's critique was two-fold:
The philosophy of UNESCO starts with the assumption that education, cultural
interchange, and in general all activities which tend to increase contacts among members
of different nations are factors in creation of an international community and in the
maintenance of peace. Implicit in this assumption is the supposition that nations are
nationalistic and go to war with each-other because they do not know each other well
enough and because they operate on different levels of education and culture. Both
assumptions are erroneous.
There are primitive people, completely lacking in institutionalized education, who are
generally peace-loving and receptive to the influence of foreign cultures. There are other
peoples, highly educated and steeped in classical cultures, such as the Germans, who are
generally nationalistic and warlike.
Furthermore, in the history of some nations, such as the British and the French, periods
of nationalistic exclusiveness and warlike politics alternate with cosmopolitan and
peaceful ones, and no correlation exists between these changes and the development of
education and culture."
From this two-fold historical generalization Morgenthau concluded that "the quantity and quality of
education and culture as such is irrelevant to the issue of a world community." Morgenthau's
skepticism was derived from his view of culture as an end in itself-"however meritorious they may
be intrinsically, " Unesco's projects had no place in a world order. Instead Morgenthau advocated
that what was needed was "a moral and political transformation," revealing the ethical role that had
been overwhelmingly projected onto Unesco, although it was never quite articulated as such. Indeed
Morgenthau's critique recalled Harold Nicholson's attack on the "new diplomacy," and in particular
the fact that the externalization of international relations into "open diplomacy" had forced upon
diplomats a definition of morality as a public performance of rather than a secret professional ethic.
Similarly, Morgenthau expressed the widespread impression that Unesco had been created merely as
a public-relations gesture, to represent the presence of "the conscience of mankind" to a public of
world opinion.'" But when he wrote that "the world community is a community of moral
Lectures Deliered at the Opening Session of Unesco at the Sorbonne (London: Wingate, 1948), and Theodore Besterman, Unesco: Peace in
the Minds of Men (New York: Praeger, 195 1).
12 Morgenthau's example is relevant here: in 1947 a proposal had been made that Unesco should start a program for the
"conservation of nature," but this proposal had been rejected "not because it lacks merit but vecause it does not appear
to be appropriate for understaking by Unesco as a contribution to peace and security."Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among
Nations (New York: Knopf, 1949), 407.
" "The world has compensated for such losses by inventing for itself an entirely new form of international intercourse
... It is possible to contend that ... [the League and the UN tribunals] ... are mere essays in idealism and that they
assume a level of international ethics which, if it were a correct assumption, would render any Covenant or Charter
unnecessary. ... Yet it is also true that there does exist such a thing as "the conscience of mankind" and that even the
most autocratic and impervious nation must in the end become aware that it is unprofitable to unite that conscience
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judgments and political actions not of intellectual endowments and esthetic appreciation,"" he
hoped sever a bond between aesthetics and morality that had been gradually formed through the
pre-war and throughout the war itself, and that most proponents of the "cultural" approach
considered a hard-won victory.
Against this backlash of realist critiques, Unesco advocates worked hard to articulate this bond
between morality and aesthetics in functionalist terms, often contributing to further confusion about
the respective role of "Science," "Culture," and "Education" in the organization's mandate. The first
secretary-general Julian Huxley, for example, proposed a "scientific humanism" as the working
philosophy for the entire organization. In part, this philosophy echoed the arguments he and other
scientists had originally made to add the "S" to the organization's acronym to oversee the work of
scientists."s This was a straightforward application of morality to science in an atomic age. But
Huxley also articulated an evolutionary analogy on an international scale, with Unesco "a higher
vertebrate [that] coordinates the activities of its various different organs, and adjust the claims of its
different innate impulses." " Culture and education played a "functional" role in the evolution
towards "understanding on a world scale," in particular through "Libraries, Museums and other
cultural institutions," which he defined as "institutions and organizations devoted to the twin
functions of preserving the world's scientific and cultural heritage and of making it available when
preserved." 7 Here "science" was no longer a practice needing oversight but a network of
institutions, as it was clear that Huxley based his definition of "cultural institutions" on natural
history museums and zoos. A year later Huxley offered a slightly different analogy between cultural
and biological phenomena, applying it directly to "the domain of the arts" and giving culture a
"function" in a more strictly social-scientific definition, as a set of practices:
against them." Harold Nicholson. "The Old Diplomacy and the New." David Davies Institute of International Studies.
(March 1961), 9
14 Morgenthau, 412.
15 "On Nov, 1 1945, British minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson heeded the call of scientists for a place in the
organizational title, offering a commitment at a meeting with Sir Henry Dale and Julian Huxley. ... 'In these days,
when we are all wondering, perhaps apprehensively, what the scientists will do us next, it is important that tey should
be liknked closely with the humanities and sholud feel that they have a responsibility to mankind for the result of their
labours.' The "S" was soon proposed by American delegates and supported readily by most others." James P. Sewell,
Unesco and World Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univetsity Press, 1975), 78-79.
16 "social organization is the mechanism on which man must rely to effect evolutionary process. ... Mutatis Mutandis,
these are the problems of a modern society-but, of course, with the basic differentce that the individual human being
has claims quite other than those of the single cells or organs of the animal body." Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose
and its Philosophy, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), 47.
17 Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and its Philosophy, 56. In the case of "these institutions which are brought into exsitence
of tperform a particular kind of function in relation to culture and scienc" Unesco would be concerned with
"techniques and their improvement."
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A distinctive art or culture, once it has died out, cannot be revived or recreated any
more than can an extinct species of animal or plant ... We have to face the fact that in
large sectors of the modern world, art plays but a very small role. We thus have to study
the means whereby the arts shall be accepted as a necessary element in life.18
Thus Huxley was tom between three analogies between science and culture: one where Unesco
acted as an ethical judge of scientific research, another where Unesco coordinated existing scientific
institutions; finally one where Unecso fulfilled an organic function in the body politic.
A similar confusion characterized the work of Huxley's successor, Jaime Torres-Bodet,
whose preferred terminology for describing Unesco's work was legal-especially after the signing
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. "Political security," he wrote, "is
meaningless if it is not founded upon the four fundamental human rights, to which the great
Agencies of the United Nations correspond: the right to life, to health, to work and, Unesco's own
reason for being, the right to education and culture." 19 For Torres-Bodet the war had confirmed the
relevance of the ideals of Enlightenment philosophers, rather than rendering them obsolete. Unesco's
role was to harness them in order to produce "the will to peace." The role played by "art" in the
production of this "will to peace" was made graphically clear in the accompanying illustration,
which conflated the head of a child with the "0" of the organizational acronym, the continents with
paint colors on a palette. (fig 3.03) This graphic style became a signature for the Organization in this
period, and it relied overwhelmingly on the conflation of the circle as the "0" of organization, the
"mind" of international understanding, and the "influence" was Unesco was supposed to institute
between them: thus the cover of Julian Huxley's manifesto used a radio-wave as a icon, while social
scientists surveying the "influence" of public libraries used concentric circles to track the influence of
cultural institutions like public libraries. (fig 3.04) This abstract iconography was indicative of an
organization which was uncertain how to represent its own influence.
One of the few thinkers to integrate education as a right and culture as an institution into a
single theory of international life was the director of the International Bureau of Education, Swiss
psychologist Jean Piaget, who was asked by Unesco in 1948 to compose a manifesto titled The Right
to Education. Piaget described the task of international education as a perpetual de-centering of
subjectivity towards objectivity. While he repeated the pre-war idea of political idealists that national
18 "One problem of considerable urgency is that of the arts of non-industrialized countries and peoples. In many cases,
such arts are in danger of either dying out completely, or of being debased or distorted through contact with industrial
civilization. It is clearly the duty of Unesco to try to prevent this." Julian Huxley, "The Role of Unesco in the Domain
of the Arts," in The Studio Vol. 134 (Oct 1947), 110-111.
19 "The Will to Peace," in The Unesco Courier II/12 (1 Jan 1950), 1.
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and international spheres are nested, he focused on the passage between one sphere to the next, in a
process he called "de-centering":
Whether it is a question of intelligence, ethical formation, or international formation, the
issue is each time to "de-center" the individual, to make him spontaneously give up his
subjective or egocentric attitudes and to lead him to reciprocity and (this is practically
synonymous) to objectivity.2"
Thus objectivity was aimed for by proceeding outwards from the center of subjectivity, in a
sequence of displacements that Piaget implied was potentially indefinite:
If at each new level human thinking has come to disengage itself from a particular form
of egocentrism, seemingly primitive or naive after the fact, it is to fall once again each
time into a more refined egocentrism, which again impedes complete objectivity. From a
social point of view, it is, a fortiori, the same thing: the "de-centering of the "I" or the
"We" or of their symbols or of their terrotories is still hampered by more obstacles.
From this succession of de-centerings Piaget concluded that, practically speaking, international
education could not simply reside in some classes about "international institutions" or "the idea that
they represent and defend" that would be added as appendages to existing curricula. Instead he
recommended instituting "a group of active methods," which included creating "model
governments," so that "international life" could be "discovered through 'lived-in' experience."21
Piaget elaborated what he meant by "lived-in experience" through the concept of "space,"
in a book titled The Child's Perception of Space published the same year. Here Piaget used "space" as a
variable with which to measure a child's cognitive development. Piaget's goal was to disprove
mathematical conceptions of space as consisting of "euclidian concepts such as straight lines, angles,
squares, circles, measurements, and the like," and demonstrate, instead, that fundamental spatial
principles were "topological"-which is to say, "based entirely on qualitative or 'bi-continuous'
correspondences, involving concepts like proximity and separation, order and enclosure." In other
words, space itself was not Euclidian; Euclidian geometry was a norm progressively formed in the
child's mind. What this meant was that space, for the child, was "essentially of an operational
character." 22 Thus one of the basic skills that Piaget tested in children was the ability to use and
recognize the conventions of orthographic projection. Asking children to construct "Diagrammatic
layouts and the plan of a model village," Piaget tracked the progressive reliance on plans as evidence
20 Jean Piaget, The Right to Education in the Present World, (Paris: Unesco, 1948), reprinted in Piaget, To Understand is to Invent
(New York: Viking Press, 1973), 131.
21 Jean Piaget, The Right to Education, 141. "International life is the theater of the same conflicts of reciprocity and the same
misunderstandings of all social intercourse on an entirely different level ... all common phenoemena on all levels, and to
understand their importance on the international plane it is essential to have discovered them through a "lived-in"
experience.
22 Piaget, "Preface," in The Child's Conception of Space, trans. Langdon & Lunzer, (New York: Humanities Press, 1956), vii.
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that "the construction of a physical reference frames proceed side by side with the general
coordination of viewpoints." 23 One corollary of the construction of "space" is that there was a moral
dimension to this spatial development; here Piaget echoed his 1932 The Moral Judgment of the Child,
where he had argued that the child "constructs his own morality" after observation and interaction
with the world, rather than through the imposition of authoritative norms. In other words, there was
a moral dimension to "lived-in" spatial development.24
This is not say that Piaget considered morality a relative quantity, dependent upon cultural
content. On the contrary morality was invariable and universalizable. In fact, Piaget spoke of social
phenomena as fundamentally exterior to human subjectivity; insofar as he spoke of "culture" at all,
it was usually to describe it an alienated externality. In his manifesto on international education he
explained the fundamental misunderstanding between individuals and their expected norms of
behavior:
We do not understand the present world either morally or intellectually. ... We are like
the old Eskimo who was asked by an ethnologist why his tribe so piously preserved
certain rites, and answered ... "we preserve our old customs so that the universe will
continue."
Therefore spatial autonomy could be used as an illusory instrument of cultural self-preservation. It is
statements like these that have fueled a debate over whether Piaget's theory was anti-social and
individualistic-in the words of one sociologist, whether "Piaget's child is a solitary scientist
constructing knowledge apart from the social context."25 But this is to miss that Piaget's was a theory
of an absent center, a theory of relationships between subjects and everything else (be it a culture, a
person, or an object) and that the medium for these relationships was a formalist notion of space.
The connection between this outward -decentering and Unesco's work on monuments is twofold.
On the one hand, it is clear that by focusing on space Piaget avoided the problem of the "collective"
which had proved so problematic to intellectual cooperation in the prewar, and with which many
social scientists continued to grapple in the postwar. On the other hand, monuments in postwar
cultural internationalism were mediated by a changing set of spatial relationships-in the city,
internally, as a network-which implied a perpetual de-centering. Therefore the heritage missions
and museum architecture of the 1950s can be understood by analogy with Piaget's project: as
23 Piaget, The Child's Conception of Space, 419. "To investigate this hypothesis in greater detail, and at the same time
conclude the present series of experiments, we cannot do better than examine the way children set about making a plan
or layout, in the sense of creating an accurate topographical schema. Such an activity is extremely important, both
from the psychological aspect, considering the development of children's geometrical drawing; and historically, as
regards the actual origins of geometry from land surveying as practices in ancient Egypt."
24 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, (London: Trubner, 1932).
25 Rheta DeVries, "Piaget's Social Theory," Educational Researcher, (Mar., 1997), 4.
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attempts to work subjectivity and "culture" back into intellectual cooperation without resorting to a
collective subjectivity, but choosing "space" as a medium instead.
The MonCom and Heritage Missions
The tension between culture as Unesco's function, education as its medium, and morality as
its effect was reflected in the work of its Monuments Committee, which was formed in late 1949.
Monuments had been absent from Unesco's initial program-the "conservation and protection of
the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science" was written
into Article II of Unesco's constitution, but as a sub-heading of what was admittedly its broadest
mandate: "to maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge." 26 The appointment of the first "Group of
Experts on Monuments" has a strictly functional origin, in the political sense of the term: Returning
from the Middle East in 1948, Julian Huxley suggested the creation of "a cultural liaison service for
the region" which would "think of the immense wealth of archaeological and artistic and
architectural treasures in terms of the region as a whole and organize their exhibition on a regional
basis."27 This "Committee of Experts on Sites and Monuments of Art and History" met for the first
time in October 1949, and despite the instrumental reasons for their first gathering they immediately
set out to make become a permanent group. They set up a symposium in the manner of the Athens
Conference, where representatives of monuments administrations gave national reports. These
representatives were also asked to bring photographic evidence of recent work, which was compiled
into a public exhibition at Unesco Headquarters, the first of its kind.28 Published as the first Museum
and Monuments manual in 1950, the proceedings of this meeting were compiled as a body of evidence
which could legitimize the continued need for monuments expertise.
The substance of this first manual is aptly summarized in its title, "Problimes Actuels" [Sites and
Monuments: Problems of Today], as it consists largely an "actualization" of all the technical and
administrative issues that had been addressed at the Athens Conference in 1932. Italian historian and
restorationist Roberto Pane was assigned the task of synthesizing the national contributions into
international trends. Pane began his survey by recalling again the basic 19 th Century opposition
between "stylistic and historical" points of view and proclaiming that conservation had long ago
26 Unesco Constitution, Article I, paragraph 2. As cited in Com.Mon. 1.4/ Doc. 12, (25 Sep 1951), International
Committee on Monuments, First session, 21-25 May 1951, Plan For the Future Work of the International Committee.
27 Julian Huxley, in Report of the Director General on the Activities of the Organization in 1948. (Paris: Unesco,
1948),10.
28 "Report on the Findings of the Meeting of Experts," in Museums & Monuments I: Sites and Monuments, Problems of Today
(Paris: Unesco, 1950). This Conference/ Exhibition format became the norm; it is the form of the Venice Charter.
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won the war against preservation ("The accepted views today are the exact opposite of those
advanced by Viollet le Duc.)."29 He frankly blamed popular sentiment for this continued opposition,
as experts usually advocated that destroyed buildings should not be rebuilt, while the public
demanded restoration for sentimental reasons. ("The conflict still exists between expert and the
public.") Yet he also admitted that the war had exacerbated the gap between doctrine and practice,
by creating more destruction than the pre-war doctrine of "conservation" had been designed to deal
with. Therefore it was "imperative to take action even if a compromise has to be made." Here Pane
used Giovannoni's distinction between "living" and "dead" monument to justify the kind of partial
reconstructions that were "not always in accordance with the general rules of modern restoration."
Taking the example of "a half demolished church," Pane conceded that the "life" criterion justified
demolition. ("if it is a living monument, still fulfilling its original functions,... an easy solution is to
build a new church in its place.") Yet he contended that this was "not facing up to the real problem.
Instead the "new" could be integrated into the "old" through the judicious design of modern lines
and shapes:
Care will be taken to make the reconstructed part stand out clearly from the rest. This
does not imply that the new part should not be closely linked with the old in its
patterns of lines and spaces; it cannot therefore be a totally new design, even where the
restorer will have to face a whole series of minor problems for the solution of which
tastes and inventiveness must often be combined with technical experience."0
For the first time in the international discourse of conservation an overriding aesthetic criterion was
introduced by which to judge the adequacy of conservation, and this aesthetic criterion was
differential, not absolute: it was the legibility of the difference between new and old-to be
designed by the restorer's talent and skill. Furthermore, Pane made the startling proposal that modern
architecture was particularly well-suited to the task of abstracting historic forms into contemporary
restorations:
It must be admitted that the new trends of modern architecture facilitate the solution of
this problem. The sheer simplicity of structure, the careful study of rhythmic relations
and of a proper distribution of light, the possibility of using new materials and the great
assistance that reinforced concrete has been for decades in solving the most complex
restoration problems, enable us to cope successfully with the special cases.
The primary example of this integration was the church of San Lorenzo, whose front facade had
been rebuilt without applied decoration. (fig 2.38) In formal terms, this principle of using modern
29 "The reconstruction of monuments based on stylistic analogies, or the retention of forms which are wrongly
considered typical has most decidedly given way to respect for each historic phase in the life of a monument." Roberto
Pane, "Some Considerations on the Meeting of Experts held at Unesco House 17-21 October 1949," in Museums and
Monuments I: Sites and Monuments: Problems of Today (Unesco: 1949), 49.
30 Pane, Problems of Today, 74.
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architectural gestures to approximate historic forms amounts to a kind of proto-postmodernism. In
doctrinary terms, Pane reconciled this recommendation by theorizing that both conservation and
restoration could be understood as ways of "preserving aesthetic unity." Clearly inspired by the
theory of painting conservation that had been pioneered by Cesare Brandi and that the ICOM
endorsed in this period, Pane recommended that this unity should be legible from a certain distance,
while closer inspection would reveal differences in material and detailing between old and new.31
This compromise required learning from the "restorations" that had been hitherto taboo. But Pane
recommended that any wholeness was better than destruction and challenged the hypocrisy of his
opponents who inherited monuments "restored" in the past only to impose strict "conservation" on
them. "To all who today object to any restoration, we might well ask: what would now remain, not
only of the monuments of architecture, but of all works of art, had there not been men to wage a
frequently heroic battle against the ravages of time in order that these symbols of civilization may
endure."3 2 In other words, the destructions of the war had condensed history and precipitated the
advent of a compromise solution that might otherwise have taken much longer to work out.
Throughout the Manual, postwar reconstructions were invariably depicted as a practical
demonstrations of the principles theorized in Athens, but instead of being disparate examples they
now constituted a cumulative international norm. The "use of modern materials" was exemplified
in the restoration of roofs in concrete and steel-here French cathedrals were the best example. (fig
3.06) The idea of modernizing monuments "from within" was represented in the de-composition
and re-building of the facade of the Tempio Malatesta in Rimini, whose proportions had been
thrown off by the blast of a nearby bomb. (fig 3.07) The cohesion of material "integrity" and urban
"integration" was exemplified by the Church of Saint Anne in Warsaw, which received "injections
of cement, hollow piles of reinforced cement, resistance walls, changes in horizontal and vertical
positions, steel tightening and a frame belt of reinforced concrete"-and, perhaps crucially, a new
ring-road highway to circumvent it. (fig 3.05) The MonCom meeting synthesized the encounter
urban reconstruction that had prevailed throughout European reconstruction into one compromise:
Generally speaking the best way of adjusting the often conflicting claims of
"preservation" and town planning is to try, in the first place, to meet the real needs of
civic economy, and then to adapt aesthetic considerations to them. This is also the lesson
taught to us by the past, since it is clear that the old thoroughfares and squares in many
31 In painting conservation, this technique required the deployment of a change of orientation in the brushstroke:
missing parts of painting could be filled in by the restorer, as long as they were painted with a brushstroke that was
visibly different to the naked eye-although from afar the effect of "aesthetic unity" would be maintained. The second
Museums and Monuments Manuals, was entitled The Conservation of Paintings, and was devoted largely to this technique. ICOM,
The Conservation of Paintings. Museums & Monuments II (Paris: Unesco, 1950).
32 Pane, Problems of Today, 78-79.
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European towns owe their beauty to their logical solution of the practical problem of
everyday life, and not to the abstract search for the "monumental."33
Against the abstract search for the "monumental" in the pre-war's myopic emphasis on buildings
themselves, an urbanized monumentality gradually became the focus of the MonCom's discourse.
Although Pane's theory of "aesthetic wholeness" was most forcefully articulated in material and
architectonic terms it was primarily at the scale of urban and regional development that this aesthetic
criterion could be tested in a series of case-studies which constitute the subsequent six Museums and
Monuments manuals.
Julian Huxley had hoped to send the first heritage missions to the Middle East, but two events
delayed the accomplishment of this task: the earthquake in the Pervian city of Cuzco on May 21
1950, and the thaw in relations with Yugoslavia. Funds for the first two missions were redirected to
Peru and Yugoslavia, and while neither mission had a particularly regional mandate, their reports set
the stage for monuments to become into active agents of international intervention at the urban and
regional scale. Certainly the structure of these two reports reveal the transformation of art historical
and archaeological expertise into a "cultural" consultancy. The report on the mission to the church
of St Sophia Orchrida began with a statement of art historical value ("The church of Saint Sophia at
Ochrida is one of the most important and ancient religious buildings surviving in Macedonia") 34 and
ended with its incorporation into international life ("these cultural contacts will contribute to a wider
knowledge of the common heritage of the past, and to a better understanding of the various
countries' civilizations"). Similarly, the Cuzco report began with a statement of archaeological
differentiation ("Cuzco is three cities. One is Inca. The second is colonial. The third is modern.""3 s )
and ended with an international regulation ("conservation and restoration policy in Cuzco should be
administered within the projected framework of the Cuzco Development authority, under the United
Nations.") 36 In between these two extremes-technical solutions to repair monuments and
international appeals for organization-the missions resorted to a broad panoply of measures,
including administrative regulations and urban planning measures like "zoning" and circulation.
The Yugoslav mission was led by Italian conservationist Cesare Brandi, and its mandate was
to survey the decay of the frescoes and the deformation of the walls the church of St Sofia Ochrida.
33 Roberto Pane, "Some Considerations," Sites and Monuments: Problems of Today, 50.
34 Ferdinando Forlati, Cesare Brandi and Yves Froideaux, Saint Sophia of Ochrida: reservation and Restoration of the Building and its
Ffrescoes: Museums & Monuments IV (Unesco: Paris, 1951), 5.
3 Georges Kubler, Cuzco: Reconstruction of the Town and Restoration of the Monuments: Museums & Monuments III, (Unesco: Paris
1951), 2.
36 Kubler, Cuzco, 38.
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Brandi and his team recommended very specific techniques for removing the frescoes while the
walls were straightened and reinforced, but they also included a set of "general improvements"--by
which they meant urban un-encumbrement. (fig 3.08) First, "the old houses surrounding Saint
Sophia" were to be "safeguarded by administrative measures," because they constituted "the best
backdrop" for the church. Secondly, the "general harmony of the area" was to be increased by re-
grading the alley along the west fagade down to the level of the building's arcade, and compensating
for the change in elevation by adding an urban stair at either end of the alley. Third, since "the
narrowness of the alley precluded a good view" of the building, the mission recommended
demolishing "one characteristic structure to provide a small open space from which the architectural
qualities of the building could be properly appreciated." Lastly, the mission recommended
converting the open space around the North and East of the building "into a garden," but taking care
"to avoid any symmetrical plan reminiscent of small-town squares.""37 These were not quite the
geometrical rules that Victor Horta had proposed in Athens to ensure the proper "open space"
around each monuments, but the effect was the same: the monument asserted its urban presence by
clearing an open space around itself.
The Cuzco mission established an even more explicit bond between functional
internationalism and functionalist urbanism. Headed by Yale Americanist and Focillon disciple
George Kubler, the mission surveyed the damage from the quake and advised on specific buildings'
archaeological reconstructions. But it also made recommended that conservation be regularized
within Cuzco's administrative and planning mechanisms. The mission chastised the Highway
Department for causing 20% of the destruction during the rubble-clearing phase, and critiqued the
building statutes of the Ministry of Fomento, which did not regulate the use of adobe in new
construction, and allowed "setbacks with front, side, and rear yards in the familiar wasteful North
American suburban pattern.""38 Then, recalling that a "development commission" had been created
on the UN's initiative to deal with the growth of the city, the Unesco report endorsed the traffic-
diversion plan that had been proposed by the city's Planning Commission of the city. (fig 3.09)
Thirdly, the mission Instead Lastly, the mission recommended its own zoning plan, according to a
progressive relaxation of preservation rules in proportion with the distance away from the historic
"center" of the city:
A. An archaeological and historical zone to be conserved and restored
B. Residential districts susceptible of modification
C. Districts in which total rebuilding is permissible
7 "General Improvements," Saint Sophia of Ochrida, 22-23.
38 Kubler, Cuzco, 4. "Nothing could be more alien to the traditional architecture of Cuzco."
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D. Districts for future urban growth"3
To implement this plan the mission recommended the creation of a "an authoritative zoning board,
which will maintain the zoning, and safeguard colonial and archaeological monuments, without
hindering the economic life of the city." This board would also he forbid the use of "unsightly
building materials" and incorporate "the traditional courtyard system," into building statutes.
Together, all the various authorities would be reconciled into a "broad urban reform."
Thus by the time funding was secured for a mission in the Middle East, the scope of the
MonCom's work had grown more ambitious. A Middle East mission was formed, which spent a
whole year surveying the sites of the region and publishing its recommendations in two manuals,
Lebanon and Syria. The mission fulfilled Huxley's desire by recommending the creation of roads,
hotels, rest-houses, along with the restoration of a suitable number of churches and castles, to create
a single circuit connecting all the monuments in the region.40 The missions also made
recommendations for administrative reorganization, addressing what Huxley had called "the two-
fold problem" of dealing with the arts in "dependent territories: first, how to persuade those in
charge of the colonial administration in the mother-country that they have a responsibility in the
matter, and secondly, how to persuade the peoples of the territories themselves that their own arts
and culture have a real value."4"
The missions to Syria and Lebanon provided a realm where three functionalisms (political,
social scientific, architectural) could come together into a single overarching theory for
incorporating monuments into urban growth and development:
In large and rapidly expanding towns... attention must be drawn to the interest which
historical monuments have for the present generation. Their aesthetic value must be
taken into consideration in all town-planning schemes, which should endeavour to
preserve or create the most appropriate atmosphere around them, befitting their
proportions, character and style. Far from hindering the natural development of a city,
they should continue to embellish it, being given their rightful place in the scene so as
to do full justice to their cultural significance as well as to the needs of modern life.42
In advance of this growth some municipalities had hired architects and planners, and the Unesco
mission took on the job of critiquing available plans. In some cases Unesco approved the work: in
Aleppo the mission endorsed the plans of Andrei Gutto, an urbanist of the Institut d'Urbanisme in
39 Kubler, Cuzco, 45.
40 Paul Collart, Selim Abdul-Hak, Armando Dillon, "Conclusion," in Syria: Problems of Presentation and Preservation of Sites and
Monuments. Museums and Monuments: VII. (Paris: Unesco, 1955), 28
41 Huxley, "The Role of Unecso in the Domain of the Arts," 1 11.
42 Paul Collart, Selim Abdul-Hak, Armando Dillon, "Conclusion," in Syria.
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Paris.43 More frequently, the plans followed Beaux-Arts principles that Unesco deemed disruptive of
the monumental "atmosphere." In Tripoli, the mission critiqued the 1947 plan, which included a
proposal "for the old streets to be widened and for the buildings on either side to be pulled down,"
taking sides with the Antiquities Department which had opposed the plan. But whereas the
Antiquities Department had simply protected the monuments archaeologically by "listing" them, the
mission gave an urban rationale for their value (that the urban fabric formed an aesthetic "whole"
which could not be fragmented) and proposed an overhaul of traffic patterns instead, a
comprehensive plan that included digging a tunnel under the city center. (fig. 3.11) Similarly, in
Baalbek, the mission analyzed the salient points of a plan that had been drawn up in 1951 by the
municipality, and commended it for "meeting all the practical requirements." But it also raised
"serious objections form the aesthetic points of view", its cutting of avenues, and the creation of a
network of circular roundabouts:
All the proposed roads are to be straight, and this is quite out of keeping with the
character of the Baalbek oasis and the surroundings of the ruins. The building of a
roadway all around the ruin would destroy the charm of the present paths, the circular
temple, through set off to great advantage, would still be isolated. A large open space,
bare and noisy, in front of the entrance to the temples and carrying a heavy traffic load is
hardly calculated to prepare tourists for the aesthetic emotions they should feel on a visit
to the Baalkebk ruins.44
The mission provided an alternative sketch for "planning the citadel like a park", by maintaining the
proposed circulation patterns but inflecting their geometry to the topography of the site, bending the
roads around the location of the monuments, and incorporating the "corners, bends and parking
areas" into a picturesque approach "arranged so as to provide interesting views." (fig. 3.10)
While none of the plans recommended by Unesco in the Middle East were implemented,
they effectively put a stop to a certain kind of un-regulated urban growth, establishing the
administrative structures for later incorporations of heritage urbanism, and introduced ideas of large-
scale urban functionalism not implemented in Europe and America until later decades. 4" Thus
Unesco acted as an agent of a type of urban planning that Lewis Mumford would call "the highway
and the city" by replacing the Beaux-Arts of the immediate postwar with more strictly
"functionalist" ideas drawing from a modernist palette, including zoning, tunneling, and parks.
"There is nothing artificial in the plan we propose," the mission architect wrote in Lebanon, "it is
43 "We are glad indeed to associate ourselves with the recommendations and reservations in the report accompanying
the scheme of improvements adopted by the municipality." 23.
44 "Baalbek: enhancement of the ruins," in Lebanon, 28. Mission leader Paul Collart had collaborated with the director of
Antiquities Pierre Coupel. See Paul Collart and Pierre Coupel, L'Autel Monumental de Baalbek, (Paris: Institut Frangais
d'Archiologie de Beyrouth / Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1951.)
41 See Peter Larkham, Conservation and the City (London: Routledge, 2005).
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dictated by the natural flow of traffic." 46 At the urban scale the term "function" had expanded to an
administrative level, and the object of conservation had grown correspondingly, from isolated
objects into entire neighborhoods.
As the work of the MonCom progressed and it began to produce manuals on general themes,
this urban functionalism was gradually complemented by an architectural definition of function, as
the purpose of building. In part this was due to a move away from cities and into the countryside. In
a 1953memorandum, Mon Com member and modernist historian Eduard Sekler recommended that
monuments in the increasingly de-populated countryside should simply be assigned "a new
function: "
There is the possibility of collaboration and assistance on an international level when
trying to find new functions for buildings which are in danger of decay because their old
functions do not exist any longer. In this connexion especially country seats ("ville")
castles and monastic buildings should be mentioned. Apart from new function which
may be found for them on a national level are probably quite a few useful purposes they
might serve on an international level.47
The single most frequently proposed solution in this search for a new "function" was "museum."
Already in the first Museums and Monuments manual Roberto Pane had offered the example of "old
buildings converted into art museums" as paradigmatic way to reintegrate monuments into "life."
The practice of converting monument into museums offered "many analogies with restoration," in
particular because they usually had "very modern fixtures" that combined ancient architecture with
modern forms."' 8 Pane also supported his argument by referring to a report by Georges-Henri
Riviere on the increasing need for monuments to be accompanied by "Museums of the
Monument." For Riviere the attachment of a museum space to monuments was a trend that needed
to be modernized. "The old functional museums, may even today be regarded as patterns."' 49 This
pattern was a way not only to re-inhabit monuments from within but also to colonize them from
without-using the urban logic of "open space" that had been discovered in heritage missions and
assigning it a museological "function."
46 Paul Collart, Lebanon, 30. It has to be said that the organicist theory of urban "functions" was distinctly modern and
did not belong exclusively to the CIAMs, it was widespread idea of European technocratic urbanism since the teens.
Indeed the invention of the Athens Charter was to not to have assigned functions to city elements but to have limited
the number of functions to four. In fact, the CIAMs of the immediate post war were marked by a heated debate over
the need for a fifth function to complement this scheme. As we have seen in Chapter 2 the monuments of Europe filled
this role in the reconstruction schemes. Here "function" became a more broad administrative category, corresponding
not to objects but to entire neighborhoods.
47 Eduard Sekler, "Some Problems Connected with the Preservation of Monuments in the Countryside: Rural
architecture, country seats, former ecclesiastical buildings, etc," WS/093.10 4 July 1953
48 Pane, Problems of Today, 76.
49 "Museums of the Monument," in Problems of Today, 62.
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The function of museums was to "organize" culture. The analogy between the
"organization" of objects in the museums the "functional planning" of historic districts in
developing cities was everywhere present in the reports of heritage missions. Thus the report for
Tripoli:
Works of art which have for long been overlooked and neglected are often found to
have acquired interest and importance in the course of time, through the research of art
historians and archaeologists. They are then suddenly given prominence in the
showcases of museums or the shows of antiquarians. We too the view that the ancient
city of Tripoli was a work of art which, with a little restoration and re-planning, could
regain some of its former beauty and take its due place in the luxurious settings of the
modern district.5so
This advocacy of urban museumification relied on a parallel between scholarship and development.
Just as "research" fueled n the progress of art-historical knowledge and the concomitant expansion
of the realm of valuable objects, so demographic development fueled the growth of cities and the
concomitant expansion of cultural heritage sites. Functionalist urbanism dealt with the expansion of
the social realm; museums organization dealt with expansion of the world of objects. What the
design of museum space allowed was a passage from the functionalization of culture to the
organization of cultural artifacts-both gestures derived from the organic analogy inherent in the
UN system. While regionalist heritage missions attempted to achieve this organization at the scale of
the entire world, the museum offered a microcosm, where smaller monuments could be arranged
to reflect the objectivity expected from this new cultural functionalism.
From Museography to Museology
It is a truism of architectural history that modern architects spoke often of museums but had
few opportunities to build them. In the words of Rosalind Krauss, "although the twentieth century
saw many constructions of shiny, marble art palaces, with their rooms succeeding one another en
filade, two new models had been elaborated [by 1949] which had far more in common with the
rewriting of the terms of the museum within the era of modernism. These models were based, on
the one hand, on the 'universal space' of Mies van der Rohe, and on the other on the spiral ramps of
Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright.""1 According to Krauss, these two models alone bridge the
gap between the Beaux-Arts enfilade and what she calls, borrowing from Andre Malraux,
"postmodernism's museum without walls." Ludwig Glaeser pointed out that this transformation
so Paul Collart, Emir Maurice Chehab and Armando Dillon, "Tripoli: replanning the old town," in Lebanon Suggestions for the
Plan of Tripoli and for the Surroudnings of the Baalbek Acropolis: Museums and Monuments VI (Unesco: Paris, 1954), 24.
s' Rosalind Krauss, "Postmodernism's Museum Without Walls," in Reesa Greenberg, Bruce W. Freguson, Sandy Nairne,
Thinking About Exhibitions (London: Routledge, 1996), 343-344.
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occurred mostly "outside of museum walls," in exhibition halls, fair pavilions and private
galleries.52 In Mark Jarzombek's analysis, it was the investment of museums with nationalist myths
that was the primary obstacle to reform, and "modernism could do little to challenge the equation
of museum architecture and neoclassical academicism" in the first half of the century."3 All three
agree that it was not until the postmodern reform of the institution itself that the lessons of
modernism were brought to bear on the architecture of new museums.s4 In this section I examine
the efforts of these institutions to reform themselves from within during precisely in this mid-century
period-after modernist models had been worked out, but before new museums were built. By
triggering and hosting a discourse on the architecture of museums, international organizations like
Unesco, the OIM and ICOM brought modernist spatial tropes into these famed academic halls and
played a crucial role in disseminating the idea that museum space was a quintessentially modern
condition. My analysis revolves around the comparison of the two volumes published 30 years apart.
The first is the massive two-volume Museographie published by the OIM in 1934 as a follow up to the
Madrid Conference, whose findings were disseminated and debated in architectural forums
throughout the 1930s. 55 (fig 1.13) The second is the last Museums and Monuments manual to be published
in the 1960s, titled The Organization of Museums: Practical Advice. Widely disseminated to museum
professionals across the world, this was a stand-alone reference for how to design, staff and operate
a small museum from scratch. A comparison between the two volumes, their similarities,
differences, and filiations demonstrates the passage from the "enfilade" academic typology to the
"museum without walls," and the role that the "spiral model" and the "universal space" played in
this passage.
The 1934 Madrid Museography Conference was the third conference organized by the
International Museums Office. Although its putative theme was "the architecture of museums," the
subject actually addressed was, in the words of one participant, "the palace transformed into a
museum."56 Most European museums were converted palaces, and the political problem this legacy
52 Ludwig Glaeser, The Architecture of Museums (New York: MoMA, Sep-Nov 1968), 2.
s3 Mark Jarzombek "Postmodem Museum," in Global Architecture, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 749.
54 For a theoretical rounding-up of this reform, see Donald Preziosi and Claire Farago, Grasping the World: The Idea of the
Museum (London: Ashgate, 2004).
" See for example the special issue of Architecture d'Aujourd'hui titled "Museographie" (Jun 1938). Hautecoeur's text was
recently republished by the Louvre, as Architecture et Amenagement des Mustes (Paris: Louvre, 1993).
56 Museographie: Architecture et Amrnagement des Musees d'Art. Conference Internationale de Madrid. (Paris: IICI, 1935). The
volume reprinted all of the contributions after they were edited by an editorial board, which included: F. Schkmidt-
Dgener (director of the Rijskmuseum), Eric MacLagan (Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum), F. Sanchez-
Canton (assistant director of the Prado Museum), and E. Foundoukidis, (director of the OIM.)
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posed onto the growth of 20th Century museums was most aptly summarized by American architect
Clarence Stein:
There is probably no other category of building whose form has been less affected by
changes in its function, as well as by progress in mechanical and technical realms, than
the museum. Although it has become a social and democratic institution, the museum
often remains retrenched behind the walls of a princely palace."s7
Louvre conservator Louis Hautecoeur supported this interpretation in a historical overview that
recalled the museum's aristocratic birth, its academic development, and the 50-year critique that
these 19th-Century dispositions had undergone. His survey was graphic as well as historical; he
offered an inventory of the evolution of "the architectural program of the museum" in a sequence
of ten plans. (fig. 3.15) The weight of this "princely" precedent was such that long narrow galleries
had become a typology, now sorely insufficient. The "monotony and boredom of these long
galleries and enormous salons" and the "lack of incorporation of "technical considerations" into the
architecture itself' meant that architectural forms were imposing a political exclusionism onto an
institution that was, in fact, ready to modernize. 58 Indeed the greatest problem of this typology was
its hindrance to the emergence of a new kind of museum--what Henri Focillon had called "the
public's museum", and which the conference called, alternatively, "the democratic museum," the
"inviting museum," or "the educative" museum."s In light of the ludicity of this architectural
critique, the solutions proposed in Madrid appear surprisingly academic-the most popular proposal
being Clarence Stein's own star-shaped plan for "an ideal museum," which used a concentric
"zoning strategy" to differentiate between "the public's museum for appreciation" at the center and
"the student's museum for investigation" on the periphery. (fig 3.13)
The ICOM's role in transforming this academic typology into a modernist model is
evidenced in a 1947 publication by Andre Leveille on the role of museums in the popularization of
science.60 Leveill"'s was an argument for the popularization both of science and of the museum
itself; he argued that each city should be furnished with a museum of science, and provided two
options for the plan: a "Maximum musem", concentric in plan, inspired by the Stein diagram, and
affording both lengthy and shortened circulation routes; and a "minimum museum," which
consisted in a single oblong room measuring of 12 by 20 meters. While the architecture of the two
spaces was radically different, Leveill6 used the same diagram to organize the information on
display. The sequence to be followed by the visitor remained the same: it began with "mathematics"
57 Clarence Stein, "Eclairage Naturel et Eclairage Artificiel," Musiographie, 78.
58 Louis Hautecoeur, "Le Programme Architectural du Mus6e: Principes G6n6raux," in Musiographie, 17.
59 It had first been published as "The Art Museum of Tomorrow" in The Architects'Journal (Jan 1930), 5-12.
60 Andr6 Lveillk, Scientific, Technical, Health Museums, Planetaria and the Popularization of Science (Paris: ICOM, 1948).
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and proceeded outwards, either towards astronomy or through physics, to merge again at the level
of "biology." (fig. 3.14) In other words, Leveille had effected a spatial version of the scientific process
of abstracting: the minimum museum was an "abstract" of the maximum plan, conveying the same
information but with a synthetic reduction of details.
This process of reduction by scientific abstraction is a fitting analogy for the passage from
the intricate organizational diagrams of Museographie to the modern architectural principles of the
Organization of Museums manual. The point is not only that there is a direct connection between the
academic typologies of the "monumental era" and free-plans of "the international style," and that
international organizations preformed a work of dissemination and popularization. The point is also
that in the passage from one model to the other, a set of formal and theoretical tropes were deployed
that allowed certain architectural gestures to be seen as intrinsically modern. Three architectural
gestures can be identified in particular, that allowed this process of "abstracting" to unfold: "the
division of space," which helped to transform the enfilade model into a free-plan model; the design
of "continuous circulation," which served to disassociate the accumulation of objects from the
distribution of visitors; and the issue of "lighting," which helped to make of "ambiance" and
atmosphere a legitimate architectural concern.
The idea that the museum design should proceed by a "division of space" was introduced, in
Madrid, as a way to talk about the interiors of formerly royal palaces in democratic terms-to
describe the need to "divide" and "break down" the long and undifferentiated space of the gallery.
Despite the modernism latent in this language the solutions proposed was still based on the creation
of "rooms," some of which-like the "polygonal rooms of the MFA"- were extracted from their
plans to resemble Leveill&'s minimum museum. (fig 3.16) Hautecoeur articulated this as a
compromise: "a system of movable walls leaves room for a variety of arrangements," but "an
architecture of rooms [une architecture de salle] allows for compartmentalization and affords more
latitude for growth.""1 The few examples of a "dynamic division of space" were examples where
walls were made of vitrines encasing objects. (fig 3.17) The most progressive position vis-i-vis the
planning of exhibition walls was provided by the director of the Rijskmuseum, who connected the
space "around" the artwork to the psychology of the public eye [psychologie du regard public]:
The great discovery that modern trends have brought to our museums is the
psychological effect of free space around the work of art. ... Today the eye has been
awakened to new exigencies: the work of art gives the impression of being a mass which
is carried by the open space that surrounds it. By increasing this space we are able to
61 "Aminagement des Musfes," Mus~ographie, 5 1.
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impress upon the spectator the aesthetic importance of the work. This space has
primarily a psychological effect on the visitor.62
If "space" was the great luxury" in museums, it was be to abused-excessive isolation would be
"pretentious". Therefore a set of guidelines could be drawn from the style of the art itself: while
"symmetrical arrangements" ennobled Italian art, Dutch painting required a more "individualized"
display. Thus an aesthetic regime emanating from the work of art itself began to regulate the space
of the new "visual field." This field itself was to be designed-all decorations to be removed,
"architectural divisions" avoided, "sponge-painting techniques applied", in order to heighten the
"atmospheric" properties of the space of the museum. These instructions echoed the articles
published throughout the 1930s in Mouseion on "the re-organization of national collections," which
showed a progressive removal of paintings from view and de-densification of the visual field. The
idea that "the wall" was the curator's main project was also echoed in articles that mediated the
relationship between objects themselves and the wall-space, such as an article by Germain Bazin on
the re-framing project of the Louvre, which began with the definition of "frame" in spatial and
conceptual terms. (fig. 3.18) ("The word "frame" designates that which delimits a form. Taken
abstractly, this can be a mental form: a concept. Concretely, the frame is a partition in time and
space." 6 3) All of this work of partitioning and dividing "space" was intended to appeal to a new,
neutral subjectivity: "a spectator who, in himself represents nothing at all." As if the architectural
stripping of the museum wall had also stripped the viewer's mind of any thoughts, the viewer
entered the museum "without reasoning" and exited "in a state of vague well-being, a certain
euphoria." 64
Concern over the well-being of a new modern visitor translated not only into a new visual
expectation but also in the need to design specific routes around the objects. Here the museographers
engaged in a protracted argument about the suitability of "shortcuts" and the desirability of
designing sequences according to criteria other than historical succession. Again because of the
limitations of "the architecture of rooms," the debate focussed on the location of doors and the
fatigue created by enfilades. (fig 3.26) But perhaps greatest innovation in the discourse on the
"circulation" of the visitor was the analogy between locating works of art in the museum and the
placement of the museum in the city. Here the Conference made two crucial recommendations: on
the one hand, museums should be located in the center of the city (against recent trends of seeking
62 F. Schmidt-Degener, "Principes Generaux de la Mise en Valeur des Oeuvres d'Art," in Museographie, 213.
63 Germain Bazin, "Principes d'Encadrement des Peintures Anciennes," Mouseion 55-56 (1946), 279.
64 Schmidt-Degener, 218.
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suburban sites) so that "the life of the museum [would be] integrated into the movement of the city,
in the manner of churches, schools, theaters, etc." 6s Yet unlike those other institutions, museums
should always be planned for future expansion, initially occupying only parts of their sites. The
effect of this double requirement was to make of the museum an object with a centripetal force in
the city: an object not unlike the ones inside its walls, which commanded both an "open space"
around itself and a "zone of influence" into the city. The best architectural model for this modern
typology , according to Louis Hautecoeur, was the "the museum with horizontal expansion" which
had been proposed by Le Corbusier. Initially designed for a Paul Otlet's Mundaneum project at the
Palace of Nations in Geneva, this was an architectural typology meant to register the social force
emanating from objects themselves-an "objectivity" that was not as static as the classic Bauhaus
"sachligkeit" but as an outward spatial force of aesthetic experience.66 (fig 3.24) Le Corbusier arrived at
this typology by making a historical argument about accumulation, namely, that museums were
institutions that "grew" indefinitely. But the spiraling outwards was also a formal gesture expressing
the power of this objectivity, and its ability to determine behavior. Thus, unlike his proposal for the
League of Nations competition which was composed according to strict functionalist lines, imposing
a traditional sachligkeit onto the international subject, the mundaneum drew subjects into a spatial pattern
produced by the perpetual accumulation of objects. (figs 3.23-25) When Le Corbusier re-proposed the
mundaneum for the competition for the museum of modern art in Paris, its pyramidal form now
flattened, Mouseion republished the plans and models with a note that the central core allowed
circulation in one part of the plan to be modified without affecting the others-as if Clarence Stein's
ideal plan had been re-proposed in spiral form.67 (fig 3.24)
The last architectural trope that was inaugurated in Madrid and fulfilled in the 1960 Manual
was that of a grid of lighting. Clarence Stein, who had been asked to provide the technical expose of
recent innovations in lighting, proposed no less than to use lighting as a way to bridge between the
old princely container and the new, universal, democratic institution. As we have seen, Stein blamed
the "monumental style" for the growing gap between form and function in museums: distracted by
the imitation of the "princely allure and pretentious aspect of buildings designed in the monumental
style," architects had forgotten to incorporate technical innovations in lighting and ventilation. Stein
advocated "breaking of the barrier" between modern architecture and museum programs, but saw
65 Hautecoeur, 28
66 Le Corbusier had made this clear in a debate with Czeck architect Karel Tiege who had protested his pyramidal form
was too "academic." See Karel Teige, "Mundaneum" and Le Corbusier, "In defense of Architecture," both reprinted in
Oppositions 4 (1974), 83-108. For a discussion of Otlet, Geddes, Le Corbusier and the spiral typology, see Alessandra
Ponte, "Building the Stair Spiral of Evolution" Assemblage 10 (Dec 1989), 47-64.
67 "Plan d'un mus6e a extension horizontale, 6tabli par l'architecte Le Corbusier," Mouseion 49-50, (1940), 29-38.
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"lighting"-and particularly "zenithal lighting"-as a palliative- measure that could bring an
"aesthetic and educative modernity" into the existing palace-museums. In a highly technical exposei
of sky-lighting techniques, Stein gave the impression that the limitations of academic architecture
were gradually being overcome with a universalizing canopy grid, which deployed an even
"ambiance" of light and atmosphere onto all the spaces, people, and objects below. (fig 3.27) Optical
diagrams spanned the space between objects, walls and visitors with geometrical patterns that
seemingly abstracted space into an atmospheric ether. Stein's recommendations and vocabulary were
seconded by British engineer J.A. MacIntyre, who explained the means of maintaining an acceptable
range of temperature and humidity in museum environments, ensuring the comfort of the visitor
and the preservation of objects through "atmospheric conditioning." 68 While these technical
discourses were applied to the conditioning of air and light, they also lent scientific veracity to an
otherwise vague psycho-political discourse. The vocabulary of "dosage" and "moderation", of
technical control over quality and quantity, was applied indiscriminately to the density of artworks,
as to the amount of lighting, and to the behavior of the visitor. The political implications were clear:
"The principles that command the installation of works in a museum are the same as the principles
of good government: to safeguard individuality of each unit, without hurting the whole.""' The
walls of a museum formed a political field to be ordered and then-visually, atmospherically-
projected into the mind of the visitor.
All three of these architectural tropes-the "division of space," the design of "circulation
routes" and the use of "universal lighting"-were echoed in Unesco's 1960 Manual on the
Organization of Museums. In contrast to the Museographie volume, which was filled with Beaux-Arts
architecture, the 1960 manual was full of modern architecture, including works by Mies van der
Rohe, Max Bill, and Albert Laprade. Unlike the conversational Museogaphie volume, the Organization of
Museums manual exuded a technical instrumentality. Its tone was unforgivingly dry and technical; its
pages combined architectural plans with tabulated information, administrative setups, technical
instructions and a table of temperatures-all presented matter-of-factly as international norms. The
intended audience for this "practical advice" was addressed in by Unesco's Director General, Luther
Evans, who presented the Manual as a direct descendent of the Museography volume, but also
synthesized the radical changes that had occurred in the meantime:
68 J.A. MacIntyre, "Chauffage, Ventilation et A6ration," Mus&ographie.
69 "Principes Gn&iraux de la mise en valeur des oeuvres d'art," in Museographie, 204.
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A great deal has happened, however, since Musiographie was published: social and political
changes have occurred, a rapid advance is being made in technology, communication
facilities have improved, air travel has reached a high stage of development, we are on
the threshold of developing new sources of energy and the first attempts at the
exploration of outer space have begun. 70
The implication was clear: from the exploration of outer space to the expansion of museum space,
Unesco was an agent in the technical expansion of environment for people and objects. Evans then
proceeded to recount the specific frontiers that Unesco had reached in its heritage work:
Experts have been sent to advise on aspects of museum development to Afghanistan,
Ceylon, Ecuador, India Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore and the Sudan. Fellowships
have been given to nationals of Aghanistan, Beligium, Burma, Cuba, Denmakr, Ecuadro,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan and Poland.
Evans also referred to the three seminars on "The Educational Role of Museums" which acted as the
discursive complements to the technical manual: training seminars where the ground was prepared
for "museological" training to be received as a technical aid.
But if the conditions underlying museum space had radically changed, certain crucial
diagrams and visual tropes that had been used to describe beaux-arts museum architecture in 1934
were republished in the Manual, now imbued with technical legitimacy and removed from the
museums whence they came. The concept of the "division of space" was conveyed with the same
diagram on "different ways to divide space" and the plan of the Hamburg Ethnographic museum.
(figs 3.18-19) In this context, the juxtaposition implied a very specific formal evolution: from the
"architecture of rooms" with polygonal forms, to the thickening of walls with objects themselves, to
the "articulation of space", and finally to the liberation of the object and the wall so that both could
inhabiting a single space autonomously. (figs 3.20-21) Similarly, the diagram on the location of doors
was reprinted, now accompanied by a recommendation that "arrangements should be made to
enable visitors to the galleries to follow a continuous route or special routes, the principle being that
the visitors' exit should be at the same place as the entrance ... differences in level should be
avoided.""7 Lastly, Clarence Stein's catalog of lighting sections were reprinted, but now the
ubiquitous "zenithal grid" disappeared, and the only grids to be found were in the plans featured in
the Manual-foremost among them the "Museum for a small city" designed by Mies van der Rohe,
presented with a caption "The absence of architecture." (fig 3.29)
By 1960, ICOM presented this universal space as the optimal medium space for the
educational mandate of museums to unfold. The museum's other missions (scholarship and storage)
70 Luther Evans, "Foreword," The Organization of Museums: Practical Advice. Museums & Monuments IX (Unesco: Paris, 1960),
9-10.
71 RMle Educatif des Mushes, 20.
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were relegated to supporting roles. The distinction between different constituencies, once a dilemma,
was now understood unproblematically as a multiplicity of "the museum's functions."72 Similarly,
the political project of aesthetic temperance and atmospheric well-being was now rephrased in
social-scientific terms, with museums exerting an "integrating influence" on an alienated subject:
Many influences today are actively at work to undermine man's human qualities, and if
love of knowledge and contact with the good, the true, and the beautiful are ever to
grow and develop in those who seem often to despise them, the museum is perhaps
one of the few instruments which can be effective. Museums are marginal institutions
which can have an integrating influence in a world suffering from division. ... They have
an urgent task in a modern world.73
In light of this social mandate it is important to note that the OIM and ICOM saw themselves as
codifying a new discipline altogether, and that by the time "museography" had turned into
"museology," architecture had been removed into its own form of autonomous expertise. On the
one hand, this meant that museologists could openly advocate the hiring of modern architects. For
example, George Henri Riviere unabashedly recommended to the Educational Seminar in Rio that
museum directors appoint "progressive architects":
The curator should:
(a) seek the advice of all his qualified colleagues;
(b) obtain as much information as possible about the advances that have been made in
the fields of museology concerned,
(c) wherever his opinion is likely to carry weight, seek to induce the responsible
authority to appoint a "progressive" architect, who would himself cooperate with all the
scientific and technical experts required for the purposes of the latest trends in
architecture.74
Riviere is credited with coining the term and founding the discipline of "museology"; as a curator of
ethnographic collections at Chaillot, Riviere had been a key figure of what James Clifford has called
"Ethnographic surrealism"-advocating a rapprochement between museums of art and ethological
collections like his own Musee de l'Homme."7 Now in charge of the Musee des Arts et Traditions
Populaires, Riviere was also the vice-president of ICOM and brought the same fervor to the
regionalization of the international museum as he did to the collection of regional artifacts from
72 Douglas Allan, "On the Museum's Functions," in The Organization of Museums, 13-26.
7" Molly Harrison, "Education in Museums," in The Organization of Museums, 92.
74 Georges-Henri Rivibre, "General Principles," in "The Architecture of Museums," in Regional Seminar on the Educational R61e
of Museums. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 7-30 September 1959. Educational Studies and Documents No. 38 (Paris: UNESCO,
1960), 18.
75 Riviere's key contribution to this movement was the 1930 text, "De l'objet d'un musie d'ethnographie compare a
celui d'un mus6e de beaux-arts," Cahiers de la Belgique 3 (Nov 1930). For an analysis of this text's importance in the
world of the artistic avant-gardes see James Hebert, "Entr'acte," in 1937: Worlds on Exhibition (Ithaca: Cornell, 1998). See
Jame Clifford, "On Ethnographic Surrealism," in Comparative Studies in Society and History (Oct 1981), 539- 564.
316
3. Functional Monuments
bygone French peasant lifestyles.76 In the hands of a connoisseur of folklores, architecture became a
cultural expression among others, to be curated along with other appropriate forms of international
styles of life:
There should be no hesitation about adopting a 'cosmopolitan' style of architecture. One
of the main features of progressive architecture is a preference for functionalism and
economy rather than for the perpetuation of the various existing styles; consequently a
much truer idea of the characteristics of a nation can be conveyed by progressive
architecture than by copying the styles of the past."
What this means is that museologists were now curating the modernism of museums from within.
Thus the transition from beaux-arts museography to modernist museology proceeded along the lines
of an inversion: from a space "retrenched behind the princely walls" of the monumental style, to a
space to surrounding and encompassing monuments-even modern functional monuments like the
museum. Even the city became a legitimate museum object, circulating around this ubiquitous
museum interior-in a proliferation of exhibitions on city planning which proclaimed, "this could
be your town." (fig. 3.22) It was these disciplines that ushered the monument into architectural
modernity, from within and without.
Unesco Headquarters
The peculiar reciprocity between modern architecture and museology as both its function
and its patron returns us to the predicament of Unesco House, and its surplus of modernist
authorship. To conclude the chapter I propose to bring the lessons of heritage urbanism and
museum space to bear on the Unesco House, in order to re-read its "political failure" in terms of the
project of cultural internationalism. Indeed the assumption that the political fate of Unesco House
lies exclusively in its collaboration has overshadowed any political reading of the project itself, aside
from the "drama" of its design process. My interpretation relies on a three-part argument. First, that
the urban presence of the building is an embodiment of the organizational functionalism that was
characteristic of the museums as urban monuments and carriers of a different Sachligkeit. The Unesco
site-indeed all of Paris, since the headquarters was planned for two different sites in Paris and its
influenced on the capital's monumental axes was carefully calibrated each time-was intended to be
76 Rivibre's course on "Museology" was reprinted posthumously in La Musiologe selon de George-Henri Riviire (Paris:
Dunod, 1989). This book also credits him with the invention of "the ecomuseum." Riviire's own recollections can be
found in the Huxley Memorial Lecture he delivered in 1968, "My experience at the Mus&e d'Ethnologie," reprinted in
the Proceedings of the royal ANthropoligical Institute (1968), 17-21. See also the Eulogy delivered by Claude Levi-Strauss,
highlighting his "revolutionary concepion of folklore," in "Hommage i Georges Henri Rivibre," Ethnologie Frangaise
XIV/1 (1986), 123-136. An article on Rivitre and the architecture of his museum is forthcoming.
77 Georges-Henri Riviere, "The Architecture of Museums," 20.
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the kind of the didactic space that forced a perpetual de-centering upon the urban subject. (fig 3.33)
In this sense the Unesco house does not really have an interior-the design process reveals that, like
the vitrines of the ethnographic museum, its volumes were progressively inflected in an abstract
space in order to express the cultural charge of the objects within. (fig 3.34-36)
Secondly, what is perceived as a lack of spatial differentiation in the interior of Unesco House
is the effect of the bending of axes, division of space, and atmospheric compositions that are
characteristic of museum space as Unesco itself helped to codify it. Typologically, this is only fitting:
unlike the United Nations headquarters, whose "delegate lounges" were spaces of negotiations,
backstage for the "new diplomacy" and therefore planned to be confined to specific "salons," here
the public spaces of the Unesco house were only supposed to impart a cultural goodwill,
moderation, and spirit of agreement-this is why they were designed as a museum of modernist
murals. The type of cultural functionalism that determines this space is best demonstrated in a
comparison with the scheme that was designed a previous site at the porte Maillot, which was
composed of three volumes following a strict architectural functionalism: an office tower, an
assembly hall, and a conference center-rigidly connected with links and plazas. (fig 3.31-32) In
contrast, the project that was built at the place de Fontenoy the project was limited by the height of
the nearby Ecole Militaire and therefore unfolded as a sequence of organized, choreographed
museological experiences. That the result was "undifferentiated" was far from an unintended
consequence; it was the prerequisite condition for the space to be understood as "cultural" at all. (fig
3.35-36)
Thus, the equation of Unesco with the failure of the CIAMs can be rethough in light of the
definition that 'modernism' had acquired by the time the headquarters was designed. There are three
ways that Unesco appears in the history of the CIAMs. The first is as an emblem of modernism's
political helplessness. For example, when Bruno Zevi wrote his famous "Message to the CIAMs" in
1948, he used the weakness of Unesco's "city planning and building center" as evidence of the fact
that "we architects of today have not yet learned how to cooperate together on the political scene."78
The second is as a hopeful partner for a project to reform the education of architects in the
immediate postwar. In 1947 Siegfried Giedion wrote a manifesto-like letter on "the education of the
architect" proposing that architecture become the discipline which is best able to "learn to
coordinate human activities," and Unesco as the only agency "able to accomplish an integration
78 Bruno Zevi, "Messaggio al "Congrks international d'architecture moderne": Della Cultura Architettonica," in Metron,
31-32 (1948), 5-30.
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which has to come about if our civilization is not to collapse."79 The third is as a client-or rather, a
potential client of Le Corbusier. When the Unesco House was first begun and Le Corbusier lobbied to
become the sole architect of the commission, he garnered the support of a petition signed by the
CIAM directors."8 But CIAM also appears in the archives of Unesco as an organization that does not
fit the existing categories of international organizations, whose congresses Unesco bureaucrats attend
in order to ascertain whether they validly qualify as a "non-governmental organization, '"8! and
whose privileged status as a "consultant organization" has to be constantly defended on the part of a
few interested individuals buried deep within the bureaucracy. In this body of literature, the
turbulent postwar struggles at the leadership of the CIAM are legible in a frequent changes of names,
structure, and leadership that were regularly registered with Unesco, which kept track of all arts
organizations of this nature. From this perspective, it is evident that, for Unesco, the CIAMs
represented not a body of expertise but rather a cultural phenomenon, to be witnessed, preserved,
and approached only within certain norms and forms. Within this pattern, the Unesco House appears
not as a failure but a success: a procedure that successfully "conserved" the modern tradition in
architecture by "bringing it to life" within a functional space in the modern city. The bureaucratic
atrophy that felt by the CIAM as a result of this collaboration was only a symptom that would soon
be felt in the preserved neighborhoods in cities across the world: the uncanny "formalism" that
comes from having been functionally, successfully, "conserved."
9 Siegfried Giedion, "On the Education of the Architect," Architecture, You and Me (Cambridge: Harvard, 1958), 102-103
80 The letter was jointly written and signed by Gropius, Rogers, Sert, Emery, Wells Coates, and Giedion on 26 July
1953. On Le Corbusier's efforts to become the sole architect see Barbara Shapiro, "Tout ýa est foutaise: Le Corbusier
and Unesco," RACAR XVI,2 (1989), 171-306.
81 UNESCO/ 72 A 01 ICMA, "International Congresses for Modem Architecture," Unesco Archives. This archival group
begin with letters from Giedion to Huxley, continue with arrangements for an enthusiastic Unesco librarian to attend
them, then onto the problem of whether CIAM's association with the INternational Union of Architects meant that it
should lose its privileged "consultant" status, and ends a stern letter to Jaap Bakema, after the Otterloo meeting, asking:
(1) what are the permanent activities of the center? (2) Does the congress have regular mode of communication with
its members (bulletin, regular meetings, etc?)
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FIG. 3.02 Unesco: Museums & Monuments manuals published between 1949 and 1960.
322
3. Functional Monuments
THE
yrrF ears ago our fathers
1 
. 
sinod at the threshold of the
-Twen4ieth Centary. Thatwas
athe of progress and of belief in
progress, and the eyes of all tenlooked orward to the future. But
events were soon to dash their
hope. Twice sinte the% war has
plingd the w-orld into tbloodshed
and horror. And our generation
asks today : What grounds have
we for belief in a better future ?
It would be easy - but euite
ooant - to blame tie men on the
Twentie e ntury for error which
amtater t. bo8tM tonttare, fter all, hut the result of
earlier centuries of self-interest of
ge and of misunderstandtng.
Whytwere the men of i90 so car-
toin that they were moviag into an
am of peace and wan%-hingWhat lad the Nineteenth Century
done but extol the glorties of nation-
alism? There were enlightened
exceptons, butin the man it Is
air to say that the man of t00,
so certain of the glorious propects
of the days to come, saw worldhistory from nta pl, nstonr t
aogte. His ancentoon no donht,
founht for lhbety, for equality, for
y-raeh at- a-bu t was for iberty
and for traternit, in a world stll
divided by the banriers of frontiers
and ofcustoms. There were a few
teoples who ruled and made hie-
tot but in most of the others,
htev wans imposed. Was it reason-
ahle, tn such a world. to expect
any pea other than one of mere
reoignation?
The wars of the Twentieth Ie-
tt to. tndnd, nado things no
But through nffortng anhave at leat-atd tlnt-heat; nd
the unity of hnuman destiny. We
have learnedt by tragic experience,to hbelieve what the phlonsophe
had vainly attempted to tOeao us:
that no mn can save himself alone;
that no clanss, no state, no race, no
nationo can save te alone. As
Dostoevskv wrote: We stand re.
sponsible for all things, before all
men." The hWtet which strikes
down any man. even though he be
our0 enemy, stritkesu too. When
he s lost, a part of ourselves Is lostlikewise. Ad the amlt he nwves
behind tilm hlas tslinog celmn upon
us.
T m Twentieth Centtury has
atledy witn ened 0na great
catastrophes. But, In the
midst of dissthr, it has also been
responsible for two inspired orea-
tlon unprecedentetd In history:
- - In gftad toonea
toL 'k0 04000 o.0 0 **00
A,4^s NtaO 000T r0 1W, f,:O
• itmt CX0ONto 00~P*40 000 O 7ot00FOtnhoo 06* It 1
WILL
The League of Nations and the
United Nations. Whatever the
immediate results of these two
ontrpnrisesone fact remains: this
entylike no ther before it, has
soughta world solution for the
probleoatf mankind. At last the
nations of the world have under-
stood that seourity forone reqntuires
seourtty tor all, and that poltital
security tis aninltsst if tt is notfounded upon the foot fundamentalhuman rigehts, to which the meat
Agencies of the United Nations
correspond: tnhe right to life. to
health, to work andr nesons own
reason for beino., th right to edu.
cation and nculture.
TO P
The conquest of these rights willdemand many Iong yeaMt We
cannot even hope that th century
will aes the tull achievement of
snuh a ptogranne. Nevertheless,
ndy thogh nh a progrname
can world tpeace become peeso for
mankind, peace foe all men,
,v yanher.
If we are to deserve and to
achieve this we must, above all,
vigilantly maintain omr will to
peace. We knowno that tthemoot
=ntrous resolutions and the most
admirable intentions ae of ltttle
value ifwe are not ready to tran-
slate them into action. We have
EACE
proclaimed Rights of Man; w,
throgh our efforts,. the unioof
the peoples must become more than
a legal phraso. If wedo not work
for peace that is possible today, we
shall never create peace that willlast for ever. Thin torn world of
ours needs a faith: taith in the
brotherhood of human ktd.
In wishing all the npeoples of the
world a New Year of concord and
belief in the power of the values
of the mind for the cause of liberty,
of justice andof peaoce.
tNew Yeaor Meseoe From The
Director-General of Uxesco.)
FIG. 3.04 "Distance between home and
library'," in Unesco, The Delhi Public
Library, 1957.
FIG. 3.03 Jaime Torres-Bodet,
"The Will to Peace'," in The Unesco
Courier, January 1950.
FIG. 3.04 Julian Huxley, cover of, Unesco:
Its Purpose and Philosophy, 1946.
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FIG. 3.05 St. Anne, Warsaw: plan and view from the new highway. From Museums and Monuments I, 1950.
FIG. 3.06 "The reconstruction of roofs with new materials'" From Museums and Monuments 1, 1950.
FIG. 3.07 Tempio Malatesta, Rimini: restoration elevation and detail. From Museums and Monuments 1, 1950.
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FIG. 3.08 St Sophia Ochrida: "General
Improvements" plan. Museums and
Monuments IV, 1953.
FIG. 3.09 Cuzco: "Preservation Zoning
Plan'." Museums and Monuments II,
1951.
FIG. 3.10 Baalbek: 1951 plan (left)
& Unesco plan (right). Museums and
Monuments VII, 1954.
FIG. 3.11 Tripoli: proposed tunnel
under the old city. Museums and
Monuments VI, 1954.
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FIG. 3.12 Distribution of services in an ideal museum. From
OIM, Musdographie, 1934.
FIG. 3.13 Clarence Stein: Plan for the Public. From OIM,
Musdographie, 1934.
FIG. 3.14 Andre Leveille: Le mus6e maximum et le musee
minimum, plans. ICOM, Mus6es Scientifiques, 1947.
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FIG. 3.15 Louis Hautecoeur, "Le Programme Architectural du Musee'," from OIM, Mus6ographie, 1934.
FIG. 3.16 "Polygonal Halls", from OIM, Mus6ographie, 1934; and Unesco, The Organization of Museums, 1960.
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FIG. 3.17 Hamburg Ethnographic Museum: Plan of
cases. From OIM, Mus6ographie, 1934; and Unesco,
The Organization of Museums, 1960.
FIG. 3.18 Germain Bazin, "The Reframing of Pictures',"
in Mouseion, 1940.
FIG. 3.19 "Different ways of dividing up exhibition
space" from Unesco, The Organization of Museums,
1960.
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FIG. 3.20 Displays from Unesco,
Museums & Monuments X: The
Organization of Museums, 1960.
FIG. 3.21 "The visitor" from OIM,
Mus6ographie, 1934.
FIG. 3.22 "This is your town" and "This
could be your town'," displays from
Museums & Monuments V: Travelling
Exhibitions.
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FIG. 3.23 Le Corbusier, League
of Nations Competition, 1922.
FIG. 3.24 Le Corbusier,
Mundaneum, 1924.
FIG. 3.25 Le Corbusier,
"Mus6e A croissance illimit6e,"
submission for the Mus6e d'Art
National, from Mouseion, 1937.
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FIG. 3.26 "Plans for the locations of Doors"' From OIM, Mus6ographie, 1934 & Unesco, The Organization of Museums, 1960.
FIG. 3.28 "Different methods of admitting light" from OIM, Mus6ographie, 1934; and Unesco, The Organization of Museums, 1960.
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FIG. 3.27 "Eclairage Z6nithal," in Paris, Berlin,
Hamburg, Toledo, Cambridge. From OIM,
Mus6ographie, 1934.
FIG. 3.29 Mies van der Rohe, Design
for a small city, 1942, from Unesco, The
Oroanization of Museums. 1960.
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FIG. 3.30 Unesco House, Porte Maillot Project: View, 1952
FIG. 3.31 Unesco House, Porte Maillot Project: "Unesco in Paris'," 1952
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FIG. 3.32 Unesco House, Porte Maillot project: plan, site plan and site section.
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FIG. 3.33 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy: Site plan and "Unesco in Paris," 1953
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FIG. 3.34 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy: Views & "The Three" at work, 1953
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FIG. 3.35 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy.
Location of artwork.
FIG. 3.36 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy.
Organigram and ground floor plan.
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Chapter 4
Salvaged Monuments
Technology and Cultural Exchange on the Nile, 1959-1964
"Work has begun on the great Aswan Dam." It is by conjuring this image of monumental
architecture arising from international cooperation that the director-general of Unesco, Vittorino
Veronese, launched the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia on March 8 th , 1960.' In the
matter of a few years, the Aswan High Dam would transform of the Middle Valley of the Nile into a
huge reservoir, rendering fertile entire stretches of desert, and flooding innumerable monuments and
archaeological sites in the process. For Unesco, this presented a "magnificent opportunity" to renew
the Organization's commitment to "the protection of mankind's cultural heritage." Since 1946 this
commitment had been associated with the destructions of city centers; as traces of these destructions
grew ever fainter, the flooding of the Nile offered an identifiable new "threat" to an identifiable
collection of what Veronese called "wondrous structures." Unlike the war, however, the Dam could
not be described as a purely destructive event. Instead Veronese acclaimed it as a major step towards
the betterment of human welfare, and tinged his appeal with the "anguish" of having "to choose
between a heritage of the past and the well-being of a people." "It is not easy", he acknowledged,
"to choose between temples and crops. I would be sorry for any man called on to make a choice
who could do so without a feeling of despair." Most accounts of the massive International
Campaign that followed have taken their cue from Veronese, telling the story of a 20-year
architectural "salvage" from this all-too-human "despair." Few have noted that the construction of
the Aswan High Dam threatened not only to submerge a significant number of monuments, but also
to render obsolete Unesco's working definition of monumentality. This chapter addresses the choice
that was implied in the campaign, not between "temples and crops," but between two conceptions
of monumentality: the one, ancient and passive; the other, modem and technological-both born of
the integration of "the technical" and "the cultural."
I look at the Nubian Campaign as an elaborate bureaucratic mechanism for producing
monumental value: a value described as "technical" so as to compete with development schemes,
but removed from political contingency into a "purely cultural" category of action. I examine how
1 Vittorino Veronese, "Unesco Launches a World Appeal" reprinted as "Appeal by the Director-General of Unesco,"
Unesco Courier: A Window Open onto The World May 1960, 6.
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Unesco transformed the "artistic and historic" monuments of the Nile Valley into "cultural" objects
by recording, preserving, and relocating them. I look at this transformation from within (as an
institutional opportunity for Unesco) and from without (as a solution to a cold-war problem). My
main argument is that, as Unesco modified the legal framework, territorial practices, and economic
regime of archaeological exchange to present Nubian monuments as the "surplus" of Egypt, a
spatial logic of excess emerged that reconfigured Nubia, (and by extension, the nascent category of
The Cultural Heritage of Mankind) into what Andre Malraux called "an imaginary museum." This
spatial logic, I argue, operated at two scales: at the scale of the desert, a principle of "aesthetic
analogy" allowed temples to be dispersed in oases along the Nile, or disbursed as "gifts-in-return" to
Western museums. At the scale of the monument, the principle of "integrity" allowed structures to
be re-engineered into landmarks of contemporary technological bravura. Thus Nubia served as the
inaugural case both for the economic viability of tourism as international subjectivity, and for the
theoretical viability of heritage conservation as international action-particularly through the
involvement of the principal authors of the Venice Charter. I conclude with the international
competition to move the temples of Abu Simbel, whose monolithic construction "in sand and out of
sand" blurred the distinction between object and environment. Disfigured into blocks then refigured
into the "face of mankind", the temples were literally injected with social assumptions that made
them more suitable for tourism. Far from a supporting act, the immense technological, financial,
and rhetorical effort expended in the Nubian Campaign was constitutive of the value of the
monuments it sought to preserve. This effort is usually taken as proof that the monuments saved
were worthy of salvage-and conversely that the salvage constitutes a "manifestation of Unesco's
faithfulness to its own ideal." 2 Instead I ask why this effort was able to occur at all, and analyze all
of the "exceptional" forms of action, political channels, discursive tropes, and material practices that
had to be invented along the way, in spite of this collaborative ideal.
Mankind saves Mankind
On January 14'h, 1964, the New York Times published a photograph of Soviet president Nikita
Krutschev and United Arab Republic president Gamal Nasser "hurling rocks" into the Nile to
inaugurate the construction of Aswan High Dam. 3 (fig 4.04) The photo was disseminated in the
2 Vittorino Veronese, "Compte-rendu analytique provisoire de la neuviime s6ance," in 55 EX/SR.9 (Prov., 2 Dec
1959), 2.
3 Jay Walz, "Kruschev Joins in Nile Ceremony: He and Nasser Hurl Rocks Into Gap at Aswan Dam," New York Times, 14
Jan 1964.
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Western press as a classic cold-war-era cautionary tale: the stones of the Aswan Dam were carriers of
a politicizing force, which could stop not only the flow of the Nile but also Western channels of
influence in the Middle East. There was no shortage of infrastructural metaphors to make the point;
Krutschev himself used the first visit to declare his intention to "drown capitalism on the African
continent." Indeed infrastructural projects were favorite bargaining chips of non-aligned leaders like
Nasser in this period, and this particular dam had been the object of an international debate long
before Nasser had made it the centerpiece of his revolutionary project in 1952. Designed by an
international consortium in 1946 under the leadership of Harvard geological engineer, the High
Dam was meant to replace the original Aswan Dam, built by the British in 1903 and raised once in
1924. In 1956, Nasser had obtained an offer of funding for the new project from the US, the UK
and the World Bank, only to see the offer withdrawn a few months later-in punishment both for
his refusal to submit to World Bank supervision and for continued flirtations with the USSR. Now,
after a decade-long international tug-of-war, (including invasions by former colonial powers and
war with Israel) the dam was being built with Soviet money and expertise.
It is a testament to the effectiveness of Nasser's non-alignment policy that by 1964, the Dam
had become a veritable iron curtain (to use another cold-war infrastructural cliche) neatly dividing
the Nile Valley between Eastern and Western blocks, each side was running a large-scale engineering
project. (figs 4.02-03) Downstream, Russian engineers and architects built the dam, its surrounding
town, and a series of electrical stations punctuating the Nile to bring power up to Cairo. Upstream,
the entire region of Nubia, soon to be transformed into a gigantic reservoir lake, was crowded with
Western archaeologists and engineers, moving monuments and surveying archaeological sites before
they were flooded by six trillion cubic feet of Nile water. Nasser played both sides of the fence: with
Krutschev he "hurled" the rocks of modernization into the Nile, with Unesco his ministry of culture
saved ancient rocks from the flood of modernity.
At stake in the success of Unesco's Nubian Campaign, was not only the re-orientation of its
protective mandate towards peace-time goals, but also a reclamation of the tropes of
monumentality, away from the (evidently politicized) world of economic development, to put
them back into the (presumably autonomous) realm of culture. By 1960 the Dam was already
known as a project whose proportions dwarfed the largest monuments in history, largely because
the UAR's Department of Information was hard at work comparing it with the monuments of
Pharaonic Egypt. The aptly-titled pamphlet Assouan: Ville des Nouvelles R&alisations Plus Grandioses que les
Oblisques et les Pyramides computed that the dam would utilize enough stone blocks to build 26 ancient
pyramids, a comparison made all the more poignant in that the dam itself was to be a rock-fill dam,
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"in the form of a collapsed pyramid." 4 (fig 4.05) But whereas the pyramids were "monstrous
architectural conceptions" that wasted material and exploited labor, each stone of the dam would
remain active in hydrological perpetuity. Therefore the "comparison" with the marvels of the past"
was "not so exact after all:"
Obelisks and pyramids were built by ancient Egyptians to perpetuate the memory of a few men.
... Their construction provided work to thousands of laborers but, once they were finished,
they became completely useless. Of the projects currently being built in Aswan, one can say that
they are larger than those built by the Pharaohs and also more human. Their goal is not to
provoke admiration but to create and to satisfy needs. In doing this, they reflect a new society
very different from the egotistical autocracies of the past. s
Against the dead stones of "a few egotistical men", Nasser proposed "larger and more human"
monuments to economic development. This image of an "active stone" was echoed by a promotion
of the "technological revolution to be embodied in the new dam" as distinctly Egyptian. According
to one analyst, "continental engineers had found a new way of utilizing the materials of the earth's
crust, ... guided by the new science of Soil Mechanics ... [that] was already widely known and
practiced in Egypt."6 While the old Aswan dam had been built by the British in an Egyptian style,
ornamented with pseudo-Pharaonic flourishes, "Nasser's Pyramid" would be made of Egyptian soil,
with a technique that legitimized its enormous size.7 In the words of a 1960 projection, "In
comparison with this great construction, the present dam will be a puny affair."8
In reaction to this propaganda the West began depicting "Nasser's Pyramid" as an economic
folly, rather than a realistic project for raising the living standards of Egyptians. US policy-makers
admitted that their support had been "motivated by political rather than economic considerations,"
and mined the World Bank's report for a critique of the design. Critiques were couched in
hydrological terms: what was needed was "a new and comprehensive study of the Nile as
hydrological entity"-in short, "a lesser dam" would have been preferable. Since "the Nile is a
4 Counting the stones of the Pyramid had also been Napoleon's reaction to Gyza, as narrated by Julian Huxley: "He
first demanded to know the measurement of the Great Pyramid: and then astonished his staff, on their return from
climbing to the top, by pointing out that its cubic content would suffice to build a wall ten feet high and a foot thick
entirely surrounding France." Huxley, From an Antique Land: Ancient and Modern in the Middle East, 240.
s United Arab Republic, Assouan: La Ville des Nouvelles Realisations Plus Grandioses que les Oblisques et les Pyramides (Le Caire:
Administration de l'Information, 1961), 18.
6 Herbert Addison, Sun and Shadow at Aswan (London: Chapman & Hall, 1959), 122. Credit for the design of the Aswan
High Dam is given to Viennese engineer, Harvard expatriate and inventor of the discipline of soil-mechanics Karl
Terzaghi. Terzaghi was chairman of the International Consulting Board for the construction of the Aswan High Dam in
1954, but resigned in 1959 in protest against the Russian engineering of his scheme.
7 "Nasser's Pyramid" is Addison's formulation. For the first dam see Sir William Willcocks, in The Nile Reservoir Dam at
Assudn and After (London: Strand, 1903).
8 L.P. Kirwan, Review of Addison's Sun and Shadows at Aswan, The Geographical Journal (Jun 1960), 220-221.
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regional river. It should be developed on a regional basis." ' Thus the proposal to build one single
dam (rather than multiple ones); so far upstream (rather than closer to Cairo); to produce the largest
possible reservoir lake (rather than calibrating it to immediate water needs) and to keep in within
Egypt (rather than spanning into other countries)-all of these engineering decisions were portrayed
as an "Egyptian monopolization of the Nile"' 0
These Western critiques of the Dam as a nationalist "caprice" only solidified its image as a
monument to post-colonial development-especially once Soviet aid was secured and the dam was
actually built. "Everywhere one hears about the contrast between the dam and the Pyramids,"
reported a Washington Post commentator in 1963, upon visiting the construction site, which he found
"dominated by some 800 Russian engineers."" Decades later, political scientist John Waterbury
agreed: "whether a triumph of Soviet-Egyptian solidarity or a triumph of the Egyptian people, the
diplomatic history of the dam dictated that it be a triumph of some sort." " It is through this decade-
long hydropolitical debate that an image of the dam as a super-human wonder was constructed. 13
By 1971 it was clear that the "the dam was simply unequal to the problems it was designed to
solve," yet it was still "consecrated [as a] massive monument, built by the Soviets." 4 The crucial
term here is "design": the technical form of the dam had remained unchanged throughout
variations in funding, management, and ideology. Eventually, the charge of improbability built into
Western critiques of the "mammoth project" became the standard against which its realization was
measured: regardless of its merits as an engineering feat, the dam became an international
"wonder" merely for beating such long geo-political odds.
Yet Nasser's decision to build the dam without Western support was not only a political
affront to international institutions; it was also an attack on a specific ideology about who should
control technology in the "economic progress of the less developed countries." When an American
policy paper legitimized the rejection of the scheme by decrying it as "a capricious 'development'
9 Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Nasser's Aswan High Dam: Panacea or Politics? (Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1956), 4.
1o Panacea or Politics?, 19. Robert W. Rycrift and Joseph Szyliowicz, in "The Technological Aspects of Decision Making:
The Case of the Aswan High Dam," in World Politics (Oct., 1980), 57, conclude that "other hydrological approaches
were actively discouraged," and "only the High Dam gained access to the political agenda" of the Nasser regime.
" Max Freedman, "The Aswan Dam," in The Washington Post, 23 Feb 1963, A9. Freedman was correspondent for The
Manchester Guardian. "The chief significance of the dam will be missed if it is seen merely as an economic project; it is
more significant as a moral symbol, a token of the determination of the Egyptian people."
12 John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 114-115.
13 In 1981 anthropologist Hussein M. Fahim summarized the negative view that eventually emerged as 'a disaster
reflecting a classic case of ecological ignorance and shortsightedness'. Fahim, Dams, People and Development: The Aswan High
Dam Case (New York: Pergamon, 1981), 4.
14 Waterbury, Hydropolitics, 151.
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program completely out of line with the realities of its precarious economic position,"" the word
'development' was placed in quotation marks throughout the paper, to make clear that Nasser's usage
was a distortion of the accepted definition.16 At stake in this debate over the scale of the dam as a
vehicle for "adequate" development was a venerable legacy of large-scale infrastructural projects in
the 1 9th-century-a canon of engineering history, composed of projects so large that their
"organization," rather than their outcome, had become the primary concern of engineers, leading to
the emergence of what historian of technology Tom Peters has called the "aesthetics of process."
According to this history, the modern engineer, unlike the architect, designs systems and processes.
Similarly, unlike the scientist who operates with fixed objectivity, the engineer proceeds by
"rationalization," a dynamic process aiming for totalities."8
Nasser's affront to this engineering tradition was all the more violent in that he had resolved
to pay for the Aswan Dam by nationalizing the Suez Canal, itself a landmark in the history of
"process engineering." The construction of the Suez Canal had been a Saint-Simonian dream, then a
commercial tug of war between French and British interests.19 As a "system" the canal radically
modified the British monopoly over water transport routes in and out of the Mediterranean-as
evidenced by a panorama from the 1883 Nouvelles Conquetes de la Science which labeled each geographic
features that would be connected, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. (fig 4.06) As a "process"
the construction of the Canal had inaugurated the passage from ad-hoc building, using human labor
to planned construction using mechanized processes and what Peters calls the "rationalization" of
the building site. A paradigmatic example of this is the "simple but highly rationalized site factory"
for building concrete blocks on the beach of the canal. 20 It is this kind of gigantic endeavor, helped
by a national narrative of radical change, that Nasser hoped to jump-start his country's modernity,
is Panacea or Politics?, 28.
16 For a description of Nasser's Egypt-centric regional "development" plan, and the role of the Dam therein, see the
conference of the Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-Operation, convened in Cairo in 1959. Y.M. Simaika,
"Irrigation in Egypt," in Proceedings of the Economic Conference for Afro-Asian Countries, 8-11 December 1959, (Cairo: Centre for
the Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, 1959), 247-254.
17 See Tom F. Peters, "Conclusion: The Building Process and Technological Thinking," in Building the Ninteenth Century
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.), 348-356.
18 For a description of engineering rationality, and its debt to hegemonic desires, see Antoine Picon, "Pour une
histoire de la rationalite technique," in L'Invention de I'Ingenieur Moderne: L'Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees 1747-185 1 (Paris: Ponts et
Chaussies, 1992).
19 For the role of Egypt in Saint-Simonian thought, see Philippe R6gnier & Amin F. Abdelnour, Les Saint-Simoniens en
Egypte (Le Caire: BUE, 1991)
20 Tom F. Peters, Building the Ninteenth Century, 178.
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boasting that "it should be possible for Egypt to do in 30 years what it took Europe 300 years to
achieve." 21
Yet by the time Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, what had begun as a technique
for managing ever-larger infrastructural wonders had become an international professional ethic that
favored smaller, incremental projects over massive, heroic ones. In contrast to Nasser's revolutionary
rhetoric, organizations like the UN and the World Bank argued that agricultural societies like Egypt
needed to be "gradually" lifted into modernity through modifications in their patterns of behavior.22
The ruling idea in the World Bank and Unesco was that poor nation should be modernized
incrementally, by way of controlled "updates" to existing infrastructural networks. This argument,
in turn, was supported by social-scientific descriptions of the role of "culture" in technology. For
instance, the first UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of
Less Developed Areas (UNCAST) in 1963, devoted an entire session to the problem of "transfer and
adaptation"--the problem of translating radical epistemological shifts into incremental technical
projects. According to the session summary, the "contemporary scientific revolution" differed from
the "19 th Century industrial revolution" in that a self-consciously 'cultural' dimension had been
added to development:
The application of science and technology is primarily a social rather than a technical
process. ... Technological change involves cultural change.... Culture, however, is not an
accumulation of unrelated and accidental elements, but is an integrated whole expressing
a certain way of life, a fundamental attitude shared in a greater or lesser degree by all the
members of the society which produced that culture. 23
In other words, now that culture itself was considered a "system" ("a system of human relations and
attitudes"), it was the "process" of entire nations' "modernization" that engineers were entrusted
with designing, and international organizations asked that they do so while minimizing radical shifts.
21 Freedman, A9. "It is a challenging boast", Freedman continued, "which has caught the imagination of less
developed nations. They have come to Aswan in large numbers to see the marvel."
22 For an account of these criteria through case-studies drawn from the "first development decade," see John A. King,
"Aspects of Project Appraisal," in Economic Development Projects and their Appraisal: Cases and Principles from The Experience of the World
Bank (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966), 3-18.
23 "International Co-operation and problems of transfer and adaptation, " in UNCAST, Science and Technology for Development.
Volume I: World of Opportunity (New York: UN, 1963) 193. The argument can be summarized with excerpts from the
session titled "The contemporary scientific revolution", which explained how this revolution differed from the
"industrial revolution of the previous century:" "Modern science and technology have widened the gap between the
rich and the poor countries.., because the advanced countries have been in a better position to use them. ... Science
and technology, however, cannot simply be bought in the market.... If Science and technology are to play an active
role in the process of development, they cannot operate in a vacuum. The country as a whole, with its won
geographical and climatic features, resources, population distribution, and education, cultural and political problems,
must be taken into account. The decisive role belongs to the creative effort of the country itself." UNCAST, 184-186.
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For this purpose the UN also became concerned with the training of engineers-as evidenced
by the UNSCAT conference session titled "Producing Good Engineers Quickly." Engineers who
would be taught both expertise and the ethic of its implementation, gradually expanding a technical
education into an economic viewpoint. Hence the "probable path of a future career" was
summarized, not altogether in jest, as follows: "The growth of many engineers follows the path:
machines, materials, men, management, method, money."" 4 Training engineers was a way for
international organizations to chaperone their investments into developing countries and ensure that
technological change would be accompanied by appropriate behavioral and societal results. If the
engineer was the human enactor of this ethic, the dam was the paradigmatic example of a complex
system in which engineering expertise would be attracted: in the words of one reviewer of the
UNCAST report wrote, "a typical development project [that] illustrates the integral part science and
technology play in the development process." As an illustration the author listed no less than twelve
forms of technical expertise that were sequentially involved in the building of a dam: from
"hydrologists study the movement of water in the river bed to select the proper site for the dam," to
"finally, educators come into the villages to teach the basic sciences.""2 Dams would bring not only
development, but also enlightenment.
The Aswan High Dam appears periodically in the UNCAST report, although the question of
its scale is carefully avoided. Insofar as all dam projects have now retroactively been re-evaluated in
light of fin-de-siecle environmental anxieties, the Aswan Dam holds the dubious honor of being one
of the first dams to be condemned as environmentally irresponsible. By 1977 the Aswan High Dam
had become literally a textbook case of engineering ethics gone wrong-a case where the engineers
had omitted to include "social, political, and economic factors" in their technical calculation-if one
is to judge by an MIT lecture series titled What is Engineering? which devoted its first four lectures to the
Aswan High Dam as a "controversial" project. Civil engineering professor Fred Moavenzadeh used
the Dam to present students with a kind of coming-out story, where the engineering profession was
increasingly placed "in relation with the public," and should develop a suitably "public" attitude.
Moavenzadeh presented the Aswan High Dam as a case study of complex factors in decision-
making, giving the "pros and cons": "In some views the decision to build the dam was the most
catastrophic, in others it was the most appropriate, decision that Egypt could make at the time."26
Whichever side the students adopted, however, the implication was the same: that "catastrophe" in
24 UNSCAT, Volume VI: Education and Training (New York: UN, 1963), 98.
25 Sherman Katz, "The Application of Science and Technology to Development," International Organization (Winter 1968),
392.
26 Fred. Moavenzadeh, "Introductory Lecture on the Aswan Dam," What Is Engineering? (MIT: Sep 15, 1977).
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engineering was more likely to be due to "social, political and economic" miscalculations rather
than technological failure.
If the Aswan Dam has become an emblem of the way "technical" matters became
subjugated to "cultural" concerns, the International Campaign for Nubia corresponds to a moment
when the cultural historians see heritage as taking a distinctly technological turn.27 The international
debates over the fate of the Nubian monuments closely mimicked the pattern of debates that had
surrounded the dam: from a technical problem of unprecedented scale, through an unlikely funding
scheme, with political disagreements translated into engineering problems, all leading to a
resolution, by way of international cooperation, against long odds. This was not the effect of an
actual convergence between the two endeavors, but of the definite gap that began to separate them in
1960.28 The greater this gap, the more the "cultural" campaign was able to echo the heroic tone of
the dam's "technological" construction. But while political historians unanimously attribute the
credit for completing the unlikely Dam project to Nasser, cultural historians have yet to explicate the
achievement of Unesco's (equally unlikely) Campaign.
Consider the fate of the Abu Simbel temples. They served as emblems for the entire Nubian
campaign from the beginning. It was not only that the size of the temples gave a colossal face to
Unesco's repeated calls for human action on an "unprecedented scale;" or that their seated pose in
front of a rising Nile made for a stoic dramatization of the impending flood. (fig 4.07) It was also
that these figures were hewn as one piece from the sandstone rock. If the general campaign was
supposed to show that "the works of previous generations scattered throughout the world [are] an
indivisible whole constituting a single heritage,"2 9 the monolithic temples provided a material analog
for the conceptual integrity of this "indivisible whole." By 1971, Concluding Report victoriously
declared that "every piece of stone sculptured in the rock more than 3,200 years ago still does
27 This period also corresponds to the time that Unesco got involved in issues of technology transfer. In 1964 Unesco
started a program of hydrological training, which taught engineers that water was to be thought of as an "international
heritage, not belonging to a single nation.
28 Throughout the 1950s the salvage of Nubia's monuments remained a sub-plot in the intrigue of dam's construction.
Even the tourist value of archaeological treasures subsumed under the dam's economic potential as a national
monument. Writing in the 1959 the director of the Egyptian Antiquities Department projected that "with the erection
of the High Dam, Aswan will become one of the most important towns of Egypt. Moreover, the proposed transference
of many monuments and objects of Nubia to Aswan will add to its importance in historical remains." Labib Habachi,
in Habachi & Henri Riad, Aswan: The Town with a Glorious Past and a Promising Future, (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut Frangais
d'Archeologie Orientale, 1959), iv. The UAR's literature also mentioned the "radical measures" taken to record
antiquities, but these were perfunctory attempts to evade the kind of outcry that had erupted over the submersion of
Philae during the building of the first Aswan dam.
29 M'Bow, 11.
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exist!"30 This carefully chosen expression was intended to omit the crucial fact that the block had
actually been cut into blocks. What happened to this conceptual integrity when the temples were cut
to pieces, then glued back together with sand and epoxy? In 1960 the Unesco Courier had confidently
proclaimed that "One would not dismantle Westminster Abbey."31 Now the temples had been
"dismantled" after all. What, exactly was achieved?
The Concluding Report, showed the relocated temples facing with a dense mass of arriving
visitors on opening day with the caption:
On 22nd September, 1968, the day of the solemn yet joyful re-inauguration of the Abu
Simbel Temples, more visitors to the Temples were gathered than perhaps since the day
of the first inauguration of the Temples some 3,200 years ago.32
In contrast to the early images of a lonely Rameses awaiting tragedy in the desert, the relocated
temples were reassuringly surrounded by a representative sample of humanity. (fig 4.08) "This is, of
course," the report continued, "the whole point of salvaging and preserving the Monuments: that as
many visitors as possible should be enabled to visit them."'33 This staging of a momentous encounter
between "mankind" and its "heritage" had also been explicitly prophesized in 1960. Narrating "The
Drama of Nubia", Georges Fradier used the shorthand of a universal "we":
Someone once said that it is best to announce a great calamity like a fire, a massacre or a
tidal wave, in measured tones and in simple words. I shall therefore say quite simply:
the monuments of ancient Egypt, among them Philae, Amada, Kalabsha and Abu Simbel,
are in danger. ... What it really means is that we are in danger. 34
To show the relocated temples surrounded by visitors was for Unesco to demonstrate that
its identification of a generic "we" with the monuments of ancient Egypt had worked: mankind had
recognized itself in Abu Simbel. It is true that the temples had been taken apart; but while they had
been reconstituted, a new kind of humanity had been constituted. The "indivisibility" of the stone
had somehow been transferred to the social fabric of the crowd facing it, the monolithic nature of
the rock now represented by the solidarity of people around it.
The encounter between a universalizing "we" and an ever-growing body of distant
monuments has now been theorized as a central trope in the postwar predicament of monuments,
particularly in French heritage discourse. Frangoise Choay concluded her 1992 L'Allegorie du Patrimoine
with a chapter on "the narcissistic pursuit" that has driven "the process of accumulation of cultural
30 "Conclusion" in Vattenbyggnadsbyrin, The Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples: Concluding Report, December 1971; Arab Republic
of Egypt Ministry of Culture (Stockholm: Vattenbyggnadsbyran, 1971), 215.
31 Georges Fradier, "The Drama of Nubia," in Unesco Courier: Save the Treasures of Nubia (Feb. 1960), 7.
32 VBB, "Completion of the Contract Works," Concluding Report, Caption to Figure 23.2:1, 209.
33 VBB, Concluding Report, 2 14.
34 Fradier, 5.
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property" since World War II. "Heritage today," she wrote, "seems to play the role of a vast mirror
in which we, members of late-20th century human societies, contemplate our own image."3 5
Appealing to Freud, Choay proposed to see this mirroring as a "prosthetic" technology which
worked to effect "the anthropomorphization" of the world, spreading a "cult of generic human
identity" through a global network of monuments. Choay historicized this interpretation by recalling
that the postwar intensification of the "patrimonial cult" coincided with the advent of a
"technological revolution confirmed at the end of the 1950s," which produced an "interiorization"
of techniques and a "dissimulation of mediation." 36
While Choay identified a technological basis for what she called "heritage inflation," she
repeated the universalist fault of the discourse she critiqued, in her generic interpretation of postwar
technology: "the advent of an electronic era [of] artificial memories and ever-more performing
communication systems," produced arbitrary classifications of monuments, while the development
of "hyper rapid transportation" had produced a dissociation of meaning from "place." Thus
technology was for Choay still the bearer of a loss of authenticity, and the cause of a replacement of
authorship by machination and artificiality. Choay's diagnosis, then, culminated in the decidedly un-
dialectical proclamation that monuments, which had previously served as "dynamic cultural
foundations", had come to generate only "passive self-contemplation and the cult of a generic
identity." Choay then repeated this theory of psychoanalytic passivity in geo-political form, with a
center-periphery account of the "cultural upheaval without precedent at the heart of advanced
industrial societies and, consequentially, in the whole world.""37 With "passivity" and "placelessness"
as foregone conclusions, Choay remained inside the all-inclusive "we" invented by Unesco.
Certainly we could read the inaugural image to confirms Choay's diagnosis: a snapshot a
post-Freudian narcissist encounter. By consulting an aerial view of the temples, we could reveal the
"hidden technologies"-access roads and parking lots-that were built behind the monument to
accommodate millions of tourists brought by "hyper-rapid transportation." (fig 4.10)
Superimposing this view with an original plan of the temples would also reveal the absence of any
traces of the immense engineering project that "saved" the temples, and see this absence as a
symptom of a mirror-like "dissimulation of technology." (fig 4.11) In other words, the campaign to
salvage Abu Simbel can be seen as an episode when enormous financial, technical, and rhetorical
effort was expended to displace these temples by 60 meters, for the sake of making commensurate
" This process now proceeded "with no other aim than a symbolic exhaustiveness, and seemingly with no criterion for
selectivity or classification." Frangoise Choay, F'Allgorie du Patrimoine (Paris: Seuil), 182-183.
36 Choay, 184.
37 Choay, 182.
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two notions of mankind-the generic mankind (contained in the temples) and the specific mankind
(embodied in a stream of visitors)-and all traces of this technological expenditure were erased,
absorbed in the cultural value of the monuments.
Yet if interpreting heritage as a technology is an attractive proposition, it is precisely in order
to get past the problem of passivity in heritage discourse-the problem of seeing the postwar
valuation of monuments merely as a question of reception, as most heritage literature does. The
salvage of Abu Simbel was intended as a mirroring act, and Unesco publicized it by using what Bruno
Latour called its trademark "sociological Esperanto," saying for instance that "The World Saved Abu
Simbel." 38 (In contrast, Krutschev claimed that "Soviet-Egyptian friendship" had built the Aswan
Dam.") Yet the temples that emerged from the salvage were not any more "generic" than they had
originally been, and specific "agency" can be read in their transformation. Consider the two
photographs of Abu Simbel before and after relocation (figs 4.07-09). The "original" temples can be
understood to contain human agency in three ways: in terms of authorship (Pharaoh Rameses II
enlisted an Egyptian architect, and Nubian slaves to build them, in the 12th Century BC); in terms of
image (they represent Rameses and his wife Neferati, by way of sculpture, bas-relief, and text); and
in architectural terms (they were designed to host the ritual occupation of humans, both in
statuesque and in bodily form.) The Unesco campaign doubled each of these terms: in their new
location, authorship was enlarged to encompass the engineers of the salvage scheme; as symbols the
colossi represented modern cooperation; as ritual environments they became attractors for tourists.
The notion of "the heritage of mankind" that Unesco proposed in this period was intended to
contain all these forms of agency at once, projecting them back onto the monument as one. This
certainly constitutes a technologically-enabled "mirroring" act. But to say that this mirroring
produced a "generic" human identity is not necessarily to say that this identity had no describable
qualities. As our cursory formal analysis demonstrates, the image of mankind that Unesco proposed
in Abu Simbel was an aggregate, figurative, and hospitable mankind.
To be methodologically clear: we should not take at face value Unesco's pronouncement that
the "World saved Abu Simbel," because Unesco used this pronouncement to project a social
achievement-that agreement over the value of a representation (as demonstrated in the salvage)
38 Bruno Latour, "Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics? Comments on the Peace Terms of Ulrich Beck," in Common
Knowledge X/3, Symposium: Talking Peace with Gods (2004), 450-462. Latour uses Ulrich Beck's proposal as an alibi for
an indictment of "cosmopolitics" which he sees embodied in Kant, Hegel, Unesco, the UN, and a variety of other
institutions and figures. The first page features what could be seen as a clear indictment of cultural internationalism:
"The problem with Beck's solution is that, if world wars were about issues of universality and particularity, as he makes
them out to be, then world peace would have ensued long ago. The limitation of Beck's approach is that his
"cosmopolitics" entails no cosmos and hence no politics either."
352
4. Salvaged Monuments
will lead to a political agreement-that has no basis in any political constituency. In Latour's terms,
Unesco's is a "cosmopolitics that entails no cosmos and therefore no politics." What we can do,
however, is to detect what historical agency was actually contained in this "world"-the specific
institutional channels, political constituencies, aesthetic discourses, and material practices-that were
required for this "agreement" and read backwards what "cosmos" was thereby posited. Just as the
salvaged monument has formal qualities despite being "generic," so Uneco's world has historical
agency despite being a notoriously universalizing abstraction.
Certainly it is not the first time that Unesco is accused of destroying values through a process
of abstraction. In Chapter I, abstraction was a process, informed by the scientific practice of
"abstracting" statements from data analysis, which was confronted for being an inadequate vehicle
for political agreement. In Chapter III the postwar educational imperative to proceed "from concrete
example to universal rule" in education was easily married to modernist aesthetic of abstraction,
which offered a way around the problem of translation. Here, in the salvage of Abu Simbel was
abstraction itself an engineering project. What were its specific technologies? How was it designed,
as a process, and what systems were devised to sustain it?
One place to begin is the Concluding Report compiled by the Swedish Engineers,
Vattenbyggnadsbyrin (VBB) in 1971, which offered a detailed description of the "world" that had
saved Abu Simbel, by distributing agency along a classic scale from the universal to the particular:
The world-famous Abu Simbel Temples have been salvaged from the rising waters of the
Nile and rebuilt on a secure site more than sixty meters above their original position.
This is an outstanding achievement. It is the result of great human effort and substantial
economic sacrifice.
The EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, through their GOVERNMENT, have shouldered the greatest part
of the burden of this noble enterprise.
UNESCO called on nations and people all over the world and urged them to make
generous contributions.
The ARCHAEOLOGIST, represented by specialists from Egypt as well as from other
countries, outlined the fundamental conditions for the Salvage Operation.
The CONTRACTOR, in the form of a Joint Venture composed of companies from Egypt,
Italy, France, Germany and Sweden, executed the gigantic works involved.
The CONSULTING ENGINEER planned and prepared the whole project and supervised
the works. He also submitted this report."9
Not only was the universal expertise of "the engineer" connected to the particular predicament of
"the Egyptian people", but each category of action was an embodied technology: a collaborative
39 Concluding Report, 5.
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shorthand that stands in for entire social categories, political constituencies, and professional groups.
The structure of this chapter proceeds along this chain of agents. We have already seen how "The
Egyptian people" was in fact an economic development plan devised by Nasser's regime and
monumentalized in the Aswan Dam. I continue by situating the Nubian campaign in Unesco's
history, continue with an account of the archaeological campaign, and end with the role of the
engineer in producing the cultural value of monuments-both at the scale of the entire desert and in
the salvage of Abu Simbel, where many of the issues that were dispersed throughout the campaign
were condensed and brought into a single dramatic narrative of monumental salvage.
I. How culture became "technical": the campaign in Unesco's history
The Major Projects, the Tourist Tax and the International Fund
If the International Campaign for Nubia was a response to Nasser's gigantism, it also
corresponds to a particular period in Unesco's history, when the regular proclamation of the
"unprecedented scale" of the organization's work became a substitute for any critical assessment of
its successes and failures. Ironically, this maximalist pattern was the effect of a minimalist turn in the
mid-1950s, when Director-General Luther Evans resolved to concentrate resources and focus
publicity by centering the Organization's program around selected "Major Projects."40 But
programmatic modesty only fueled rhetorical bombast. By the mid-1960s, Unesco publicized even
its most scholarly Major Project, the History of Mankind: Scientific and Cultural Development, as "A Great and
Unparalleled Publishing Venture," as if to calibrate the reader's expectations to the magnitude of the
undertaking, rather than the pertinence of its insights.41 Designed to be historical events in
themselves, the Major Projects were Unesco's own interventions into the History of Mankind: a narrative
of ever-increasing solidarity, evidenced by ever-larger human accomplishments.
The Nubian Campaign clearly partook in this vision of history as propelled by large-scale
cooperative efforts, though it was never officially declared a Major Project. At the 1980 closing
ceremony, Director-General M'Bow proclaimed the campaign "the first example of international
cooperation to an essentially cultural end," "unparalleled in Unesco's history" and "achieved thanks
40 See T.V. Sathyamurthy's 1966 summary of the "doctrine of program concentration" and his description of Evans was
"a true votary of 'functionalism', pure and simple," with a "strong conviction that UNESCO should actively pursue
well-defined undertakings, rather than animate its miscellaneous activities with a permissive ideology." "Twenty Years
of UNESCO: An Interpretation," International Organization 21/3 (Summer 1967), 620-621.
41 The citation itself was taken from (and credited to) the New York Times.
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to a movement of worldwide solidarity without precedent in the history of mankind.""42 Recalling
that 40 archaeological missions came from 5 continents, six groups of monuments were moved,
five temples donated, and a total of $26 Million was raised by 50 member states, M'Bow "the
present-day world community ... mobilized in Nubia resources which ... can be compared to those
used by the sovereigns of Egypt to build the temples of Philae island, to carve out those of Abu
Simbel or to erect the fortress of Buhen."43 Unesco had achieved a scale of cultural agency to match
the monuments it salvaged-the implication being that these had become monuments to
international cooperation. This chapter addresses this act of monumental recuperation-not as the
post-facto rationalization of megalomaniac leaders, but as an imperative that dictated the conditions for
the campaign's success at every stage. Indeed the very idea of "major project" lends itself to
monumentalization. Hence a nesting of histories is legible within the Nubian campaign: the salvage
of Abu Simbel served as the "major project" of the Campaign: the largest and most visible
undertaking and test for new collaborative channels, and a focus point for fund-raising.
While the Nubian Campaign was an intervention in a decade-long geopolitical struggle
between Egypt, the World Bank, and the USSR, it also represented the culmination of an internal
struggle within Unesco itself: the struggle of the Cultural Affairs Division (CUA) to register
financially on the same scale as the other components of Unesco's program. The history of this
internal struggle begins at the 1948 General Conference in Beirut, which instructed the Director-
General to investigate all ways "monuments" might become the focus of Unesco activity. The
resulting memorandum, Measures for Ensuring the Co-Operation of Interested States in the Protection, Preservation and
Restoration of Antiquities, Monuments and Historic Sites; and Possibility of Establishing an International Fund to Subsidize
Such Preservation and Restoration, stands in many ways as a blueprint for all efforts Unesco directed at
monuments throughout the 1950s and 1960s.44 It recommended renaming Unesco's "Museums
Division" the "Museums and Historic Monuments Division" and outlined three "main aspects of
international cooperation" in this domain: A. Education and Propaganda / B. Legislative and
administrative action / C. Technical Action. This last category included 6 sub-fields, which were
consolidated the following year, when the Paris Conference appointed an Expert Committee to
consider three categories of "technical work" in the field of monuments:
- general protection, preservation and restoration of antiquities, monuments and historic sites
- establishment of an international fund to subsidize the work of preservation and restoration
42 Amadou-Mahtar M-Bow, "Introduction, " in Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia: The International Rescue Campaign at Abu Simbel,
Philae and Other Sites," ed Torgny Save-S6derbergh, (London: Thames & Hudson / Paris: Unesco, 1987).
43 M'Bow, 13.
44 Unesco /Sc/PRG/6, "Item 8.6.1.5 of the Provisional Agenda" (Paris, 27 Mar 1950).
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- specific protection of objects of cultural value against the dangers of modern war.45
This three-part distribution of tasks guided the division's work through the 1950s. By 1960, the
mandate of "general protection" had been addressed by establishing a regular schedule of expert
missions, publishing a series of technical manuals, and conducting publicity campaigns, while the
ratification of the Hague Convention in 1954 had settled the terms of "specific protection" related to
war-time. All attempts to "establish an international fund," however, had failed. The debates
surrounding these proposals reveal the difficulties encountered by all attempts to quantify terms the
value of monuments in absolute financial terms.
The first idea for the accumulation of an International Fund for Monuments was a 1951
proposal for "a special tourist tax," levied on all tourists entering member states, and devoted to "the
maintenance of museums, monuments and collections possessed of universal interest." 46 A US $3
fee per tourist would accumulate into a fund shared by the host government and Unesco (in the
amount of at least 20%), in exchange for which the tourist would receive free entry to State and
municipal museums. The proposal received scant support when it was circulated in preliminary
form. The difficulties began with the very definition of the word "tourist"--thus the Iranian
National Commission asked whether the term was "applicable to pilgrims visiting the holy places of
their religion,... situated in foreign countries." Others, like the Italian Government, opposed the idea
of a per capita tax, proposing a daily collective tax instead, adjustable to the length of stay.47 These
objections revealed that Unesco had underestimated how much financial stake each member state
had invested in tourism, and how much this stake was dependent upon different versions of tourism.
As Museums and Monuments Division director Hiroshi Daifuku recalled, with 25 years of hindsight:
the use of a tax on tourism ran counter to prevailing tendencies to liberalize travel
formalities and in many cases, special taxes (such as airport fees) were considered to be
an important source of income which governments were reluctant to increase for
purposes other than travel facilities. 48
This retrospective account of a "liberalization" of tourism is supported by the distinction, throughout
the 1950s, between smaller states who opposed the "tourist tax" but supported the principle of an
45 Emphasis added. "Note on the Desirability of framing an international Convention establishing an international fund
for the preservation and restoration of monuments and historic sites and for the development and creation of museums
and introducing a special tourist tax" UNESCO Document CL/452, Annex I, December 1950.
46 Proposal made the Mexican government to the 6 th General Conference in 1951. Summarized in CL/452, Annex I.
47 "Supplementary Report on the possibility and advisability of adopting an international convention instituting a
special tourist tax for the preservation of monuments and museums." UNESCO Document 6C/PRG/10, Addendum I.
48 Hiroshi Daifuku, "The First Decade" in ICCROM Comes of Age 1959-1979 / L'Iccrom a 20 ans 1959-1979, Rome:
International Centre for the Conservation and Preservation of Cultural Property, 1979, 5.
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international fund (Italy, Iran, Turkey, for instance), and the countries who opposed both: Australia,
Canada, the UK and the US.
The US position against the International Fund was arrived at, in part, on the advice of
museum officials (National Gallery director David Finley and ACLS director Waldo Leland, both of
the Roberts Commission), who expressed "very little sympathy," because, as National Park Service
director Ronald Lee summarized, "the belief is that the fund would have to be collected largely from
the United States."" Lee expressed this point formally in a memo that made three objections to the
Mexican proposal. First, against the generalized definition of the word "tourist", the US pointed out
that not all foreigners visit the US to visit museums, and that most US museums were "visited
principally by nationals." Secondly, against the financial proposal, the US felt that the tax would
"impede the flow of foreign visitors and tend to defeat the purpose of greater mutual cultural
appreciation," that the promise of free admittance was impractical in countries where collections
were privately owned, and that the "imposition of special administrative procedures on foreigners"
would "be too costly." Finally, and most vehemently, the US objected on principle to the proposed
utilization of Unesco's share of the fund "to support archaeological research and study-abroad
grants, preparation of seminars, etc.""s This proposal, the US wrote, "arises from the inherent
subscription to the unconscionable principle that the general traveling public should be taxed for the
benefit of a very specialized group."51
What all these debates revealed was that the category of "tourist" was too general, yet not
universal enough, to be the bearer of Unesco's mandate on behalf of "the cultural heritage of
mankind." The failure of the tourist tax was a failure of correspondence between the universalizing
idea of monuments developed by Unesco, and the increasingly technical nature of its activities,
which required the training and dispatching of specialized experts. The attachment of an
international fund to tourist travel was never realized; as the final report put it, "the original plan was
replaced by a more modest one," namely a proposal for "International Center for the Centre for the
Scientific study of the problems of preserving and restoring cultural property."5 2 This center, which
was soon to be established in Rome, was eventually to become ICCROM. The diversion of efforts
49 Letter from Ronald Lee (Nat'l Park Service) to J.O. Brew, May 17 1951. Brew 7/1083b.
so CL / 452, Annex II: Questionnaire, 13-14.
51 Subcommittee on Foreign Travel of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, "Proposed Adoption of
an International Convention Establishing a Special Tourist Tax for the Preservation of Monuments, Museums and
Historic Sites in the Signatory Countries, and for an International Fund Controlled by Unesco." Draft, February 13,
1951. Brew 7/1083b.
" 7 C/PRG/6 Report on the Possibility of Establishing an International Fund for the Maintenance of Museums, Monuments and Collections of
Universal Interest. Paris, 22 Aug 1952.
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from an international fund towards the Rome Center was clearly a "technical" turn of events-in the
US's terms, away from "the general public" and towards "the very specialized group."
Similarly, it was only when the opportunity for the Fund to receive a frankly "technical"
treatment that the proposal was revived-in 1963, for the specific case of the Nubian Monuments, to
remedy the fact that "the resources available to the Organization are unfortunately inadequate for
large-scale operations, which, in many cases, are very urgently required." This time, the
recommendation included specific request to "explore, in particular, ways and means of financing
the fund from special sources.""' The 5 6 th session of the executive committee created a Trust Fund
for Nubia, and the idea of a tourist tax was revived, to supply part of these funds-again applied
only to Egypt.54 As we will see, the tourist which came to determine the criteria for the Nubian
campaign was one who could deliver "hard" currency directly to Egypt.
The decision to name the Nubian project an "International Campaign" can be seen as an apt
summary for the way the project would combine "technical" problems with a broad-range
ambitions. This expression was originally coined to describe large-scale publicity campaigns about
cultural institutions. The first of its kind, "The International Campaign for Museums" was launched
in 1954 to encourage member states to promote their museums; a second campaign, devoted to
"Monuments" was supposed to begin 1960 but was put on hold for the sake of the Nubian
Campaign, which soon overshadowed these two precedents. Folding into its operation a smaller
"technical center" which had been created in Cairo as an initial response to the Nubian problem, the
Campaign therefore became a catch-all project within which all previously proposed general ideas
on monuments could be revisited, including "the whole business of tourism."5s
The TVA Idea
The specific "technical" label adopted by the Campaign was archaeological: it was that of a
TVA of Archaeology. The phrase was coined at the 1960 launch by Andre Malraux, who praised the
Campaign in his dramatic vibrato as "a plan so magnificent and so precise in its boldness-one
3 Item 4.4.1 of the Provisional Agenda, Study of Measures for the Preservation of Monuments through the Establishment of an International
Fund of by any other Appropriate Means. 65 EX /9 Paris, 22 March 1963.
54 56 EX/5 Add. 1/ "International Action to Safeguard the Archaeological Monuments of Nubia." Brew /"Counterpart
funds". The tax of 2 dollars was imposed on each entrance visa to Egypt; The intention was to raise hard currency for
Abu Simbel, although an exemption had to be made for diplomats. It was collected as an the Egyptian Antiquities
Organization. Save-Sodeberg, Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia, 78-79.
ss Letter from Brew to Minnich (Exec Secretary of US Nat'l Commission to UNESCO) Sep 25, 1962. Brew 7/1083b.
Writing in 1962, Jo Brew promoted the idea of the Monuments Campaign as "of even greater general interest" than
the Campaign for Museums which had taken place in the 1950s, because "the material with which it deals are more
concrete; they are easier to focus on; and ... they will generate a broader participation, including the whole business of
tourism."
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might say, a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority of archaeology-the antithesis of the kind of
gigantic exhibitionism by which great modern states try to outbid each other."5 6 We will return to
Malraux's own role in the campaign and his careful choice of words: having just completed his Mus&e
Imaginaire de Sculpture Mondiale, Malraux did not critique "gigantic exhibitionism" carelessly, and as a
confirmed Hegelian he did not use the term "antithesis" lightly. For now it might suffice to note that
Malraux's phrase was conscientiously highlighted when The Unesco Courier published Malraux's speech
and that it continued to be used opportunistically, especially to publicize the Campaign to an
American audience. For instance, the Campaign Guide of the US National Committee for the
Preservation of the Nubian Monuments contained the key talking point that "One might say that this
Nubian project is indeed a Tennessee Valley of Archaeology. Expeditions from the U.A.R., Poland,
the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Sweden, Norway, the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany,
are all working in unison to catalogue and enlarge our knowledge of the area prior to the danger of
submersion.""s This section examines the implication of this phrase, both in the way that "the TVA
idea" was a model for international action and by exploring how salvage archaeology made culture
more "technical."
Two years before becoming Unesco's first Director General, Julian Huxley published a study
presenting the TVA as "An Achievement in Democratic Planning" to an international audience.5 8
Huxley's installment as the first director of Unesco two years later cemented his reputation as an
international popularizer of science; and as Chapter 3 demonstrated, his functionalism led him to
understand intellectual cooperation as part of "the human phase" in evolutionary history."9 Within
this institutional and scientific framework, the TVA embodied for Huxley the advent of this
collaborative stage in human history: a large-scale technical undertaking, dedicated to a single goal,
but producing generalizable benefits. To support this point he cited liberally from political theorist
David Mitrany, who had explicitly relied on the TVA as "a fair prototype for joint international
56 Andre Malraux, "TVA of Archaeology, " in Unesco Courier May 1960, 10.
7 US Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments, "Campaign Guide to Preserve the Monuments of
Nubia," 6. Brew /"US Commission."
'8 Julian Huxley, TVA: Adventure in Planning (London: Architectural Press, 1943), also published as a special issue of the
British architectural journal The Architectural Review, as "TVA: An Achievement of Democratic Planning," (June 1943).
'9 The last chapter of Huxley's Evolution in Action, titled "The Human Phase," summarized that "psycho-social evolution-
human history for short-operates by cultural transmission." And that "the general tendency of the past few centuries
has been to intensify this trend.... Of intercommunication and cultural interchange" which lead to "the inevitable
outline for the future-the emergence of a single world community." Julian Huxley, Evolution in Action (New York:
Mentor Books, 1953), 118, 122.
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action" to develop his "functional theory of politics" on which the UN's system of specialized
agencies was based. 60
For Huxley, as for Mitrany, the TVA had "introduce [d] a new dimension into the
constitutional structure of the United States-without any formal change in the constitution." This
surreptitious penetration by a "cooperative, unified, multi-purpose undertaking" was possible only
because the TVA acted "as an autonomous authority", while being "clothed with the power of
government" and could therefore "cross and envelop all political boundary lines.""6 Hence Huxley
took on Mitrany's formulation of "full powers for a limited function" to describe a new kind of
political autonomy on an international stage, both self-contained and all-encompassing, that worked
by "undercutting and transcending nationalist sovereignties, as the TVA undercuts and transcends
States' rights and boundaries."62
"The TVA idea", as Huxley called it, had "already found its way into the world's general
thinking" by 1943. He saw particular promise in the application of this idea "to promote the
planned development ... of regions of greater backwardness," and his example of a region ripe for
functional internationalization was the Middle East. "TVA ideas and methods" for example, had
already "guided the growth of new planning agencies such as the Middle East Supply Council [sic]."
The Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) was a war-time invention, an integration of resources devised
by the UK and US to focus the economic and industrial production of the region against the German
attack on North Africa.63 Dissolved inl 945, the MESC suffered a fate exemplary of "the TVA idea" in
the postwar: while the political partnership that sustained the industrial integration fell apart, the
regional identity that this partnership produced began to acquire an autonomous reality. All that was
left of the MESC in the late 1950s was the designation "Middle East", which became the preferred
label for what used to be called "the Ancient Lands," and carried with it an updated set of
expectations about the political, economic, and cultural cohesion of the region centered on Egypt.64
60 David Mitrany, "The Making of the Functional Theory: A Memoir," in The Functional Theory of Politics (London: LSE/St
Martin's Press, 1975), 27.
61 Mitrany as cited by Huxley, TVA: Adventure in Planning, 135. The citation is from an article of David Mitrany, in Agenda
in October 1942, republished as "The New Deal" in A Functional Theory of Politics, 160-164.
62 Huxley, TVA, 134.
63 On the MESC, see a review of Martin Wilmington's The Middle East Supply Centre in The International Journal of Middle East
Studies 4/3 (Jul 1973), 377-378, which summarizes the view that the MESC was an internationalist solution to
centuries-old problems: "successful in averting economic (and perhaps even political) disaster, and also contributed by
means of technical assistance in promoting a regional approach to the solution of problems which for centuries had
obstructed economic progress in the ancient lands."
64 On the emergence of the regional concept of the Middle East, and the role played by the MESC's "military
communiques" in coining the term, see C.G. Smith, "The Emergence of the Middle East," Journal of Contemporary History,
3/3, The Middle East (Jul 1968,) 3-17). Smith points out that, although by 1945 the "Middle East" was identifiable as
"a vast military province where British influence was paramount", the postwar saw the progressive blurring of the
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Nasser's own "three rings"-Arabism, Islam, Africa-were eventually seen to rely on the same idea
of Egypt as a "center" of a vaguely defined region. The link with water control was also made
throughout the 1950s, as Western advocates of "the TVA idea" never failed to list the Aswan High
Dam-in its World Bank incarnation, not its eventual Soviet realization-as a project that had learned
the "region-building lessons from the Tennessee Valley." 65
Huxley was not alone in promoting the TVA as a model for international governance, but it
is his devotion to the aesthetics of "the TVA idea" that makes him prescient of its eventual Nubian
appropriation. Huxley was intent on detecting in the TVA's architecture its success as a civilizing
endeavor:
I will pass over many other facets of the work going on in the Valley, but I must devote
some space to architecture, for in this field the existence of the TVA has had important
cultural repercussions.... [it] has made a notable contribution to the central architectural
problem of to-day--how to integrate human construction and its natural environment
into a planned whole, and to do so in a way which shall conduce to better living,
including aesthetic satisfaction.66
From this statement of the central problematic of architectural modernism, Huxley proposed to see
the TVA as a regional Gesamtkunstwerk which provided "aesthetic satisfaction," and proceeded to a
formal analysis of this aesthetic "integration into a planned whole:" first, a formal suppression of
objecthood helped to undermine the artificial boundary between natural and human worlds: "the
dams and power houses form a unity with the landscape ... instead of standing out ... in gross and
defiant conflict with the natural environment." Secondly, in a separate section titled "details" Huxley
found that "It is in the design of detail that the architect, as the great humanizer, has played a
magnificent role. From a major element to a minor, one finds the same meticulous care taken in the
choice of material and simplification of form." 67 Materials, abstraction and integrated planning
made the TVA a paradigmatically modernist endeavor.
Despite this seamless "integration" into the environment, Huxley argued, the dams and
power-houses of TVA architecture still acted as recognizable "monuments," "'expressive of the pride
a whole nation takes in itself,"' and "in some ways a modern equivalent of medieval cathedrals or
renaissance palaces." Citing the Chief architect of the TVA, Huxley noted that the TVA "consciously
adopted architecture as one of the instruments of policy for building up a sounder, more vital
conceptual boundaries between geographical, political and cultural affiliations in the region. He pointed to Nasser's
three rings-Arabism, Islam and Africa-as a continuation of this blur.
65 James Dahir, Region Building; Community development lessons from the Tennessee Valley (New York: Harper Collins, 1955). See in
particular the chapter "Beyond TVA," which lists international applications of the idea including the Aswan case, 156.
66 Huxley, 73. "The great dams are planned from the outset as works of art as well as utilitarian constructions."
67 Huxely, 74, 94.
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civilization in the Valley.""6 8 Architecture was the way "planning" affected "civilization" directly,
even when the object of design was not buildings but highways, bridges, stations, filling stations, etc.
Hence Huxley was quick to point that this new type of monumentality "attracted a steady stream of
visitors" and that, although "the attraction lies in their stupendous quality as engineering works, yet
few can escape being influenced by their architectural quality."
Huxley's description of architecture "influencing" the visitor to the Tennessee Valley was not
a casual reference to tourist enjoyment, but a technical description of architecture's aesthetic mode,
which worked by integrating "the order, amenities, and beauty that should characterize a well-
functioning society" directly into the social sphere. Throughout the text, Huxley repeatedly
attributed to architecture the powers of "influence:" as a mode of human agency ("the architectural
influence of the TVA is not confined to that exerted by its own architects"), a category of knowledge
("further promotion of good architecture and design is achieved by the TVA exerting pervasive influence
on a number of contractors"), and a mode of perception ("Details ... everywhere contribute to the
one major effect ... Unconsciously, through them, the whole architectural effect is registered in the mind.") 69
Huxley's obsession with architecture's influence, and the attendant idea that the TVA's regionalism
operated by way of an aesthetic effect, was confirmed in a separate section of the book titled "The
Architecture of TVA."
Printed on glossy paper, lavishly illustrated by black-and-white photographs, and written by
British architects Gordon and Flora Stephenson, this text gave disciplinary legitimacy to Huxley's idea
of architecture as "effect":
We have become accustomed to thinking of architecture as isolated buildings; as of this,
that or the other style; as an art for the few. ... Many times in history a unifying
philosophy of the age has brought about unity of design. The sense of the whole
predominated. Then you were not conscious of architecture; only of architectural effect.
And so it is with the work of TVA. Here is architecture on a scale dictated by the age.70
The evolutionary narrative of a "unity of design" arising from architectural history was a
commonplace trope of in mid-century British architectural discourse. But this modernist
historiography took on a different glow in light of Huxley's credentials as an evolutionary biologist.
Thus the advent of an architecture of influence, that blurred the distinction between object and
context, was for Huxley a scientific event: a historical substitution of discreet monumentality by
regional effect.
68 Huxley, 75.
69 Huxley 75, 94. Note that this 3-part distinction echoes the division of architecture in the early years of Unesco as
seen in Chapter 3.
70 Stephenson, in Huxley, 77. Continues: "Democratic government, engineers and architects, skilled and unskilled
labour, active citizens, all participate."
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Huxley's aesthetic advocacy of regional integration is a useful guide to understanding how
the Nubian campaign unfolded an architectural "effect"-complete with landscape composition,
simplification of form, and integrative materials-with historic monuments now filling the
monumental mandate of dams and power stations. Certainly the monuments of Nubia were
described as blurring the distinction between object and context; and while Huxley assigned to
contemporary architects a "humanizing" role, it was at the hands of archaeologists that the
application of an aesthetic "influence" was eventually effected. This replacement of archaeology for
architecture is explained in part by the methodological convergence between Huxley's own
biological Darwinism and archaeology as a mid-century discipline: the former devoted to finding a
convergence between social developments and natural selection; the latter, as Alan Schnapp pointed
out, borne of the realization that "natural history and human history were one."71 But before this
convergence is recounted, the association of the TVA with archaeology must be examined in its own
right: by the time it was invoked in 1960, it recalled a 30-year history of association between
archaeological digging and infrastructural development-a history in which the TVA was a
landmark achievement, and a trajectory in which Unesco itself had recently become a major actor,
by inaugurating a program in "salvage archaeology".
Salvage Archaeology as Redemptive Historical Force
Salvage archaeology was given its clearest definition by Harvard Peabody Museum director
and Monuments Committee (MonCom) chairman John Otis (Jo) Brew, in a 1960 paper that
presented the archaeological projects of the TVA and the Aswan High Dam, under the title Emergency
Archaeology: Salvage in Advance of Technological Progress.72 "During the last 15 years," Brew proclaimed, "a
new dimension has come to archaeology. The thing it describes is not new but because of the
development of modern technology it has taken on unusual prominence. We call it Salvage
Archaeology."73 Brew's association of archaeology with "technological progress" described both the
conditions under which an increasing number of archaeological digs were conducted ("the
construction of the great multipurpose reservoirs, elaborate modern highways, extensive airfields,
71 Alain Schnapp, The Discovery of the Past (London: British Museum Press, 1996).
72 John Otis Brew, Emergency Archaeology: Salvage in Advance of Technological Progress, (draft) Paper delivered to the American
Philosophical Society, ca. 1960. Brew 10. The paper was originally given at the 1958 Technical Meeting of the I.U.C.N.,
as "The Repercussions of Dams on Historical Monuments and Prehistoric Remains," Athens Proceedings of the IUCN, Technical
Meeting, 1959, 2/187-192; and later republished, as "Introduction" in Fred Wendorf, A Guide for Salvage Archaeology (Santa
Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1962).
7 Brew, in A Guide for Salvage Archaeology, 7.
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petroleum and gas pipelines, urban and industrial development")7" and the historical patterns of
human development that these digs sought to uncover (human progress as the 'subject matter' of
archaeology). Accordingly, Brew began his treatise with a grand historical narrative conflating the
history of mankind and the history of archaeology into a single thread: an intelligent search for
origins, fueled by increasingly sophisticated technology. Life in Babylon, for instance, was described
entirely by the sentence, "On monuments of stone and tablets of clay, man recorded not only
current affairs but also important events from past centuries in the history of his civilization." This
conflation implied that a basic archaeological drive distinguished humanity from other animals-a
proposition Brew made explicitly when he re-published the text in the 1962 Guide for Salvage
Archaeology :
Anthropologists often seek cross-cultural generalities ... those elusive threads called
cultural universals, which are thought to ... distinguish us from our near relatives, the
higher apes. ... Little indeed can be said about our earlier ancestors which will survive
attacks by eager colleagues skilled in physiology, psychology, and the various dialectics. It
is difficult to imagine, however, anyone with a brain sufficiently developed to be
classified as human who would not occasionally pause from time to time in his search
for food, sex, and shelter to speculate upon his origin.7
Having made of a 'speculation on origins' an intrinsic human drive like "sex" and "food", Brew
then recounted the parallel evolution of mankind and of its historical self-consciousness: from the
production of a "clearer and clearer record to be read by the curious ... as man grew in skills," to
the nineteenth century discoveries that "brought archaeology to the threshold of professional
status." 76 By the early 2 0 th century, "the whole field of the history of mankind took on meaning,
content, and purpose." Yet it was only the "innovation of salvage archaeology" that turned this
"esoteric humanistic discipline, of significance only in the realms of the imagination and as a very
minor subject in academic halls," into "a matter of concern to the board rooms of great construction
companies, to the world's most august legislative assemblies, to the cabinets of nations, and even to
heads of state.""77
Salvage Archaeology was not the first attempt of archaeologists to reach out to the
engineering professions. Witness for instance the 1912 pamphlet Archaeology as a By-Product, advertised
as a "pamphlet for use by German engineers of the Bagdad [sic] railway, to enable them to utilize
74 Brew, "The Repercussions of Dams," 187.
7s Brew, in A Guide for Salvage Archaeology, 7-8.
76 Brew, in Wendorf, 9.
77 Brew "Emergency Archaeology," 3.
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their opportunities for scientific observations not connected with their work."7 8 But in contrast to this
presentation of archaeological discovery as a "by-product" of infrastructural development, Brew saw
salvage as a triumphantly professional end to a history of parasitical amateurism. 79
The relationship of technology-driven destruction to archaeological discovery is crucial for
understanding Brew's theorization of his newfound disciplinary predicament. Archaeology's political
rise was due to a historical foregrounding of technology itself, a "revolution":
The reason for this change, which is actually a revolution, is to be found in our
twentieth century technology. The great population explosion which is manifest all over
the world and the technological developments which have been devised to cope with it
present a frightening threat to our historical and archaeological heritage. Salvage
archaeology has developed to meet this concerted threat.
This archaeological view of 20 th-century infrastructural development painted a picture of an
expanding human mass, leaving technological traces on a growing area of the planet. While this
technological determinism was unremarkable in itself, it allowed Brew to legitimate archaeology's
new bureaucratic procedures as an internal, disciplinary development: archaeology had finally
succeeded in permeating the very technological forces of which it had always been the record. Thus
Brew arrived at the most important pronouncement about his subject, namely, that "archaeological
salvage neither denies nor impedes progress." It is not that salvage changed archaeology
fundamentally; but rather that it occurred as the opportunistic application of archaeological
objectivity to present-day technological developments.
Far from "impeding or denying progress," archaeology was an invisible redemptive force
that hovered around 20 th century technology, salvaging the past. Brew's story of this new force was a
78 William N. Bates, "Archaeological Discussions," in American Journal of Archaeology, 16/4. (Oct-Dec, 1912), 561.
79 Brew was operating within what is now recognized as "the first formal paradigm of Americanist archaeology," the
paradigm of "culture history," which bridged the gap between late- 19 th -century Darwinian influences and the
structuralist developments of the 1960s. Brew figures in the recent The Rise and Fall of Culture History, for instance, as an early
critic of phylogenic filiation, perceptive in his attack on "the paradox" of the methods he inherited, and alone in
detecting the "conflation of essentialist and materialist metaphysics," which is to say, the tension between universal
typological classifications and evolutionary schemes of cultural change, ["J.O. Brew and the death of Phylogenies," in
R. Lee Lyman, Michael J. O'Brien and Robert C. Dunnell, The Rise and Fall of Culture History (New York: Plenum Press,
c1997), 101-102.] But because Brew's proposed solution was to "simply create more new classifications," the authors
dismiss his career as "evidence of the pervasive lack of archaeological theory" in this period. Certainly this theoretical
dearth can be verified in the imprecise language of Brew's texts, where he sweepingly describes archaeology,
alternatively, as "the history of mankind", as "anthropology", or as a generic "search for origins." Yet as James E.
Snead has pointed out, the theoretical contradictions of culture-historical methods cannot be understood without
noting "the influence on disciplinary thought" of such "contextual elements" as "the complex institutional rivalries of
the 1910s, the massive government interventions of the depression years, ... or the accelerating estrangement of
archaeology from anthropology." [James E. Snead, Review of The Rise and Fall of Culture History, Journal of Anthropological
Research 54 (1998), 266.] From this perspective, these Salvage Archaeology texts represent the closest Brew ever got to
theorizing his own discipline: a theory that these three "contextual" limits-institutional hermeticism, federal
bureaucratization, and a loss of anthropological credibility-was to be progressively surpassed by an emerging
international prominence.
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four-part narrative arc that spanned a half-century, and neatly tied Egypt and the United States: (1)
the construction of the Aswan Dam in 1907, where "the Egyptian Government provided for a
systematic archaeological survey" directed by G.A. Reisner of Harvard University; (2) the first
raising of the dam in 1929, which prompted three more years of surveying by British archaeologists;
(3) the first "major program of salvage archaeology in the US", connected with the constructions of
the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s; and (4) the crowning event-the 1945 formation of
the US Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains (CRAR), the first federal program
that systematically surveyed the ground covered by the construction of any public works in the US.
This neat historical arc, with its experimental beginnings in Egypt and its bureaucratization in the
United States, then culminated in the "the situation in Nubia," which Brew called "the greatest
challenge yet to be faced by Salvage Archaeology."80 Thus what had begun in Aswan ended in
Aswan, with help from the "TVA idea," "federalized" in the US, then "internationalized" by
Unesco.
One unspoken advantage of presenting salvage archaeology in this manner-a "new
dimension" of history achieved exclusively in the 20 th century--was that it gave a positive ending to
the often unsavory history that tied archaeological discovery to colonial conquest and imperial
expansion.8 Although Brew himself was involved in the TVA program and the creation of the
CRAR, he detached himself from these projects, by compulsively using a passive voice that rendered
archaeological salvage as an autonomous historical force that had accomplished its own
"extraordinary achievements" throughout the century, an "it":
It has built a museum in the middle of what was once the Zuider Zee. It is turning the
major river valleys of the world into vast archaeological laboratories. It delayed the
construction of new buildings in the centers of bombed-out cities of Europe ... It has
joined together in a major scientific research program ... It has caused a great natural gas
pipe-line company to devote space ... And, beginning this year, it will reopen the field
of Egyptology."82
Brew's third-person account of archaeology made for a cleaned-up history of the relationship
between politics and discovery--a history more easily presented to politicians weary of reviving
colonial pasts. Indeed his text contained key formulations, used throughout the Nubian campaign to
convince political authorities that archaeological salvage belonged properly on their agendas.
80 Brew, Emergency Archaeology, 5.
81 Recent work on the intersection of the two include The Archaeology of Colonialism ed. Claire L. Lyons and John K.
Papadopoulos (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, c2002) and also Margarita Diaz-Andreu's A World History of
Nineteenth-Century Archaeology: Nationalism, Colonialism and the Past (Oxford: Oxford, 2007), and Nationalism and archaeology in Europe,
ed. Margarita Diaz-Andreu & Timothy Champion (London: UCL Press, 1996).
82 Brew, Emergency Archaeology, 4.
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Foremost among these neutral formulations of archaeological obligation was the principle of
"necessary minimum salvage," which distinguished between 'saving' and 'salvaging', and separated
salvage archaeology from a history of antiquarianism and open-ended collecting:
Obviously everything cannot be saved, but it can be surveyed and recorded. Outstanding
sites can be excavated and important buildings can sometimes be moved. But for the
most part, the salvage consists of study and excavation, after which construction can
proceed... The salvage actually lies in the publication of the report of the archaeological
research.8 3
By arguing that the ultimate goal of salvage was not ownership of monuments but their presence in
the historical record, Brew inaugurated a debate that unfolded throughout the Campaign, over which
monuments were "outstanding" enough to be "saved." 84 More crucially, his description of salvage
as "the publication of reports" anticipated the requirements of the United Nations Technical
Assistance program, which disbursed aid to member states by dispatching experts, who compiled
such "reports." Indeed Brew's MonCom work throughout the late 1950s was devoted to having
salvage archaeology "incorporated into the official Unesco Technical Assistance program, so that the
nations without competent archaeologists can obtain aid in the setting up and administration of a
salvage program."8 5 Salvage Archaeology represented the MonCom's best hope for entering the
Technical Assistance circuit, which had remained out of reach of the Cultural Affairs Division.86
The "Purely Cultural" category of action
In 1959 Salvage Archaeology achieved what Brew proudly called "a toehold on the official
UNESCO program," by securing the funds to publish a "a general report bearing on the
consequences of large-scale engineering works in regard to the conservation of the cultural heritage
of mankind.""87 Brew saw this success as a "major step ... for general international relationships in
the humanities."88 Archaeology, with its territorial mode of research and its objective attachment to
83 Brew, Emergency Archaeology, 12.
84 Contemporary reference works consider Unesco's campaign the moment when work in Nubia turned from mere
recording to monumental salvages. See for instance the "Lake Nasser" entry in A Dictionary of Archaeology, Ed. Ian Shaw and
Robert Jameson (London: Blackwell, 2002), 349-350: "Whereas the two previous major phases of Nubian exploration
had concentrated on the simple recording of threatened sites by mapping and excavation, the Unesco-sponsored
Nubian Salvage Campaign also included the ambitious dismantling of 14 entire stone temple complexes."
8s Letter from J.O. Brew to Dr. Mike Daugherty, Jan 28, 1959. Brew 8/1054d.
86 Letter from Brew to Frederick Johnson, Peabody Foundation, Andover, MA (undated): the committee "has made the
formal recommendation to the DG: (1) that provision for archaeological salvage be made in all plans for River Basin
development and all other construction projects projected under Technical Aid." Brew Archive 7/1084a.
87 CUA/ 129: The Preservation of Cultural Property endangered by Public or Private Works: Preliminary Report, (Unesco: Paris, 10
September 1965), 4.
88 Letter or J.O. Brew to Dr. Mike Daugherty of the ACLS, in support of funding for Ralph Solecki's mission to travel to
Paris to work on a salvage archaeology handbook. Jan 28, 1959. Brew 8/1085b.
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technological development, was to be the new mode of cooperation for Unesco's "purely cultural"
endeavors.
Throughout the 1950s, an increasingly long list of professions were recruited into this new
mode of international collaboration centered around monument "salvage." Lists of "interested
specialists" circulated internationally and progressively optimized by the members of the MonCom.
JO Brew's own contribution to the circulating draft was to add, in pencil, the category of "architect"
to an already long list: "pedagogues, &cologistes, systematiciens, geographes, urbanistes, [added in
pencil] architectes, anthropologues, ethnologues, archeologues, historiens de l'art, etc."" The final
recommendation was phrased in terms of cooperation: it recommended that, in the case of
infrastructural development, "a meeting should be convened in situ of representatives of the
following disciplines":
anthropology
archaeology
ethnology
history of art (in particular, of architecture)
study of traditional cultures
natural sciences
physics
engineering
political economy
town planning and modern architecture 90
This double appearance of architecture in this list of in situ expertise-as historical subject and
planning practice-reveals a search for synthesis that would give meaning to the MonCom's
mandate after the problem of war-time protection had been resolved.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the detachment of monuments from the "specific protection"
of war coincided with an increasing focus on monuments in urban settings, but this focus was
difficult to qualify in terms likely to warrant the label of "general protection." Accordingly,
MonCom proposals of this period oscillated between trying to find new objects to "protect" and
defining a new "threat" against which to protect them:
1953: Preservation of Monuments in the Countryside: Rural architecture, country seats,
former ecclesiastical buildings, etc. 91
1953: Safeguarding of monuments used for other than their original purpose" 92
1 95 3: Study of Vestiges of the Past endangered by Large-Scale Works
89 Draft of the recommendation, written by committee, unmarked, undated. Brew 7/1084a.
90 Com.Mon. 6.43/116 Doc. 49: "Protection of Vestiges of the Past and Aspects of Nature endangered by Large-Scale
Engineering Works." 29 April-2 May 1957.
91 Eduard Sekler, "Some Problems Connected with the Preservation of Monuments in the Countryside: Rural
architecture, country seats, former ecclesiastical buildings, etc." Unesco/Com.Mon.6.21/58 Doc. 32.
92 ML/1026, 13 Aug 1953. Brew 7/1084a.
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195 7: Protection of Vestiges of the Past and Aspects of Nature endangered by Large-Scale
Engineering Works93
1960: Safeguarding the Beauty and the Character of the Landscapes and Sites 94
1965: Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works. 95
This progression demonstrates the increasing influence of the protection of nature on Unesco's
conception of the protection of "culture." Brew was a crucial agent in contriving this overlap; in fact
he had delivered the first version of his paper to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) in 1958, in a session titled "The Effects of Dams on Habitat and Landscape. "96 As late as
1957 the MonCom consulted with the president of the IUCN, Roger Heim, to compile a
comprehensive- proposal for "large-scale engineering works upon several categories of cultural
property or natural resources.""97 By 1960, this alliance with nature conservation had become
stronger than the idea of defense from destruction, and the formulation on "the Beauty and the
Character of the Landscapes and Sites" removed any specific mention of risk from public works. This
removal provoked a discussion that fears that this "sounded too much like Heimatschutz"-the
traditional German formulation for a generic protection of "the homeland." 98 The final wording,
"Endangerment by Public or Private Works" kept salvage archaeology separate from any proposals
that "sounded like Heimatschutz," and represents a return to a reactive vocabulary that would both
capitalize on the existing idea of "cultural property", as it had already been codified in the Hague
Convention of 1954 and continue to attract funding as attachment to public works projects.
The MonCom's "general" work during this period-aside from its "technical" work in
Nubia-placed monuments on a sliding spectrum between urban and natural poles, and
archaeology occupied the centre of this spectrum. So, while Brew intended to grant archaeology
greater prominence in international politics, 99 these selfish disciplinary motives were complemented
by a keen sense of interdisciplinary opportunism. Brew's main insight, as MonCom chairman in this
transitional period, was that archaeology could become a medium through which to expand the
horizontal reach of monuments' protection. Because the territorial aspect of archaeology was not in
93 UNESCO/Com.Mon.6.43/116 Doc.49, Paris, 19 May 3, 1957. Brew 7/1084a
94 Preliminary Study of the Technical and Legal Aspects of International Regulations Concerning the Safeguarding of the
Beauty and the Character of the Landscape." 94 UNESCO/CUA/100. Paris: 12 February 1960. Unesco Archive
9' CUA/129.
96 "Technical Meeting - Athens 1958, Theme Ib" Brew 7/1084a.
97 "Protection of Vestiges of the Past and Aspects of Nature endangered by Large-Scale Engineering works," UNESCO
/Com.Mon.6.43/116 Doc.49 (19 Apr-May 3, 1957), 1. Brew 7/1084a.
98 Letter from Jo Brew to Van den Haagen, 26 Jan 1959. Brew 8/1085b. "It was my understanding ... that a manual
was wanted for the salvage archaeology program which I thought we had always kept separate from the Heimatschutz."
99 and to capitalize on the success of the 1957 Recommendation regarding the "International Principles Applicable to
Archaeological Excavations,"See 9c/PRG/7 27 "Draft Recommendation of International Principles Applicable to
Archaeological Excavations", 1956.
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question, it could mediate between the urban pole represented in the protection of "centers
containing monuments" and the natural pole represented by a progressive interest in the safeguard of
"the beauty and character of landscapes."
Unesco's program in salvage archaeology was cancelled early in 1960, as the Nubian
campaign began to take over the entire Cultural Affairs Division. Yale archaeologist Ralph Solecki,
who had been appointed editor of the "Salvage Archaeology" manual, was divested from his duties,
"to make eventual use of the lessons learned form the Nubian project, which is becoming one of the
most important examples of the protection and salvage of cultural property endangered by large-
scale engineering works." 100 '01 Thus the Nubian campaign can be understood, from the point of
view of Unesco's institutional history, as a case-study that substituted for a more general elaboration
of principles. In particular, the mission of striking a delicate conceptual balance between Heirnatschutz,
protection of "cultural property", and the regulation of archaeological access, was achieved in
exemplary form through the Campaign. Once the bulk of the archaeological work in Nubia was
completed in 1963, the MonCom's work on the salvage recommendation resumed, inaugurating a
thread of resolutions that led directly to the signing of the 1972 World Heritage Convention, which
brought architectural, urban, archaeological and natural heritage under a single protective
mechanism.
But this substitution of "an important example" instead of a "general report" was not
effected without a cost. As Solecki noted with irony, there was one aspect of the Nubian Campaign
that was "directly opposed" to "one of the main themes" of the Salvage Archaeology publication, as
he would have developed it: "that the cost of salvage archaeology was to be incorporated in the cost
of the works project." This principle of financial incorporation was far from a technicality; Brew had
made it the only explicit "overriding principle" of salvage archaeology:
There is one overriding principle which should be established at the beginning of any
salvage project; namely, the cost of the salvage surveys and excavations should be an
integral part of the cost of the dam or highway...The cost of salvage archaeology in a
large reservoir would seem relatively very great when considered in the terms of the
annual budget of a national university or national museum, but if this same figure can be
100 Letter from J.K. van den Haagen to Ralph Solecki. 1 March 1960. Brew 8/1085b.
101 Document CUA/129 summarized this episode as follows: "While considering the implications involved in the
safeguarding of landscapes, recommended to the Director General the compilation of a general report bearing on the
consequences of large-scale engineering works in regard to the conservation of the cultural heritage of mankind. Later
that year, however, it was decided to undertake an international campaign [for Nubian monuments.] In order to
benefit from the lessons to be learned from such an unprecedented action, it was decided to defer the project for a
publication to a later date." CUA/ 1 29: The Preservation of Cultural Property endangered by Public or Private Works: Preliminary Report,
(10 Sep 1965), 4.
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viewed in relation to the cost of the construction of the dam, it is so small a percentage
as to be almost negligible. "'
In order to avoid the impression that "the tail would seem to be wagging the dog", the financial cost
of salvage archaeology was to be incorporated directly into development funding. This technique
was a way for archaeology to detach itself from the diminutive cultural budgets of museums and
universities, and attach themselves to engineering works themselves. In contrast, Solecki wryly noted,
the salvage project planned by Unesco was "like a tagged afterthought, very much a poor relation"
of the funding of the Aswan High Dam. An added irony was that the Dam was planned and funded
by the Russians, who "certainly understood salvage archaeology in their own country." 103
Solecki was not the only one to note that separating the finances of the Nubian Campaign
from Dam's finances would be perceived as a cold war gesture. The point was made, with a
reference to the TVA, by the chairman of the US Senate Hearing committee for the amendment of
the Mutual Security Act in 1959:
ARE THE RUSSIANS GOING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROJECT?
The Chairman: One last question. Since the Russians have undertaken the construction of
the Aswan Dam project, why isn't this a part of the overall cost of the project? In this
country when the Federal Government builds a dam, part of the cost is the acquisition
and removal of structures within the basin covered by the dam. In TVA this was done by
the Government in building the dam. Why isn't this a cost of the Aswan Dam project?10 4
Brew's answer demonstrated he thought international bureaucratization had placed archaeology into
a larger geo-political frame, where the principles of financial autonomy had to be recalibrated.
"There is a very tricky possible gimmick here," he wrote to Solecki, "that the Russky's may
eventually shoulder the costs if the Western world failed to raise the money, pointing out gleefully
that we were perfectly willing to let all this cultural material go under water." He did, however, find
comfort in the idea that archaeology would only emerge reinforced from the tug-of-war: "the
considerable publicity this movement is going to have all through the world will do no harm either
to archaeology in general or salvage archaeology in particular." 10s
Nevertheless, the re-attachment of salvage funding to a cultural institution (Unesco) rather
than to the engineering work itself (the Aswan high Dam) propelled the Nubian campaign into the
102 John Otis Brew, "The Repercussions of Dams on Historical and Archaeological Monuments and Prehistoric
Remains." Extracted from Athens Proceedings of the IUCN Technical Meeting, 2 (1959), 190.
103 Letter from Solecki to Brew, March 22, 1960. Brew 8/1085b. Brew too acknowledged the Russians as pioneers in
salvage archaeology, and recommended for this reason that an American should be designated to "design Unesco's
salvage program."
104 "Mutual Security Act of 1960," Foreign Relations of the United States, 582.
10s Letter from Bew to Solecki. Brew Archives, 8/1085b.
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cold war, 10 6 and this is where the meaning of its "purely cultural" character has to be examined.
Throughout the campaign, the expression "purely cultural" was attached to a definition of funding
as unrelated to any international politics. For instance, Director General Rene Maheu addressed "The
member states prepared to make voluntary contributions for moving the temples of Abu Simbel" in
Cairo by recalling the disinterestedness of the endeavor. Though he acknowledged that "this is not the
first time that mankind has reacted generously to a noble cause," since "Man is essentially alive to
the appeal of noble causes" yet he confidently declaimed the autonomy of culture from any
international politics "But this is the first time that an international fellowship has found expression
on so large a scale in matters of culture." 107 Brew made a point of using the phrase in its literature to
public relations, "one of the first opportunities for the most exciting and extensive program of
international cooperation on a purely cultural matter"108 This kind of proclamation cannot be
understood without looking more specifically at the way Unesco redefined "culture" in opposition
to its other program elements (Education, and Science), and the way this redefinition bore on the
conduct of archaeological exchange in Egypt that themselves had a long history of being implicated
in political powers. The label of "purely cultural" was a convenient formulation to detach the
Nubian campaign both from cold war politics, and from archaeological "abuses" of the past.
Recent scholarship on the "restitution of cultural property" has made of the Aswan salvage
campaign a historical turning-point, hopeful evidence that "the Mephistophelian relationship of
imperialism with dominated cultures," inherited from the 19 th century, "may have a more
constructive future" in a post-colonial age. In his introduction to the Getty Center's recent volume,
Claiming the Stones, Naming the Bones, Elazar Barkan put it in terms of "mutual benefit":
Contemporary conservation and collecting often work to the mutual benefit of both
larger museums and local cultures. The Agyptisches Museum in Berlin, among others,
participated in salvaging Egyptian antiquities as part of the Aswan Dam project, which
flooded major archaeological sites in Egypt. In return, the Egyptian government granted
certain impressive antiquities to the museum, which were prominently displayed there.
106 The rest of the conversation demonstrates this: "The Chairman: We are told that they are extremely interested in
cultural affairs./ Mr. Wilson: Yes, sir, they are extremely interested. They are extremely defective in this particular line
of Egyptian archaeology./ Senator Sparkman. May I ask is Russia is a member of UNESCO? / Mr. Wilson: Russia has a
representative on UNESCO, yes; and there will be Russian committee members on UNESCO, committees on this
project. /" Mutual Security Act of 1960, 582 in Foreign Relations of the United States.
107 DG/1963/5 Address by Rene Maheu, Meeting of Member States, 9 November 1963, Cairo. Brew 10/54a.
108 Letter from Brew to the CEO of the Today Show, Feb 7, 1963. Brew Archives. In response to an unfavorable show on
February 6t h when Dr. John Cooney of the Brooklyn Museum suggested that the money could have been used in some
other fashion.
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This is in contrast to the notorious controversy ... between the museum and the
Egyptian government concerning the restitution of Nefertiti. 109
Based on this apparent symmetry between "impressive antiquities" salvaged in one country and
"prominently displayed" in another, Barkan goes on to argue that "the growing awareness of a new
moral perspective on the part of museums" might be "the best guarantee [against] the worst abuses
of the past." As a symbol of such abuse, Barkan offers the head of Nefertiti, exported from Egypt by
the Deutsche Orientgesellschaft in 1912 and which remains to this day in the Agyptisches Museum
despite a century of controversy. Thus the case of the Aswan Dam serves to expand the category of
"restitution" to include not only the literal return of cultural property once taken by imperial
powers, but also the rectification of a basic "power disparity" between Western nations rich in
museums, and non-western cultures rich in cultural content. 110
To see the Nubian campaign as triggering a new era of "restitution" is theoretically
misleading, though it rings historically true. On the one hand, Barkan is correct that the Nubian
Campaign coincided with Unesco's definition of a new type of "cultural exchange" between uneven
powers among its member states. This exchange was spelled out, for example, by the director of the
Cultural Activities Division in the 1961-1962 Program:
If Unesco contributes less in its cultural activities programme than in its other fields to
technical assistance in less developed countries, it makes up for the deficiency by a very
important psychological help. Often the country that is poor in the economic and
industrial sense is rich in cultural values ... Thus there can be a real exchange, a two-way
action, which will enable all the countries to give and to receive, to enrich each other."1"
Unesco's prescription of cultural exchange as "a two-way action" resonates with Barkan's hope for a
postwar age of "mutual benefit". Yet "psychological help" should not be confused with object
exchange, especially since Unesco used "cultural values" to compensate for financial imbalances in
its program.
Certainly one cannot take at face-value the equivalence of an object "displayed" and a
cultural value "exchanged." The Nubian campaign, as closer inspection will show, was an elaborate
mechanism for extracting archaeological "value" from cultural "objects," and it was careful to
avoid the depiction of objects being "exchanged" at all. The financial imbalance between countries
109 Elazar Barkan, "Amending Historical Injustices: the Restitution of Cultural Property-An Overview," in Claiming the
Stones, Naming the Bones: Cultural Property and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity, ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (Santa
Monica: Getty Research Institute Issues & Debates, 2002), 38.
110 Barkan, 39. "The growing moral awareness on the part of museums may serve, at present, as the best guarantee that
the worst abuses of the past stemming from power disparities are less likely to occur in the future."
"'1 Rudolf Salat, "Cultural Values and International Cooperation," in The Proposed Program for Unesco, 1961-1962, as
published in Unesco Chronicle 6/11, 416.
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within Unesco's program was due to the increasing leverage of the UN's Technical Aid program
onto Unesco's definition of culture; therefore Egypt's cultural objects had to become "technical"
entities before they could properly be exchanged for international help. This redefinition of culture
as "technical" was specifically aimed against the two labels of 'art and history' that had hitherto been
attached to monuments: "By culture Unesco implies neither a luxury reserved for a minority nor the
mere heritage of the past." 112
Similarly, Barkan generalizes the Aswan salvage as a model of exchange between "local
cultures" and "larger museums," assuming that an informal culture always represents autochtonous
localities while formal institutions represent the hegemony of the West. Yet the Nubian Campaign
involved local cultures and larger institutions on both sides. In particular, we will see that the
emergence of a "regime of archaeological excavation" in international law, resulted from a struggle
between Western Egyptologists trying to retain the informal "local culture" they had established
along the Nile, and the Egyptian Antiquities Department trying to become a national bureaucracy-a
"larger museum." In short, if Barkan's depiction of the Aswan campaign as a neat exchange
between "participating in salvage" and "displaying impressive antiquities" is misleading, it is
because it implies that the antiquities were impressive all along-that they began as a local product,
and retained this value throughout. Closer look at how the Nubian Campaign was structured, and a
comparison with pre-war forms of archaeological exchange will demonstrate that the archaeological
value of the Nubian antiquities was acquired in the process of exchange itself.
II. "Objects and Values": Postwar archaeology and the law of gift exchange
Nefertiti's Head: the logic of the counter-object
The episode of Nefertiti's Head--undoubtedly one the most famous Egyptian objects of the
century-provides a useful starting point for understanding how Unesco modified pre-war
archaeological exchange into a new, "purely cultural" category of action." 3 As John Wilson recalled
in his History of American Egyptology, the episode of Nefertiti's head began with an expedition of the
Deustche Orient-Gesellschaft to the Nubian site of Armana, led by Ludwig Borchardt, cut short by World
112 Unesco, "Unesco Adopts a New Programme in Cultural Activities." Press Release 2335, (Paris: Dec 11, 1962).
Spelled out the pressure put on the word "culture:" "By culture Unesco implies neither a luxury reserved for a minority
nor the mere heritage of the past. ... It is through the loyalty to the authentic spirit of culture, to its freedom, its
soundness and its fertility that Unesco can contribute to placing culture in the service of man as an entity." From Brew
8/1085c.
113 Dominic Montserrat's "Ninety Years of Nefertiti," Apollo 485 (2002), 3-8 gives a very short summary of the
circulation, both literal and symbolic, of Nefertiti's head over the century.
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War I, and which brought back to Berlin a uniquely delicate bust of Nefertiti. "' (fig 4.12) The
limestone bust remained in private hands for a decade, then was given to the Museum and
"published" in 1923. As soon as the publication was made, government authorities in Cairo
protested that they would never have conceded "such an outstanding work of art" to the German
expedition, with "the implication of some kind of devious activity which prevented Egypt from
retaining this treasure." • The controversy continues to this day-although already at the time,
perceptive archaeologists like Wilson noted that Borchardt's published report contained a pre-emptive
defense: that ""two outstanding objects" had actually been found in the 1912 digging season-
Nefertiti's head, on the one hand, and a limestone altarpiece of the Royal Family, on the other." As
was customary, Borchardt explained, one piece was only "conceded to the Germans" because the
second one "acted as a counterpiece" and went the Cairo museum according to a "division of paired
values." ' 16 (fig 4.13)
This concept of a "counterpiece", with its implication of a reciprocity between foreign
excavator and host government, had long been the medium of exchange between Egyptologists and
Egypt. This medium was designed to ensure a fair trade between access to a site (granted by the
Egyptian Government) and the expertise to dig in this site (held by Western archaeologists, aided by
local diggers). As explained by Wilson, this agreement dictated that every archaeological find was
automatically composed of two halves, so that a "fifty-fifty division of value" could occur:
The older dispensation ... had been on the order of a fifty-fifty division by value. When
the archaeologist had sorted his season's finds into two lots, roughly equal in
importance, a representative of the Egyptian government would review that assignment,
probably make some changes in it, and then accept one lot for the Cairo Museum. The
other lot would be assigned to the excavator, to be cleared for export abroad."'11
For every object owned by a Western institution, there was a counter-object in the Cairo museum,
whose value was certified by the ghosted presence of its separated "paired value" abroad. Thus any
controversy over an exported object was in fact a controversy over two objects. What the "fifty-fifty
division of value" meant is that every archaeological dig was in fact a form of exchange, a
complicated equation involving objects, knowledge about those objects, and access to its location:
KNOWLEDGE [Egyptologist] (DIG) OBJECT [Nefertiti's head]
TERRITORY [Egypt] (DIG) COUNTEROBJECT [Altarpiece]
114 John Wilson, Signs and Wonders upon Pharaoh: A History of American Egyptology (Chicago, 1964).
115 Wilson, 155
116 Wilson, 156. Borchardt's original report of the digging season was published in Mittleitungen der Deustchen Orient-
Gesellschaft 55 (Dec 1914), 1-45, and translated in Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution (1915), 445-457.
117 Wilson, 194.
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The basic equation of archaeology-that digging is the transformation of knowledge and territory
into objects-was also a system for dividing the world of objects into a system of values.
If archaeological value was created through this digging operation, the fairness of the split
between object and counter-object hinged on the simultaneity of the exchange between access and
expertise. The debate over Nefertiti's head, in fact, was never about who owned the piece, but rather
about when and where knowledge about its value was made public. By all accounts, "the Germans
were immediately aware of the high value" of their find, while the Egyptian government only
realized its value after Borchardt "published" the piece under the safety of institutional cover in
Berlin. In other words, the real currency by which to value archaeological objects was knowledge, as
Wilson revealed:
It is not unknown for archaeologists to try to safeguard their most cherished pieces by
pretending that their greatest interest is in objects of lesser merit, in order to direct
attention of the government man away from the prizes. This is a well-known bargaining
technique in the Orient."118
The so-called fifty-fifty rule was in actuality a "bargaining technique" which implicated two
unequal actors in a bluffing game where knowledge, object, and territory were three potentially
separable spheres. At stake in this bargain was the wholeness of the archaeological object.
The Nefertiti episode put this "bargaining technique" into crisis. The regime of fifty-fifty,
which had ruled over Egyptian excavations since the mid-19t1 century, was revoked in the late 1920s,
as all objects found automatically became state property of Egypt. According to Wilson, "a stalemate
resulted for nearly a generation." "19 Subsequent historiographers have confirmed Wilson's account
of a "general retreat" of Western institutions, who "phased out their excavations" in the 1930s as a
result of both the Nefertiti episode and the Tutenkhamon exhibition. These two controversies are
now seen to have coincided both with an expansion of local archaeological knowledge and a surge
in nationalism, making national authorities more suspicious of surreptitious exports and triggering a
general change of attitude. 120 In these histories, the 1957 creation of the CEDAE under Unesco's
tutelage, becomes the first experiment in local control of Egyptian archaeology, before "complete
local control of archaeology came along with full political independence in the 1950s." 12' The
Nubian campaign then figures as a third step in the "Decolonization of a Profession:" the event that
"18 Wilson, 156.
119 Wilson, 156.
120 "Indigenous Egyptology: the Decolonization of a Profession?" in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 105/2 (Apr-Jun
1985), 233-246.
121 Ibid. "But questions of dependency on the West linger in Egyptology as they do in Egyptian national affairs."
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"usher[ed] in a new era of international Egyptological cooperation." The implication is that a new
international regime emerged, and that a freer circulation of knowledge and of people evened out
the terms of the 'fifty-fifty' equation. The flaw in this narrative is that it assumes the neutrality of
Unesco's intervention into the equation of classical archaeological exchange.
To say that a prewar power imbalance was rectified in the postwar is to assume that
archaeological supply and demand remained constant throughout the "stalemate" period. In fact,
demand for archaeological access to Egypt had all but died by the late 1950s. The very image of an
"appeal" made by an international organization, and answered by a worldwide army of ready
experts, is a Unesco fabrication. By John Wilson's own admission, when the appeal was made in
1959, interest in Nubian archaeology was meager at best:
Nearly twenty-five years had passed with a minimum of field work. The Egyptologists
had turned to other lines of research; few of them were now experienced in excavation.
Further, when compared to Egypt proper, Nubia was a backward and unpromising area
for digging. The preservation of the stone temples of Nubia was a job for the engineers,
not the archaeologists. The first reaction to the appeal was one of dismay. What could we
do?1 22
That archaeologists showed little interest in the "impressive antiquities" when they were first offered
to them in 1959 is perhaps the best evidence that the value of these antiquities was acquired in their
salvage. More to the point, we arrive at a crucial historical question about the Campaign as a whole:
if the archaeologists themselves doubted the value of conducting it, how did the Nubian campaign
occur at all? How was such an elaborate exchange of objects and values performed, under the
explicit label of "a TVA of archaeology," if the archaeologists themselves were so "dismayed" that
their help was wanted? Wilson gave a retrospective answer that hinted at the mechanisms underlying
a new type of archaeological exchange: "The two governments offered the archaeologists generous
terms: at least a fifty-fifty division of the objects found, and ... the future right to excavate in Egypt
proper, plus the ceding of certain temples and of antiquities from the government storehouses. The
atmosphere was genuinely cordial." On the face of it, this answer confirms the story of a restoration
122 John A. Wilson, "The Sequel," in Signs and Wonders Upon Pharaoh: A History of American Egyptology, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1964), 195. A more detailed version of how the UAR's "new and enlightened policy" was "a
restoration of the older ruling" is given by Walter Emery in his Lost Land Emerging, 20-24. About the of the UAR, he
writes that "It may seem rather sad that such a response is apparently only forthcoming because of a promised reward,
but such is not really the case, as a study of the economics of archaeological research will show." He then proceeds to
recount the story of the imposition of state ownership onto all archaeological finds during the "Stalemate", and
absolved the west from accusations of fetishism, since expeditions always had a "twofold objective of promoting
archaeological and historical knowledge and of gaining additional material", crediting the West with the insight that
"the value of the finer objects of ancient art was enhanced by knowledge of its origins." Ultimately Emery supports the
interpretation given here that the objects provided were "surplus": "the irony is that the storerooms in the basement of
the great museum at Cairo and big warehouses on the sites of excavations such as those at Sakkra were crammed with
duplicate objects, unworthy of a place in the collections of Cairo, but which would have been of great value in Western
Museums."
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of the rule of "fifty-fifty division of value." But if a rule was merely restored, why does Wilson talk
so compulsively of generosity, of "future rights", and cordiality? What kind of exchange is
performed when the problem is a total disinterest, and the solution is total generosity?
Far from restoring the pre-war "fifty-fifty" regime, the Nubian Campaign disbursed gifts to
unwilling receivers. In so doing, it enacted the principle Marcel Mauss had called "total prestation":
the principle that "one gives because one is forced to so... because the recipient has a sort of
proprietary right over everything which belongs to the donor." In his Essai sur le Don, Mauss theorized
that the gift carries a triple obligation: "the obligation to repay gifts received, ... the obligation to
give presents, and the obligation to receive them." Taking on the contradiction of this perpetual
reciprocity between donor and receiver, Mauss argued that a single value circulates among the
network of persons and things involved in gift exchange.
the pattern that tightly connects these symmetrical and reciprocal rights and duties ceases
to be a contradiction, if we realize that it is first and foremost a pattern of spiritual bonds
between things which are to some extent parts of persons, and groups and individuals
that behave in some measure as if they were things. 123
While Mauss inherited the qualification of these bonds as "spiritual" from the ethnographers
of his primary sources, it is possible to understand the connection he proposed between "things that
are parts of persons" and "persons who behave like things" in relational terms, as Claude Levi-Strauss
did in his 1950 Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. Levi-Strauss aimed to detect in Mauss's text the
"relational character of symbolic thought," proposing to rename the singular value of gifts more
abstractly as a "symbolic value, degree zero." 124 As we have seen, the problem posed by the
preservation of the Nubian monuments was a problem of "mankind saving mankind," through the
medium of a collection of objects. In Maussian terms, there is little doubt that monuments were
"things which are to some extent parts of persons" and that Unesco's Mankind was "a group that
behaves in some measure as if it were a thing." In Levi-Strauss' terms, the monumental value
produced by the exchange of monuments for culture can be seen as a monumental value "degree
123 "La prestation totale n'emporte pas seulement l'obligation de rendre le cadeaux requs; mais elle en suppose deux
autres aussi importantes: obligation d'en faire, d'une part, obligation d'en recevoir, de l'autre." 161. "Mais ce melange
6troit de droits et de devoirs sym6triques et contraires cesse de paraitre contradictoire si l'on congoit qu'il y a, avant
tout, melange de lien spirituels entre les choses qui sont a quelque degr6 de Fl'me et les individus et les groupes qui se
traitent i quelque degre comme des choses." 163. << Tout va et vient comme s'il y avait &change constant d'une matire
spirituelle comprenant choses et hommes ... >, 164. Marcel Mauss, "Essai sur le Don," in Sociologie et Anthropologie, (Paris:
PUF, 1950), orig. 1912; 145-280. Translation mine.
124 Claude Levi-Strauss, "Introduction a l'Oeuvre de Marcel Mauss," in Sociologie et Anthropologie, (Paris: PUF, 1950), IX-LII.
Levi-Strauss himself made the connection between Mauss and a nascent psychoanalytic discourse in France. For a
concise, dense, and sweeping summary of where Mauss fits within Western metaphysics, see Mark Taylor,
"Capitalizing (on) Gifting," The Enigma of Gift and Sacrifice, ed. Edith Wyschogrod, Jean-Joseph Goux, Eric Boynton, (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 50-76.
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zero," an empty category residing equally in the objects offered by Egypt and the mankind proposed
by Unesco. Levi-Strauss himself made the connection between Mauss' system of "total facts" and the
encyclopedic ambitions of Unesco's "heritage of mankind" in his introduction, proposing that
Unesco fulfill the mandate outlined by Mauss.
The next section deals with the way this exchange was conducted. First, I will look at the
legal document that elaborated its terms, (the Declaration.) Then I will look at the collection of
objects and how it was presented as a collection of gifts (the objects). Then, I will look at the type of
expert that was enlisted and the debates they engendered (the knowledge). Finally, I will look at
Nubia itself as it was posed as a design problem, as well as a historiographic problem (the territory).
This re-examination will then transition into why Abu Simbel itself was saved, in order to see how
the cultural value that had been produced was then traded against political and national power. This
means that we proceed roughly in chronological order: from the devising of a legal scheme for the
campaign in late 1959-with some flashbacks to the developments since the 1930s that informed
this scheme-to the beginning of the campaign and the enlistment of experts, and to the larger
salvage operations of the mid- 1960s.
The law: from Regime International to International Action
Between October 1st and 1 1 th 1959, the twelve members of the International Consultative
Committee of Experts, led by chairman Jo Brew, traveled by boat up the Nile to visit the temples
threatened by the flood, and "draw up a plan for international action." The document that resulted
from this Nubian cruise, The Declaration by the Government of the United Arab Republic Concerning The International
Action to be Taken to Safeguard the Monuments and Sites of Ancient Nubia provided a blueprint for how to
conduct salvage and exchange of objects.1 25 Authored in equal parts by the Egyptian Minister of
Culture and National Guidance, Saroid Okasha, and the archaeologists of the Consultative
Committee, it is the best place to detect the modified regime of cultural exchange that came into
being through the Nubian Campaign.
Structured in 6 parts, the Declaration proceeded like a legal contract between two parties, from
the obligations of one actor (agencies "participating in the international action", 1. a-e), to the
values provided in exchange by the other ("the Government of the United Arab Republic," 5. a-c)
through the arbitration of an intermediary agent (UNESCO, 2--4). This tripartite structure modified
"'25 Technically authored by the Minister of Culture and National Guidance, Saroit Okacha, in Cairo, on 1 October
1959, the declaration was also reprinted as an annex in Unesco, A Common Trust: The Preservation of the Ancient Monuments of
Nubia (Paris: Unesco, 1960), 27-28, which was timed for the diffusion at the launch of the campaign.
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the archaeological binary of object/counter-object, since Unesco now served an "intermediary
role," mediating between what used to be "Egypt" and what used to be the "Egyptologist." 126 This
role was soon formalized in an intricate network of committees which filtered the "offers for
participation" from foreign institutions and assigned them "archaeological concessions" in return.
But Unesco's impact on the resulting regime was far more pervasive than this simple insertion
implies.
Each side of the new archaeological equation reveals, in its structure and language, the
influence of a lineage of efforts to regulate archaeological excavations by way of international law.
On the side of "foreign agencies", for instance, every "procedure" composing international action
was described as a self-contained archaeological endeavor, in a Unesco parlance that embodies the
expectation that the Nubian campaign should mobilize "scientific, technical, financial" programs
into a single "purely cultural" endeavor:
1. ... procedures to be adopted by those participating in the international action:
(a) Scientific, technical and financial responsibility for ... excavation work... on sites where
inadequate or no survey has been carried out
(b) Scientific, technical and financial responsibility for... preservation ... of monuments which
cannot be moved
(c) Scientific, technical and financial responsibility for ... transfer ... of specific items...
(removal of a temple or part thereof)
(d) Scientific, technical or financial assistance ... for surveys of threatened monuments
With this trio of "science/technique/finance," Unesco codified archaeological digs as
complete and conscribed campaigns, rather than dispersed open-ended probes. This is no small
point: the trail of unfinished archaeological sites, filled with exposed cultural objects, that was left
behind by foreign expeditions had long been a source of discontent for governments hosting
archaeological missions. In fact, the first formal proposal for an international regulation of
archaeological digging-what came to be known as the R gime International des Fouilles-was designed to
evade precisely this kind of incompletion: at the 1931 Athens Conference, Greek archaeologist
Keramoloulos, made a distinction between "methodical" and "hasty" digging, and proposed an
"international regulatory mechanism" to allow foreign schools only one dig at a time, and require
them to record all of the antiquities they found, and pay for their display and conservation. 127
126 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 4.
127 A. D. Kermoloulos, "Le Regime des Fouilles: Nfcessite d'une Reglementation Internationale," in Office International
des Musees, La Conservation des Monuments d'Art et d'Histoire (Paris: Institut International de Coopiration Intellectuelle,
1933)392-393. Kermoloulos identified as a primary issue the "scientific impatience of those authorized to dig, which
led them not to "mener leurs recherches jusqu'a bout" and "porte a exiger a l'archeologue une hate inconciliable avec
les travaux ... methodique." The image of foreign archaeologists running around Greek sites irresponsibly, leaving
behind a trail of unfinished digs and exposed antiquities is confirmed here, and he blamed "cet &tat d'esprit qui fait
des recherches arch6ologiques un veritable sport." In response to Barkan's assumption about who occupies the position
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Keramoloulos blamed irresponsible foreign archaeologists, for leaving behind a trail of exposed
antiquities, in "a state of mind that made of archaeological research a veritable sport." His critique,
in other words, was that foreign archaeologists behaved as an informal culture which left the
formalities of surveying, recording, and institutionalizing to the national antiquities administrations.
What he hoped instead was to force upon foreign diggers what Unesco, 30 years later, called "the
scientific, technical and financial responsibility" for their archaeological concessions.
If the first half of the Declaration defined a new kind of "international action" in archaeology,
the second half of the contract, which appeared to restore the terms of the fifty-fifty regime, was
frankly qualified by Unesco's work in international archaeological law. The entire paragraph was
preceded by a disclaimer that the UAR had been "guided by the Recommendation, adopted by the
General Assembly of Unesco on 5 December 1956, and especially paragraph 23, concerning the
assignment of finds." Passed largely as a result of Brew's efforts, this Recommendation was also the
outcome of a line of efforts that began with Keramololous at Athens, and continued in the
framework of International Cooperation, culminating notably in the so-called Cairo Conference of
193 7. Although the Cairo Conference itself had been inconclusive, its Final Act known as The Cairo
Agreement, is worth an analytical detour as a precedent for the 1960 Declaration: the first document to
transform the binary of object/counterobject into a three part regime.
The 193 7 Cairo Agreement divided into three categories the "Problems Involved in Free Access
to Archaeological Excavations": "(A) Authority to Excavate, (B) Assignment of Finds, (C)
Excavator's Scientific Ownership of his Finds." 128 A and C concerned the left side of the
archaeological regime (knowledge and territory), while B addressed the right side (object and
counterpiece). To address the issues of A and C, the Agreement attempted to regularize a variety of
disparate national legal traditions by introducing two ideas: First, that the "archaeological subsoil" of
any country should be considered State property, regardless of the private ownership of the top soil
above it. Second, that archaeological findings should be published in an international market of
ideas, regardless of the private sponsorship of the expedition which produced the finds. When work
on the Rigime International resumed within Unesco after the war, the distinction between the ownership
of territory and the ownership of knowledge had only been accentuated; working documents for the
in cultural exchange, the critique here was precisely that foreign archaeologists behaved as an informal culture which
left the formalities of surveying, recording, and institutionalizing to the national authorities.
128 UNESCO/Com.Mon.4.4 Doc.6. Paris: 21 March 1951. International Committee for Monuments, First Session,
Remarks on a Plan for International Agreements to Allow Archaeologists from all Countries Free Access to Archeaeological Excavations and Sites."
Unesco Archives, MonCom
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1956 Resolution distinguished "a Government's ownership of the archaeological subsoil" and "an
excavator's scientific ownership of his finds."
Here, then, is important to note that the avowed purpose of regulating archaeological
digging was to liberalize it, so that Western institutions and foreign governments could overcome
private monopolies on land and objects alike.1 9' In the case of regulated access, archaeological
concessions were now to "allow the possibility of 'competing' for licenses;" in the case of results,
scientific research would be published "without violation of the principles governing intellectual
ownership." 130 In effect, the international rigime was developed to act as a defense mechanism against
the progress of private property, not as a positive instrument for the establishment of international
value.
The only part of the Cairo Agreement that reflected the internationalist inclination of the
institutions hosting the debates was the famous "Paragraph 23" cited in the 1959 Declaration, about
the "assignment of finds." As written into the 1956 Recommendation, the paragraph dictated that
"finds should be used, in the first place, for building up, in the museums of the country in which
excavations are carried out, complete collections." 131 Adopting these standards, the 1959 Declaration
excerpted both "unique" and "representative" objects from its "grants-in-return":
5. ... guided by the Recommendation ... the UAR will conceded the following grants in
return ...
(a) cede at least half of the proceeds of their finds to parties which have carried out
excavations in threatened area ...
(b) authorize excavations outside the threatened area ...
... on the understanding that certain items which are unique or ... most representative
of the civilization.., shall be assigned to the museums of the UAR
(c) cede, with a view to their transfer abroad, Nubian temples and a large collection of
antiquities
By subjecting the fifty-fifty rule to universalist standards of judgment, Unesco mitigated the
traditional equation that had mediated between two kinds of private ownership. Thus the Nubian
Campaign was, simultaneously, the first instance when the fifty-fifty rule was formally upheld in a
129 Brew placed the 1956 accord along these lines of "liberalization" in a letter to Donald Hurdeck, program officer
Unesco Relations staff on October 20 1955: "The point of the present proposed revision of the so-called "Cairo
Agreement is not to make additional restriction regulations but to liberalize and improve facilities for foreign scientists
to work in the various countries." Brew 8/ 1086b.
130UNESCO/ Com.Mon.44/71 Doc.36. Paris: 10 March 1954. International Committee for Monuments, Artistic and
Historical Sites, and Archaeological Excavations, Fifth Session. Working Paper on International Regulations with Regard to
Archaeological Excavations., p. 1
'13 See document UNESCO/CUA/68 "Draft International Principles Governing Archaeological Excavations," (Paris:
August 9, 1965), Part II: "Previous Action" for a summary of the Cairo Conference and the subsequent international
efforts regarding archaeology, leading up to the 1957 resolution. The Resolution itself is found as an appendix to the
Records of the General Conference, "Appendices to the Programme for 1957-1958: Recommendation on International
Principles applicable to Archaeological Excavations," (Paris: Unesco, 1956), 40-44.
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legal instrument for international exchange, and the first instance when this traditional division was
subjected to international standards. In some sense, the expectation remained throughout the
campaign that every object found would be haunted by a counter-object. Even as it was mitigated by
tentative principles of international law, the logic of "fifty-fifty" remained in a shadowy form.
A more radical departure from both Cairo Agreement and fifty-fifty rule was evident in the
last item of each term of the Declaration. On the Foreign side, item (1 .e) detached financial
contributions from any archaeological obligations, thereby breaking the pattern of "completion"
that otherwise tied knowledge, object, territory into a neat package.' 32 On the UAR's side, item (5.c)
promised temples and antiquities in return for this purely financial aid, thereby detaching objects
from their traditional counter-objects and imposing another kind of "completion"-an encyclopedic
idea of comprehension-onto archaeological exchange. Finally, the last item of the Declaration itself,
item (6), required that objects thereby exchanged be made available to an international public.
Together, these new elements constituted a third dimension of archaeological exchange:
FOREIGN AGENCIES UNESCO UAR GOVERNMENT
Procedures to adopt ) Offers for Participation <- Grants-in-return
(1) a. excavation (2) assessed by (4) administrative help for digs
b. preservation International Action Committee (5) a. at least half the finds
c. transfer (3) must contain particulars b. digs North of the dam
d. survey (except unique pieces)
e. financial contribution - (6) "open to the public" c. temples for transfer abroad
This third dimension of archaeological exchange is where "salvage funds" had finally come
to lodge themselves. Separated first from the engineering works themselves, and now dissociated
from actual archaeological salvage, these "financial contributions" now stood as a potential tipping
point in Unesco's attempts to balance archaeological access and cultural reward. The dissociation of
finance from aid introduced two new types of objects into the pattern of archaeological exchange:
on the one hand were objects to be placed in national collections because they were judged
"representative" of a national culture; on the other hand were objects ceded for export because they
would be "exposed" to an international public. In a certain sense these two kinds of objects acted as
counterpieces to one another, but the pattern that established their equivalence had changed.
132 This isolation of the financial aspect of salvage was later reflected in Unesco's creation of an International Fund to
receive the contributions to the campaign of member states. See 56 EX/5 Add. 1 Establishment of a Trust fund for Contributions
for the Safeguarding of the Monuments of Nubia.
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The objects: "Gifts from the Nile"
The Declaration set the legal terms for an exchange between monetary contributions and
cultural property, but forbade the establishment of a quantitative equivalence between the two.
Accordingly, throughout the campaign no object was ever described as being "exchanged," whether
for a financial contribution or for another object of equivalent value. Other language was used-the
United States "offer" talked about "the quid-pro-quo element" that allowed a "transfer of matching
funds" in return for "adequate reward in objects.""133 This was, in effect, a new "bargaining
technique," which came to replace the one that had been operative in the pre-war "fifty-fifty"
regime. And just as with the Nefertiti episode, it was John Wilson who revealed what lay behind a
seemingly equitable division of objects and values. Upon returning from Washington, Wilson
reported that the Declaration should be thought of as a "package deal:"
A rumor active in Washington was that the UAR would insist on a "package deal" for
foreign agencies. That is, no institution could win the bonus of digging north of the dam
... or could be rewarded with surplus antiquities or with one of the smaller temples,
unless that institution both excavated in Egyptian Nubia and made a contribution to the
preservation of the Big temples. 134
Wilson confirmed the rumor one month later, upon returning from Cairo: "if we really want rights
and objects, we have to present a 'package deal:' money for safeguarding the temples, in addition to
our digging." 135 This meant that no single item on the list of "procedures" could be triggered, unless
contributions were made to the campaign as a whole. Archaeological digging was not, after all, a self-
sufficient form of technical assistance. In addition, the whole exchange was now to be referred to in
terms of excess: institutions could be "rewarded"; antiquities could be rendered "surplus," and
"access" was described as "bonus." It was as if the idea of "completion" introduced by Unesco had
brought with it an image of surplus: objects not needed to achieve completion could be described as
excessive, and it was this excess that would be granted "in return" for voluntary assistance. What
kind of archaeological regime resulted from this disarticulation of the balanced equation of classical
Egyptology? How did this new "surplus" regime differ from the "counterpiece" logic it superceded?
133 US National Committee for the preservation of Nubian Monuments, Memo of Phone Call from Washgington, Lois
Haase, Nov 29, 1960. Brew "Counterpart" Folder. (This impression was reinforced by the language of Western
Archaeologists, who remembered all the objects that were "kept in the coffers" of the Egyptian antiquities and clearly
expected that these antiquities would be "given as counterparts.")
134 National Committee for the Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia. "Interim Report to the Executive Committee,
from executive secretary John Wilson." April 4, 1960. Brew 9/1086h.
113 In his report Wilson paraphrased Okasha as follows: "Please, Please you offer to dig X-group cemeteries or copy rock
inscriptions. What we need is money! How can you expect us to reward you handsomely for digging and copying,
when you are not giving the money to safeguard the temples?" John Wilson, US National Committee for the
Preservation of Nubian Monuments. Informal Report to the Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee (23 May
-1 Jun 1960), 2. Brew: Folder "US Commission."
384
4. Salvaged Monuments
The language of surplus that permeated the Campaign was arguably inaugurated on the
second day of the Nubian cruise, when the International Action Committee decided not to translate
the French word "contrepartie," but to use the English "grant-in-return" instead:
Definition of the French word contrepartie, in the U.A.R. Government's Declaration, of
which the literal English translation is not clear. After an exchange of opinions, it was
proposed to substitute the phrase grant-in-return for the English word counterpart.
Referring to the word contrepartie and the comments made by several experts, the
Chairman thought it right to make it clear that we ought not to consider the gift of certain
monuments or objects by Egypt as cutting them off from Egypt's cultural inheritance, but
much rather as a further extension of it.' 36
While Okacha had appealed to the fifty-fifty tradition by describing as "counterparts" the
monuments his ministry would grant to foreign countries, the International Action Committee chose
to call them "Grants-in-Return" instead. The intention of this substitution was double: first, to avoid
placing the exchange of objects "on the same level as a commercial transaction," and secondly, to
prevent museums from "ask for particular objects." Instead museums should be content "to make
their requests in general form." Thus the transformation of Okasha's Declaration into a generous
"offer" had the effect of homogenizing the objects into a single collection of "gifts." When Okacha
agreed to change his terminology, he wrested control of the objects away from the West, triggering
a chain of designation that soon led these temples and antiquities to be "declared surplus."'37
The passage from "counterpart" to "gift" in Unesco's publicity material was effected in a
few months: first published in the 1960 A Common Trust, the Declaration was illustrated with a list of
"Objects to be Offered by the UAR as Counterpart." By October 1961 the Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel:
Now or Never featured a spread of "Gifts from the Land of Pharaohs," collected under the label of
"Ancient Treasures which the Government of the UAR is Offering as Grants-in-return. " 138 Unesco's
international audience had already heard this gifting vocabulary activated by Vittorino Veronese,
who had ended his inaugural appeal with the phrase "Egypt is a Gift of the Nile," which was "for
countless students the first Greek phrase which they learnt to translate." The implication was that
gifting acted a universal tongue, which could unify the value of the Egyptian objects, despite their
disparate historical and geographic provenance. Similarly, while "counterparts" contained specific
136 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 3. An announcement was made at the end of the meeting on 7 th October 1959 that
Okacha had agreed to the sawp: "The Minister of Culture has agreed to substitute, in the English translation of the
official declaration of the U.A.R. Government, the expression "a grant in return" for the word "counterpart." Ibid, 27.
137 Brew described the temples as "originally declared 'surplus"' in a letter to Wilson, 5 Aug 1963. Brew 10/54b.
38 "Gifts from the Land of the Pharaohs," in Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel: Now or Never (Oct 1961), 22-23. The spread
compulsively repeated that these objects were "gifts:" "Also offered are five pharaonic temples. Both the UAR and the
Sudan have also offered 50 percent of excavation finds ... and Egypt has generously modified its antiquity laws."
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reference to their own archaeological origin, "gifts" could come generically from "the land of the
Pharaohs," their value as a collection certified by their autonomy as gifts.
A few further conclusions can be drawn from the substitution of "grant-in-return" for
"countrepartie." The decision to avoid the English "counterpart" later acquired greater significance
in light of the type of funds that the US eventually devoted to earning such temples-as will be
described later, these funds were called "counterpart funds" and were derived from the sale of
surplus agricultural commodities to Egypt. It should also be noted that the birth of this language of
surplus coincided with an anxiety of secession-the fear that "the gifting certain monuments or
objects" might mean "cutting them off from Egypt's cultural inheritance." This fear that "gifts-in-
return" would no longer be understood as belonging to Egypt reveals how much the system of
counter-objects had previously connected exported objects to their original location.
Thus, in its afterlife throughout the Campaign, this Declaration continued to be used delicately
to appeal to this systemic longing for a counter-origin, while also enlisting experts interested in
objects and values "for their own sake." The assurance that gifts-in-return would serve as a "further
extension" of Egypt, in turn, hints at the way the surplus economy of heritage was legitimated by a
geographic image of expansion. In the next section I describe how the distribution of surplus
antiquities across Egypt and the world was a strategy for inscribing Nubia into a spatial regime for
the disposition of excess. I begin with the afterlife of the Declaration, to see how it was used by
Unesco to enlist experts into three categories of action that would otherwise have appeared
gratuitous, in increasing order of self-interest: the archaeologists performing a "systematic survey,"
preservation architects doing the "dismantling and removal of ancient temples," and engineers with
"the two most important projects of the campaign-the preservation in situ."1 39
The experts: knowing vs. saving
The veneer of generosity that coated the UAR's Ministerial Declaration, the language of surplus
of the "package deal," and the elaborate legal mechanisms that gave substance to this "gifting"
rhetoric-all were devised, it must be remembered, to preempt the puzzlement of Western
archaeologists: as expressed by John Wilson, the "dismay" of "what could we do?" This dismay, in
turn, was due to the impression that neither digging in Nubia nor moving temples were sufficiently
archaeological projects to warrant the attention of Egyptology as a traditional Western discipline. The
function of the Ministerial Declaration was to answer this rhetorical "what could we do?" by making an
archaeological connection where none existed, between a kind of digging that yielded no objects
139 "Abu Simbel: Now or Never," in Unesco Courier, (Oct 1961), 6.
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(surveying Nubian sites) and a kind of object that required no digging (preserved monuments.) To
do so, the Declaration abstracted the basic equation of archaeology-digging is the transformation of
knowledge and territory into objects-into a bureaucratic procedure, deployed at an international
scale, beginning with "digging in Nubia" and ending with "preserved temples." Thus the mediatic
label of a "TVA of archaeology," which was applied unequivocally to the photographs, films, and
reports of Unesco's fieldwork in Nubia, worked to conceal the lack of any connection between the
teams of scientists busily surveying the banks of the Nubian Nile, and the collection of monuments
heroically salvaged from catastrophe.
If the function of the Appeal was to "create a real psychological shock" 4 0 in the
international community at large, the function of the Declaration, as a document disseminated to
Unesco's member states, was to trigger the successive enlistment of specific experts, in a disciplinary
chain-reaction devised in September 1959 at a meeting convened in Washington DC by Assistant D-
G Julian Thomas, MonCom members, and a group of American experts. 141 The question was how
best to stimulate interest of Western institutions, and the answer came in the form of a distinction
between two kinds of archaeologists: those who could conduct the majority of the work, and those
who could attract the majority of the funding. All agreed that "the majority of the work would go
into saving the thousands of sites which ... would be submerged by the construction of the dam."
Since "many of these sites are pre-historic and contain the hearths, homes, flint implements and
other artifacts of Neolithic and Paleolithic man,"142 this kind of intensive, repetitive and
comprehensive digging was likely to attract "scientific institutions interested in uncovering
information as to early history just for its own sake." But despite consensus that these "so-called dirt
archaeologists would have a field day in Nubia," "it was generally conceded that the practical aspect
of this being a method for museums to acquire materials might be the more important
consideration." 143
Behind the distinction between "uncovering information for its own sake" and "acquiring
material"-between knowing and having-lay an institutional divide: "dirt archaeologists" were pre-
historians from research universities, but better-endowed museums were needed to serve as
140 "Plan of Action," in UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR (12 Nov 1959), 42.
141 CUL (59)4 Summary Meeting on Unesco involvement in the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Ancient Nubia. (Sept 18, 1959.)
The meeting was attended by representatives of: Unesco; the New York Office of Unesco; the Egyptian Department at
Metropolitan Museum of Art; the Division of American Ethnology, the Freer Art Gallery, and the Division of Old World
Archaeology at the Smithsonian Institution; the National Park Service, the National Science Foundation, and various
Bureaus of the State Department.
142 CUL(59)4.
143 CUL (59)4, p.5
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institutional partners for the UAR. Indeed Unesco's cultural politics bypassed nation-states only by
going through cultural institutions instead, and it is museums that had traditionally been interested in
Egypt.14 4 "These museums," as MonCom director Gysin put it a month later during the Nubian
cruise, were "run by independent trustees who could not hand over money without being sure of a
proper quid pro quo." Such museums would cooperate only if they could "receive objects in
return", either to "complete their collections of Egyptology" or to create one. 14 However, these
Egyptology departments were interested only in objects of Pharaonic origin-not in the "hearths and
homes" of anonymous prehistoric men. And as an Egyptologist diplomatically summarized during
the Nubian cruise, "Simply to return to the old rule of 50% would produce a bad effect on
archaeological research, for it was certain that finds in Nubia would be poor." 146 Thus the generosity
of the Declaration was calculated to lure Egyptologists with promises of "rights" to sites North of the
dam that were sure to be "richer," as well as "objects" from Cairo's warehouses, which would
"satisfy the heart of any curator of a foreign museum." The expectation was, that these satisfied
curators would bring funding to Nubia in return. Nor was this simply an American equation-as the
Wall Street Journal cited a "European Egyptologist" as saying, "it is only logical to open purses by
opening warehouses."'4 7
This emphasis on objecthood ran contrary to the disciplinary tendencies of prehistorians,
who were skeptical of "squawking Egyptologists" and expressed their skepticism in terms of a debate
between science and aesthetics. 148 Knowledge about Nubia's prehistory, they argued, had to be
gathered before the flood, whereas Pharaonic antiquities had already been recorded and their
location was a museological matter, not an archaeological one. The implication was that science was
an absolute criterion for salvage, while a greedy obsession with objecthood would never be
satiated.' 49 Yet even their positivistic argument was subject to relative evaluations-certainly state
officials remembered having already funded the First and Second archaeological surveys in the early
144 In the case of the United States, the Smithsonian Institution served as "the formal, official, general archaeological
agency of the Federal Government," the NSF was deemed "the most practical agency for administering grants," and
museum directors from Ivy-League Universities were enlisted to ensure that the "the distribution of antiquities"
became the responsibility of the American Association of Museums. That this institutional imperative came from
Unesco is evidenced by Brew's own distaste for it: "Any project will work better if it doesn't have to be saddled with
the Smithsonian. ... If we could contribute to the reform of the Smithsonian, this would be a greater achievement than
lifting Abu Simbel 200 feet." Letter from Brew to Wilson, April 11, 1961.
145 Gysin, UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 27.
146 Walter Emery, in UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 40.
147 James Wallace, "High dams, Old Scarabs," in Wall StreetJournal (Mar 16, 1960), 14.
148 Letter from Brew to William Y. Adams, April 24, 1967, Brew archives, Correspondance: Adams.
149 Aside from the few archaeologists like Adams and who had been involved in the first Survey, most pre-historians
eventually enlisted had trained on sites in their own national territories.
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part of the century, and were therefore convinced that "Nubia had been thoroughly dug in earlier
years," and was therefore "known" by scientific standards."is
Egyptologists' motives in the campaign were frankly ulterior, yet they still expressed their
interests in terms of disciplinary autonomy, as part of an altruistic "revival of Egyptology." The
Curator of Egyptian Art at Boston's MFA, for instance, saw "an opportunity for the finest kind of
international cooperation" which would bring new objects back from Egypt, and care for existing
ones in the US:
Our great collections of Egyptian art, if combined together, would probably represent
holdings only to be equaled in a single country by those of Egypt itself. ... Our
distinguished tradition of Egyptian studies has been maintained by a handful of people,
the problem of whose training has been of increasingly alarming difficulty ... this is of
particular interest in the Museum field ... if our great holdings of Egyptian art are to be
properly cared for, evaluated and made known to the public. We should also visualize
their increase through the possibility of excavation. 15•
By granting Western museums rights and objects, the Campaign would re-connect US experts and
US objects to their field of origin, and renew the disciplinary legitimacy of "Egyptian studies."
Clearly this attitude reinforced the connection between objects and their counterpieces, since Western
collections would be "increased" with pieces that had been accumulating in Cairo, after a century's
worth of fifty-fifty divisions. Hence to "visualize the increase" of collections was to visualize the re-
unification of separated pairs, and if the Nubian Campaign is to stand as an example of any kind of
restitution, it is one that benefited Western museums, who received the "duplicate objects" they had
once given up and considered rightfully theirs. 5s2
Egyptologists repaid the contempt of dirt archaeologists with zealotry, sounding alarm at any
news of prehistoric objects exported to the West for purposes of "research." The most notorious
s50 The US contributed to the two archaeological campaigns in the early part of the century. Rainey was the director of
University Museum at the University of Pennsylvania, and elected director of AAM in 1960. He was told in
Washington that the first demand for funds in 1959 was stuck because the cultural affairs officers knew Nubia "had
been thoroughly dug in earlier years." But while the Department of State was therefore biased towards "Egyptology",
Brew noted that the NSF was marked by "an emphasis on prehistory, which arises from the fact that the social science
division is committee to that kind of archaeology." Letter from Brew to Wilson, April 11, 1961
'51 CUL (60) 8: William S. Smith, "The Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia," delivered to the US Committee of the
International Council of Museums, (Boston, May 25, 1960), 3. Brew Archives, Correspondance Folder. Smith defined
the collections as witnesses to past expertise: "Our collections will testify to the important results of such excavations."
152 Walter Emery was a particularly vocal proponent of this argument: "The irony is that the storerooms in the
basement of the great museum at Cairo and big warehouses on the sites of excavations such as those at Sakkra were
crammed with duplicate objects, unworthy of a place in the collections of Cairo, but which would have been of great
value in Western Museums." Lost Land Emerging, 20-24. During the Nubian cruise he revealed he had specific objects in
mind: "Mr. Emery quoted from personal experience. A small part of his discoveries at Saqqara, at present preserved in
the storerooms since only a small part of them could be exhibited, would satisfy the heart of any curator of a foreign
museum." Emery even extended the idea of surplus to the ground itself: "Moreover, how many times had he not been
forced, faced with an abundance of finds of the same kind, to rebury pottery that could usefully be exhibited outside
Egypt." UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 41.
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incident featured skull fragments post-dated by a few thousand years and re-classified as "modem
man" in order to qualify for export. This incident caused Unesco officer Jan van den Haagen to
intervene, making explicit the underlying clash between two disciplinary autonomies, one based on
historical objects the other on historical narratives. "Questions concerning the 'illicit export' of some
prehistorical pieces," Van den Haagen granted, "may be overdone or even incongruous, as an
enormous number of them can be found," but "Egyptologists do not think in the same terms as pre-
historians and are prone to consider every object as a 'cultural treasure'." And since Egyptologists
were in charge of archaeological laws, the export of "information for its own sake" was ultimately
bound by the same rules as the export of "cultural treasures." "3
This tension between science and aesthetics was exacerbated by a territorial tug-of-war,
triggered by a rule that bound the Egyptologist's "bonus digging" in northern Egypt to the
completion of the prehistorians' excavations in Nubia. Each lobbied to be disassociated from the
other: Egyptologists claimed that "the real political purpose ... was to start excavations in the north
of Egypt again,"154 and continually pressed for the end of "prehistoric excavations, which are for the
birds," in order to begin "honest archaeology."1 "' The dirt archaeologists, in turn, worried about
attempts to "monopolize Egypt" with object-driven digging."' The dispute was mediated by the
International Action Committee, but even members of this committee were embroiled in competing
allegiances: chairman John Wilson, for example saw his position as "complicated by a triple
responsibility:" on the consultative committee, he was "obliged to work for the success of the
Nubian campaign regardless of nationality," but as secretary of the US National Committee, he
worked "for the best interests of America in the total picture" by obtaining rights and objects for US
s53 Letter from Haagen to Solecki, Brew 10/54a. "Correspondance" Folder. The debate was over "several pieces of
human skull including frontal," found by Yale zoologist Ralph Reed, and which interested him because they
"exhibited very large brow bridges." Reed then "re-examined the skull pieces and came to the conclusion that the
brow bridges really weren't so big after all, so it could safely be described as modern man and taken out of the country
for study." Fred Wendorf and Ralph Solecki protested that in doing so Reed "risked creating another Nefertiti
scandal," exposing him to the Egyptian director of Antiquities. It was Louis Christophe who wrote van den Haagen to
warn that such letters were prone to be mis-understood by the Egyptian Antiquities, prompting van den Haagen to
write to Solecki. Brew 10/54b.
154 They were supported by the State Department in this conviction. "I don't know what is eating Wilson... surely he
has known from the start that the real political purpose behind all of this was to start excavations in the north of Egypt
again... surely he must know that 'higher ups at State" are primarily interested in American work in the major sites of
the North-and care little about this business of digging in Nubia which no one wants to do." Letter from Froehlich
Rainey to Brew, April 9, 1962. Brew 10/54b.
1ss Letter from Rainey to Brew and Wilson, Mar 14, 1962. Brew 10/p. 8.
"'56 See an exchange of letters between Charles Reed of Yale and Ralph Solecki, mediated by Jo Brew, in February 1962.
Brew 9/1086d.
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museums, while he also remained a delegate of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago,
which had "honestly applied for funds ... not until Nubia is really finished." '5
What Wilson experienced as a personal anxiety-the dilemma of knowing when "Nubia
was really finished"-was a symptom of the tenacity of the fifty-fifty rule, which continued to
manifest itself in two now contradictory strains: the lingering pressure to exclude Nubia from
"Egypt proper," and the continuing strength of the counter-object as a mode of legitimation. If
Egyptologists were skeptical of Nubia as a cultural entity, it is because their discipline traditionally
excluded it. Witness for instance Bourguigon d'Anville's maps in the Napoleonic Description de l'Egypte
(Egyptology's inaugural text), which showed that Egypt ended precisely where Nubia began."s8 (fig
4.14) Yet the Unesco Campaign transformed this difference (Egypt/not-Egypt) into an equivalence
(Egypt/Nubia), the kind of archaeological equivalence where one object is deserved in exchange for
the other. This same logic, which had previously divided all archaeological finds into two lots, was
now dividing Egypt into two halves, each needing the other to guarantee its legitimacy.
What this fight between the two Egypts shows is that even when its legal terms had dissolved,
the "fifty-fifty" regime remained as a shadowy bond, projected at a territorial scale onto the entirety
of the UAR. It was the Aswan Dam that now acted as the line of archaeological demarcation, making
the operative distinction between "digging north of the dam" and "excavating in Nubia." It is
through this geographic version of a object/counter-object pair, that Egypt became "whole" again as
a place of archaeological discovery. In this sense, Western museums earned their surplus temples not
only in return for assistance to Egypt but also so they could return to Egypt, their Egyptology departments
newly legitimized, with Nubia now included.'5 9
III. The "Greatest Open-Air Museum in the World"
Nubia as international space
The reconstitution of Egypt into a museological referent was only one aspect of a broad re-
working of "Nubia" into an international entity. This cultural redefinition of Nubia was strung along
157 Letter from Wilson to Brew, July 24, 1962. Brew 10/54b.
158 "The Description de l'Egypte is itself a monument," writes C.C. Gillispie in the introduction, adding that the
Description's "nine volumes of memoirs, description, and commentary, averaging 800 pages each, may be considered the
point of departure of Egyptology as a field of study." CC. Gillispie, "Historical Introduction," in Monuments of Egypt, 1.
159The autonomy of this reconstituted archaeological territory was dependent on two mutually-exclusive, yet
complementary autonomies: the scientific autonomy of prehistory as expertise, and the aesthetic autonomy of
Egyptian antiquities as museum objects.
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a new historiographic continuum that began with Nubia's past as a "Corridor to Africa,"
encompassed its present as "A Vast Archaeological Camp," 60 and continued into its future as a "the
Greatest Open-air Museum in the World." 161 The foundation for this cultural history had been laid
in the 1907 by the First Archaeological Survey, when extensive digging had yielded "several phases
of indigenous Nubian culture (the so-called A,B,C, and X Groups)," thereby "effectively refuting the
commonly held-belief that ancient Nubia was culturally dependent on Egypt."' 62 The archaeologists
of the Unesco campaign continued to "accumulate new data" to fill this A,B,C,D,X framework,
further supporting the hypothesis that Nubia was as an autonomous cultural entity. But they also
went much further in extrapolating from this early history a legitimization of Nubia's present-day
situation. In some cases this extension was made by the same scholars, with early and late phases of
the same career punctuated by the construction of the dam. British archaeologist Walter Emery, for
instance, who had been Director of the Second Archaeological Survey of 1929, led the British
expeditions for Unesco and published his authoritative Lost Land Emerging upon his return in 1964.
In his "General Outline of Nubian History" Emery asked "Where is Nubia?," and gave a
historical answer to this geographic question: "such is its history as a highway to battle for the
contending armies of the North and South, that Nubia never really attained a independent status of its
own." Yet Nubia was a distinct region, a "Battleground of the Ancient World," and home of "a very
distinct nationality, very closely knit by blood relationships and a common way of life." Emery also
ventured into the present-day, giving four pages of amateur ethnographic insights on "the modern
Nubian," an intrinsic paradigmatic traveler whose attachment to his homeland was not deterred by
frequent movement and perennial exile. "The Nubian of today," Emery wrote, "is racially distinct
from the Egyptian," and "unlike the Egyptian, he is a great traveler." The significance of this
mobility is that Nubians had become an exemplary labor force ("a first-class servant," "all the best
butlers and cooks in Egypt,") and as such, had achieved "the protection which in Europe can only be
expected from a strong labor union." Thus despite their dispersal in Egyptian cities, Nubian
communities formed a "united group."1 63 The answer to the question "where is Nubia?", then, was
that Nubia was not a place but "a cultural network," a "social system that works." If Nubia was
160 Louis Christophe, "Nubia Today: A Vast Archaeological Camp, in Unesco Courier, (October 1961), 21.
161 Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "The Greatest open-air museum in the world is about to disappear." In Museum
XIII,3, (1960).
162 "Lake Nasser" entry in A Dictionary of Archaeology, Ed. Ian Shaw and Robert Jameson (London: Blackwell, 2002), 349-
350. The campaign granted further archaeological legitimacy to the differentiation between Egypt and Nubia by acting
as "an important catalyst for focusing the attention of archaeologists in the Nile valley on the hitherto-neglected study
of towns and cities, thus also ensuring that many Egyptologists were trained in the more exacting scientific methods
and approaches required by settlement archaeology."
163 Walter B. Emery, Lost Land Emerging (New York: Scribner & Sons), 8-9.
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understood as a place of passage, the Nubians themselves were conceptualized as a model cultural
constituency, mobile yet authentic.
Emery's (and others') description of Nubian social networks as a "system" eventually helped
to legitimate the relocation of over 120,000 Nubians from their soon-to-be-flooded villages to "New
Nubia" and "New Wadi." (fig 4.19) As early as 1959 the relocation of people and of monuments
were paired as the human and archaeological "prices" to be paid for the Aswan Dam's economic
"benefits," and this symmetry often served to fold Nubia's history of local autonomy
unproblematically into its new role as an international land. The French journal La Vie Urbaine, whose
brand of urban geography was particularly attentive to population movements, described "The
Drama of Nubia" as a trade-off between "the joy of economists and philanthropists" and the
"discomfort of relocated Nubians." But while the editors called the displacement of Nubians "a
secondary problem, to be resolved on a local scale," they saw the movement of antiquities as "a
much graver problem" on the scale "of the entire civilized world."' 64 Although the distance traveled
by most antiquities was infinitely smaller than that endured by Nubians, their resettlement in distant
new towns was considered a "local" problem, while the movement of monuments was seen to be
"universal." (fig 4.25) This hierarchy carried over into later assessments of the dam's success, as the
monumental culture saved came to serve as a substitution for the human culture displaced. 165
These repeated accounts of Nubia as a place of passage between Africa and the
Mediterranean produced a cohesive depiction of an independent region, whose cultural identity had
survived a lineage of imposed regimes, from Pharaonic rule, to Christianity, Islam and, by
implication, Nasser's "socialist experiment." Certainly Unesco's publicity department capitalized on
these ethno-archaeological insights to present Nubia as a place of peaceful ethnic encounter, "the
meeting place of civilizations," 66 like Unesco itself. (fig 4.18-19) The International Consultative
Committee, for instance, referred to the "The Spirit of Nubia" as a cooperative impulse that pervaded
their negotiations on the Nile:
We came from six different language backgrounds. We had political backgrounds which
were monolithic or highly individualistic. ... In view of these factors, the sessions were
164 Jeanne Hugueney, "Le Drame de la Nubie," in La Vie Urbaine No. 1, Vol. (Jan-Mar 1961), 48. An urbanistic study of
the actual resettlement of Nubians was eventually conducted in 1973 in the journal Ekistics. See Hussein M. Fahim,
"Nubian Resettlement in the Sudan," in Ekistics 212 (July 1973), 42-49.,
165 By 1976 Nature magazine approvingly noted that no "cultural losses" had been felt thanks to the salvage campaign,
and that despite the "bitterness and serious social consequences," caused by the relocation of Nubians, "the value of the
Aswan High Dam" was to be "judged .... according to an overall assessment of Egypt's situation," as if "social
consequences" in no way contributed to this national picture. The same article noted that Nubians had always remained
"stubbornly hostile to foreigners." Julian Rzoska, "A controversy reviewed," in Nature Vol. 261 (June 10, 1976), 445
166 55 EX/30 "Communication of the Government of Sudan Concerning the archaeological sites and Monuments
threatened..."
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harmonious and candid. ... the atmosphere continued so cordial that you heard joking
little references to "the spirit of Nubia" as being the right attitude to the problem.
And in this spirit of Nubia there is hope for a real revival of Egyptology.'67
As the campaign progressed, and teams of archaeologists repeated this inaugural cruise in their
"Floating Laboratories on the Nile,"1 68 the image of Nubia as a cooperative milieu became more
technical. Not only had Nubia been the "island workshop of stone age man," where "Man achieved
his first triumph over his material conditions.""'69 Nubia was a place of architectural experimentation
and it would now also be a model for technical aid in the Unesco sense. These archaeological results
painted a picture of a hospitable mankind and made the Nubians into a model international
constituency. Thus Nubia was only continuing its role as "a Corridor to Africa" by enabling the
movement of archaeologists and, eventually, tourists.
"Geography is partly discovered and partly invented," admitted anthropologist Bill Adams
with 30 years of hindsight, when recalling his role as the leader of Unesco's campaign in the Sudan.
Acknowledging his own role in "The Invention of Nubia," he analyzed it as a six-part historical arc:
there was "the Egyptians' Nubia / the Egyptologists' Nubia / the Greeks and Romans' Nubia / the
Black Nationalists' Nubia / the Nubiologists' Nubia / the Nubians' Nubia." Each identified a territory
that was occupied by varying degrees of otherness: "Nubians as inferior Egyptians; Nubians as noble
savages, Nubians as Africans; Nubians as the originators of civilization; Nubians as culturally unique;
Nubians as Arabs." 7 0 While Adams credited the Unesco campaign with creating one particular
breed of expert (the Nubiologist, whose "cultural particularism" he critiqued), it is important to
note that, during the actual Campaign, these identities were used with equal fervor by Unesco and its
various committees for fund-raising purposes.
American archaeologists, for example, routinely described Nubians as "the first historically
recognizable black African people" to imply a direct connection between Unecso's work and
167 "We came from six different language backgrounds. We had political backgrounds which were monolithic or highly
individualistic. In one sense, several of us were bargaining with several others ... In view of these factors, the sessions
were harmonious and candid. ... the atmosphere continued so cordial that you heard joking little references to "the
spirit of Nubia" as being the right attitude to the problem. ... And in this spirit of Nubia there is hope for a real
revival of Egyptology." John Wilson, "General Results: Positive," in US National Committee for the Presrvation of
Nubian Monuments, Informal Report to the Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee, May 23 -June 1, 1960, June 6,
1960, 2. Brew Archives, "Counterpart" Folder
168 Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "Floating Laboratories on the Nile," in Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel Now or Never, 26-29.
169 Rex Keating, "Journey to the Land of Kush," in Unesco Courier, Now or Never, 32-36.
170 William Y. Adams, "The Invention of Nubia," Hommages a Jean Leclant Vol. 2 (Le Caire, 1994) reprinted in Arkamani:
Sudan Journal of Archaeology and Anthropology, (February 2002), 1.
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contemporary American race relations.""' In the context the civil right debates of the early 1960s,
American archaeologists testified in Washington about the cultural autonomy of Nubia and the need
to inscribe the region into a general history of "Africa.""72 In his Senate testimony on behalf of the
US committee, Chicago orientalist John Wilson described Nubia as the place where "the first
Negroes entered history," and implied that "research in the area" might yield a solution to domestic
civil-rights issues.'73 In some ways the effect of these arguments was not felt until much later, after
the Black power movement had reclaimed for their revolutionary cause the Nubian icons made
famous by Unesco, and the archaeological findings of the Nubian campaign became evidence in the
heated scholarly debates over the erasure of "black pharaohs" from Western historiography in the
1980s.
Similarly, anthropologists working on the Sudan described Nubia in their fund-raising
material as "a kind of 'mouvance,' in the medieval sense, between Egypt and the Southern
World, "'" and emphasized the importance of investigating "the exceptionally late survival of
Christianity in this part of the Moslem Sudan."'17 Adams himself titled his application for an NSF
grant "An Archaeological Investigation of the Cultural Transition from Christianity to Islam in
Nubia.""'76 Clearly this emphasis on the "survival of Christianity" was a poignant way both to
differentiate Sudanese Nubia from Egyptian Nubia, and to distance Unesco from the revolutionary
171 Adams, The Invention of Nubia.
172 It was Martin Bernal who revived Nubia as a place of potential "Black" ontology, with Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots
of Classical Civilization. Bernal, Black Athena, Volume 1: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985, (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1987). Bernal argued that Western historiography had, since the 18th century, purged the image of
Ancient Greece of the contributions made by Egyptian and Phoenician cultures. Bernal proposed to locate the genesis of
Ancient Greece in ancient Egypt, and to see Egypt itself as "fundamentally African," sparking a bitter debate over
whether ancient Egyptians could, in his formulation, "be usefully understood as black." It Bernal's detractors who
solidified Nubia as place of blackness: while they agreed with his critique, they asked to remove this African specificity
from Egypt, and often granted it to Nubia instead. The volume Black Athena Revisited is typical in offering Nubia as a
"really a black African culture with enormous influence and power," and using the archaeological results of Unesco's
campaign to do so. "Nubians in the Ancient Mediterranean World," 121-128, in Frank M. Snowden, Jr., "Bernal's
'Blacks and the Afrocentrists,' in Black Athena Revisited, ed. Mark Lefkowitz and Guy MacLean Rogers (Chapel Hill: Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 1996.)
173 Mutual Security Act of 1960, 576. "Between 4,000 and 3,000 years ago the first Negroes to enter history entered in
that area, and this process needs to be studied in terms of the evidence here." That this was a pressing issue is evidenced
by Wilson's own report that the hearing was poorly attended meeting, because "there was a civil rights ebate on the
floor of the Senate, so that only three menmner of the committee appeared." National Committee for the Rescuye of
the Monuments of Nubia, Interm Report to the executive committee from executive Scretary Wilson, April 4, 1960.
Brew 9/Nubia 10.
174 W. Y. Adams and J. Vercoutter, "Why Excavate in Sudanese Nubia?" Lecture (undated), in Brew 9/1086L
"Sudanese Nubia," p. 13.
175 "International Meeting on the archaeological Campaign in Sudanese Nubia, Venice, Italy, 18-22 April 1966,".
Addition made by Brew onto the draft meeting notes. Brew 9/p. 16.
176 University of Kentucky Research Foundation, on Behalf of the University of Kentucky, initiated by William Y.
Adams., Dept of Anthropology. Brew 9/p. 16.
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regime that had ruled Sudan since 1956 with notable hostility to the catholic missionary presence on
its soil."77 But, as with all the other "Nubias," Adams' hypothesis of "Cultural Transition" was only a
working concept, a way to contribute to a general theory of social and historical hybridity. What
anthropologists, archaeologists and historians all sought in Nubia, on behalf of Unesco, was not a
new international ontology but rather a regional epistemology that allowed for flexibility, hybridity,
and expansion.
Two major themes emerged from this international redefinition of Nubia: hybridity and
mobility. The first-wherein Nubia was a hybrid social environment-must be understood as a
contribution to Unesco's concurrent attempt to conceptualize a World Civilization as the product of
an optimized mix of "contributions of cultures." The second-wherein Nubia was a land of
transient material cultures-helped to legitimize the relocation of the Nubian temples. Each warrants
its own examination, because both set the stage for how "space" (understood geographically or
environmentally) participated in the creation of a "cultural" value for monuments.
"Contribution of cultures" vs. "museum without walls"
The task of accommodating hybridity and diversity within a new definition of world
civilization was one to which Unesco had devoted a number of projects since 1950."78 As part of the
International Campaign Against Racism, the Committee for Diversity organized a series of conferences and
published the results as anti-racist manifestos. The 1952 edited volume La question raciale devant la science
modeme, for instance, posed the question "the contribution of cultures to civilization" to an eminent
roster of thinkers, including a young Claude Levi Strauss.'7 9 In his text "Race and History," the
French anthropologist Levi Strauss introduced the notion that human societies are built for "optimum
diversity"-a notion which has now become famous as much for having been repudiated by the
author in 1971 as for becoming, despite this repudiation, the main tenet of Unesco's
177 The Unesco Campaign drew attention to this hostility, and provoked denials by the Sudanese government: "A
number of articles ... appeared with increasing frequency ... raising the question of religious freedoms in the Republic
of Soudan, alleging.... Government intervention with the right of Sudanese citizens and foreign nationals in the Sudan
to practice Christianity; others have alleged the expulsion of Christian missionaries ... The policy of the Sudan has
always been to guarantee and protect freedom of religion and worship of all citizens and foreign residents without
discrimination of any kind." "Statement by the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Washington, DC", (Jan 29,
1963). Brew 9/pl6.
"17 "L'Unesco lance une Campagne Mondiale contre l'Injustice raciale: Notice Historique," Apres-Papier No. 104 (Paris:
19 July 1950).
179 Claude Levi-Strauss, "Race et Histoire," UNESCO, La question raciale devant les sciences modernes (Paris: 1952), republished
in 1960 in Le racisme devant la Science. See also L'originalitC des cultures: son role dans la comprehension internationale (Paris: 1953).
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multiculturalism.'8 0 In short, Levi-Strauss proposed that while cultures are clearly unique and could
be identified in relative position to one another, there was no cumulative "civilization" in which
these contributions were to be collected. Instead the problem of the diversity of cultures was solely a
problem of relation, where each culture had to be preserved by way of its difference against others.
As recently as 2001, the text was cited as inspiration for the drafting of the Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity which became a Convention in 2005.181 But decades before Unesco was involved in
preserving entire "cultures" it was concerned with preserving cultural monuments, and it is
significant that Levi-Strauss' abstract statement of the problem was contemporaneous with an applied
working out in Nubia. By 1960 Levi Strauss' text had already become canonical, and the problem of
disposing the temples in the Nubian desert can be understood in light of this ambition to "optimize
diversity" while acknowledging the lack of any "cumulative" shell.
Unesco hosted these debates on the "contributions of cultures" in the hope of displacing a
eugenicist discourse on race that relied overwhelmingly on evolution as an organizing principle, and
assigned a secondary role to the environment. Levi Strauss resorted to geography in order to discredit
this discourse, and it is this geographic feature of his argument, more so than the notion of diversity
alone, that sets it apart from others. Julian Huxley-to take the most obvious counter-example-
continued to speak about the relationship between race and environment in eugenicist terms of
evolutionary "optimization," albeit with an updated sensibility. ("Eugenics is not just a matter of
stopping deterioration," he wrote in 1952, "it can also be aimed at securing further
improvement.") "82 In contrast, Levi-Strauss attacked racial hierarchies by speaking of culture in
geographic terms. "The opposition between progressive cultures and inert cultures," he wrote,
180 "Human societies define themselves by a certain optimum of diversity, above which they cannot go, but below which
they can also not descend without danger." Claude Levi-Strauss, "Race et Histoire," Race et Histoire / Race et Culture (Paris:
Albin Michel / Unesco, 2001). Levi-Strauss' repudiation came in the form of a 1971 lecture given on the occasion of
another "Year of the fight against racism," which was titled Race and Culture and which Unesco reluctantly published in
the Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales XXIII:4(1971). Levi-Strauss included, and the second in The View from Afar in 1983,
preceded by a preface that clarified Levi-Strauss' position. We will return to this preface in the conclusion of the
dissertation. All quotations here are from the new Unesco edition of both texts, published with a preface by Michel
Izard that chronicles the entire controversy.
181 CLT.2002/WS/9: Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the 31st session of the General Conference of UNESCO, (Paris: 2
Nov 2001).
182 Huxley clearly intended himself as a standard-bearer in an age of relativism: "There are standards in evolution,"
Huxley wrote in his 1952 Evolution in Action (London: Harper Books, 1953), 121. "One school of anthropologists s never
tired of proclaiming the doctrines of cultural diversity-that different cultures are not higher or lower, but merely
adjusted in different ways. But this is to neglect the lessons of biology." While Huxley attempted to update his
evolutionist doctrine by restorting to a cartographic metaphor, he did so only to make the point that any "map must
be a four-dimensional one. A three dimensional map will help [man] determine his position and chart his direction,
but a four-dmesional one will also help him choosing his destination." Ibid, 135.
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"seems actually to stem from a difference in localization."'"' While he agreed that the "diversity of
cultures cannot be conceived statically," and used the conventional diagram of two forces working
against one another, (one tending towards particularism, and the other towards integration) he
painted a spatial picture of their balancing act: "isolation" bread homogenization, while
"geographic contiguity" encouraged assimilation and affinity. 84 In other words, "Frontier regions"
like Nubia were perfect subjects for case-studies in the conflict between particularization and
integration.
Yet one advantage of the evolutionist thesis over the culturalist one-and undoubtedly the
reason Unesco continued to endorse a version of eugenics into the 1950s-was that evolutionists
offered to legitimate Unesco's own work as the logical result of millennia of a natural progression,
the latest "cultural" phase in human evolution.'8 s In contrast, Levi Strauss' thesis assigned a curatorial
role to Unesco: the "mission of international organizations" was "to preserve the fact of diversity,
not its historical content." 186 Instead of a accumulation, this "fact" could be described in relational
terms, as the space between contributions: "The veritable contribution of cultures does not consist in a
list of their particular inventions but in the differential gap that is offered in between them."
Significantly, Levi Strauss justified this differential gap through an archaeological vision of world
history:
The development of archaeological and prehistoric knowledge tends to spread out in
space those forms of civilizations that we are accustomed to imagine as stacked up in time
in time. ... Progress is not continuous; but proceeds by jumps and leaps. ... The
progress of humanity does not resemble a character climbing a stair ... it invokes rather a
gambler whose luck is spread over several dice and who, every time he throws them,
sees them disperse over the carpet, bringing different scores. 187
In speaking of the progress of humanity as a game of chance that dispersed events in space, rather
than stacking them up in time, Levi Strauss prefigured the archaeological results of the Nubian survey
campaign which studied a haphazard sequence of events that had left scattered archaeological
remains in the desert. What Levi Strauss's text didn't address, however, was the non-archaeological
183 Instead Levi Strauss proposed a distinction between two types of contributions: "isolated acquisitions," features with
a clear provenance and but limited use, and "patterns" (Levi Strauss used the English word) lifestyles which are so clearly
identified with specific cultures that any synthesis or hybridization would signify a dramatic cultural change. Levi
Strauss, 71.
184 Levi Strauss used a linguistic example of phonetic convergences between tongues in neighboring lands, but added
that "other human institutions, such as religion and art," would furnish similar evidence. Levi-Strauss, Race et Histoire, 40.
85s Huxley's saw "the human phase" as the last chapter of his "synthetic" view of evolution.
186 Levi Strauss, 119. He actually used a medical analogy to express this mission, speaking of "an international body"
that was "threatened with infection" by "dead diversities" that lingered, "putrefied vestiges" of collaborations past.
187 Levi Strauss, 64.
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portion of the campaign, which was to intervene into this horizontal field of chance ddiberately. If the
spatial regime of evolution was a haphazard field, what spatial order should guide a willing
intervention into this carpet?
"Locality" was systematically offered as an answer to this problem of cumulative history,
notably in the History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development, of which the first of ten volumes
appeared in 1953. In his introduction to the series, the President of the International Commission for a
History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, invoked geography as an index of developments
past, describing "development," in contrast to accumulation, as being made of multiple strains of
progress and of progress as having collective authorship. Indeed the History of Mankind emphasized
"the life of the mind" (as opposed to events) and the "contributions of cultures" (as opposed to
those of individuals). Thus "development" proposed here as a scholarly concept echoed the idea of
"development" that the UN supported in its Technical Aid programs: a process where by
technologically-enabled inventions afforded humanity ever-greater coverage of its earth. Yet to
compensate for this removal of the heroic figures that usually propelled universal historical
narratives, the History of Mankind tended to chronicle a succession of regional settlements. Effectively
"place" became the subject of history.'"' Monuments themselves tended to be underplayed-Egypt,
for instance made its appearance in the chapter on "The Urbanization of Society" rather than in its
classic role as the first "monumental" civilization.
A decade after the first impact of the History of Mankind, the Nubian campaign offered both a
specific region in which to experiment with this idea of locality, and an opportunity to design an
image of a non-cumulative universality itself. Yet it is also particularly ironic that Nubia-a region
relentlessly subjected to the linearity of the Nile, which stretched at some points no wider than a few
miles on either side of the river-bank-gave Unesco its first opportunity to incorporate monuments
into the non-linearity of human development. To be certain, the Nile was central to the
understanding of Nubia as a place of "passage." In addition, Nubia's dependence upon the Nile
supported a universalizing notion of geographic locality--where "life" is determined by geographic
features, not innate human traits-that Unesco echoed elsewhere. Yet the Nile corridor had also
become a common trope in the linear, cumulative vision of progress, especially since European
powers had progressed further and further upstream and returned to tell the tale. Consider for
instance the imagined panorama of monuments that served as the frontispiece for Description de l'Egypte
188 Unesco, History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development Vol. One, Part II: Sir Leonard Wooley, The Beginnings of Civilization (New
York: Mentor Books, 1963).
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published upon the return of Napoleon's Egyptian campaigns.'8 9 (fig 4.21) Collapsing into a single
perspective view a three-thousand mile stretch of the Nile valley, this engraving presented a
cumulative view of all the monuments the French expedition had witnessed, from Cairo to Kom
Ombo-in a visual demonstration of physical conquest. Here the Nile Valley served as a visual
counterpart to the "world civilization" that France had claimed to domesticate, placing the entire
view in a frame from which the emerging bourgeois viewer could enjoy the growth of the
"provinces of France." Against this history of exploratory cumulation, Levi-Strauss asked Unesco to
propose a different idea of history: an archaeological one, which implied horizontal layering,
successive passage, and progressive hybridity.
Unesco came close to producing a "non-cumulative" counterpart to the Napoleonic
frontispiece in 1964, when it produced a short publicity film for the launch of The International
Campaign for Monuments. Like the frontispiece, it described a collection of ancient monuments, while
appealing to a contemporary viewer to connect the space between disparate monuments. (fig 4.23)
The film consists of shots of eleven monuments: one building (Florence's Palazzo Vecchio) and ten
colossal sculpted faces, impassibly over a few seconds of film. Between these shots of colossal faces
are inserted short clips of modern man, in the form of four Unesco officials pronouncing speeches
during the launch of the International Campaign. 190 The origin of this cinematic technique-
shot/countershot ; monuments/men-can be found in the Nubian campaign: when the Unesco Courier
had published double-page collections of faces: two pages of ancient sculpture (the "Gifts from the
Nile,") and two pages of modern portraits (the "Patrons of the International Campaign to Save
Nubia's Monuments" who had lent their fame to the cause.) 191 (fig 4.22) The Monuments Campaign film
represents the result of shuffling and intercalating these two sets of faces, and animating them into a
montage.
This montage of colossal faces used human figuration to create a formal continuity, while
highlighting a fundamental discontinuity between each sculptural tradition. In doing so it borrowed
a cinematic technique that had been pioneered by French art critic and cultural minister Andre
Malraux (1901-1976) in his Mus&e Imaginaire de Sculpture Mondiale. 92 Malraux's text, first published in
1946 and perfected over decade of re-editions as an art book, was structured primarily around the
189 CC. Gillispie and Michel Dewachter, eds., Monuments of Egypt: The Napoleonic Edition, ed. (Princeton: PA Press, 1987).
190 They were: Rene Maheu (Director General), Paulo de Berredo Carneiro (president of the General Conference), Baron
Castro (president of the executive council) and Jo Brew, president of the MonCom For a plan of the inaugural
ceremony see Campagne Internationale des Monuments: Projet de programme pour la cbremonie d'inauguration (undated, 1964) in Brew
Archives
191 "Patrons of the International Campaign to Save Nubia's Monuments," in Unesco Courier, (May 1960), 14-15.
192 First edition is Andre Malraux, Le Mus&e Imaginaire de la Sculpture Mondiale (Paris: Pl6iade, 1952).
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juxtaposition of close-up shots of sculpted human form. It is all the more significant, then, that
Malraux had presided over the ceremony the launch of the Nubian campaign on March 8, 1960, and
that his speech had offered to Unesco this Imaginary Museum as a model of cultural action. A closer
inspection of Malraux's text is warranted here.
While archaeologists inscribed Nubia into a cultural history of "Africa," Malraux placed the
Campaign in a different kind of universal history, where monuments are carriers of a fundamental
"unity" of civilization, and art constitutes a "universal language." 9  Malraux opened his launch
speech by setting Unesco's action apart from the realities of international politics, where nations
were "engaged in overt or open conflict." In contrast to "the gigantic exhibitionism by which states
try to outdo each-other," Malraux saw Unesco's collaborative "TVA of archaeology" as an act of
reclamation: civilization was, for the first time, "claiming the world's art as its indivisible heritage."
The political "unity" of nations and the cultural "indivisiblity" of heritage were therefore conjoined:
the first a political turning point, the second an epistemological shift when "men have discovered the
universal language of art."
Within this double narrative of political unification and aesthetic resurrection, preservation
served as an index of progress: a victory of humanity over nature, and a victory of "art" over
"history." Malraux pointed out that, paradoxically, increasing uncertainty about historical master-
narratives had led to increased certainty over the material value of monuments. 194 Egypt's rise in the
Western imagination was a case in point: from being admired "as a province of the Bible," to being
prized for its "naivetei," to belonging "within the realm of history rather than the realm of art,"
Egyptian monuments had finally become "living witnesses" in the 2 0 th Century. Yet he warned
against any empathetic re-creation of ancient Egypt since "we can really only comprehend a culture
that survives." Instead he offered to see the salvage Nubian monuments as the prophetic apparition
of a worldwide aesthetic rebirth.
In describing how Nubian monuments recreated "an Egypt that never existed," Malraux
resorted both to formalism ("Egypt survives by virtue of certain forms") and expressionism ("these
statues have acquired a soul"), ably combining the analytic qualities of one with the dramatic
potential of the other. This elision was only possible because the "forms" he depicted were
exclusively human figures: he spoke of "sculpted mountains," of "colossal effigies," of "the face of
Queen Nefertiti" of "colossal death-masks." The emphasis on sculpture, then, allowed Malraux to
193 Andre Malraux, Speech delivered at the launch of the International Campaign for the Salvage of the Monuments of Nubia, Unesco
House, March 8, 1960, reprinted as "TVA of Archaeology," in Unesco Courier May 1960, 8.
'94 "In the days when the West believed its cultural heritage had its source in Athens it could nonetheless look on with
equanimity while the Acropolis crumbled away." "TVA of Archaeology," 10.
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rephrase Veronese's ethical dilemma of "choosing between temples and crops" in aesthetic terms, as
a choice between men and statues, a "rescue operation" deployed "on behalf of statues, the
immense resources usually harnessed for the service of men." Ultimately Malraux resolved this
tension between aesthetic form and ethical expression by resorting to a conventionalist view of art,
where the Nubian monuments were simply carriers of the "Egyptian convention," which was
"designed to mediate between ephemeral men and the controlling stars."
Malraux was not the first to theorize Egyptian art as "the art that translated the temporal into
the eternal." Certainly he made no distinction between Nubia's monuments and those of lower
Egypt. Indeed the Campaign was for Malraux simply an example, a precedent for future action,
which might have arisen for any other art.195 But insofar as his intervention raised the profile of
Unesco's campaign, and the superficiality of Malraux's interpretation helped to depict the Campaign
as a gesture towards perpertuity. Like Egyptian funerary art, monuments salvage was an aesthetic
defiance of mortality, "the most signal victory of human effort over death." Thus Malraux's famous
closing pronouncement was equally applicable to the monuments and their salvage:
There is only one action of which indifferent starts and unchanging rivers have no sway:
it is the action of a man who snatches something from death.
When Malraux's speech was mined for slogans to be used in the campaign, it was this conclusion
that was repeatedly excerpted to be incanted throughout the fund-raising process.' 96
By dramatizing Unesco's "snatching of monuments from death," Malraux was in fact giving
the organization permission to act as what he had called "an imaginary superartist." In his Mus&e
Imaginaire Malraux had described the construction of a world-wide inventory in terms of the parallel
progress of "real" museums in capital cities and their "imaginary" counterpart in the modern mind.
"A museum without walls has been opened to us," he wrote. Similarly, he described Nubia as only
one place to access "the tremendous storehouse of art;" by saving its monuments Unesco was
bringing them "into a single family relationship the masterpieces of many civilizations which knew
nothing or even hated each-other." In the Mus&e Imaginaire, Malraux attributed agency to this collection
to a metphysical undercurrent, which unified seemingly unrelated works of art as if a single spirit
inhabited them all:
... as if an imaginary spirit of art pushed forward from miniature to painting and from
fresco to stained-glass window in a single conquest ... as if a subterranean torrent of
history unified all these scattered works by dragging them along with it ...Reproduction,
'19 "It goes without saying that it would try to save other great ruins, Angkor or Nara, for instance." Ibid., 12.
196 For an efficient theorization of Malraux's rhetoric as an artform, see William Righter, The Rhetorical Hero: An Essay on the
Aesthetics of Andri Malraux, (New York: Chilmark Press, 1964).
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and reproduction alone, has brought into art those imaginary super-artists which have an
indistinct birth, a life with its conquests and concessions to the taste for wealth or
seduction, and a death-agony and resurrection-and who are called styles.'97
If creating juxtapositions was "an art" in itself, and the salvage of Nubian monuments helped to
placed them in a universal survey of art, then Unesco took on the role of an "imaginary super-
artist:" a transcendent hand, which could breathe "life" into inanimate cultural objects and lodge
them straight into the foreground of modern consciousness.' 98
Insofar as the Nubian Campaign was but "an example" of future action, it is useful to note
that it was also as an example of Malraux's work, and conversely, how many aspects of Malraux's
work lent themselves to recuperation by Unesco's agenda. Most easily adaptable to the cause of
cultural internationalism was Malraux's idea that art exists as "furniture of the mind" in modern
consciousness. This idea was clearly echoed in Unesco's interest in aesthetic perception as the basis
for cross-cultural exchange that would not rely on a language-based "comprehension." What
Malraux called "intellection," Unesco called "international understanding." Yet this connection,
between individual aesthetic experience and the metaphysical value of art, is the most controversial
aspect of Malraux's work. Already in the 1950s Marlaux drew accusations, from art historians like
Ernst Gombrich, of being a mere "prophet" and an irresponsible popularizer. In his "Search for a
cultural history," Gombrich condemned Malraux for inventing a "romantic saga of art" that
"reinforced the mythology of history that had dominated historiography since Hegel had people the
past with the "Spirits of nations and races." 199 Invoking Spengler in a defense of particularity,
Gombrich dismissed precisely the elements of Malraux's work that made it so useful for Unesco:
"the idea of a united mankind is so much sentimental humanitarianism." 200 In doing so he
highlighted the paradox of Malraux's work-namely, why anyone who so deftly analyzed the
illusionary powers of art "would rather have faith in an illusion than no faith at all." The search for a
connection between Malraux's individualistic expressionism and his icollective meta-narratives has
since drawn attention to his own biography. But neither Malraux's early years as an antiquities-
exporting adventurer, nor his later years as a Gaullist "art politician" offer any reassurance that he
was motivated by anything more than sheer meglomania. In this sense, the opportunism of Malraux
'97 Andre Malraux, Museum Without Walls, trans. Stuart Gilbert and Francis Price (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 160.
198 Malraux was even lucid about restoration itself as a stylized intervention, a metamorphosis which implied super-
historical agency: "Even mutilations have their style. A process of filtration, which it would be too simple to call taste,
contributes to our resurrection;... Chance may shatter and time brings metamorphosis, but it is we who choose."
Museum Without Walls, 1 67.
199 E.H Gombcirh, "Andre Malraux and the Crisis of Expressionism," in The Burlington Magazine (Dec 1954), 375.
200 "Can we hope to do more than describe the strange varieties which exist among human civilizations?" Gombrich,
376.
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and Unesco worked both ways-the Imaginary Museum benefited from being associated with the
campaign as a "real" event in world history, even if the politics underlying the event were a
benevolent culturalism that relied on a self-fulfilling narrative of cultural autonomy.
While Unesco and Malraux were equally vague in drawing connections between collective
meta-narratives and the history of art, both were equally precise in their endorsement of mass-media
as enhancements to the collective value of artworks themselves. 20 1 Unesco's production of
inventories, exhibitions and catalogs to popularize the world's art can essentially be seen as an exact
embodiment of Malraux's idea that "reproduction, though not the cause of our intellectualization of
art, is its most effective tool."20 2 A generation after Gombrich, art historians have begun to read
Malraux's paradox not in ethical but in aesthetic terms. "Malraux's profound incoherence," Henri
Zerner wrote, "lies in the fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, the ontology of art
to which he proudly proclaimed his allegiance and his awareness that works of art only achieve their
existence as works of art thanks to the intervention of photographic reproduction." For Zemer,
Malraux's invention was to have treated photography as a legitimate aesthetic medium, and
pioneered in his books "a mute discourse, a type of visual writing, and achieved an unexpected
eloquence. Where others saw a simple didactic device, Malraux discovered a means of action."203 It
is this same transformation of visual media into "action" that Unesco attempted.204 Lyotard even saw
Malraux's writing style as a formalist conceit: "identification of scenes, centering, filming,
montage"20s and there is no doubt a potential analysis that can be conducted comparing Malraux's
texts, films and photographs, with those produced by Unesco in these years.
Similarly, formalist critics like Rosalind Krauss have concentrated on Malraux's analysis of
the museum as a medium, highlighting the spatial component of Malraux's analogy between 'real'
and 'imaginary' museum. Like Zerner, Krauss detected a fundamental modernism in Malraux's
museum in the sense of a Greenbergian medium with built-in self-consciousness: "an open field
into which the viewer's most imaginative, projective, play was welcomed, making the space of
modernism itself the ground of a universalization of the power of the artist and of the creative
201 "The museum without walls is not a heritage of vanished ardors, it is an assemblage of works of art-but how can
we see in these works only the expression of a will to art? ... It is what is said to us by theses sculptures and these
paintings, and not what they have said." Museum without walls, 239.
202 Museum Without Walls, 82.
203 Henri Zerner, "Malraux and the Power of Photography," in Sculpture and Photography: Envisioning the Third Dimension, ed.
Geraldine Johnson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 116-130.
204 Zerner, 1 26.
205 "Malraux's writings-his novels, essays on art, funeral orations, even his literary criticism, not to speak of is film-
are all fashioned in this way: identification of scenes, centering, filming, montage." Jean Francois Lyotard, Soundproof
Room: Malraux's Anti-Aesthetics, trans. Robert Harvey, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 62
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act."2 0 6 Writing in 1986, Krauss pointed out that since Malraux's work "things have changed," and
that critical discourse name the advent of this change "postmodernism." In the intervening years,
Krauss pointed out, the model used by Malraux-the Louvre, with its enlifade-was superceded by a
modernist architectural paradigm, "the spatial idea of 'the plan' in its neutrality and
immensity. "207 For Krauss, this development meant that Malraux's abstract idea had been turned in to
actual architecture, the same literalization that occurred when the word "Imaginaire" in the French title
had been translated into the English Without Walls.
What Krauss did not point out, in bridging these thirty years architecturally, is that Malraux
himself had hinted that the story of the two museums might have a spatial dinouement, born himself
of the tendency of art objects to destroy the space around them. The imaginary museum had for
Malraux been created "in response to the appeal of the 'real' museums": the first had created an
appetite for exhaustiveness that the second tried to fulfill: "the assemblage of so many
masterpieces-from which, nonetheless, so many are missing-conjures up in the mind's eye all of
the world's masterpieces." Thus it was in order to begin to "fill the gaps left by museums" that
extra-institutional activities like tourism, photography, and publications, had come to construct the
imaginary museum. In other words, the Muswe Imaginaire was not a museum "without walls" but a
museum "without gaps." The success of this "filling in," then, had begun to affect the "real
institutions" in an inversely proportional way. The more crowded the "imaginary inventory," the
more sparse the "real museum" had become. This progression was clearly legible in the
transformation of museums into photographic backdrops:
The point has been reached when the real museum is beginning to resemble the
museum without walls; its statues are much better lit and far less frequently clustered
together. ... Michelangelo's Rondanini Pieta in the Castello Sforzescho in Milan (it is too
isolated) seems admirably posed, awaiting photographers. 208
Paradoxically, the photographic expectation created an increasing "isolation" of objects. This
"destruction of surroundings" was a constitutive feature of all museums; what museums destroyed
was "not the life of the object but the life of its surroundings":
Our museum without walls is founded on the metamorphosis of the surroundings of
the works it includes. It is an ignorance of this metamorphosis that so often leads our
museums to be qualified as cemeteries.209
206 Rosalind Krauss, "Postmodemism's Museum without Walls," in Thinking About Exhibitions, ed. Reesa Greenberg (New
York: Routledge, 1996.), 346.
207 Krauss, 344
208 Museum Without Walls, 110.
209 Museum Without Walls, 220.
405
Lucia Allais
Within this narrative, then, Malraux predicted a change that would bring a renewal of curatorial
conventions:
The curators of museums will not much longer be content with "the best possible
presentation of objects": even now they are seeking a means of expressing the
mysterious unity of works of art, of which they are constantly reminded by the images in
books published by the museums themselves." 2 10
It is this dilemma between isolation as a consequence of the photographic imagination, and
collection as a consequence of photographic accumulation, that constitutes Malraux's relevance for
our purposes. As we will see, the Nubian campaign corresponded to a conceptualization of Nubia as
a "museum" both real and imaginary--both navigable by tourists and to be reproduced for mass-
consumption.
While Levi-Strauss had entrusted Unesco with preserving a differential gap of diversity,
Malraux asked Unesco to dramatize this gap for aesthetic effect. Where Levi-Strauss saw an
opportunity for optimal hybridity, Malraux saw an opportunity for a new kind of stylistic unity.
Both models, however, relied on a spatial analogy to undermine previous paradigms of historical
succession. Whether as a metaphysical "imaginary" realm or as an underlying layer of cultural
archaeology, Nubia would be reconfigured into a field (not a timeline) of events.
The Design of the Desert
The reworking of Nubia as an archaeological myth, the discourse on the diversity of cultures,
and the invocation of art in defiance of death-all set the stage for a contemporary intervention in
the Nubian desert. But while it is by theming Nubia with a history of international "mobility" that
Unesco hoped to legitimate its relocation of the 24 Nubian temples, the experts approached to
perform this relocation were in an altogether more sedentary mood. (fig 4.17) By the end of the
1950s the concept of monumental "function" developed by MonCom experts (as seen in Chaper 3),
had evolved into an ethic that allowed both drastic urban changes and total architectural
reconstructions. But never before had the reconfiguration of a "monumental collection" and its
context posed itself on such a large and desertic scale. However radical the war-time transformation
of European cities, reconstruction architects and urbanists had theorized their projects with formal
concepts--like "footprint," "neighborhood," "proportion"--that allowed them to argue cities
themsdves had retained their identity as human settlements. Indeed from the experience of
reconstruction the international preservation community had emerged inclined to think that what
had been preserved were not Europe's objects but the very "spirit of its cities."
210 Museum Without Walls, 220.
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The pressure to think of Nubia as a cohesive environment and its monuments as inextricably
anchored in their sites was exacerbated by Unesco's publicity, which encouraged a geographic
approach to the region's predicament. The American magazine Nature published an article on "Nubia,
an African Frontier Region" that concluded that monuments were to be valued not for their
objecthood, but for their "striking environment":
Even under the Pharaohs who have left so many monuments in Nubia, the level of life,
and of art, was never better than provincial. Much is now being written about Egyptian
art in Nubia, but the Egyptian temples there owe more to the effects of an unusual and
striking environment than to their qualities of sculpture or relief.211
Thus, the international public was introduced to the Nubian desert as a monumental environment,
rather than to the temples as paradigmatic Egyptian objects. But if the authenticity of Nubian
monuments lay in their relation to their locale, this relation could not easily be described with the
traditional criteria whereby the international monument was supposed to "belong" to a certain
"place." Not only were there no "local populations" to whose history the monuments could be
anchored (since Nubia was historically a space of transience, and local populations' claims to the
monuments were therefore mediated by a history of imperial subjugation), but the very idea that
human inhabitation leaves traces in the ground was made problematic by the sandy materiality of
the Nubian desert. Even archaeologists, who specialized in studying those traces, admitted that the
Nubian monuments were "question marks in the desert," inexplicably isolated from all traces of
human settlement.212
In the wake of this double success--the portrayal of European reconstruction as a
preservation of place, and the successful popularization of Nubia as monumental environment-
preservationists involved in the campaign repeatedly expressed reservations about the idea of moving
the monuments at all. This was particularly true of the central figure in the campaign, Piero Gazzola
(1908-1979), who was inspector at the Italian Antiquities, later founder of the International Center for
the Preservation of Monuments (ICOMOS), and principal author of the Venice Charter. Gazzola had been sent
to Nubia on a reconnaissance mission in 1959; the report he authored upon his return became an
instant reference for the campaign, distributed as The Gazzola Report to every committee created
between 1959 and 1963, and appended to meeting minutes as a technical Annex. (fig 4.29) The
Gazzola Report used plans, photographs, and texts to describe the condition of each monument to be
saved; it was also, however, prefaced with the following "statement of principle":
211 "Nubia: An African Frontier Region," in Supplement to Nature (1 Sep 1962), 883.
212 "Question marks in the Desert," in Unesco Courier (Feb 1960).
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As far as the principle of transfer is concerned, I must begin by stating my negative
scientific opinion against any monument relocation: for reasons of history and of
architectural authenticity. However, in absolutely exceptional cases, such relocation is
inevitable, and can nonetheless be acceptable.
In this sense, the most advanced modern techniques, and the experience we have
recently gained from the destructions of war, have changed nothing of what remains,
fundamentally, a problem of principle. Indeed, the transfer of any monument, as
perfectly executed as it can be with contemporary techniques, is still an imperfect
solution [solution boiteuse]. 213
This disclaimer articulated the "exceptional" terms of Gazzola's (and, by implication, Unesco's)
involvement in the Nubian campaign, in two ways. By invoking the war, Gazzola likened the
flooding of Nubia to an inevitable catastrophe. By distinguishing both the war and the dam from an
entire history of "lame solutions," Gazzola also distanced himself from the innumerable Egyptian
monuments which had been relocated, as colonial souvenirs, under decidedly un-catastrophic
circumstances. In fact, in the next paragraph of his preface Gazzola rejected the very idea that
monuments could act as international "ambassadors," frankly disapproving of the UAR's offer for
temples "in return," and boldly wishing that "no government would avail itself of this offer." "The
times for moving monuments out of their national borders," Gazzola concluded, "have thankfully
passed.""1 What Gazzola invoked was a whole history of political recuperations of Egyptian
monuments by successive imperial powers.
Indeed if the Aswan Dam recalled the pyramids as paradigmatic ancient Egyptian
monuments, Unesco's Campaign recalled in no uncertain terms the paradigmatic modem Egyptian
monument: the relocated obelisk. Egyptian obelisks occupy crucial positions in European cities and a
central place in the history of modern European city planning.215 The displacement of a monolith, in
this history, tied the passing of political power with the marking of a new place, "since the most
tangible result of this view of history was a vast mobilization to move obelisks to more obviously
central, and Christian, places." Indeed, architectural historians have made of the exiled obelisk a kind
of Ur-form in the delelopment of urbanism itself-in Henry Millon's eloquent formulation, "the
213 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/6 (Le Caire, 28 September 1959). Transfert des Temples et autres monuments et ruines: considirations de
caractire architectural et archiologique. Rapport de M. Pietro Gazzola, Dr. Phil, Inspecteur Central des Monuments aupr~s de la
Direction G6n6rale des Antiquit6s et Beaux-Arts d'Italie, 3. Translation mine, from French.
214 Ibid., 4.
21s From the moment Assyrian monarch Assurbanipal conquered Thebes in 664 BC and carried two obelisks some 1,600
miles home to mark the occasion, the displacement of an Egyptian object has been charged with political meaning. For
a chronicle of obelisks moved, see Peter Tompkins, The Magic of Obelisks (New York: Harper and Row, 1981). The urban
component of this charge was inaugurated by the Roman Empire, who made obelisks into "centerpieces of a new
vision of world history," emblems of "the passing of the sacred torch from the Kingdom of Egypt to the Roman
Empire," and, eventually, "to the Roman Catholic Church." "Movement is at the center of the rediscovery of the
Egyptian obelisks in Rome." E. Ann Matter, Review of Giovanni Cipriani's Gli obelischi egizi: politica e cultura nella Roma barocca.
In Sixteenth Century Journal XXVI / 2 (1995).
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idea that an urban complex can be described and bounded by a series of crucially placed stone
needles."'21
Despite the crucial role played by moving Egyptian objects in the history of monumental
place-making, this tradition of monument relocation was entirely absent from Unesco's campaign.
Even the technological history of obelisk transport-a noted "chapter in the history of engineering,"
with its narrative of sponsored ingenuity and technological bravura-was barely mentioned, and
then only to authenticate "movement" as genuinely and ingenuously Egyptian. 217 This conspicuous
omission points to Unesco's insecurity about the political implications of the Nubian campaign as an
international model of action. While UAR officials were only too willing to recall that Egyptian
monuments had long served as "extraordinary ambassadors of Pharaonic culture" abroad, in order
to contrast the "unintentional" colonial exports of the past and the "intentional" ones of the
nationalist present, Unesco promoters were reluctant to inscribe modern intellectual cooperation in
this history of imperial displacements.
Certainly this pattern of monumental displacements is so prevalent in modern European
political history that obelisks had ceased being specifically Egyptian monuments. Instead they acted
as generic markers of power-what George Bataille described as the epitome of modern, capitalist,
"headless" power. For Bataille, the French decision to mark the spot of the guillotine by importing
an obelisk from Egypt, and transforming Paris's Place du Roi into the Place de la Concorde, marked a
fundamental shift in the ability of monuments to turn conscious meaning into unconscious
forgetting. "Total sovereignty and the guillotine-blade that put an end to it no longer occupied any
place in the minds of men," Bataille wrote, invoking an erasure of history, a replacement of
principled monuments with psychological ones: "Where monuments that had clearly affirmed
principles were razed," Bataille wrote, "the obelisk remains only so long as the sovereign authority
and command it symbolizes do not become conscious."21 8 Ironically, it is precisely this erasure of
sovereignty and this passage from "conscious" to "unconscious" monument that Unesco was trying
to produce on a global scale.
Clearly the Nubian temples were not obelisks. They were inhabitable temples, of varying
styles and periods, and most were not "monoliths" in the sense that gives obelisks their spectacular
technological difficulty. Yet what made the Nubian monuments more like obelisks than like the
2'6 Henry Millon, "The Visible Character of the City." In The Historian and the City, ed Oscar Hndlin & John Burchard,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963).
217 For this history see Bern Dibner, Moving the Obelisks, (MIT: Burndy Library, 1991.) Christiane Desroche-Noblecourt for
instance invoked the "Egyptian engineering tradition of using water to transport temples."
18 George Bataille, "The Obelisk," in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press), 221.
409
Lucia Allais
monuments of World War II is that they constituted a system: much as baroque Rome was defined
as "streets and obelisks," Nubia was defined by Unesco as "the Nile and its temples", as points along
a path.219 Thus, while the monuments of postwar European cities had remained "themselves" chiefly
by staying the same "place," in Nubia the identity of place and object alike were at stake. Since the
Nile was to change so drastically, in order for "Nubia" to be "salvaged," a whole set of relationships
would have to be re-designed. Yet as Gazzola's early disclaimers demonstrate, the nascent
preservation discourse understood "site" as a feature intrinsically attached to each object, not as an
abstract relationship in space.
Before examining the debates on temple relocation, it is important to understand the
fundamental compromise that had to be struck between Gazzola as an expert and Unesco as an
agency giving him power to act. The compromise was discursive: what was clearly a project of
regional restructuring was never discussed in terms of architectural, landscape, or urban design.
Instead the phases of relocation--the choice of sites, the disposition of monuments, the design of
access roads-were discussed as mere consequences of the movement of each object. Still, the spatial
charge that Bataille had attributed to the obelisk as a modern political instrument--the dilemmas of
"concentration," "erasure," and "dissemination"-permeated every discussion of the relocation and
ultimately, I argue, regulated the design of the Nubian desert.
The debates over the relocation of temples were inaugurated during the initial Nubian cruise
of late 1959, as the Executive Committee traveled down the Nile, "Gazzola Report" in hand. The
discussion pitted those who wanted to preserve all monuments in situ against those for whom
granting tourist accessibility was paramount. Leading the charge for the in situ camp was Gazzola.
"Bearing in mind," he wrote, "that the essential role of those who are responsible for protecting
ancient monuments is to do the utmost possible to maintain their integrity and their setting, the
experts believe above all that the maximum of effort should be exerted to preserve the most
important of them in situ." 2 20 Opposing this view was British Egyptologist Walter Emery, who
questioned whether tourists would travel to a "desolate Nubia" purely for its temples. This objection
re-oriented the discussion towards the nature of "the Nubian landscape" as a "monumental
environment" and its importance for the significance of the temples. In some ways Emery was more
intransigent than Gazzola: "the Egyptians always chose a site for building their sanctuaries with
regard to a ritual conception," he remarked, and therefore, if preservation was to alter monumental
219 See for example the Unesco feature "The Nile: Waterway of art & history," in Unesco Courier (February 1960).
220 "Preservation of Monuments," UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/REPORT, 7.
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sites at all, it would be preferable to "dismantle and transfer all the temples to an island near a tourist
site such as Luxor.""' The Director of Egyptian Antiquities, however, took the opposing view, that
"it was not above all a question of satisfying tourists, but one of saving the witnesses of a definite
culture within its own framework." This objection, in turn, re-oriented the discussion towards the
problem of how to translate a "cultural framework" into a physical landscape.
One solution for translating "culture" into "environment", all the while "continuing to
attract tourists to Nubia" was proposed by CEDAE director Christiane Noblecourt and supported by
the Chairman of the High Dam project, Hassan Zaki. Their proposal was to relocate the temples in
the sites where "a majority of the Nubian population would be concentrated," namely, in two
"oases" planned along the new lake, at Kalabsha and Abu Simbel. This proposal was meant as a
compromise: to please the British Egyptologists (by ensuring that tourists traveling long distances to
Nubia would be rewarded with an authentically exotic experience) and to placate the Italian
conservationist (by ensuring that the settings would "remain a Nubian landscape.") This strategy
worked: Gazzola acquiesced that temples could be moved "in exceptional cases," so long as any
new site was "aesthetically analogous" 222 to the monuments' original locations, and a "tablet was
affixed to the new site, indicating the original position of the monument in relation to the Nile."223
For the rest of the cruise Gazzola wielded this concept of an "aesthetic analogy" as a weapon
against any homogenization of the Nubian landscape, warning that seemingly "natural" features of
sites were in fact traces of human quarrying, and that these trademarks feature would have to be
reproduced at great expense when relocating temples. 224 But graver still than the problem of
reproducing human traces in the Nubian landscape was the problem of exporting temples outside of
Egypt, to radically "dissimilar" environments like Western museums. It was the delegate for the
Egyptian Cultural Ministry, Anwar Shukry, who put an end to the debate by translating the language
of surplus into a spatial logic, and proposing to see the dilemma of relocation in terms of visual and
spatial excess:
The UAR would be very happy to preserve all the temples in Nubia with the aid of the
whole world. Yet if, in order to preserve them, they had to be grouped around the two
Kalabsha and Abu Simbel sites, these temples would be very numerous. In such a case,
the Egyptian government would be ready to concede several of them, which would be
extraordinary ambassadors for Pharaonic culture abroad."22
221 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 5.
222 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 7.
223 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/REPORT, 5.
224 UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, He first invoked it when discussing the temple of Kalabsha, remarking that in front of the
temple "the rock had been quarried out to make at least one recess emplacement."
225 Ibid. This formulation "nouveaux ambassadeurs extraordinaires" acquired a life of its own, cf Sodeberg, 70.
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Having first "concentrated" the temples in two points, the Minister then "dispersed" them again for
the sake of environmental authenticity. In so doing he created a legitimate, "contextual" reason for
European museums to receive them.
In other words, portraying the temples as being too "numerous" provided a solution to both
the aesthetic problem of "the Nubian landscape" and the technical problem of rewarding
archaeological aid with "grants in return." Just as they had to be designated as "non essential" to
Egyptian national heritage, the temples were spatial surplus. Both the economic idea of an excess of
Nubian antiquities, and the geographic proposal for an extension of this excess abroad, were
supported by a spatial logic: an imaginary sequence of design moves involving concentration,
crowding, and dissemination.
Despite this apparent resolution, the debate over temple relocation replayed itself over a two-
year period, chiefly because plans of the Lake Reservoir, and the resettlement of Nubians in two
"oases", were still in a preliminary stage. Gazzola took this as an opportunity to dismiss the "oasis"
solution, and to begin advocating that the "aesthetic analogy" between old and new site should rely
primarily on proximity. In this he was helped by Harold Plenderleith, director of the newly-founded
International Center for the Conservation of Cultural Property in Rome (ICCROM). Asked to write up the terms
of a second mission to be led by Gazzola again in 1960, Plenderleith wrote a report that built
proximity into the criteria for relocation:
For reasons of conservation and for theoretical reasons, it is preferable to reconstruct
temples, as much as is possible, in sites that present the maximum of analogy with the
original site (physical conditions, landscape, orientation, distance to the Nile) and even,
as close as possible to these origins.226
Before he embarked on this second mission to seek "proximate" sites, Gazzola intensified his
campaign against concentration, pronouncing himself "against oases" altogether. "It seemed
better," he summarized in December 1959, "to choose spots near the preset sites where the natural
conditions are similar. This appears likely to lessen the dangers of transfer still further and at the
same time to ensure the most realistic setting obtainable."227 To this "realism" of a proximate site
was now added a factor technological efficacy: shorter distances meant safer travel for the temples.
226 CP4/RES. 1 Centre International d'ttudes pour la conservation et la Restauration des Biens Culturels, Conseil
Provisoire, Avis du Centre de Rome Sur la Mission Prdiminaire en Nubie concernant le Diplacement des Temples, prevue au Paragraphe 53 du
Rapport 55 Ex/7, (Rome: 8-10 Dec, 1959), 1-2. Translation mine.
227 11 C/PRG/9 - Add.I / Annex III: "Short Statement by the Preparatory Mission On the Transfer of
Monuments, Sent by Unesco to Nubia, Under Professor Gazzola." (Rome: Oct 1960.) "The experts originally
suggested that the Egyptian monuments should be removed to the vicinity of the oases it is proposed to create
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By the time Gazzola came back from this second mission, what had begun as a "preference"
had become a doctrinary "imperative." Thus "any concentration into oases" was a "betrayal of
history:"
The displacement of a monument and the choice of a new site
This brings me to another fundamental imperative: one must not betray history, nor
erase the vestiges of a country's, a people's, past.
Populations must not be deprived of their greatest cultural patrimony. Monuments that
symbolize their spiritual roots must remain-like living documents-within their
homelands, in the very place where they emerged, as witnesses, indices, and reminders
to future generations.
For monuments to retain this primordial function, if it ever becomes impossible to
preserve them on their own sites, one must transfer them to a place as near as possible
to their original location, situating them with an orientation and ambiance that
corresponds to their current siting. In this case this rule is all the more important, given
the sacred character of these monuments.
Indeed these buildings were built facing the Nile, and are connected to the sacred river
by very tight-though mysterious-bond.
As a result, it goes without saying that to group these monuments in an oasis is out of
the question.2 8
In this final generalization of his criteria, Gazzola made two crucial moves: he "sacralized" the
relationship between the temples and the Nile (by way of a "mysterious bond") and he added a
social factor to the rule of proximity (by way of "people's past"). Indeed, the more generally
Gazzola articulated his argument against monumental concentration, the larger the role he attributed
to "people" in his doctrine.
Despite Gazzola's protests, when the expert committee met again in 1962, the number of
oases proposed by the UAR had grown to three, and four temples had been designated for export as
"grants-in-return." (fig 4.26)
Recommendation 3.5: Relocation of temples
For the present, three new sites are recommended for the regrouping of temples. (a)
south of the Sadd al-Ali, on the left bank-for Kalabsha, Beit el-Wali, and the Qertassi
Kiosk; (b) northwest of Wadi es-Sebua, on the left bank-for Dakka, Wadi es-Sebua,
Mahharaqah and Gerf Hussein; (c) near Amada, on the left bank-for Amada, the chapels
of Qasr Ibrim, and Pennut.2 29
In each of new grouping of temples certain principles should control the organization of
temples in their relation to each other, to their setting, and to the facilities provided for
visiting them.
in the region, but, out of regard for the considerations set out above--the importance of choosing settings
comparable to the original..."
228 Pietro Gazzola, Projet de sauvetage des monuments existants dans le territoire de la Nubie DestinQs d &re innondis a la suite de la construction
duh au barrage d'Assouan (1960), 5-6. ICCROM Archives. "Practical reasons, such as accessibility, tourist frequency, and
simplified supervision, undoubtedly hold some weight, but have no relation to the exigencies of art and the spirit,
which suggest that works of art should be protected in their integrity and their site."
229 "Recommendation 3.4: Relocation of temples." In UNESCO/Nubia/2CE/9
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This final recommendation differs from Gazzola's in that it incorporates a visiting tourist into the
criteria for relocation. A final act of concentration and dissemination had been performed, for the
sake of the international tourist. But perhaps more importantly, the oases themselves had been
depopulated, as Egyptian and Sudanese governments had decided to resettle their entire Nubian
populations in two inland locations, where new industrial development and infrastructural
extensions would create the new towns of "New Nubia," near Kom Ombo in Egypt, and "New
Wadi", near Khartoum in the Sudan.230 This physical separation of Nubians from the Nile revealed a
latent hierarchy in Gazzola's criteria-namely, that proximity to the Nile trumped proximity to local
populations.
Furthermore, Gazzola's technological argument that moving the temples to nearby locations
would minimize the risk of damage was disproved, as six temples had already been dismantled and
stored, as collections of stones, on Elephantine island near Aswan.231 In a sense, this turn of events
was a triumph of "rationalization," in the sense that historians of technology have given to this term,
the organization of a process that takes precedence over the organization of a product. Certainly the
dismantling of the temples and their storage, in advance of the resolution of their final site, was a
"rationalized" process much like the mass-resettlement of the Nubians. In contrast, Gazzola's
solution of assigning each temples a "nearby" location, relied on the idea that only an "authentic
evolution," would also have required building a new access road for each temple.
Politically, this three-oases solution reveals Unesco's overwhelming passivity in the face of
bilateral relations. If the UAR government was able to proceed with the removal of temples to
Elephantine Island, it is because it secured funds directly from member states for temples as stand-
alone projects: the temples of Amana were moved by France, the temple Kalabsha by West
Germany, and the speos of upper Nubia by the United States. 232 These countries entered in direct
agreements with Egypt, making their funds available directly to the UAR government in Egyptian
230 The relocation of Nubians itself was the object of intense anthropological scrunity, including by a project supported
by the Ford Foundation, which unfolded in two phases: The Ethnographic Survey of Nubia 1960-1963 and A Study of Newly
Settled Communities: The Abis area in the Northwestern Nile Delta, and Kom Ombo, Upper Egypt, 1963-1975. For contemporary
evaluations, see Fernea & Kennedy, "Initial Adaptations to Resettlement: A New Life for Egyptian Nubians," in Current
Anthropology, 7, 3. (Jun 1966),349-354. For the statement of the project, see Ethnological Survey of Nubia: Statement of
purpose and organization (Cairo: Social Research Center, May 1961.) For a principal work to come out of this grant,
see Hussein Fahim, Dams, people and development: the Aswan High Dam case. (New York: Pergamon, 1981).
231 "UNESCO/NUBIA/CE/II/SR. 1, 21-23 march 1963" Executive Committee Summary Record. "Mr. Chehata Adam
(UAR) drew attention to the fact that six temples had been dismantled and removed between 1960 and 1962.
NUBIE/9, page 21
232 UNESCO/NUBIA/2.126
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pounds and were therefore not subject to Unesco authority 233 Unesco was not an autonomous
political actor, but rather a facilitator of bilateral relations in moments when diplomatic ties between
countries were severed or severely strained.
After the UAR began dismantling temples to concentrate them in tourist-friendly locations,
Gazzola and other MonCom experts began bitterly emphasizing that, since "the government of the
UAR is the maitre d'oeuvre, ... Unesco's opinion on particular aspects of the technical operations is not
relevant." 234 But while the UAR bypassed the authority of Unesco experts in concentrating its
temples, the problem of a visual "concentration" still posed itself at its three new oases, which ran
the risk of looking too "crowded" with monuments. The UAR created a new committee to review
the site proposals for each site along the Nile. The United Arab Republic Consultative Committee Concerning the
Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Nubia, a group composed of architects, landscape architects and
engineers, and included Van den Haagen and Plenderleith, wrote a set of "basic principles" to
evaluate these disparate proposals for relocation. A single aesthetic principle of isolation, was to unify
all proposals for temple relocation:
1. New sites should be selected as far as possible in the vicinity of existing sites.
2. When temples are grouped to form a precinct, they should be separated so as to be
visible only one at a time, and the original orientation of each temple is to be
maintained.
3. Landing quays should not be placed immediately before any temple but sited at a
distance, preferably in a place where they are concealed.
4. Rest-houses and other installations should likewise be hidden and should be sited so
as definitely not to be a part of the temples complex.
5. The false analogy of an open-air museum could be harmful: the atmosphere of a
temple precinct is to be sought and maintained and might be enhanced eventually by
the judicious introduction of trees.2 3"
These principles were prescriptive of an architectural typology-the desert as an optimal
monumental environment-which afforded monuments the integrity of being continuous with their
environment, and the objecthood that comes with being "visible only one at a time."
233 See "Protection of Temples and Monuments from Inundation from Aswan High Dam: Agreement Between the
United States of America and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Effected by
Exchange of Notes, Signed at Paris January 11 and 19, 1962)" in Cultural Relations of the United States Treaties and Other
International Acts Series 4941 (1961). This agreement allocated 2 Million Dollars to the relocation of temples, and
named those temples specifically. While the agreement was between Unesco and the US, in fact the funds were part of a
PL 480 and were therefore only made available if the UAR government officially "requested" them.
234 Letter from van den Haagen to Valter Furuskog, 28 May 1962, ICCROM Archives.
23s UNESCO/Nubia/2CE/9. United Arab Republic Consultative Committee Concerning the Safeguarding of the Sites
and Monuments of Nubia: Third Session. (Cairo, 24-Jan - 3 Feb 1962), 6.
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The recommendation to avoid the "false analogy with open-air museum" merits its own
examination, especially in light of how liberally this analogy had been invoked in the early days of
the campaign launch. In 1960, director of CEDAE Christiane Noblecourt contributed an article to
Museum titled "The Greatest Open-Air Museum in the World is About to Disappear." 236 Noblecourt
gave the reader a literal "tour" of this open-air museum, taking the analogy between desert and
museum to its metaphorical extreme. Because "the temples were set at almost regular intervals,"
they acted literally like the "floors in a museum": "Nature and man have combined to arrange this
amazing museum in such a way that each of its levels displays the monuments and works of art of a
separate epoch. ... The path of the visitor to this far-off country has been smoothed by a daring and
gifted museum expert. As in any other museum, access to the Holy of Holies is by a door ... This
portal is the Aswan Dam." Having thereby established the analogy, Noblecourt then proceeded
through Nubia as if it were the Louvre where she had been trained: through a sequential enfilade of
successive periods. "The visitor now comes to the first floor of the exhibition, where he finds an
entirely different environment, one created by the great builders of the New Kingdom." The 19t'-
Century engraving by Horeau accompanying the text confirmed that this was an unabashedly
"cumulative" telling of monumental history: a bird's eye view of the Nubian temples, scattered one
by one, as seen from what the text described as "the summit, where another period, that of medieval
Nubia, unexpectedly makes its appearance." (fig 4.35)
This article was published in 1960, when the UAR was till planning its two-oases-scheme.
Accordingly, Noblecourt concluded with a confident prediction that "two attractions will bring the
tourist back to Nubia." Yet in so doing she described exactly the "open-air typology" that the
committee would eventually come to reject:
At the Kalabsha oasis the visitor will encounter a reconstitution of that Nubian life and
husbandry which he thought were lost forever. Then, at the same latitude as Abu Simbel,
he will find a similar oasis where the monuments removed from that site will be
grouped together. Lastly, not far from the projecting promontory, he will see the huge
artificial mound, covered with flowers and trees, which will guard one of the world's
most historic spots.
As a typology, the open-air museum was unabashedly vernacular, implying a connection to local
history, and inhabitation by contemporary descendants whose claims to the monuments might
compete with that of the international subject-whether tourist or archaeologist. Thus the final
forbidding of the analogy with the open-air museum can be understood both as a final concession to
236 Christiane Desroche-Noblecourt, "The Greatest Open-Air Museum is about to Disappear," in Museum XIII/3 (1960),
156-194.
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preservationist ideology, and as the assertion of national authority over cultural heritage. By
recommending temples be "isolated," and "the atmosphere of a temple precinct" be maintained,"
the UAR controlled the design of its Nubian museum into a museological experience detached from
historic veracity-a narrative left to experience itself. In this sense, what had been an "open-air
museum" became an "imaginary museum" instead, in the sense that Malraux meant it: an art-book
on the Nile, a cinematic sequence of individual sights, isolated for photographic reproduction and
orchestrated for the sake of an international imagination. (fig 4.27)
That the effect of this intricate system of temple-relocation was to consolidate Nubia's value
as a cultural entity can be seen by comparing two Baedeker's Guide to Egypt that were published a half-
century apart (figs 4.31-32). In 1928, Baedeker's Egypt showed Nubia in a double-page map as a desert
landscape traversed by the Nile, densely dotted on either side by a continuous fabric of
undifferentiated sites. In this uninterrupted sequence, Philae and Abu Simbel are the only ones to
earn any of Baedeker's "stars." In contrast, the 1984 Baedeker includes Nubia in the general map of
"Principal tourist sites in Egypt," where it is now represented by the four oases, each now earning
two stars. The concentration of temples, in other words, produced a double a consolidation of value.
What had been an undifferentiated field of became a clear itinerary, legible at the scale of Egypt
itself. The four temples sent abroad also appear in the 1984 Baedeker, in the section titled "Museums
with Egyptian materials," having apparently retained their authenticity as Egyptian objects despite
their relocation. This section is illustrated by three photographs: the temple of Dendur at the
Metropolitan Museum, given to the US as a "grant in return", the famous head of Nefertiti, and the
Obelisk in Rome's Piazza del Popolo. The expansion of 'heritage' had worked retroactively to grant all
Egyptian objects dispersed over the course of history a legitimate international value-whether their
original displacement had been operated along imperial, colonial or post-colonial modes. In
addition, the internationalization of Egypt had expanded far past Nubia: not only had Nubia become
a part of Egypt, but now New York, Berlin, even Baroque Rome, were also in Egypt.
To the twofold "mobility" that had defined Nubia (the enforced mobility of Nubian
populations relocated to make way for Lake Nasser, and the engineered mobility of monuments
relocated along the new Nile Lake) was thereby added a third: the imagined mobility of future
tourists, able to navigate Nubia as a proto-internationalist utopia. It was this hypothetical European
tourist who inherited Nubia's history as a place where material cultures are deposited along the trails
of a transient mankind.
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Particularization: Venice in Nubia
It is not only the future of European tourism, but also the future of preservation as a
profession that was assured through this reconfiguration of the Nubian desert. Piero Gazzola
summarized the developments made by preservation in the 1960s by saying that "We have gone
from punctual protection to global protection."23 7 Writing in 1976, Gazzola was speaking mostly of
the Venice Charter, a document signed in May 1964 by the International Congress of Architects and Technicians of
Historic Monuments. In fact, Gazzola's involvement in the Nubian Campaign coincides with the period
when he entered preservation history a principal author of the Venice Charter and the founder of
ICOMOS. Conventional histories usually separate the two events as parallel historical "firsts,"
belonging respectively to practical and theoretical realms: the Nubian campaign as the first
international act of preservation, the Venice Charter as the first international statement of preservation
doctrine. 3 ' In addition, the Venice Charter is known for its historical and conceptual rigidity: Patrick
Ponsot sees it as a "dated and inapplicable" document, "written in the consensual and
incomprehensible tongue of diplomacy" and symbol of a bygone style of restoration. 239 Francoise
Choay reads in it a "limited horizon" and a "dogmatism" that lost the distinctive richness of the
Athens Conference.2 40 Gazzola himself, in his 1978 retrospective, treated the Venice Charter as the
beginning of an evolution: a constitutional effort upon which further progress was to be based. In
his account of the passage from Athens Conference to Venice Charter he talked about an increasing
particularization of the monument-by way of the inclusion of "smaller" and more "vernacular"
typologies, as well as an "expansion" of the mandate of protection, in geographic and stylistic
terms. In other words, Gazzola's statement is usually interpreted to mean that preservationists turned
their attention to vernacular typologies, natural sites, and urban complexes. Yet the role of the
Nubian campaign in this narrative remains unexamined by all. It is not enough to say that the
237 Gazzola actually continued intended the stament as a warning, that "total protection can actually mean no
protection.": "Siamo passati dalla protezione puntuale a quella globale: non nascondiamocene I pericoli. La protezione
totale pu6 avere come conseguenza la non protezione." Pietro Gazzola, "L'Evoluzione del Concetto del Restauro Prima e
Dopo la Carta di Venezia," in Bollettino del Centro INternazionale di Studi di Architettura Andrea Palladio XX (1978), 243.
238 For a good example of introspection from the heart of the discipline, see Jean-Louis Luxen, "Reflections on the Use
of Heritage Charters and Conventions," in Newsletter of the Getty Conservation Institute XIX/2 (2004), 4-9.
239 Offering a frankly French perspective, Ponsot's article is most interesting in its detecting Italian "intellectualism" of
the period in the Venice Charter and for its dating of a "style." "Ce n'est pas en general cela que l'on retient de la Charte
de Venise en France, mais plut6t un certain style de restauration, tris date, qui irait de l'ecorche archeologique a la
prothese moderniste." Patrick Ponsot, "Pourquoi lire Cesare Brandi?" in Bulletin Monumental, 161/3 (2003), 223-229.
240 "Dans le cadre de la mondialisation du patrimoine, la premiere Charte internationale sur la conservation des
monuments et des sites, dlabor&e i l'issue du congr&s de Venise, demeure le document de r6f6rence. Pourtant, son
horizon limiti et son dogmatisme la situnet singulierement en retrait au regard des travaux d'Athines dont la demarche
ouverte, questionnante et dialectique est plus que jamais d'actualite." Frangoise Choay, "Introduction," La Conference
d'Athenes (Paris: Tranches de Villes, 2002), 9.
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Nubian campaign "prefigured" the work on the Venice Charter. Close inspection of the progress of
Gazzola and his colleagues' rhetoric throughout the campaign reveal a distinct progression, from
particular "recommendations" to universal "declarations", indicative of a much tighter and
reciprocal relation between Venice and Nubia: on the one hand, the Nubian campaign provided
Gazzola an opportunity to articulate his theory in increasingly doctrinary terms; on the other hand,
this theoretical universalization of protection was accompanied by an increasingly technical
description of objects to be protected.
Why did Gazzola participate in the campaign at all? As we have seen, he was torn between
the impulse to distance himself from a three-thousand year political history of international
monument movement, and the opportunity to capitalize on the ideological gains that preservation
had made as a result of Unesco's work in the post-war reconstruction. This tension was evident in
Gazzola's compulsion to preface ever report he wrote by stating the "historical," "aesthetic,"
"architectural" objections that could be made to Unesco's work.24 1 Like his colleagues involved in the
archaeological surveys of Nubia for the sake of "Salvage Archaeology," Gazzola had a choice
between two ways of achieving disciplinary autonomy: the benefits of the visibility of the campaign
vs. the need for statements of orthodoxy. That he chose to proceed with the campaign only confirms
what his disclaimer already hinted at: that preservationist ideology proceeds by negation of
established precedent, as a kind of retrospective policing act.
Gazzola remained involved in the campaign in order to "police" the application of his
nascent preservation doctrine. As a result, he began to articulate with ever-greater vehemence an
orthodoxy, in which the Nubian project was clearly theorized as an "exception." For example, in his
preliminary mission Gazzola had simply acknowledged possible "historical and aesthetic objections"
to temple movement. A year later, these objections had become a full-fledged "exception":
Any principle, however fundamental, must undergo exceptions: there are human
reasons which are profoundly valid and which are beyond us. The case of the Aswan
Dam is one such exception. 24 2
Following Gazzola's lead, Plenderleith took every opportunity in ICCROM's reports to confirm the
distinction between "principles" and "project":
Considering the urgency and the importance of this project, the center made a deliberate
effort to avoid any perfectionist inclination in order to present to Unesco a program that
would be both concrete and realistic.243
241 "This solution is undoubtedly open to objections: historically, since the original position of the monuments is
changed, and aesthetically, because it involves their re-erection on sites and in settings that are not genuine. However,
this remains the only way of avoiding their total destruction."
242 Gazzola, "Projet de Sauvetage," 6.
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Once this pattern of disclaimers had been set, Gazzola and Plenderleith were able to make
pronouncement of principles with increasing authority, even as these principles were increasingly
violated by Unesco. By the end of his third mission, Gazzola set his doctrine apart in an introductory
section titled "Theoretical Principles of the Conservation of Monuments," articulating a set of rules
that correspond in large part to the main body of the Venice Charter. 244 In other words, Gazzola
used these Nubian reports as rough drafts for the Venice Charter.
The Nubian Campaign and the Venice Charter belong in the same bureaucratic chronology:
the Venice meetings for the "Second International Congress of Restoration" were scheduled to avoid
conflict with the Nubian meetings, and much of the conversation at the meetings revolved around
the intrigue of the Campaign-in particular, over the US contribution to the Abu Simbel, which had
just been denied a second time by Congress. Jo Brew, who served as vice-president of the Venice
meetings, used the Venice event to leverage better support for the project upon his return. He
composed a letter to Senators:
The Venice meeting was made up of approximately seven hundred scholars, architects,
and engineers from all over the world devoted to the preservation of our cultural
heritage. I can assure you that my conversation with them convinced me that favorable
action toward the preservation of Abu Simbel would be justified by its effect in our
international relations alone. 245
In other words: the Venice Congress took place against a Nubian backdrop, and Venice was a crucial
stop on the way to getting support for the Nubian campaign. It was Nubia, in fact, that provided an
image of international action for the Venice Charter. The Nubian Campaign was a crucial precedent
for the articulation of the Venice charter as a set of universal imperatives.
143 CP4/RES. 1: Centre International d'ttudes pour la conservation et la Restauration des Biens Culturels, Conseil
Provisoire, "Avis du Centre de Rome Sur la Mission Pr6liminaire en Nubie concernant le Deplacement des Temples,
prevue au Paragraphe 53 du Rapport 55 Ex/7" (Rome: 8-10 Dec, 1959), 1-2. Translation mine.
244 The Venice Charter is published in a variety of forms; most useful for exegesis is the tri-lingual edition introduced by
current ICOMOS president Michael Petzet. Grundsiitze der Denkmalpflege / Principles of Monument Conservation / Principes de conservation
des monuments historiques (Munchen: Karl M. Lipp Verlag, 1992). The list of signatories survives in its original order, with
Gazzola at the top: Piero Gazzola (Italy), Chairman; Raymond Lemaire (Belgium), Reporter; Jose Bassegoda-Nonell
(Spain); Luis Benavente (Portugal); Djurdje Boskovic (Yugoslavia); Hiroshi Daifuku (UNESCO); P.L de Vrieze
(Netherlands); Harald Langberg (Demmark); Mario Matteucci (Italy); Jean Merlet (France); Carlos Flores Marini
(Mexico); Roberto Pane (Italy); S.C.J. Pavel (Czechoslovakia); Paul Philippot (ICCROM); Victor Pimentel (Peru);
Harold Plenderleith (ICCROM); Deoclecio Redig de Campos (Vatican); Jean Sonnier (France); Francois Sorlin (France);
Eustathios Stikas (Greece); Mrs. Gertrud Tripp (Austria); Jan Zachwatovicz (Poland); Mustafa S. Zbiss (Tunisia).
24s Letter from Brew to senators, June 23 1964. [Carl Hayden, Ronan H Ruska, Leverett Saltonstall. Brew 10/54a. The
Exhibition of projects displayed at Palazzo Grassi was published in Seconda Mostra Internazionale del restauro Monumentale
Catalogo Guida (Venezia: Palazzo Grassi, 25 Maggio-25 Giunio 1964) while the proceedings were published in 1971
as International Council of Monuments and Sites, II1 Monument Per l'Uomo: Atti del II Congresso Internazionale del Restauro
Venezia 25-31 Maggio 1964 (Padova: Marsilio / ICOMOS. 1971)
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A comparison between the 1964 Venice meeting and the first "International Congress of
Restoration," which had been held in Paris in 1957 demonstrates the impact of the Nubian
Campaign on the ambitions of international restoration. The Congress, attended roughly by the same
roster of professionals, was hosted by the French Government at the Mus&e des Monuments Frangais. It
produced a set of recommendations that are, in substance, similar to those of the Venice Charter:
expressing a need for specialization, a concern for the material value of monuments to be codified,
and for protective measures against urban development. But in Paris in 1957 these were articulated as
recommendations by each session, and phrased as internal notes, indicating where future
disciplinary progress might be directed. 246 In contrast, the Venice Charter, inspired by the scope of
international action achieved in Nubia, addressed a broad public beyond the specialized community.
Within the history of international charters, the Nubian campaign should figure as the "exceptional"
concession for the cause of a general theory. Conversely, it is imperative to understand the
orthodoxy of the Venice charter as the product of exception.
What were the terms of this "exception?" The answer lies in the increasingly technicality
with which Gazzola and Plenderleith described the material value of the temples as they lost the battle
over their natural connection to their site. The first explicit statement of "principles that are
fundamental to the present theories on the protection of monuments," made by Gazzola and Harold
Plenderleith in 1959, indicated that when transfer operation could not be avoided, the operative
principle would be the "absolute value of each stone":
- Considered in principle alone, the transfer of a monument, out of respect for the
civilization of which it remains a living witness, should not be envisaged. It is only in
quite special cases when such a transfer is absolutely necessary that it is acceptable.
- Every stone, even if it is not decorated, has in itself an absolute value. It should be
preserved at any cost.247
The Gazzola-Plenderleith "Declaration" displaced the absolute value of the monument onto the
material itself. If the location of a monument had to be compromised, then at least its material
would be treated as inviolable. Gazzola and Plenderleith articulated this clause about the "sanctity of
stone" with increasing specificity, as the movement of temples became increasingly certain, and the
sanctity of the monument was progressively distributed throughout its material constituency:
246 See Jean Verrier, "Le Congres International des Architectes et technicians des monuments Historiques, in Monuments
Historiques de la France, Apr-Jun 1957, 65-88.
247 "Recommendations regarding the transfer of the temples: Declarations of Messrs. Gazzola and Plenderleith." Annex
VII: 1 1th Meeting, in UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR Meeting of International Experts on the Safeguarding of the Setes and Monuments of Ancient
Nubia Cairo, 12 November 1959.
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For most people the value of a stone is negligible .... Yet on the contrary it imperative to
consider the primordial value that each stone contains in itself. ... The sacred value that a
monument hold in its entirety ... distributes itself over every one of its elements: in
itself, in relation to its exact position in the unity of the monument, and its place within
the blocks around it.
Thus the more theoretically mobile the monument became, the more aggregate it became in
technical terms. By 1962, when Plenderleith was asked to compose a general document on "Ideas
that should be taken into consideration in re-erecting ancient monuments" he composed perhaps the
only statement of universal value that was never violated throughout the campaign:
Ideas that should be taken into consideration in re-erecting ancient monuments
1. Stones consist of granules in a connective tissue. In sandstone the granules are
impervious: the connective tissue is inclined to decay.248
The effects of this increasing particularization of the monuments were most visibly felt in the actual
reports of the campaign, which became increasingly technical. A survey of format of the lists in
which the monuments were inventoried may suffice to evidence this progression: beginning as
points on a map, becoming North-South inventories of assigned processes and new locations
appended, and eventually turning into lists of construction typologies and material samples.24 9 (fig 4.
28) This increasingly detailed description of the tectonic reality of the temples was accompanied
with an increasingly scientific description of the material substance and chemical behavior of these
types of stone. The UAR began regularly sending samples of stones to the ICCROM laboratories in
Rome, which returned them with an "identity card" of stone types. By granting each "stone granule
in a connective tissue" an intrinsic value, the conservationists hoped that the monuments would
retain some intrinsic connection to their site-which was made of the same "connective tissue." In a
sense, all of the Nubian temples were described as "monoliths." In light of this, one can return to the
attribution of a civilizational spirit to the monument in Gazzola's rhetoric. By the time Gazzola was
able to assert in 1962 that "a building is a work of the spirit," which "participates in a soul and in
248 Harold PLenderleith, Report by Dr. Plenderleith UNESCO/NUBIA/2/CE/13 Annex II (Paris: 3 April 1962),3.
249 30 October 1960: "These twenty-four monuments constitute an artistic group of the highest importance, and the
problem of their salvage is all the more difficult to resolve in view of their different techniques of construction. In terms
of constructional method, the monuments fall into four categories:
1) monuments quarried of large Nubian sandstone blocks (example: Kalabsha (Egypt), Temple of Madulia)
2) monuments hewn into the rock (speos) (example: Aniba (Egypt), Tomb of Pennut)
3) monuments consisting of a masonry frontage and a rock-hewn speos behind (example: Wadi Es Sebua (Egypt),
temple of Ramses II)
4) mud-brick monuments with frescoes. (example: Adb El Kadir (Sudan), Christian Church)." Gazzola, Projet de
Sauvetage,7. The introduction to Projet de sauvetage was shortened and made into the "short statement." Appended to
11C/PRG/9 Add.I.
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history of a people which created it," the implication was that the "spirit's" material of choice was
Nubian sandstone.2"s
The relationship between Nubia as a particular case and the Venice Charter as a universal
declaration is not a trivial matter, since Unesco presents itself as an agent of universalization and
particularity. To return to Gazzola's claim that the Venice Charter provoked a passage "from
punctual protection to global protection," with its classic interpretation that monuments became
smaller and more vernacular, while the protective envelope around them got bigger and bigger.
What the Nubian campaign reveals is another process of "particularization," whereby monuments in
were described in finer and finer grain. The more the principles of architectural conservation were
set in stone (figuratively inscribed into international charters, and literally engraved on stone tablets
near salvaged monuments), the more aggregate the monuments became (figuratively described in
scientific formulae measuring graininess and porosity, and literally disassembled into blocks). In the
case of the Nubian Campaign, it is the protective boundary that became increasingly finer-more
"punctual," one might say--and the monument's value emerged proportionally more "global." In
other words, the more the monument was 'particularized,' the more protection was 'universalized.'
IV. The "big temples": cultural expenditure as cold war aid
Commensuration
In the battle between "knowing" and "saving," the so-called Big Temples had emerged as
largely expendable. The temples of Abu Simbel and the island of Philae were the campaign's icons
from the start, but their fate was far from assured. They differed from other temples in that they
were to be preserved in situ, and therefore the schemes for their salvage faced the problem of being
the most expensive and the least visible. While smaller temples would gain surplus value in being
displaced, Philae and Abu Simbel seemed destined to absorb value without giving anything in return.
This was all the more problematic because, despite Unesco's efforts to portray them as equal parts
"Art and Science," few of Unesco's own specialists were willing to discuss the two monuments'
artistic or historic merits. ' Certainly the grandiose projects for their salvage "encountered an
appreciable amount of opposition from the 'dirt archaeologists':"
250 Gazzola "Projet de Sauvetage." (1960), 5.
2s1 "Art & Science Conspired with Nature," in "Abu Simbel: Now or Never," in Unesco Courier, (Oct 1961), 8.
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They are all for salvaging remnants of unknown prehistoric cultures but take a very dim
view of the vast amount of money which will be necessary to preserve Abu Simbel,
Philae, etc. They feel that, scientifically speaking, these monuments are completely known and
described, particularly with photogrammetric studies. They are not impressed with the
aesthetic of symbolic values, at that price. 2s2
This reference to "the aesthetic of symbolic values," was intended as an indictment of Egyptologists.
But while the latter brought to the Campaign the institutional support and aesthetic sensibility that the
distinctly un-glamorous dirt archaeologists lacked, they did nothing to dispel their colleagues'
skepticism about the salvage of Philae and Abu Simbel.
Where dirt archaeologists withdrew any "scientific" endorsement of these projects,
Egyptologists refrained from granting the temples much "aesthetic" value. In particular, they insisted
that Abu Simbel was "an inferior work of architecture and art," "an atrocity [with] everything out
of proportion, everything all wrong," and were happy to dispense this opinion in the mainstream
press.2 S3 Against this negative aesthetic valuation as a "monument," journalists began to argue for the
value of Abu Simbel as a "document"-the Washington Post, for instance, vaunting "its historical,
philological and archaeological importance, especially the hieroglyphic inscriptions which are
believed to afford the key to the origins of the Sinaitic and Moabite alphabets; also the scrawlings by
the various Greek, Levantine and Anatolian Kilroys who visited the place many centuries after its
construction." 25 4 The battle between science and aesthetics that had animated the specialist
committees was repeated in the non-specialist press, with art critics now wielding a documentary
logic against the aesthetic appreciations of amateur collectors.
In light of these lukewarm scientific and aesthetic appraisals, it was against Abu Simbel's
value as "the heritage of mankind" that skepticism was collectively re-directed-especially as it
became apparent that nobody had yet differentiated between this value and crass tourist appeal:
Egyptologists I have talked with feel very strongly that there is no real reason to preserve
it. ... The sculptures are not only huge... they are crude. Look at the thick knees. The
battle reliefs, outside and in, are not new creations but were introduced 200 years
before. While Abu Simbel easily dazzles the tourist, .... still one asks: What is priceless
about it? What part of "man's heritage" does it represent? Is it art?2ss
252 Letter from Brew to Hiroshi Hidaifu, Mar 17, 1960. Brew Archives,
2ss53 Dr. Holland Hall, cited in the Washington Post. The "scientific skepticism" was also leaked to the press, as when The
New York Times reported on a Mar 15, 1961 meeting of the Columbia Department of Archaeology on March 15 th where
"scientists .... Were doubtful that the effort was worth the cost, since the monument had been widely studied and
there were many other important sites in the same area that had not been investigated at all." "Saving of Temples on
Nile is Disputed." New York Times, Mar 16, 1961, 30. The presentation had been made by Edward E. White.
254 "For the Temple," in Washington Post (Mar 21, 1960), A12.
zss Emma Swan Hall, "Abu Simbel as Art: Preserving Temples threatened by Dam Waters Questioned," New York Times
April 28, 1963, 185.
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If Abu Simbel was neither a unique document nor a unique monument, it was neither worth
"saving" nor "recording." Even MonCom chairman Jo Brew, who had skillfully negotiated the
demands of competing archaeologists by arguing for pluralistic expertise, eventually resolved that
"the line to adopt" was that "Philae and Abu Simbel are not basically archaeological projects in the
technical sense."2 6"' Why, then, were they saved at all?
The answer begins with a notion of commensuration, which was introduced by Unesco to
redirect the qualitative question "what part of man's heritage?" towards a quantitative evaluation
instead. Okacha expressed this quantitative imperative in terms of scale: "The world-wide common
effort which can make [the campaign] a success must be commensurate with the priceless heritage
which is to be preserved for all mankind." 25 7 Commensuration translated contemporary effort into
monumental worth, according to an aesthetic system that bypassed the valuation of monuments in
absolute terms, and placed them in a system of relative value instead: it was, in short, a system of
proportion. However, because the elements to be compared were "priceless," it was a system that
valued disproportion. While the rest of the campaign was conducted under the sign of the
"incommensurability of cultures," the salvage of the Big Temples was performed for the sake of
commensuration--in the sense of the ability of values to be translated. One way to understand this is
a rhetorical reversal: while Nubia was a cultural particular which was saved as an example of
universality, the "big temples salvage proceeded from an assumption of universal value (the big
temples represented universal relevance of Egyptian culture) to the search for a particular instance of
modern action that the temples could be made to represent. This process of translation was presented
as occurring in an abstract realm (the conversion of "priceless heritage" into "worldwide common
effort") but can actually be traced specifically as it unfolded in a variety of discursive realms. 258
256 Brew to Wilson April 3, 1961. Brew Archives, Correspondance Folder. "I think this is the line we should all adopt.
We should make a greater effort to sell this to our archaeological colleagues for they are at the source of the statement
that we know all there is to know about Abu Simbel. This statement is doing us harm."
257 CUL (59) 4, p. 5.
"28 Three bodies of literature are useful here. First, the philosophical discourse on incommensurability, in its two strains:
one literary, concerned with translation, trauma, and hermeneutics (cf. David Couzens Hoy, "Hermeneutic Circularity,
Indeterminacy, and Incommensurability," in New Literary History, Literary Hermeneutics (Autumn 1978), 161-173), the
other scientific, revolving around Thomas Kuhn's thesis on the incommensurability of scientific theories (Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1962). Unesco appears in this literature in passing, cited as an agency that assumes
the preservation of the incommensurability of world cultures.
The influence of these theories on the social sciences has been felt, on the one hand, in a reevaluation of comparative
methods (see George Steinmetz, "Odious Comparisons: Incommensurability, the Case Study, and "Small N's in
Sociology," Sociological Theory (Sep 2004), 371-400), and more usefully, in analyses of commensuration as "a social
process," particularly as a bureaucratic procedure (Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell Stevens, "Commensuration as a
Social Process," in Annual Review of Sociology (1998), 313-343. Most pertinent is Espeland's account of how American
regulatory agencies changed their dam-building ethos after the National Environmental Policy Act. See "Bureaucrats and
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The most obvious way Unesco wielded commensuration as a value in itsdf was to account for
the central role played by financial contributions in the fate of the temples. Consider for instance
how the official Unesco history of the Campaign tells the Abu Simbel story with one graph, showing
both estimated costs and funds pledged between 1959 and 1968. (figs 4.32-4.33) The graph uses the
four engineering schemes proposed between 1959 and 1963 as fund-raising landmarks and as as
successive stages in a linear process of achieving "realism" in the campaign. According to this
history, "only the proposal of more realistic schemes brought a better balance" between cost
estimate and pledged contributions.25 9 In effect, the graph is supposed to demonstrate that economic
and technical factors converged into a single, "commensurate", monumental value. A similar graph
also exists for the temples of Philae with the same interpretation that "only the adoption of a less-
expensive, realistic project starts to attract more important contributions." At face value, this account
is correct: four engineering schemes were solicited for Abu Simbel, each cheaper than the previous
one, while the salvage of Philae was originally under-estimated and eventually grew to be more
expensive than Abu Simbel. But one thing these graphs ignore is the fact that neither project ended
up being a "dam" and that therefore a new qualitative criterion was added to the technological
proposal. Perhaps more importantly, the graphs do not convey the importance of the US
contribution: the fact that it represented more than 30% of the total fund, that it was originally
pledged to Philae but eventually devoted to Abu SImbel, and that it consisted exclusively of Egyptian
pounds, instead of convertible dollars. Thus these two graphs are actually connected--to each other
and to the campaign as a whole--and the isolation of each monument into a separate process of
linear "realism" is misleading.
Indians in a Contemporary Colonial Encounter, Law & Social Inquiry (Spring, 2001), 403-433, and The Struggle for Water:
Politics, Rationality, and Identity in the American Southwest (Chicago, 1998). The case is similar to the Aswan case; the dam
threatened to destroy a Native American settlement grounds. But as Charles Perrow pointed out, this work substitutes
hermeneutics for any analysis of power, since "the presence of incommensuration makes all rational choices suspect and
simple "interest" accounts misleading." See Perrow's review in Social Forces (Jun 1999), 1652-1654.
Such technical discussions of "interest" are available in the legal discourse, concerned with how to regulate the
translation of values that are thought to be incommensurable, usually for purposes of "compensation." See "Law and
Incommensurability", University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Jun 1998). This includes natural environments ("Million-Dollar
Mountains: Prices, Sanctions, and the Legal Regulation of Collective Social and Environmental Goods," Op Cit, 1327-
1369.) and works of art (Cass R. Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," Michigan Law Review (Feb.,
1994), 843.") Most useful is the legal distinction between the "commensurability of options or choices," and "the
incommensurability of other items (such as values, goods, life-plans, and so forth)," and the debate over whether the
latter is reducible to the former. (Matthew Adler, Op Cit, 1170.) That the value of objects can be deduced from the
measurement of options is precisely the position taken by Okasha in his appeal: by asking not whether the monument
should be saved but how they should be saved.
259 On Philae:" Only the adoption of a less-expensive, realistic project starts to attract more important contributions."
Temples and Tombs, 169, Fig. 17. On Abu Simbel: "only the adoption of the more realistic cutting scheme resulted in a
better balance." Save-Sodeberg , 79, Fig 1.
426
4. Salvaged Monuments
If commensuration is a process of conversion of value, what values were really converted in
the four proposed schemes? As we summarily seen, the temples were not presented as containing
any value except one available for exchange. What value was invested into them, and what return
did they offer? Commensuration, I will argue, was a transformative economy that unfolded in
multiple registers, translating economic quantities into political ones, "technical" values into
"cultural" ones, and aesthetic discourses into tourist techniques. Most importantly, I argue that that
commensuration was not an exclusively quantitative process. On the contrary, economic factors
played a qualitative role: it was not only the amount but also the type of funding, that served as the
ultimate measure for the evaluation of salvage proposals. Furthermore, a kind of symbolic exchange
between quantity and quality occurred in the process of convincing the political constituencies to
expend the available funds. I begin here by looking at the debates over the meaning of Abu Simbel,
as a quantitative transformation of purely technical values into an international aesthetic. I then look
at the debates over the funding for the salvage, which reveal a quantitative transformation of
economic measure into political value. Only after having problematized both of these realms can we
then proceed along the graph of commensuration to examine each engineering proposal.
"Who was Abu Simbel?"
Commensuration set the comparative terms for an aesthetic valuation that superceded the
absolute value of monuments and voided them of their importance as artistic and historic signifiers.
Nowhere is this emptying of monumental referent clearer than in the way Philae and Abu Simbel
were differentiated. The Big Temples first entered political discourse as alternatives: both projects
were "dam" projects, and the simplicity of fighting dams with dams made them easily comparable
in aesthetic and economic terms. In his original pledge-a November 1961 message to Congress-
President Kennedy presented the two projects as alternatives. But while the Abu Simbel salvage was
"plagued with difficulties" and had been estimated at an extravagant $80 Million, thus any US
commitment to the salvage was "premature." Instead Kennedy offered $6 Million for the whole
island of Philae, and $6 Million for "remaining lesser temples."' 26 By the time these funds were
finally made available to Unesco in 1964, the same $12 Million were appropriated for saving Abu
Simbel instead; Philae was, in some sense, a down-payment for Abu Simbel. The first process of
260 "The task of saving the Nubian monuments can be conveniently divided into two parts: (a) the reservation of the
Abu Simbel on the one hand, and (b) the preservation of the temples on the Island of Philae and the remaining lesser
temples in the threatened area." "Two major plans have been advanced for saving these monuments; ... each of these
plans entails serious difficulties, and further studies are being made. Therefore I feel it would be premature to
recommend, at the present time, that any US funds be provided for this purpose." Kennedy Appeal, 3.
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commensuration to be examined, therefore, is the one that transformed the salvage of Philae into the
Salvage of Abu Simbel.
It was not only for financial reasons that Kennedy considered the project of salvaging the
island of Philae a more natural fit project with US interests. Geographically, the island's location near
Aswan meant it could be easily incorporated into exiting tourist circuits.2 61' Historically, the island
bore the traces of five consecutive imperial recuperations of the Isis and Osiris cults, and could be
read as a veritable index of the history of civilizations. In addition, the temple of Isis had served a key
scientific role in the "recovery of knowledge ... of hieroglyphic script" by helping to corroborate
the name of Ptolemy on the Rosetta Stone. 262 Artistically, Philae had a long history of being known
as "the Pearl of Egypt," and its temples as jewels of "architectural elegance, planned in scale with the
small size of the island." Nor would Philae's salvage be devoid of spectacle. The island had been
almost entirely submerged since the building of the first Aswan Dam. With its column capitals
barely emerging from water, Philae dramatized the meaning of archaeological "salvage" by re-
emerging every year, in a periodic enactment of the impending flood. (fig 4.36)
The yearly flooding of Philae since the first raising of the dam in 1924 had already erased
significant archaeological information on the island--obliterating "the maze of mud-brick houses,
churches and other buildings" around the temples, which had been insufficiently recorded by the
First Survey.263 But this only made a second salvage more dramatic and redemptive. Hence, to the
economic idea of proportion was added an aesthetic one. The US hoped to undertake the entire
project by itself salvage of Philae by itself, in the same way that West Germany and France had each
"chosen" a temple project to represent them.2 64 Kennedy expressed this hope for the exclusive
"American" rights to Philae by saying, "There would be no more effective expression of our interest
in preserving the cultural monuments of the Nile Valley than an American offer to finance the
preservation of the Philae temples." As an island, Philae was a metonymic representation of the Nile
Valley and "its monuments"-a role it had played since appearing in the Description de 1'Egypte. Philae
261 In a letter to Rainey, sent from Cairo, on 5 July 1960, Reinhardt spelled out why the US embassy chose Philae: "1)
it could be saved at reasonable cost; 2) cost ... could be paid in local currency; 3) near enough Aswan to become a
tourist attraction; 4) considered one of the jewels of Egyptian art, second only to Abu Simbel." Brew 10/54b.
262 Both of these descriptions are summarized in the appendix to Save-Sodeberg's Temples and Tombs. Annex V: The
Temples of Abu Simbel and Annex VI: Philae-The Pearl of Egypt.
263 Walter Emery, Lost Land Emerging, 28. Emery continued: "All were destroyed by the water of the reservoir.., and with
them went archaeological evidence of vital importance to the student of Nubia's later history... The stone structures on
the island remain, but the loss of information which must have existed within the humble brick buildings is, I think,
one of the major tragedies in the long record of archaeological research."
264 The calculation was correct; the two temples got a lot of press as exemplars of a single country's dedication: in Abu
Simbel Now or Naver, for example, the editorial noted that Germany had offered to save Kalabsha and France Amada, 6.
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had the advantage of already being perceived as a cohesive whole. 265 (fig 4.34) The American hope
was that the island itself would become a singular monument to the US contribution, in perfect
proportion to America's intentions.
While the US wanted a collection of monuments (Philae) to represent its sole contribution,
the UAR wanted a single monument (Abu Simbel) to represent collective effort: after years of
cooperative crescendo, "a phase that calls for collective action." 66 The US had always known, in the
words of Rainer, that "from a political point of view we would probably gain more here from Abu
Simbel." 267 But in contrast to Philae's temples, which were designed in proportion to their site, and
whose origins were visible in tectonic and archaeological form, Abu Simbel was a historic and
artistic cipher. This archaeological riddle only contributed to its disproportionate monumentality:
Abu Simbel was a place of considerable importance, but historians and archaeologists
have found it difficult to explain the role not only of Abu Simbel but also of the other
temples built in lower Nubia by Rameses II. The odd fact is that the number of
contemporary settlements and cemeteries is insignificant in relation to the majesty of the
monuments. ... It remains a riddle why practically no traces have been found of the
settlements which must have existed in the neighborhood of the great temples where
the daily rituals would have demanded the presence of a large number of priests and
servants of the cult. And it is strange too that the tombs of temple personnel have never
been found despite painstaking investigations." 268
This inexplicable lack of context and origins was integral to its "magnitude," and Unesco's
admission that Abu Simbel was an archaeological enigma only fueled the impression that it had been
created ex nihilo out of the sand. While Philae's "appeal arose not from magnitude but perfect grace
and exquisite beauty" Abu Simbel's salvage was itself a mystery. While taking apart smaller temples
had made them speak, revealing for instance a whole history of block re-use, Abu Simbel's
monolithic construction dissimulated the traces of its human origins.269 In short, while Philae was
265 See Michel-Ange Lancret's account of his arrival in Philae by night ride on the Nile: "In one of the most
extraordinary locations on the earth, amid places that partake of the fabulous, the names of which ... have assumed
gigantic and almost magical significance. ... Nowhere else are monuments still surviving of one of the most ancient
peoples of the world, inscriptions that it has carved in to the rocks throughout seems to speak to posterity. Such
objects, by carrying the mind back to the most distant centuries, enrich the panorama with a beauty greater than
anything that nature alone can offer in most imposing sites." Cited in C.C. Gillispie, "Historical Introduction," in
Monuments of Egypt: The Napoleonic Edition. 18.
266 "Statement of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of 20 June 1961 on the Preservation of Abu Simbel Temples."
CUA/109 Annex III. "an important phase ... the most serious stage.... phase that calls for collective action."
267 Even as he explained the rationale for saving Philae, Rainer gave a personal vote in favor of Abu Simbel: "I have no
doubt that [the UAR] would be delighted to have the US undertake the Philae project but would be most anxious that
this would preclude participation in Abu Simbel job. It is my personal feeling that from a political point of view we
would probably gain more here from Abu Simbel." Reinhardt to Rainey, 5 July 1960, Brew 10/54b.
268 "Annex V: The Temples of Abu Simbel,", Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia, 234.
269 This was a feature of the campaign that was widely advertised: for instance about the Temples of Dakka, "When it is
dismantled, many blocks of stone dating from earlier periods, which had been used over again, will probably be
identified." A Common Trust, 12.
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precious and legible, Abu Simbel was almost as mute as a mountain. Unesco and its archaeologists
spent three years trying to make Abu Simbel "speak" to the US on behalf of the UAR.
Once the question of a US participation in Abu Simbel's salvage became a subject of political
debate in America, Rameses II himself became the object of a monument/document debate. It was
as it had become necessary to attach a persona to the temples' sculpted figures-"to ask the prize
question," as a recalcitrant Congressman Rooney did, "Who is Abu Simbel?"270 Rooney's mistake
was quickly rectified ("Mr. Chairman, Abu Simbel refers to a geographical location"), but his desire
to fix the identity of the colossus only expressed the widespread expectation that monuments have a
definitive referent. No satisfactory answer was forthcoming: Rameses II was "not an awfully
important pharaoh," 27' who was "usually identified with the Pharaoh of the earlier chapters of the
Book of Exodus." 272 Although he was megalomaniac enough to "have foresightedly had himself
sculpted in quadriplicate," this repetition ironically rendered each of his sculptures less valuable. 27
As Unesco itself advertiszed, "the kings' image is to be seen everywhere." 274 By the standards of
history, Rameses had merely pulled off a publicity stunt; by the standards of art, he had the bad taste
of being monument-obsessed.
The search for Abu Simbel's biographic referent was partly motivated by a desire to seek
historical precedents for an age when heroic figuration was itself perceived to be a feature of
totalitarianism."' The UAR saw an opportunity to give Pharaonic origins to Unesco's new universal
subject; skeptical Western politicians were eager to demonize Nasser and other Soviet-friendly
leaders as despots. Even the New York Times conceded that "if Rameses II were alive today he would
probably be recognized as one of the world's most boring and dangerous characters, though he
would have competition."2 76 But it was precisely the symbolic deficiency of Rameses and his
monument-the sheer "boredom" of his reign--that made Abu Simbel a suitable Unesco
monument. As one letter writer responded: "No doubt Abu Simbel is an expression of ruthlessness,
power and inhumanity, ... but most people see it as a unique and powerful work of Egyptian art,
270 The exchange was reported in Drew Pearson, "Aid for Historic Treasures Denied," Los Angeles Times, Jun 3, 1964.
271 John Canaday, "Temple in Extremis," The New York Times, Apr 14, 1963, 119.
272 Few were willing to remind the public that he had chased the Hebrews out of Egypt.
273 Jay Walz, "Cairo Seeks to Save Temples Above Aswan," Jan 23, 1960, 3. "A fault in the rock long ago let one of the
heads crash to the ground. But since Rameses, foresightedly had himself sculpted in quadriplicate, archaeologists do not
regard this blemish as major."
274 "Abu Simbel," in A Common Trust.
275 Rooney, for instance, suggested that Nasser, Krustchev and Castro should pool resources to rescue Rameses.
276 "And Who Was Rameses II?" in New York Times, Jan 24, 1960. E 10. The article made clear that megalomania was
itself the subject of the Rameses' reign: "The greatest achievement of Rameses II was to produce the temple of Abu
Simbel and decorate the same with gigantic statues of himself." And opined of the salvage that "If it is done, it will
probably rank as the most expensive commercial in the all the history of paid publicity."
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and only incidentally as the tomb of some Pharaoh."277 Thus none of the attempts to make
totalitarianism itself the subject of Abu Simbel were successful; what remained instead was a tension
between figuration as mode of empathy and abstraction as a technique of universalization: Abu
Simbel was human enough to "capture" the world's philanthropic "imagination," but abstract
enough to be proposed to Western countries as an international monument. This tension was far
from resolved by the time money for the salvage was obtained.
In fighting against the image of Abu Simbel as a monument to a despot, Egyptologists
developed an interpretation of Abu Simbel's sculptural seriality as an early example of mass-
produced art. The Keeper of Egyptian Antiquities at the British Musem, Dr. Edwards, for instance,
told of a phase of Egyptian art that was defined by the problem of quantity instead of quality. In his
"urge to win immortality at any cost." Rameses had pushed his artisans and architects towards "a
technique of effect by mass and frequent repetition." Edwards used this to justify both the lack of
quality of the Abu Simbel temples and their exceptional status among all examples of this era. "With
the emphasis mainly on quantity, it is not surprising that much of the sculpture of the time lacks any
aesthetic appeal and originality."278 By the time Minister Okasha inaugurated the monuments again in
his 1968 speech, this repetitive anonymity had been recuperated for Unesco's own symbolic ends:
"Rameses the Second's dearest wish was to ensure his immortality. He has it, but it is after out own
fashion that we have bestowed it upon him."27 9 The temple's lack of aesthetic "originality" had
become a positive quality: crudeness, anonymity, and seriality stood to represent modem
cooperation.
Instead of appealing to a stable artistic or historic referent, Unesco forged an aesthetic that
valued "magnitude" over "beauty." In addition to describing the temples as a reproducible, Unesco
worked to incorporate a quantitatively-minded spectator into the meaning of the temples, by staging
an appeal to sublimity and activating a discursive lineage that had long detected "the sublime" in
Egypt's monuments. In his 1790 Critique of Judgement, Immanuel Kant had offered the pyramids as an
illustration of the "mathematical sublime." 280 The mathematical sublime was defined as resulting
277 "Preserving Abu Simbel" Letter to the New York Times 10 Feb, 1960, p. 36.
278 Edwards, "Foreword," in MacQuitty, Abu Simbel (New York: Putnam, 1965), 9-11.
279 Sarwat Okacha, in Abu Simbel: addresses delivered at the ceremony to mark the completion of the operations for saving the two temples, Abu
Simbel, 22 September, 1968. (Paris; Unesco, 1968). SHC.68/d.41. English version, p. 18. The French version of the speech
has a slightly different tone: "Le d6sir le plus cher de Ramsks 6tait d'assurer son immortalit&. C'est chose faite et nous y
avons contribuE a notre manibre. Aujourd'hui ses temples se dressent de nouveau pour l'ternit."
280 Kant distinguished three forms of aesthetic enjoyment: the agreeable is "made intelligible by its Quantity," the beautiful
"requires a presentation of the Quality of the object," and the sublime "pleases immediately by reason of its opposition
to the interest of sense." The idea of the sublime required "the estimation of the magnitude of natural things," and
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specifically from a confrontation with objects that are so perceptually overwhelming, that they
trigger in the viewer an attempt to estimate their magnitude by mathematical means. While
mathematics belong to the realm of reason, Kant posited, mathematical apprehension of physical
magnitudes was actually aesthetic, since it depended upon an "aesthetic estimation" of a basic unit
of measurement by perceptual means. (In other words, the physical magnitude of objects can only
be perceived by means of an aesthetic, not an exact, representation of scale in the subject's
imagination.) The sublime effect is triggered, then, when this original unit of measure "disappears
from the imagination" during the process of trying to comprehend the object, provoking a
"movement" in the mind as comprehension (aesthetic estimation) attempts in vain to catch up to
apprehension (mathematical estimation).
The pyramids for Kant vividly illustrated this flight of the imagination, large tectonic forms
whose original measure of scale vanishes as the eye moves up the stone tiers:
This explains Savary's observations in his account of Egypt, that in order to get the full
emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids we must avoid coming too near just as much
as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the representation of the apprehended
parts (the tiers of stone) is but obscure, and produces no effect upon the aesthetic
judgment of the Subject. In the former, however, it takes the eye some time to complete
the apprehension from the base to the summit; but in this interval the first tiers always
in part disappear before the imagination has taken in the last, and so the comprehension
is never complete.
The pyramid mediates this flight to infinity with geometric precision: serving as a funnel of
perception, wherein "as much is lost at one end as it gained at the other." Instead of comprehending
the object, the subject derives pleasure from the insufficiency of his senses vis-a-vis his imagination.
Again in Paul de Man's words, "what the sublime achieves ... is the awareness of another faculty
besides understanding and reason, namely, the imagination."281 What is to be retained from the
sublime interpretation of the pyramid, for our purposes, is the problem of situating the criterion of
heritage of mankind inside the subject itself.
Unesco's sublime aesthetic was a fight for the "imagination" of an international subject, and
this is why its struggle to differentiate heritage value from tourist appeal is far from trivial. Kant, as
many have pointed out, never saw the pyramids first-hand; he relied instead on the account of one
of Napoleon's Egyptologists, Savory. By the mid-20th century the pyramids had been seen by
produced in the subject the realization of the impossibility of representing this estimation by human understanding.
Immanuel Kant, "Analytic of the Sublime," in The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1952), §26, 119. In Paul de Man's rendition, "the sublime is not 'the large' but 'the largest,' it is that
compared to which everything else is small'... the sublime is to be borderless and yet a totality." Paul de Man,
"Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrej Warminski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996), 75.
281 Paul de Man, 75.
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innumerable tourists, their image circulated internationally, and the problem of their sublimity had
become intertwined with the potential boredom of tourist expectation. Julian Huxley, for one,
admitted in his memoir From an Antique Land that by the time he visited them as Unesco's Director
General, "Familiarity (though second-hand) had led me ... to discount the Pyramids. They had
become international commonplaces, degraded to the level of the tourist souvenir." And yet he
argued that the experience of seeing the pyramids in person trumped this debasement:
In actuality, they make an overpowering impression. It is not one of beauty, but on the
other hand not one of mere bigness. Though size enters into it, and there is an element
of aesthetic satisfaction in the elemental simplicity of their triangular silhouette. But this
combines with an element of vicarious pride in the magnitude of the human
achievement involved, and a sense of bold novelty and their historical uniqueness, to
produce an effect different from that of any other work of man. 282
Huxley's description of his visit to the pyramids recalls Kant's definition of the mathematical
sublime. Where his rendition differed from Kant's, however, was in the direction of his "flight to
infinity:" instead of reflecting back on his own imagination as a universal subject, he imagined the
literal effort that had been expended to create the monument, in a kind of trans-historical empathy.
Unesco did everything it could to channel this empathy towards itself, leveraging the
sublimity of the colossi into a "vicarious pride" towards its own achievements. This "culturalization"
of the sublime experience reveals a link between tourist expectation and sublime experience which
should not be taken lightly, especially in the case of Abu Simbel. It was, after all, at Abu Simbel that
Gustave Flaubert, paradigmatic 1 9 th century orientalist, felt compelled to record the reflection "the
Egyptian temples bore me profoundly."283 Yet what mattered to Unesco is not that Flaubert was
actually bored.284 His ability to experience the sublime infinity of the colossi was hampered by all
the sand covering the colossus-in his own words, "Handsome heads, ugly feet." Furthermore, his
wariness was archaeological, since had just spent two days helping "dig out the chin" of the fourth
colossus for Du Camp's photographic purposes. (fig 4.62) Thus "what bored him," in geographer
Derek Gregory's words, "was not so much the ruins as their incorporation ... within the discourses
of archaeology and tourism that policed their appropriation." 285 A century later, it was these
282 Julian Huxley, From an Antique Land: Ancient and Modern in the Middle East (London: Max Parrish, 1954), 239.
283 "Are they going to become like the churches in Brittany, the waterfalls in the Pyrenees? Oh necessity! To do what
you are supposed to do; to be always ... what a young man, or a tourist, or an artist, or a son, or a citizen, etc., is
supposed to be!" Gustave Flaubert, in Flaubert in Egpypt, ed. Francis Steegmuller, (London: Penguin), 141-143
284 Many commentators, including fellow-traveler Maxime du Camp, have pointed out that Flaubert's detachment and
homesickness were misleading; Steegmuller makes of this "disdain" a novelist's trait, in opposition to du Camp's
"journalistic" impulses, which led him to remark that "Balzac was the same: he looked at nothing and remembere4d
everything." Steegmuller, "Editor's Foreward," in Flaubert in Egypt.
28ss Derek Gregory, "Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50," Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers, 20/1 (1995), 43.
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discourses that Unesco tried to "police" into the meaning of the monument itself. By the time
Unesco proposed to save them, the temples carried an expectation of sublimity, connected to
boredom as a tourist symptom. It was a success for Unesco merely to have argued that Abu Simbel
belonged not in a range from "art" to "science," but on a spectrum from "boredom" to
"imagination."
Unesco hoped to turn every tourist who visited the temples between 1959 and 1964 into a
potential "witness" to the sublime power of the temples, cooperating with the UAR government to
make the site accessible to as many vistors as possible. The experience of New York Times art critic John
Canaday, is exemplary. Canaday felt "a sense of duty" to verify the advertised effect before
endorsing the salvage project, in order to clear the "suspicion that the colossal monument ... might
be only a gigantic novelty." 286 Having been coached to recognize modern agency in the possible
salvage of the temples, Canaday returned from his visit convinced. Upon visiting the temples,
Canaday felt that, salvaged or not, the monument had activated a sentimental "resonance" and that
this alone was reason for the salvage to occur. Canaday theorized, following Malraux, that Abu
Simbel was "among the half-dozen examples of Egyptian art where the presence of a creative artist
is most strongly felt, and where life most pervades an art dedicated to the placation of death." In
other words, collaboration had already become the new "direction" towards which the sublimity of
Abu Simbel "brought the imagination." When Okacha consecrated Abu Simbel as an international
monument in 1968, he was able to herald this sublime "pride" as the only suitable criterion for the
success of "tremendous scale" of effort expended.
Yet it is not until this sublime aesthetics of commensuration was complemented by an
archaeological impulse for retrospection that it became the operative motive for saving Abu Simbel.
By late 1962, 22 teams of excavators had invaded Nubia, and a sense of accomplishment had begun
to pervade the international archaeological community. As Brew proudly wrote to Jacob Javits in
November, the digs were themselves "extraordinary achievements." But, he continued candidly,
international recognition of these achievements would never be forthcoming, unless a
commensurate monument was heralded as an immediate result:
Were it not for Abu Simbel we would all be patting eachother on the back and claiming a
great triumph. The fact that within two years ... some thirty expeditions with scientists
286 Canaday was unequivocal in his answer: "I was wrong." "Every argument ... has been made except the one that
surprised me most and impresses me as most valid, which is that the temple as a whole and the painted bas-reliefs on
the interior and in particular are aesthetically, if not Egyptologically, among the half-dozen examples of Egyptian art
where the presence of a creative artist is most strongly felt, and where life most pervades an art dedicated to the
placation of death." John Canaday, "Temple in Extremis," The New York Times (April 14, 1963), 119.
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from 25 countries would be excavating in Nubia is itself an extraordinary achievement.
The peoples of the world governments and academic institutions have joined together
on a cultural matter ... to an extent none of us was optimistic enough to foresee.
Unfortunately ... unless we can save Abu Simbel a great many people, including our best
friends in Egypt, will feel that we have failed. So our big fight remains to save the two
superb temples at Abu Simbel.287
Brew identified two scales of commensuration and attached to each a political constituency. Yet
what sounded like a political imperative-placating political allies in Egypt and satisfying a
fascinated public in the West-was in fact a feedback system, that built contemporary evaluation
into monumental meaning. This new meaning was legible in the very fine distinction between the
"purely cultural" and the "purely archaeological." As Williams Adams recalled in 1967, "the
continuation of all forms of archaeological research depends in the long run on public support, and
in Nubia it was Abu Simbel which captured the public imagination. Had there been no Abu Simbel,
the scope of the purely archaeological campaign in Nubia would assuredly have been smaller, not
larger."288 Thus, Adams concluded, the "principles of conservation of cultural treasures" were truly
different from the principles of "the advancement of scientific knowledge." If Abu Simbel's salvage
was not "archaeological in the technical sense," it could still acquire an archaeological value
retrospectively. "Cultural" principles tied Abu Simbel's survival to the immediate continuation of
archaeology, and imagined the monument's survival in a very distant future.
As the temples neared immersion, Unesco's tone grew more dramatic and it emphasis turned
to commemoration: "One of man's distinctive features," the 1964 pamphlet announced, "is a habit
of leaving behind on the soil from which he wrests his livelihood all sort so remains which provide a
record of his history. "289 The archaeologists were all too aware that, however "extraordinary", the
achievements of salvage archaeology in Nubia would leave no traces behind. (Even with the
archaeological work being done, Brew wrote in late 1963, "the record of at least 500 thousand years
of human history will be obliterated.")2 90 Abu Simbel was an immediately available monument,
287 Letter from Brew to Jacob Javits, Nov 20, 1962. Brew 9/1086f.
288 "Unesco's participation in the campaign was founded on principles of conservation of cultural treasures, not
advancement of scientific knowledge. " Draft of lecture, April 1967. In Brew Archives, Correspondance: Adams. The
phrase "captured imagination" was a trope used by all to signify the political importance of the campaign in the eyes
of an international public, and the political potential represented in these captive eyes. Kennedy's appeal used it for the
campaign as a whole "In making these funds available the United States will be participating in an international effort
which has captured the imagination and sympathy of people throughout the world." PR (61)5.
In the discourse of the archaeologists like Adams, the phrase was used as a euphemism for the amateur interests of
powerful politicians, crucial to the continuing funding in congress. See for example Brew's account of meeting with
Kenneth Galbraith: "his interest in archaeology was in seeing it. ... For the inspirational value of great archaeological
sites." Letter from Brew to Wilson. April 3, 1961. Brew Archive 10/54b.
289 CUA.64/D.30/A. Unesco, International Campaign for Monuments (Paris: Unesco, 1964.) Unesco Archives.
290 "Nubia and the Aswan Dam," Cranbrook Newsletter (Aug 1963). Brew 8/1086c.
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that could render visible the archaeological effort already expended. In other words, archaeologists
embarked on their "big fight to save the two superb temples at Abu Simbel" in large part to make
render visible the archaeological work they had already completed. How did this "big fight" unfold?
The "big fight" to turn food aid into cultural exchange
The "big fight" of American archaeologists to secure funding for the salvage of Abu Simbel
illustrates that a temple did not have to be exported as a "grant-in-return" in order to be understood
as a "surplus" object. This fight began in January 1960, when Unesco's representative at the State
Department, Mr. Thayer, convened a "meeting in Washington of Egyptologists and museum
directors to explore their interest in the project" at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC.
The resulting memorandum gave "three aspects of the Nubia question that seemed to merit
consideration." This list of aspects placed the value of saving the temples on a sliding scale of
interest, from "altruism" to "national interest:"
1) Altruism: It was reasonable to suppose that many Americans would respond favorably
to the appeal to preserve these great monuments for posterity.
2) Enlightened self-interest: A re-awakening of interest in Egyptology was foreseen through
widespread publicity... especially for the saving of Abu Simbel
3) The obtaining of good digging sites: ... since the Europeans would not delay in
organizing digging parties in Nubia, the US should seriously consider ... that this
project be discussed in terms of national interest, as well as particular interests. 291
This progression connected two forms of abstract valuation ("altruism" valued the relative
prominence of "monuments" in "posterity," while "national interest" valued the prominence of
nations in the Nubian desert) through a specific value of single monument, Abu Simbel (which, in
itself, was valued in the realm of "a revival of Egyptology".
This pattern connecting cultural altruism to political self-interest was consistently repeated, as
expert committees proliferated and politicians requested their judgment with increasing frequency.
In 1963, when estimates for an acceptable moving scheme for Abu Simbel were proposed, State
Department liaison Max McCullough wrote Brew and Wilson, asking them to state "their best
judgment on the value of preserving the temples." Wilson replied by spanning from the
monument's "unique value" to the country's "cultural leadership" in five numbered steps:
1. Abu Simbel is unique and of value which transcends any money valuation.
2. This opportunity is the most brilliant one currently available in the arts and will do
much to advance the standing of the arts and humanities
291 Minutes of Meeting at the National Gallery of Art, 24 March 1960. Brew 9/1086m.
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3. An international agreement to preserve something for the long future represents a
peaceful consensus of nations, which must not be brushed aside;
4. A success in the endeavor may be of marked aid in out relations with the United Arab
Republic; and
5. The United States here has a brilliant opportunity to show cultural leadership.292
A nested set of autonomies was manifest in this sliding scale from objecthood to politics. Each
numbered item was listed as having value in and of itself, beginning with the monument, which had
value because it transcends valuation, and onto the "arts and humanities" which could only advance their own
standing. The juxtaposition of these autonomous elements, then, legitimated the presence of the
nation-state in the list, as a autonomous cultural entity to be preserved for its own sake. This time, the
progression from "altruism" to "self-interest" was mediated not by the monument but rather by
"the peaceful consensus of nations:" a new international space where the autonomy of a cultural
object could mutate into the self-interest of a nation.
The analogy between a collection of monuments and the consensus of nations had already
been made by President Kennedy in his recommendation to Congress, which referred to Nasser's
claim that the temples were cherished by "the whole world, which believes that the ancient and the
new components of human culture should blend in one harmonious whole."293 This fusion of
ancient and modern, Kennedy continued, was visible in the bilateral relations between the US and
Egypt: "The United States, one of the newest of civilizations, has long had ... a special interest in the
civilization of ancient Egypt ... and a deep friendship with the people of the Nile Valley." It was in
the same "harmonious whole" that monuments and nation-states should co-exist, and the history of
mankind would be shaped into the image of an international order. Perhaps more to the point,
nation-states would borrow the autonomy of monuments from culture, that harmonious milieu of
disinterest.
The progression from a monument's "valuation" to a nation's "leadership" reveals the
process latent in the Nubian campaign: a conversion of the raw value of cultural objects into political
power. Brew spelled out the workings of this transformative process: "If the US aids this project," he
wrote to Thayer, "we shall gain credit all over the world for contributing to a major cultural project.
Not only will be doing something worthwhile itself but we will be advertising to the world the fact that
we are interested in something beyond military security and economic prosperity." 294 By
publicizing its disinterestedness, the US would demonstrate its power. Here we can understand the
292 Letter from Wilson to Max McCullough, 8 Jan 1963, Brew archives, Correspondance folder.
293 John F. Kennedy, Letter from the President to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, April 6,
1961. Reprinted as Press Release PR(61)5, 7 Apr 1961.
294 Letter from Brew to Thayer, Jan 2 1963. Brew 10/54d.
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trope that Abu Simbel had "captured imaginations" more literally: the monument contained
hundreds of thousands of captive attentions, a public from which it was necessary extract political
gain.
Where Brew's explanation went further than Wilson's is that he made an economic
argument in addition to a political one: the campaign could be seen as a cultural solution to a cold-
war spending problem. Thayer had asked for a quantitative "assessment of the cultural and historic
value of these monuments.""' 9 Brew responded qualitatively: that there was a type of funds that was
commensurate to the task at hand.:
This would seem to be an excellent opportunity to use for good purpose some of the
considerable amount of money which has accumulated in Cairo under Public Law 480.
... Large accumulation of PL 480 funds are subject to last through devaluation of the local
currency. The Abu Simbel project seems to me to be a good way to protect ourselves, in
part, from this contingency and at the same time to gain credit for a laudable action of
which people all over the world will approve. 296
Brew suggested was that the US Government use so-called "counterpart funds," which were also
known as "Public Law (PL) 480 funds," that resulted from the sale of agricultural surpluses to Egypt,
and were earmarked for US-approved "Aid" projects. In other words, Brew proposed to bridge the
sliding scale from political power to "purely cultural" value of objects, by using a funding scheme
that already bridged between "disinterested" action (feeding the hungry) and "strategic interests"
(enlisting allies abroad.)
In Maussian terms, the fact that the US contributed "counterpart funds" to the campaign
means that these contributions were intended to take back from the UAR the power it had gained by
offering its antiquities as "gifts-in-return." In a neat application of Mauss' theory, the campaign
unfolded according in this pattern of giving and countergiving. Just as the Egyptian government had
interested the US by offering these temples as "gifts," the US now presented itself as giving away a
very specific form of "aid" which came with obligations. The US's financial contribution to the Abu
Simbel salvage project must be understood as a counter-gift, in the strict Maussian sense: an object
offered, whose value is intended to exceed that of a gift received. Indeed one might see this post-
colonial back-and-forth pattern as an enactment of George Bataille's politico-economic interpretation
of Mauss, where "giving must become acquiring a power." What was exchanged in this political rivalry
between the US and the UAR was generosity itself, the idea of giving and the power to receive. 297
295 "Only a very high estimate of the worth of these monuments could justify so large an expenditure." Thayer to Brew
and Wilson. Brew 10/54d.
296 Letter from Brew to Thayer, Jan 2 1963. Brew 10/54d.
297 "The subject who gives... enriches himself with a contempt for riches, and what he proves to be miserly of is in
fact his generosity") Bataille, La Part Maudite (Paris: Minuit, 1967), 129. Bataille described this reclamation, as a
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The US was not the only member state to partake in the salvage of Abu Simbel without
contributing hard currencies. Former colonial powers took Unesco's appeal as an occasion to resolve
asset disputes that had arisen from the Suez Canal crisis. France "offered to contribute one million
dollars payable in French property confiscated in Egypt in 1956,"298 and Britain's contribution, in
"impounded pounds," was partially drawn from donations given to cultural institutions in 1953 but
frozen by the UAR government in the expropriation of foreign assets in 1957. 299 In both cases, these
contributions were presented to domestic public as a tactical solution to the severance of diplomatic
relations with Egypt in a post-Suez climate. Both "donations" intended to strong-arm Nasser into
giving up property he had acquired by nationalization: a very public reclaiming of assets that he was
holding hostage in the UAR.
What distinguished the American "counterpart funds" from these other contributions,
however, is that laws governing these funds tied US economic aid to the disposal of "those world
renowned surpluses, American wheat and cotton."300 Counterpart funds were US assets held by the
UAR, but they had not been "taken" by Nasser; rather, they had in some ways already been "given"
to him. Thus they were already laden with counter-gift power: they allowed the US to match the
UAR's contention that its temples were "surplus" with a proposition to contribute funds which were
also "in excess." Thus the story of the "big fight" to secure these funds for Abu Simbel is the story
of how archaeologists battled to transform the value of America's "surplus food" into the value of
the UAR's "surplus temples."
Originally inspired by Marshall Plan funding, the sale of America's surplus agricultural
commodities to developing countries in local currencies was a way to accommodate "long-term
pressure for surplus disposal." Over the course of the 1950s, the problem of finding "customers for
American grain in an impoverished world became intertwined with attempts to solve complex
destruction: "If he destroyed the object in solitude, in silence, no sort of power would result from the act.... But if he
destroys the object in front of another person or if he gives it away, the one who gives has actually acquired, in the
other's eyes, the power of giving or destroying. ... He is now rich for having ostentatiously consumed what is wealth
only if it is consumed." The relationship of destruction to power is crucial to understand, since Unesco expected the
campaign to represent the power of mankind to resist destruction. (This is a form of sublimity.) Georges Bataille, "The
Gift of Rivalry: Potlatch" The Accursed Share Vol I Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1991), 69.
'98 "Unesco Gets New Plan to Save Temple," in Chicago Tribune (May 12, 1963), A14.
299 The British contribution was made by settling a dispute over a gift made in 1953 by former British Commissioner
for the Egyptian Public Debt upon his death, to the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge and the National Art
Collections. Since Cairo had refused to release these funds, the UK Foreign Office made the contributions itself, then
"informed President Nasser that he could regard the money as Britain's official contribution toward saving the Abu
Simbel temples." See "Gift: Impounded Pounds" New York Times (May 4, 1964), 20.
300 "Artisans Enlisted in Egypt to Use Surpluses" New York Times (Oct 17, 1960), 39.
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political and military problems abroad." 301 The amount of negotiating power that the US really
derived from its PL 480 power has remained unclear--as recent analyses have shown, "there is little
evidence that US food aid policy usefully served US diplomatic interests. "302 Egypt's participation in
the PL 480 program is a case in point: it dated to 1955, was suspended during the Suez crisis, but
resumed the following year, and reached its peak in 1962. John F Kennedy was a particular believer
in the fund, however, renaming the program "Food for Peace" and pledging to use it more
forcefully as an instrument of international politics during his presidential campaign. His arrival at
the presidency therefore intensified reliance on these funds, in particular to influence Middle East
policy by "recognizing the force of Arab Nationalism" and "channeling it constructive lines." In the
case of Egypt Kennedy proposed to use counterpart funds to prompt spending on domestic projects,
hoping to turn Nasser's nationalism inward, away from any communist alliances and tendencies. "If
neutrality is the result of concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the
people and so forth, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, I would accept that."303 Thus,
although it was proferred under the cover of an internationalist agenda, Kennedy's pledge of PL 480
funds was actually an attempt to neutralize Nasser's international ambitions.
The idea of using Counterpart Funds for cultural purposes was not new; they had already
been the primary source of funding for the US archaeological excavations during the early part of
the campaign. But the sums involved in the salvage of Abu Simbel were so large that they began to
figure in a symbolic way in Unesco's discourse: the US contribution would be pivotal to the very
success of the endeavor. Kennedy's pledge received widespread international publicity, After the
Kennedy pledge was made public, the US contribution was featured in the press as stand-alone,
equal only to the UAR's own. But after it became the contribution to Abu Simbel instead of Philae, it
also acquired a specific connotation: since the US was anxious to "preserve the traditional pattern of
an American ceiling of 30 percent in international expenditures," 30 4 the sum of $12 million implied
that a $36 million dollar project was possible. This impression was reinforced by the Egyptian
decision to match the US contribution with its own $12 Million.
301 Harriet Friedmann, "The Political Economy of Food: The rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food Order." in
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88 Supplement: Marxist Inquiries: Studies of Labor, class, and States (1982), S251. For a
contextualization of American Food Aid in worldwide context, see Michael Wallerstein, Food for War - Food for Peace: United
States Food Aid in a Global Context (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980.)
302 "Public Law 480: "Better than a Bomber," Middle East Report Mar-Apr 1987 , 25.
303 JF Kennedy, Strategy of Peace, 217-219, cited in Douglas Little, "The New frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab
Nationalism, Journal of American History 75/2 (Sep 1988), 501-527.
304 Note from Brew, Memorandum from a Phone Call from Washington, Lois Haase, Nov 29, 1960.
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The trouble with the link between domestic politics and international aid is that it subjected
counterpart funds both to being "requested" by the receiving country and being "appropriated" by
Congress. However public Kennedy's pledge, it was not binding to congress, and the extent to which
these contributions were approved largely depended on a perceived political climate of the moment.
By the time Unesco archaeologists went to request the funds in Congress, the climate of cooperation
between Nasser and US had soured. The archaeologists approached a hostile Congress twice, and
were twice confronted with a refusal to appropriate the funds.
The first time that the archaeologists approached congress, they made the very simple
argument that PL 480 funds were accumulating disproportionately in Egypt, and that these funds "in
excess" of US needs presented a significant risk of devaluation, especially in light of mounting
tensions with Nasser.30s When John Wilson testified to the Senate that "these funds exist there with
the problem of what the disposal of them might be," he paraphrased Bataille's famous encapsulation
of the Marshall Plan: "Le problkme se pose de la depense de I'excedent."3 06 Kennedy's pledge itself made this
excess" apparent:
The US contribution can be in the form of US-owned Egyptian currency generated under
PL 480. The total of these contributions recommended below can be met from the
portion of these currencies available for U.S. use which is determined to be in excess of
U.S. prospective requirements.30 7
In private, the archaeologists saw this threat of excessive accumulation as an opportunity: "threat of
devaluation.... is a good argument for people who would not otherwise be interested in a cultural
matter." 308 In front of Congress, they presented culture as a safe, "non-controversial" mode of
expenditure: "It cannot be called cultural politics to use our surplus funds for this cultural
purpose." 309 Certainly the excess of surplus made US politicians nervous as it created an imbalance in
the gifting patterns between US and UAR. By 1961 a rumor circulated amongst archaeologists that
"the appropriations committee is seeking good usage of the PL 480 funds." To the "surplus" value
of the imported wheat was now added the "excess" value of the aid.
30s Historians today see the 1960s as a moment when the problem of 'Excess funds" became apparent: "Over time, the
local-currency provisions of the large PL 480 sales to Egypt created a problem. ... Proceeds from local-currency sale were
placed into a special account for the use of the local government. However, in Egypt local currency accounts became
very large, leading congress to become concerned about the uses of this 'Excess currency.' The presence of such excess-
currency countries eventually led Congress to substitute long-term dollar-credit sales for the use of local currency." Lisa
Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton: PU Press, 2000), 142.
306 Bataille, Ibid.
307 As Kennedy wrote in his letter, "The US contribution can be in the form of US-owned Egyptian currency generated
under PL 480." Kennedy appeal, PR (61) 5, page 2.
308 Brew Memorandum to the Executive Committee, 19 Sep, 1961. Brew 9/1086f.
309 Mutual Security Act of 1960, 576.
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Yet congressional skepticism of the proposed use of funds in Egypt was supported by
ignorance of the role of Unesco as a channel for international action, and familiarity, in contrast,
with a tradition of personal or corporate philanthropy. Kennedy's pledge had been secured largely
through inter-personal diplomacy: enlisting the first lady to pressure Kennedy on his "cultural"
interests, leveraging his personal relationship with Nasser. Private diplomacy at the highest level had
also been necessary to negotiate an assurance from Nasser that he would accept the use of the funds.
As Brew wrote, "we are greatly handicapped in seeking funds from the Federal Government by the
fact that the Egyptians themselves do not request them."310 Thus the Swiss-born Prince Saruddin Aga
Khan had served as an mediator. Similarly, US archaeologists were encouraged to appear in Congress
as private citizens, rather than representatives of institutions, organizations or committees, to avoid
the impression of special interests.31 Yet this recourse to personal diplomacy backfired: some
expressed distaste for the particular individuals involved, and most suggested, essentially, that private
funds should be sought for the salvage rather than government expenditure.
After this first Congressional refusal to appropriate funds in September 1961, the
archaeologists inverted their strategy. They embarked on a national publicity campaign to argue that
monuments-salvage would succeed where the "food for peace" had failed: by rendering visible
America's influence in Egypt. It was no longer devaluation, but recuperation that was the major
threat, as they played on growing fears that food aid to Egypt went "unsung," and that Nasser was
reaping the public-relations benefit that properly belonged to the US. Indeed "food for peace" had
been publicized as "better than a bomber" (again echoing Bataille, "The American economy is in
fact the greatest explosive mass the world has ever known.") 312 because by "speaking the language
of food" American surpluses won the allegiance of foreign populations by feeding them. But as
visiting American politicians found, most Egyptians were convinced that the wheat came from
310 Much of 1962 was spent trying to find a way for Egypt to "ask" for the funds. "Every year the Egyptians make
requests for us of part of the blocked currency under various categories. One of these categories does not even need the
approval of Congress. What is needed, however, is an expression of their wishes and a high priority for Abu Simbel by
the Egyptian Government. This we never had. Last April I went into this very thoroughly with Akasha during an hour's
session in his office. I pointed out exactly the various moves that would facilitate the matter, if made by the Egyptian
Government. Nothing came of it." Letter from Brew to Mortimer Wheeler. 27 Dec, 1962. Brew 10/54d.
311 Reni Maheu himself suggested to the Executive Committee that "a campaign in the private sector" be started,
although he did so only in "confidentially," at a meeting in October 1961: "The third and last point raised by Maheu
was the matter of starting a campaign in the private sector. M. Maheu confidentially suggested that a formal
organization for the Nubian Committee was needed. To foster such a move M. Maheu promised to endow the newly
chartered committee with a quasi-official Unesco status and even offered to make a token financial contribution for its
support." US National Committee, Minutes of Meeting of Executive Commnunittee, (October 14, 1961). Brew Archives, 9/1086e.
312 Bataille, "The Marshall Plan," 171.
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Nasser-worse yet, from the Aswan High Dam.313 In contrast, the archaeologists argued that the
Kennedy pledge had already garnered enough publicity abroad, including in Egypt, that the US was
already speaking the language of monuments. In personal letters to senators and congressmen,
archaeologists argued that to retract the funds would be perceived as a tragic repetition of the Aswan
Dam fiasco.
Unesco's archaeologists argued that monuments-especially large monuments like Abu
Simbel-could accomplish what no wheat could: visibility. Yet by the time these arguments were
made the second time, in 1963, Egyptian-Soviet friendship had escalated to symbolic levels, as
evidenced by Khrushchev's visit to the Dam. Not wanting to monumentalize its aid to a country over
which it evidently had no political control, the US Congress refused a second time to appropriate the
funds. Paradoxically, this second refusal marks a failure of the food-for-peace program and the
success of the archaeologists' symbolic conversion: the archaeologists had successfully convinced the
senators that contributing to the campaign would constitute a significant symbolic gesture-and this
is precisely why the senators refused to do so.
Faced with this second failure, in May 1964, to align political symbolism with economic
opportunity, the State Department resolved to take matter out of Congress and to offer to appropriate
the funds by "appropriation waiver authority," in a process where "no vote was necessary." PL 480
funds could be made available to the State Department directly without any negotiation "for specific
purposes-in this case economic support." The only requirement was for the project to be reviewed
by the US Agency of International Development (USAID), which certified that funds devoted to Abu
Simbel would contribute to the idea of "balanced economic development."314 Two lessons can be
drawn from this development. First, that in this case, the "balance" of development was provided by
tourism: it was ultimately argued that "the US should be associated with the preservation of the
temples which not only have great cultural interest, but will contribute to the economic development
of the UAR through increased tourism.""3 Secondly, that the channel that was thereby opened to
make the funds available was closed off to re-use as soon as it was opened at all. Thus a final
"exception" was made in the appropriation:
While the committee feels that the US should be associated with the preservation of
these temples, which not only have great cultural interest, but will contribute to the
313 Jean-Jacques Dethier and Kathy Funk, "The Language of PL 480 in Egypt," Middle East Report 145, The Struggle For Food
(Mar-Apr 1978) 22-28.
314 Letter July 24, 1962, Brew 10/54d.
31s Letter from Brew to Wilson, 14 Aug 1964. Brew 10/54a. For a brief theorization of the role of tourism in the
Middle East in the 2 0 th Century, see Robert Vitalis, "The Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery" in Middle
East Report, 196, Tourism and the Business of Pleasure (Sep- Oct 1995), 2-7. For cultural criticism on the contemporary effects
of this history, see Rami Farouk Daher, Tourism in the Middle East (Buffalo: Channel View, 2007).
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economic development of the UAR through increased tourism, it does not believe that
an appropriation, as such, is necessary under the circumstances.
The Committee recommends that the US contribution be funded through a Public Law
480, Title I, 104 (c) grant from the appropriate portion of the currencies available as the
result of the sale of agricultural commodities to the UAR under this title. The state
department has indicated the feasibility of making the contribution in this manner.
While recommending this method of financing this particular instance, the Committee
emphasizes that, in general, it disapproves of the use of the appropriations waiver
authority in the making of outright grants, which authority, in the past, has been
misused.316
This use of funds for a cultural purpose was only "a particular instance," not the basis for a new age
of cultural politics. The success of the Abu Simbel appropriation was dependent, much like the rest
of the campaign, on allowing cultural value to be realized in temporary and exception conditions,
while publicized as fulfilling apparently permanent and normative goals.
This "big fight" therefore opened two channels of exchange between the US and the UAR,
both designed to bypass tensions in their diplomatic relations. The first channel was secret; it allowed
economic aid to continue to flow from the US to the UAR despite international tensions; here it was
the uniqueness of the economic opportunity that helped the salvage to occur. The second channel
was public; it mobilized "international public opinion" in favor of the salvage in both countries; here
it was the reproducible anonymity of the temples that was foregrounded.
V. Abu Simbel and the birth of International Style preservation
The French "dam" and Italian "lifting" schemes
Between 1959 and 1963 over ten schemes for saving Abu Simbel were proposed to Unesco;
only four earned the status of an official proposal worthy of expert evaluation, but all were evaluated
according to the criterion of "integrity." As a norm for international preservation, integrity implied
that the value of monuments stemmed from their relation to their site, but allowed monuments to be
moved while retaining this value. 317 As Unesco historian Save-Sodeberg has noted, despite the
316 Minutes of the Senate Subcommittee, Cited in a letter from Wilson to Brew, August 14, 1964. Brew 10/54a.
317 Upon visiting the temples during the Nubian cruise the experts unanimously agreed that "no effort must be sparedto
salvage this complex in its integrity."55 EX/7 Annexe I, page 6. "Les 2 temples d'Abou Simbel constituent un
complexe monumental de la plus haute importance, dans un site admirable. Les experts sont unanimes a considfrer que
s disparition serait une perte irreparable pour le patrimoine culturel de l'humanit&. En consequence, ils estiment que rien
ne doit ktre nigligi pour sauvegarder cet ensemble dans son integrite."
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prominence of this term in the Abu Simbel debates, it is not until 1968, when the cast of experts
reconvened for the salvage of Philae, that this concept of "integrity" was officially defined:
By the phrase integrity of monuments is meant the preservation of the original geographic,
architectural and cultural position and ambiance of the monument including not only the
position of various buildings vis-a-vis each other, but also their original relationship
with surrounding physiographic and cultural features in the area.318
What was meant by "integrity," in other words, was a matrix of relationships between site and
monument. It is precisely because the bond between monument and context was to be broken, that
this bond was elevated into a principle. Each scheme for salvaging Abu Simbel was understood as a
proposal for how best to sever this "integral" bond, and how to reconstruct it with "integrity."
This passage from the "integration" of objects to the "integrity" of actions implied crucial
ethical overtones. In a neat application of the aesthetics of process, engineering was invoked to
transform an ontological problem (on the value of the object) into a deontological dilemma (on the
value of action). While most teams included architects, the competition unfolded undoubtedly as an
engineering event-as evidenced, for instance, by the fact that each proposal began with a critique of
its predecessors. Even the first scheme commissioned began with an enumeration of the four options
outlined by the Executive Committee on its Nubian cruise, and presented the solution as a
comparative "choice.""3 9 Thus in contrast to the Aswan Dam, Unesco's salvage project followed the
'decision-making' protocol set for engineering projects by development institutions. One of the
consequences of this engineering procedure is that each scheme cumulatively contributed to the final
solution, even if it was harshly judged when evaluated in itself.
Each national team was also an experiment in collaboration, and all projected a ecumenical
role onto the figure of the engineer: the ethical integrity of the engineer would substitute for the
material integrity of the temple. Many of the hybrid modes of architectural authorship that were
later codified by postwar architecture and engineering avant-gardes were prefigured here: from the
poetic figure of the architect-engineer with a structural vision (Italy's Riccardo Morandi with
conservationist Piero Gazzola), to the heroic technocrats of territorial management (France's Coyne
& Belier, with colonial urbanist Albert Laprade); from the multivalent consortia of infrastructural
318 Save-S6deberg, 100. UNESCO/SNUBIA 15 (1968), 15.
319 These were: - Lifting the temples and surrounding rocks above the levels of the waters;
- Construction of a concrete dam in front of each temple;
- Construction of a vaulted concrete dam, protecting the temples from up close
- Construction of a rock-fill earth dam, approximately 700 meters wide, in such a manner that the
rock mounds in which the temples have been hewn are respected in their totality. The distance between
the facade of the great temple and the crest of the dam would be around 300 meters.
55 EX/7 Annexe 1: "RMunion d'Experts Intemationaux pour la sauvegarde des sites et monuments de Nubie menaces,"
Le Caire, 1-11 -Octobre 1959, "Rapport", 6.
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development (Sweden's VBB and Italy's Italconsult), to the innovators who launched engineering's
own international avant-garde (Britain's Ove Arup, led by Ted Happold, with architects Drew & Fry).
While these collaborations clearly can be inserted in the emergence of a trans-national engineering
profession, one should not underestimate the effect of the "national" affiliation under which these
teams were convened, and the effect of their sponsorship by state or para-state institutions. These
teams, especially those lacking a preservationist, were united by unspoken assumptions about
restoration. Insofar as all these teams contributed to the definition of an international "integrity"
upon which Unesco would build its "international style" of preservation, they also served as carriers
of national conventions inherited from the 19 th century.
The first scheme to be officially adopted by Unesco was proposed by the French engineering
firm of Coyne et Bellier: to preserve the temples in situ by building a rock-fill dam-in some ways a
copy of the Aswan High Dam-in front of the temples. (fig 4.39) The scheme had been conceived
during the Nubian cruise by French engineer, and former president of the International Commission
for High Dams, Andre Coyne (1891-1960).320 In a massive, two-volume Report submitted to Unesco,
Coyne & Bellier (C&B) explicated all the technical, financial and aesthetic aspects, proposing a
straightforward application of the "aesthetics of process" to the entire Nubian environment: by re-
integrating Abu Simbel into its new settings by using the same technologies that had radically
transformed the site in the first place.
The actual design of the dam was left to French architect Albert Laprade (1893-1978), who
explicated his proposal in a paragraph titled "Aesthetics." The "extraordinary harmony" of the site,
Laprade argued, could never be "reconstituted by artifice" but should rather be "magnified and
maintained" in an "enclave", albeit in "reduced scale and more limited horizon." The new dam, in
other words, was not to be an "additional monument" but rather a "jewel-case" for the existing
temples. 32 1 What was "preserved" in this scheme was a set of relationship between the orientation of
the sun, the arrival by water, and the Nubian hillside. In order to retain the effect of the sun rising on
the temples, a broad space was left in front of the temples, and "in order to maintain the perspective
320 Coyne was instrumental in modernizing France's dam-building practices in a moment when hydro-electricity
became central to the French energy policy. The encyclopedic Art de 'IngSnieur has him learning the lessons of the TVA
and introducing thinner concrete-vaulted dams to France. Coyne built 61 dams in France and 23 abroad. A. Picon, ed.,
L'art de I'ingrnieur, 141-142. The Commission Internationale des Grands Barrages (CIGB) was created in 1928, as part of the
Conf6rence mondiale de l'inergie (CME/WPC). For Coyne's primary invention, the "ski-jump" dam section, see A.
Coyne, "Quelques Nouveautis dans la structure des barrages et usines hydro-ilectriques," Techniques et architectures 6
(1946) 193-196. At the Nubian meeting Coyne was represented by his colleague Georges Post.
32' Albert Laprade, "Esth6tique," Bureau d'etudes Andr6 Coyne et Jean Bellier, Avant-Projet des Ouvrages de Protection des Temples
d'Abou Simbel. Vol. 1: Rapport. (Paris: 1960), 1,2-3.
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of the arrival by boat" this space would be filled with a shallow pool of water. Similarly, it was in
order to "melt [fondre] the work into the landscape" that Laprade proposed making the dam an ellipse
rather than a circle, since "the circular form ... would have been too majestic." He also purposely
"avoided any axis of symmetry" which would have "diverted onto the amphitheater of the dam the
attention that should be directed at the temples." Both of these choices were explained in terms of
aesthetic integration:
Because of the unique aesthetic requirements, enough space must be left in front of the
temples for visitors to be able to view them in their natural perspective and the lines and
apperance of the dam bust be integrated with the monuments and their surroundings."
As Laprade's perspective view showed, not a single element was left out of the choreography:
visitors, slowly descending towards the temples along a diagonal path, would theatrically re-create
the elemental performance of man, earth, sun, wind and water that had always defined the site.
It is clear that Laprade felt no anxiety in leaving a legible human gesture in the desert sand-
as long as it was a gesture aesthetically continuous with the original setting. As an academic architect
("the last grand architect-planner graduate of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts" according to one
encyclopedia), Laprade used his own hand to mediate between building and site. 323 But the resulting
scheme can also be understood as a version of the practice of "restoration", as it had been defined by
Viollet le Duc: the act of "re-instating a monument in a condition of completeness which might
have never existed at any given time." 324 Indeed all of Laprade's restoration work can be understood
as adapting this preservationist creed to the urban and colonial scales of Beaux-Arts planning. His
theory of vernacular Moroccan architecture, elaborated in pattern-books like the 1924 Le Jardin et la
maison arabes au Maroc and in designs like the 1917 Nouvelle Ville Indiggne, was based on a design system as
"completely" invented as it was "rationally" derived from a rigorous stylistic analysis.
Similarly, at Abu Simbel, Laprade performed what can only be called a stylistic analysis of
the site-studying "the materials, the forms, even the colors, against which the temples have stood
for thirty centuries"--in order to insert his own hand into this timeless landscape, producing a dam
with an "almost natural appearance, [un aspect presque naturel]."
Laprade was undoubtedly invited to collaborate with Coyne & Bellier because of his double
experience, working as an urban planner in North Africa, and designing dams in France. As
Gwendolyn Wright has noted, Laprade saw Arab constructive traditions as effectively "existing out
322 II C/PRG/9 Add.I Annex I: "Summary of the Preliminary Design Prepared by Coyne et Bellier, consulting
engineers, for the protection of the Abu Simbel temples."
323 Elizabeth McLane, "Laprade, Albert," 610.
324 Viollet-le-Duc, "On restoration" Trans. Charles Wethered, (London: Sampson, Low, Marttson, Low and Sparce,
1875).
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of time" (much as Viollet le Duc's gothic masons were idealized agents of constructive truths, rather
than real historical figures.)"32 Wright concludes that "despite good intentions" Laprade only
produced "an architecture of pastiche." Laprade's involvement in the Abu Simbel project shows that
the collaborative "harmony" he read in medieval building traditions fed both his appetite for
pastiche forms and for modern-day collaborations. Whether in North African vernaculars or in the
"fagade systems" of Parisian old quarters, Laprade's interest in vernacular forms was only one facet
of a much larger vision for the future: the architectural "integration" of France. 326 This would
include reviving its regional traditions, marrying its landscapes with industrial forms and-most
crucially-re-uniting its long-separated architectural and engineering professions.32 7 It is in order to
usher a new age of architectural heroism that Laprade sought a new type of architectural
collaborations. In 195 7 he wrote of a "veritable renaissance of the aesthetic sense in the world of
engineers," and gave Andrei Coyne a place of honor in his roster of examples.328 In other words, in
participating in projects like the Abu Simbel salvage, Laprade was trying to hoist himself, and the
whole French architectural profession, "out of time." He even invoked Egypt as a model, recalling
that "in the marvelous history of Egypt one out of five men who were deified were architects." 32 9
Thus the very form of this Coyne-Laprade partnership was designed to follow in the heroic footsteps
of ancient engineers.
The technical portions of C&B's report echoed Laprade's elemental understanding of
"integrity," by presenting the choice of a rock-fill dam (over a more tight-fitting, arcuated, concrete
solution) as a concession to the "natural harmony" of the site. Coyne et Bellier were France's
325 Wright cites from Laprade's Croquis: Portugal, Espagne, Maroc: "Up to 1909, custom (clad) had not changed since the
fifteenth century. Mason, sculptor, carpenter, ironworker, each enjoyed himself on his own without breaking the
harmony among them, so much had traditions remained stable in these countries situated outside the grand currents of
Europe." Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), 113.
326 Laprade gave an impassioned defense of these old quarters in his contribution to the "Pour ou Contre?" series,
against Pierre Dufau's arguments "for" urban renewal. Albert Laprade & Pierre Dufau, Pour ou Contre la D6molition de Paris?
(Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1967). This defense did not prevent him from building a much-reviled administrative
building on the Ile St Louis, despite having argued for "modesty" and "sensibility." See Laprade, "Amenagement des
quartiers historiques," Techniques et Architectures and "Plaidoyer pour la sensibiliti et la modestie," L'Art sacre (1948), 11-
13.
327 For Laprade's dam designs, see "Les arts et la technique dans la vie moderne," in Maurice Culot, Albert Laprade:
Architecte, jardinier, urbaniste, dessinateur, serviteur du patrimoine (Paris: Norma, 2007), 262-292. The author mentions the Abu
Simbel scheme in passing (286) calling it "the most just and elegant of the solutions", but only in order to make the
collaboration into a cautionary tale about the decline of both Laprade and Coyne's careers. Coyne died in 1960, a few
months after the catastrophic failure of his dam at Malpasset, which ruined his international reputation and demoralized
him, apparently to death. Citing from Laprade's eulogy, the authors argue that Laprade's last work, the Pr6fecture de
Paris, was a career-canceling failure on par with Coyne's Malpasset dam.
328 Albert Laprade, "Les Architectes et les Grands Travaux Publics," in Laprade, Les Architectes (Paris: SADG, 1957).
Originally published in Bulletin mensuel d'informations de la SADG 9 (Dec 1954).
329 Albert Laprade, "Notes sur un Congres," in Les Architectes v. I, 51-53
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foremost dam-builders, primary beneficiaries of the mid-century "French infatuation with hydro-
electricity" and pioneers in the nationalization of its electric power and the design of thin-shell
concrete dams.330 In Nubia, however, they drew the three alternatives and concluded that a "classic
design" for an earth dam was most suitable, since it allowed a larger perimeter around the temples.
To this "classic design" they added two other hydraulic systems designed to "cut off any path for
water" to get to the temples. Indeed, despite the dam water was to infiltrate the rock at any level
below that of the reservoir lake. With a "very complex system of injection" an underground "clay
curtain" around the temples would be created, projecting the crest of the dam deep into the ground,
and continuing beyond the lake with a curve mirroring the ellipse in the back the temples. Yet even
this scrim was not sufficient to keep out any seepage: it would only "reduce the water flow to
pumpable levels." 331 The water would be to be collected in drainage galleries, and funneled to a
pumping station at the back of the site. The elaborate nature of this hydrological scheme was used in
the report further to legitimize the elliptical design as aesthetically and hydrologically "integrated"
into the site: providing enough space for a monumental approach in front of the temples, and enough
space for the pumping station to be hidden from view in the back of the temples. (fig 4.40-42)
Yet it is within this technological sophistication that the fault of the scheme lay. The
architectural legibility of the dam could not conceal its procedural difficulties as an engineering
proposal. In fact, Although the C&B report was the first document to expose to the Unesco
committee the nature of the problem, highlighting that the problems of infiltration, of deposits, and
salination would not be solved by a dam alone. As Jo Brew soon realized, "unfortunately, dams are
made to go across streams not to protect something on the side of the stream."' "3 The document
made clear to Unesco's expert committees how radically the Aswan Dam was going to transform
the material ecology of Nubia, whether or not its monuments would be flooded. The reason for
preferring the earth dam as a solution -that it "respected the extraordinary harmony between the
elements of this unique site"--had disappeared, since the Asawn Dam was going to throw off the
"elemental" balance of the Nile Valley altogether. Instead it was the pumping station that would do
most of the work of "preservation." Accordingly, out of the total $80M cost, the report estimated
330 See Robert L. Frost, Alternating Currents: Nationalized Power in France, 1946-1970 (Ithaca: Cornell, 1970) and Michel Vilain,
La Politique de l'Energie en France de la Second Guerre Mondiale d 1'Horizon 1985 (Paris: Cujas, 1969).
331 "Un tel 6cran r6duira les venues d'eau dans l'enceinte a des d6bits ais6ment pompables." In "Consid6rations
Techniques," Coyne et Bellier, Op.Cit., 1,2-7.
332 Letter from Brew to Ralph T. Barney (20 Dec 1962). Brew 10/54a.
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"annual maintenance" at 300,000 $/year. This sum "appalled" Unesco and UAR officials alike.
Faced with this prospect of perpetual upkeep, they commissioned an alternative study.333
Unesco commissioned a study of an Italian scheme which had always existed as an
unofficial alternative to the C&B proposal: to "lift the temples and surrounding rocks above the level
of the waters," by cutting each temple loose from the rock, and elevating the two massive monoliths
hydraulically, and reconstituting surrounding beach and hillside on the new plateau.334 (fig 4.35) This
scheme, known as the "Gazzola Plan," had been considered during the Nubian cruise but set aside,
for two reasons. First, any "cutting" appeared, against in situ solutions, to be a compromise of "the
integrity of the site and its monuments." Second, the technologies that Gazzola relied on were too
experimental, requiring "the adoption of apparatus and techniques ... which have not yet been
confirmed by experience, that is to say, which cannot entirely eliminate the risk of serious damage
to the temples." 33 The Gazzola plan, in short, was too risky. It is only after realizing that the C&B
scheme distributed risk over time instead, that the committee decided to grant the Gazzola plan official
status.
The Gazzola Plan was the first scheme to propose "liberating" any part of the temples from
the mountain: the monument was now to be understood as a building-with a fagade, an interior, a
structure, and a site. In contrast to the stylistic "completion" that motivated the French scheme,
Gazzola equated integrity with "wholeness." To allow severing the temples from their hill, Gazzola
claimed his scheme would "preserve the integrity of the monument by lifting it whole." 336 In so
doing Gazzola revealed his conceptual ties to an Italian tradition which focused, as articulated by its
main promoter Cesare Brandi in his 1963 Teoria dd Restauro, on "restoring the potential oneness of the
work of art," by focusing on its "material life." The difference between Italian "oneness" and
French "completion" is that while Laprade, following Viollet-le-Duc, posited a timeless state "that
might never have existed in history," Brandi defined restoration as a moment in time: "the
methodological moment in which the work of art is appreciated in its material form and in its
333 "Apparently everyone has been appalled by the Coyne and Bellier estimate of annual maintenance costs in
connection with their dam. I hope that you will be able to impress on the Egyptians and everyone else that there will
be an annual maintenance cost whatever is done and there is little point in doing anything unless the UAR Government
is prepared to take proper care of the site afterwards." Letter from Brew to White, Dec 22, 1960. Brew 10/54a.
334 See a letter on December 1950 from Wilson to Rainey. "Until the other day I understand there was no formal
alternative to the coffer dam around the temples, so that the Gazzola Plan and others could receive no official
recognition. Only the Coyne-Bellier report has been authorized. Now the Paris group wants to study the Gazzola plan so
that Unesco may give it some official recognition." Brew 10/54a.
33 "Annex VI: Safeguard of Abu Simbel, Report of the Sub-Committee," Unesco/SN/EXP/SR, 8.
336 Gazzola Report, 32.
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historical and aesthetic duality, with a point of view to transmitting it to the future." Restoration, in
other words, was a method, a re-enactment of value. "'
Insofar as Gazzola invoked it to sever the temples from their site, it is important to note that
Brandi's "method" emerged from a tradition of painting conservation, which made distinctions
better suited to paintings and statues than buildings, and least of all to hybrid typologies like
monolithic rock-hewn temples.338 Brandi proposed an "in-depth examination of the relationship
between matter and the work of art," but the first step in this investigation was to make a distinction
between "structure" and "appearance" [struttura e aspetto]:
The material used in a work of art carries the message of the image and it does so in two
ways which can be defined as structure and appearance. ... Together they represent the two
functions of material in a work of art and normally one does not contradict the other,
although conflict is still possible. Such conflict is usually in the contrast between the
aesthetic case and the historical case, and in the end appearance will override structure, where
they cannot otherwise be reconciled." 9
Brandi was careful to give both literal and figurative examples of a severance between "structure and
appearance" (a canvas whose wooden support has rotten, a collapsed building whose interior plan
structure can be modified to better withstand future earthquakes) but even his attempt to distinguish
between the "historic" nature of structure and the "aesthetic" qualities of appearance reveal a
distinctly classicizing architectural sensibility.
Where did the "structure" of Abu Simbel begin and its "appearance" end? What hierarchy
would they be subjected to? Perhaps the best evidence that the Gazzola Plan for Abu Simbel was one
where "appearance overrides structure" is that, while the C&B scheme was the official choice,
Gazzola had been put in charge of the mission to "consolidate the facade" of the temples.340 Thus in
his 1960 report, Gazzola removed his suggestion to "lift" the temples, but added a detailed project
337 Brandi, "The Concept of Restoration, in A Theory of Restoration, trans. Cythia Rockwell, (Rome: Nardini/ Istituto
Centrale per il Restauro, 2005), 52. In accordance to this emphasis on action, Brandi added guidelines of behavior to
this objective definition, in the form of two principles. First, that "only the material form of the work of art is
restored," and secondly, "Restoration should aim to re-establish the potential oneness of the work of art, as long as this
is possible without committing artistic or historical forgery, and without erasing every trace of the passage through
time of the work of art."
338 Elsewhere Brandi elaborated on the applicability of these principles to architectural monuments, making of "rock-
cut" monuments a special case of monument which is "indissolubly bound to a place." Brandi, "Principle for the
Restoration of Monuments," Theory of Restoration, 94.
339 Cesare Brandi, "The Material of a Work of Art," A Theory of Restoration, 52.
340 This Group of Experts on the Consolidation of the Fagades and Interiors of the Abu Simbel temples and the Reconstitution of the Site was
composed of Harold Plenderleith, Dircecto or ICCROM, Cesare Brandi, Paul Coremans, director of the Institut Royal du
Patrimoine Artistique in Belgium, swiss architect William Dunkel, Ernst Habetha of the Bundesanstalt ffir
Bodenforschung, and Zaky Iskander, Director of the Chemical Laboratory of the Cairo Antiquities service (UAR), with
Piero Gazzola and Paolo Mora, principal restorer of the Istituto Centrale del Restauro. Brandi had been involved in other
aspects of the campaign, as well, notably the 1958 mission to restore the wall-paintings in the tomb of Nefertiti.
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for consolidating their "facades.""' By the time the Italian scheme had been adopted in 1961, a
whole "Group of experts" had been formed around the problem, which included Brandi himself, in
addition to Gazzola and Plenderleith. Furthermore, the group's mission of "consolidating the facades
of the temples" had been complemented with that of "reconstructing the site." This division of tasks
twice detached the monolithic "structure" of rock from its "appearance": first from its sculpted
surfaces, and then from its surrounding desert.342
This architectonic division between "structure" and "facade," reveals Gazzola's interpretation
of Abu Simbel as a monument to be entirely architectural: the temples would remain monolithic as
long as the stone block cut around them was large enough to deny it any architectural legibility
except as a block. In this sense, Gazzola's plan for Abu Simbel was consistent with the
recommendations he made for other Nubian temples, particularly in the principle that "each stone
has absolute value." His first proposal included a schematic design for a horizontal concrete platform
poured directly under the temples. (fig 4.43) As his proposal was refined into a real engineering
proposal in the Italconsult report, the platform had transformed into a concrete "box," but the size
and shape of this "block" remained a constant. The sequence of works proposed by the Italian group
therefore described a distinction between "block," "box", and "rock":
Preliminary works
Removing the rock above the temple
Cutting off the block from the rest of the surrounding material
Reinforcing the block by a strong ferro-concrete structure
Positioning the jacks below the block so obtained.
Lifting the block and simultaneous construction of supporting pillars;
Reconstructing the environment. 34
In other words, the Gazzola/Italconsult proposal was to turn Abu Simbel into a "block" of stone
which could be treated with "absolute value."
Gazzola's fixation on the "sanctity of the stone" at Abu Simbel was a logical sequel to his
career as a preservationist, particularly as an expert in stone-by-stone medieval reconstructions. His
most famous achievement as superintendent of Antiquities in Verona, for example, was the
reconstruction of the Ponte Pietra and the Ponte Castelvecchio-two Veronese bridges which had
been shelled by retreating German troops in 1945. Here Gazzola ensured that the "absolute value of
341 Gazzola "Project..." 1960, 22.
342 UNESCO Nubia/2 CE/8 "Meeting of a Group of Experts on the Consolidation of the Facades and interior of the
Abu Simbel Temples and the Reconstitution of the Site: Report of the Group." (30 Mar 1962), 6-7. The
recommendations of this committee steered away from anything perceived as "architectural" ("architectural shapes are
to be avoided.") therefore reinforcing that while the work of this "fagade committee" was highly specialized, the rock
itself was determined by the architectural criteria that Gazzola had built into his plan.
343 Italconsult Report, 6.
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each stone" was re-enacted in the salvage process: each stone was recovered, counted, numbered,
drawn, cast in plaster (or, when missing, substituted by a stone discretely marked as "new"), and
ultimately re-integrated in a bridge structure, re-constituted with medieval bridge-building
techniques. 4 (fig 4.44) These projects effectively demonstrate the orthodoxy that arose when
Brandi's theory of restoration was applied at an architectural scale, legitimizing "identical"
reconstruction and encouraging a rationalist view of architecture where "structure" and
"appearance" can only be one and the same.
In contrast to the medieval bridges of Verona, the block of Abu Simbel could never be "re-
integrated" into its context. This is no small point. Brandi's theorization of the "material" of art was
problematic in the case of Abu Simbel, because this distinction between "structure" and
"appearance" was accompanied by another distinction between human "history" and everything
else:
It is a common misapprehension that un-quarried marble is no different to marble that
has been worked into a statue. (This could be called the illusion of immanence.")
Whereas unquarried marble has only its physical makeup, the marble in a statue has
undergone radical transformation to become the vehicle of an image. In doing so it has
become a part of history thanks to the work of a human hands, and a chasm has opened
between its existence as calcium carbonate and its existence as an image. 345
Brandi had intended to shatter what he called "the illusion of immanence." Yet in discrediting one
metaphysics, Brandi had invented another: while no organic evolutive value could be attributed to
the "unquarried stone", the transcendent power of human hands allowed materials to "enter
history." Clearly at Abu Simbel the line between 'quarried and unquarried' was unclear. In addition,
the "vehicles" that had allowed Nubia to "enter history" stretched sometimes as far as the Sudan. By
the standards of Brandi's own theory, "cutting off the block" from the rock was equivalent to
deciding what belongs in "history" and what does not.
It is by adapting Gazzola's Brandian scheme into an engineering proposal that the Italian
engineering team re-invented the criterion of "integrity" in terms of mechanical behavior. The team
344 Gazzola recounted the reconstruction of the Ponte Pietra in his 1963 Ponte Pietra (Firenze: Leo Olschki, 1963), of
which the first volume was devoted to all the stone bridges of Verona, while the second volume was devoted to the
reconstruction. For the Ponte Castelvecchio, see Egizio Nichelli, "Ponte di Castelvecchio a Verona: Il Cantiere di
restauro di Piero Gazzola" in Architettura e Restauro: Esempi di Restauro eseQuiti nel dologuerra (ed Carlo Perogalli (Milaon: G6rlich,
1955), 90-104.
345 Brandi: "It is a common misapprehension that un-quarried marble is no different to marble that has been worked
into a statue. (This could be called the illusion of immanence.") Whereas unquarried marble has only its physical
makeup, the marble in a statue has undergone radical transformation to become the vehicle of an image. In doing so it
has become a part of history thanks to the work of a human hands, and a chasm has opened between its existence as
calcium carbonate and its existence as an image." Brandi, "The material of a work of art," Theory of Restoration, 53.
453
Lucia Allais
differed from the French team in that the engineers were bridge-builders, and bridge-building
played in Italy the role that dam-building did in France. The proposal was overseen by Italconsult, a
consultancy group created in 1957 to channel Italian expertise and influence into the Third World,
and headed by industrialist, former Fiat president, and soon-to-be Club of Rome founder, Aurelio
Peccei. Peccei enlisted Paolo Lodigiani, the engineer at the head of one if Italy's largest construction
companies, to compile the report, under the direction of two other engineers: Gustavo Colonetti, a
mathematician-engineer with a theory of elasticity, and Riccardo Morandi, an engineer-architect
with a laboratory devoted to pre-stressed concrete. Gazzola and Colonetti were concerned with
concrete as a material that defied any Brandian reduction into 'structure' and 'appearance.' At the
core of the Italconsult team, then, was a theory of materials not as inert masses but as rich
speculative universes.
Whereas Brandi declared all material passive until a human hand transformed it, the
Italconsult team subscribed to post-Galilean view mechanics, where, in the words of Edoardo
Benvenuto, inert materials are "idealized elementary machines ... a virtual construction site, frozen
in time." 346 Morandi was interested in preservation as a form of applied research; thus his first major
restoration project, was to consolidate a portion of the Arena of Verona by effectively "pre-stressing"
the Roman structure from within, and letting it stand as an autonomous, free-standing fragment.347
This structural understanding of pre-stressing was, in itself, an inversion of the Brandian hierarchy
where "material" as primary, and "structure" is a function assigned to it. Similiarly, Gustavo
Colonnetti had spent his career developing a pedigree as "an almost perfect synthesis between the
figure of the engineer and the mathematician." Colonnetti's work was focused on finding both a
new theory of elasticity and better techniques of construction, and pre-stressed concrete was his
experimental site of choice because it allowed him to isolate, study, and design the kind of strain that
346 Benvenuto, writing in I'Art de l'inginieur, wrote that after Galileo "chaque ld1ment de la construction fut reconnu
comme le siege d'une machine leimentaire ideale op&rant en son sein. ... En somme, le champ de la construction
sembla se transformer en un chantier virtuel fige. >> Edoardo Benvenuto, "Histoire de la r6sistance des mat6riaux" in
L'Art de l'Ingenieur, 410. He had written this formulation into his 1994 text on restoration, where << architecture becomes
a congealed construction site (cantiere congelato). >> < Restauro Architettonico : I1 Tema Strutturale >. Dialoghi di Restauro 3, (Trento :
Comitato Giuseppe Gerola, 1994). See also Benevuto, Materialismo e Pensiero Scientifico (Milano: Tamburini, 1974).
347 See "Research applied to Specific Restoration Works," in Imbesi, Morandi, Moschini, eds., Riccardo Morandi: Innovazione
Tecnologia Progetto (Roma: Gangemi, 1991), 231 Although the authors see Morandi as making "no attempt to theorize the
problem of restoration" they note that his "interpretation of ancient structures was linked to a historicizing process of
techniques. Morandi basically felt tied to 'the previous stages in excursus of the art of building.' For Morandi's
restoration projects see the recollections of Salvatore d'Agostino, in the same volume, 235-238. See also Giorgio Boaga
and Benito Boni, The Concrete Architecture of Riccardo Morandi (New York: Praeger, 1966) and Lara-Vinca Masini, Riccardo
Morandi (Roma: de Luca, 1974), and
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the classical theory of elasticity could not explain.348 In short, Morandi and Colonnetti saw the
Nubian sandstone-whether naturally sedimented, sculpted into a relief, or carved into a temple-as
a dynamic assemblage waiting to be interacted with.
It was by re-conceiving the material value of Gazzola's block in terms of "elasticity" that
Morandi and Colonnetti allowed it to retain its "integrity" even as it was radically displaced.
Reinforced concrete was crucial to this operation. (fig 43) Colonnetti described the problem of
maintaining the integrity of the temples as two-fold. The first difficulty was "to isolate the block that
contains the temple without disturbing the equilibrium of the stone of which it is made." To solve
this problem, the temples would not abruptly be "cut" from the rock; instead a matrix of vertical
shafts and horizontal tunnels would be dug around the temples, into which a reinforced concrete
would be poured. Once connected, these cast-in-the-rock elements would constitute "an enormous
and extremely resistant box [un resistantissimo cassone], capable of containing the block and of
maintaining it in its current state of internal equilibrium when its connections with the surrounding
hillside would be severed." In other words, the monumental context of the block was temporarily
replaced by a tight-fitting concrete net, whose "elastic" value was continuous with that of the
sandstone cliff.
The second major difficulty was to maintain this elastic equilibrium during lifting, applying
external pressures to this assemblage without "ever knowing the distribution of loads on the base of
the concrete box." Colonnetti conceded that monolithic architecture could never be described by a
precise mathematical model: "the non-homogeneity of the rock, the fissuring that has been
produced in the past, the presence of a large cavity constituting the temples-all of this certainly
makes for a very irregular distribution of loads, but this distribution cannot be computed, even very
approximately." In order to compensate for this, Colonetti recommended that the jacks operate by
incremental distance, rather than dispensing a given force. Thus a measuring system would be built
into the hydraulic grid, to monitor the displacement of each point as it was being produced, and
interrupt the lifting when the displacement had reached the set interval of 2 mm. As for the final
measure of security--the horizontality of the base--Colonnetti recommended that a "plane of
reference", a horizontal chamber filled with mercury, be built into the base of the box. As with the
C&B scheme where a dam was asked to perform a duty beyond its engineered purpose, Colonetti
admitted that the jacks would be put to a use for which they had not been designed-to keep a
horizontal surface level.
348 "Pioneer in construction techniques based on the use of prestressed concrete." Citations and a clear explanation of
Colonnetti's contribution can be found in: Gaetano Fischera, "The Italian contribution to the mathematical theory of
elasticity," Meccanica 19/4 (Dec 1984), 259-268.
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The elegance of the Italian scheme lay both in its interpretation of integrity as the "elastic
continuity" between old and new materials, and its progressive building of a "new ground" for the
elevated temples, out of the structure constructed for lifting. Every time the base of the box was
raised by 30 centimeters, a new concrete matrix would be laid for the jacks, gradually building up a
new ground from below. Upon reaching the required displacement of 62 meters, this concrete
formwork would then serve as the skeleton for the reconstituted sandstone site. 349 Thus, where the
C&B scheme had hidden process behind objecthood, here the process of salvage was made visible in
a technological expenditure that would eventually leave no trace on the monument itself, while
being present beneath.
One cannot overstate the technological heroism that permeated this scheme, which remained
Unesco's official solution for most of 1963. Already in his first report Gazzola emphasized that the
value of the monument would be enhanced by their movement, and the international community
should therefore not shy away from "extraordinary means":
We should not hesitate to resort to extraordinary means. Considering the technology
available to us, and the sometimes destructive purposes to which we devote sometimes
fabulous sums, our atomic age should not miss this opportunity to brilliantly
demonstrate that our appreciation of spiritual values is not just made of words.350
Similarly, the Italconsult report concluded with an assurance that a continuity existed between
"ancient" and "modern" engineering miracles, the former absorbing the value of the latter.
Modern engineering techniques has displayed its best resources in order to save these
miracles of ancient engineering ... when the project has been brought to completion,
mankind will rightly say that the value of the monuments was worth the immense effort
accomplished.3 51
The continuity between the original authors and the modern preservationist was, it should be noted,
consistent with Brandi's idea of a restoration as re-enactment. And indeed despite significant internal
differences the Italconsult team was undeniably bound by a vague Crocean phenomenology that
found the origin of a work of art in a human creative act.
Hoping to turn this "aesthetics of process" into a fund-raising strategy Unesco publicized the
schemewith a press release titled How Modem Techniques can Save one of the Great Monuments of the Past that
called the scheme "a tribute to the experts of the past."352 The organization also circulated the
349 Colonnetti's description can be found in Gustavo Colonnetti, "11 Progetto italiano per il salvataggio dei templi di
Abu-Simbel" in Problemi Attuali di Scienza e di Cultura (Roma: Accademia dei Lincei, 1961), 3-12. His own contribution to
the theory of elasticity was published as Gustavo Colonnetti, Scienza delle costruzioni (Giuliu Einaudi, 1948).
350 Pietro Gazzola, "Abou Simbel," in "Transfert des Temples et Autres Monuments et Ruines: Considerations de
Carcatere architectural et archeologique." UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/6 (28 Sep 1959).
351 "Conclusions," Italconsult, Saving the Temples of Abu Simbel (Rome, November 1960), 11.
352 This release was often reproduced verbatim; "the Temples of Abu Simbel' in AIAJournal (Sep 1962), 33-36.
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sketches of the lifting made by Riccardo Morandi. While these rendering were spectacular, they
paradoxically did little to dramatize the technology of lifting. (figs 4.47) The lifting technology--the
hydraulic jacks-were barely present, dwarfed by the concrete "box" that itself appeared to be some
sort of Brutalist monument. The box also dwarfed all other conventional construction technologies
on the site, including two cranes and three construction barracks. This had the strange effect of
rendering the box completely static. (The cartoon-version of this drawing featured on the cover of
Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel, now or never added teams of workers and enlarged one of the cranes (fig 4.46))
The Italconsult drawings did include a sequence of axonometric renderings, which were sometimes
reproduced in more technical publications to demonstrate the sequential order of operations and the
progressive lifting of the temples. (fig 4.4) But little "effort" was conveyed in these images, and the
result was distinctly un-dynamic, seemingly reinforcing the weight of the block and the difficulty of
its lifting.
Morandi left all the dynamism of the operation for another perspective rendering, which was
never disseminated to the press. Titled "Position of Jacks During Lifting Operation." (fig 4.47) this
drawing masqueraded behind this technical name a utopian vision of a technologically-enabled
future. The rendering was of one of the "tunnels" dug in the space between the monument and its
site, occupied by two Nubian children. Undoubtedly Morandi drew the figures to demonstrate the
monumental scale of the hydraulic jacks. But, as the only representative of modem-day mankind in
the whole scheme, they also served an allegorical purpose of inhabiting the space opened up by the
gap between ancient and modem technologies-as Brandi might say, the "chasm" between history
and inert matter-and confidently progressing along a teleological tunnel of stone. The Italian
scheme borrowed from architecture not only its conceptualization of a "block" but also the mandate
of depicting utopias that would unfold in a technologically-enabled future. Despite--or perhaps
because of-the utopian resonances of these drawings, and their distinct architectural sensibility, the
scheme never attracted the funds necessary for its completion.
The British "underwater" and French "floating" schemes
As the flooding of the monuments grew near and fund-raising stalled, national delegations
volunteered their own alternative schemes. Of these, a British proposal was labeled the most
'fantastic', because it proposed to leave the temples underwater. Based on the assumption that it was
not water itself, but the chemical composition of the Nile, that would cause the temples to
decompose if they were flooded, the British team proposed to build a thin membrane dam around
the temples, separating reservoir from purified water. The British team had perhaps the greatest
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avant-garde credentials of all, as the architecture of the scheme revealed a combitantion of
architectural brutalism, with light-structure expressionism, held together by an intricate architectural
promenade. (fig 4.48) From the top visitors proceeded down an elevator, to occupy three levels of
tunnels, where circular windows and bubbles of glass offered glimpses of the colossus, and worm's
eye views of the shrines. "3
This scenography had first been invented by Irish film produced Bill MacQuitty. MacQuitty,
who had made a film about the titanic, A Night to Remember, (he is featured as himself in the 1997 film
Titanic) was an avid scuba diver, and eventually became involved in underwater archaeology (a cause
with which Unesco didn't concern itself until decades later). MacQuitty had visited Abu Simbel on a
reconnaissance for a film; but he was also partly inspired by his own theory of underwater
perception, whereby "one can see better underwater."35 4 It was upon returning from a dive that
MacQuitty contacted Jane Drew to propose that they develop the scheme. As with the others
schemes, this proposal, echoed the principles of restoration first introduced by 19th Century thinkers-
particularly, of John Ruskin's definition of restoration as "the most total destruction which a building
can suffer." Ruskin's was, if anything, a theory of dis-integrity: 315 since "the life of the whole"
embodied in a monument lay in the entire epoch "we have no right whatever to touch them." 356 Instead,
monuments were to be left to the force of "universal decay", after which they would acquire the
beauty of a "parasitical sublimity" that Ruskin dared to call "picturesque."3 s7 Certainly MacQuitty's
idea that human intervention would damage the temple more than water Ruskinian. The cinematic
nature of the scheme, its choreographed path, its reliance on surprise and optical effect resonated
with Ruskinian "picturesque" overtones. But MacQuitty also added an envionmentalist's futurology
to the proposal: predicting that the dam would become an obsolete technology, that nuclear power
would replace hydroelectricity, that the reservoir would be drained, and the temples re-discovered.
358 With this narrative of a future re-discovery, MacQuitty hoped to put to rest all the other schemes
that presumed to 'save' the temples by irrevocably transforming them.
353 Bill MacQuitty, "The Author's Scheme," Abu Simbel (New York: Putnam's, 1965), 182
354 Drew summarized the incident in her memoirs: "It happened like this. Bill who was a great friend of mine and a
friend of the ICA, phoned me up one day and said, "Jane I have been swimming under water this morning and I find
you can see better under water. They are going to flood the Nile and submerge the Abu Simbel figures or else they are
going to put them upon a hill where they will get totally eroded. All countries are supposed to put up scheme to
UNESCO, why don't you do one with my idea?" Jane Drew, "Memoir" (Unpublished) CCA Collections
35s John Ruskin, "The Lamp of Memory," The Seven Lamps of Architecture (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988),
178.
356 Ruskin, 186.
3s7 Ruskin, 184.
358 "Within the next hundred years the high dam itself will be outdated by atomic power bringing new methods of
irrigation and electricity. And if that happened the Nile water would return to its original level, and the temples of Abu
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The public explanation of the scheme fell to a young engineer from Ove Arup, Ted Happold,
who described the scheme as a critique of the Coyne & Bellier "dam" scheme.." 9 Instead, Happold
proposed to perform many of the same operations-surrounding the temples with a curtain,
pumping and purifying water-but without the additional problem of draining the site. Eliminating
the task of retaining water removed the main bulk from the estimated cost, as well as most of the
thickness out from the surfaces, turning the dam into "a light and inexpensive membrane" and
cleverly condensing in this "membrane" the work of maintaining integrity of the site. 360 Indeed, all
the surfaces were drawn so thin that they barely appeared to be an edge at all; the concrete dam was
drawn so thinly that it appeared like glass-a flexible curtain, casually "folded" for stability.
ingenuity of this solution lay in the thinness of this interface between object, subject, and site. It was
not the monument, but the visitor that was encased, in bubbles that implied a nomadic underwater
life and left undisturbed the harmonious continuum of elements. (fig 48-51)
The integration of architecture, subject and environment was a common theme in the work
of Jane Drew and Max Fry. Both their treatise Architecture and the Environment and their didactic booklet
Architecture for Children argued for a climate-driven architecture; both began with a summary of "How
our forefathers built" which demonstrated the archetype of an architectural "environment" with a
simple diagram of Egypt as "Nile", "Sun" and "desert. (fig 4.50) "It is useful to remember," they
wrote, "that every civilization is the result of circumstances. The Egyptians did not make their
civilization; it arose because the Nile was the most fertile place in the known world, and attracted
people to it." 361 Yet in pointing out that "the Egyptians' lives were dominated by two things-the
sun and the Nile" they pointed to the one environmental feature that their design for Abu Simbel
would completely eliminate: the sun.362 Indeed the only stenographic certainty of the Abu Simbel
site was a once-a-year alignment of the rising sun with the axis of the main sancturary, which
illuminated three of the four statues at the very back of the shrines deep into the rock. (fig 4.50) Here,
Simbel could be restored to their present state." MacQuitty cited in "New Scheme to Save Abu Simbel Temples,"
Architects'Journal (20 Mar 1963), 610.
"9 On Ted Happold and his later career, see Derek Walker, ed., Happold: The Confidence to Build (London: Happold Trust
Publications, 1997).
360 "They required not only a dam on the river side but also had to provide an elaborate grouting system and cut-off
trench to reduce seepage through the rock, and pumping equipment to deal with any water which penetrated. As even
a small quantity of water reaching the tunnels would cause damage the problem became extremely difficult." "The
proposed scheme is very simple in principle. Round each temple will be built a thin 'membrane' enclosing clean water
on the temple side and keeping it constantly at the same level as the Nile water outside. This would result in the
pressure on the membrane being balanced on both sides, so that the membrane could be as light ad inexpensive
structure." Edmund Happold, "The Scheme Explained," The Architects'Journal (20 Mar 1963).
361 Jane Drew and Maxwell Fry, Architecture and the Environment, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976), 75.
362 "To worship the sun and the river," they wrote "was natural and necessary, as was the rule of their priests, the chief
among whom was also their king." Architecture and the Environment, 73.
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the sun would never reach the back of the temples again. MacQuitty proposed a suitably cinematic
substitution, replacing the sun completely by engineered artifice ("Powerful electric lights reproduce
the rising and setting of the sun"' '363) and selling the idea as "a cool modern miracle at a relatively
low cost."36 But the British scheme sacrificed the only environmental feature of the site that even
skeptical Egyptologists had deemed important. Similarly, while they argued that sandstone would be
preserved underwater they showed no concern for the deterioration of the plaster-painted frescoes
and reliefs on the interior of the shrine, to whose preservation Unesco had dedicated an entire
committee. Ultimately it is Unesco the environmental sensibility of the scheme, which distributed
risk, expense, and artifice so evenly across the site, that made it too radical for Unesco. Both Drew and
MacQuitty also later wrote that their British affiliation, rather than their technological vangardism,
sank their proposal-as Drew summarized in her memoirs, "after Suez nothing British would be
acceptable." 365 Still, the scheme had a significant impact as a critique of the ItalConsult scheme, and
as a proposal for an environmental version of "integrity" against which to measure Unesco's
decidedly more object-based conception.
In contrast to the British scheme which captured the public imagination but was never taken
seriously by Unesco, a second French scheme was given the consideration by the Executive
Committee but never gained publicity except as a one-liner. (fig 4.53) Designed by venerable French
military engineer Albert Caquot: to cut off each temple into a block, encase it in steel and concrete,
and "float" them up the river in synchrony with the rising of the Nile. Clearly this scheme was
motivated by a much broader "hydraulic" vision than the one embodied the 650 diminutive
hydraulic jacks of the Italconsult scheme, and Caquot explicitly offered it as a betterment of it. After
reviewing the jacks designs, Caquot proposed a what he called a "realistic" solution borrowed from
his own experience: "the only procedure being practically used today to lift vertically, and transfer
horizontally, any mass weighting thousands of tons is the floater. It is used in particular for the
building of artificial islands until their final anchoring, as well as for the construction of ships."366
Caquot had pioneered the use of floating platforms for ship-repair at the military port of Saint
363 MacQuitty wrote a book which included the four schemes at the end. "The great temple is submerged in clear water.
The muddy water of the Nile are kept out by a membrane dam a foot thick. It does not have to be heavily constructed
as the pressure of water on either side always remains the same. Running through the dam are two passages at different
levels. These contain reinforced glass windows through which the colossi can be seen from various angles. Powerful
electric lights reproduce the rising and setting of the sun. Further passages lead beneath the temple floors and emerge
into reinforced glass chambers from which the interiors of the temples can be examined. The water is constantly filters
and supplied with chemical to ensure the preservation of the sandstone." MacQuitty, Abu Simbel, 181.
364 William MacQuitty, "Khartoum to Abu Simbel," A Life to Remember (London: Quartet), 341.
36s Drew, Memoir, 154. MacQuitty describes in greater depth the exchange of letters and meetings with British
delegation and UAR ambassadors, but comes essentially to the same conclusion. MacQuitty, A Life to Remember, 342.
366 Albert Caquot, Les Temples d'Abou Simbel: Avant-Projet de leur DNplacement Complet (Paris: Simecsol, 1963), 8.
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Nazaire, where ships floated into platforms shaped in "radoub", then the water around them would
be drained for repair. The Abu Simbel temples would also be encases twice: first in a "floater" then
a reservoir designed to accommodate the "horizontal and vertical translations." The floaters were
circular, and the reservoirs had oval plans and L-shaped sections. (fig 4.53) Thus the temples would be
"stored" in the reservoirs until the level of the Nile had reached its final elevation (4-5 years), at
which time the water would be let into the reservoir, which would gently guide the temples, in their
floaters, to their new situation:
An so, without no impact and no noise, the island containing the rock will lift itself and
float towards the definitive place that has been made for it. The operation will brely last
the necessary time that it takes for the reservoir to be filled.367
Caquot's modest proposal came with a revised estimate for less than 40 million dollars-but the
elegance of his solution, including its appeal to the ancient tradition of Nile transport, did not
compensate for the incompletion of the scheme. Indeed this scheme had only been proposed as a
way to "save" the Italian project against a "cutting" proposal which had been secretly worked out.
The Caquot scheme was last-minute attempt at a "wet" scheme before the "dry" thinking was
brought to its dreaded logical conclusion: cutting the temples into smaller and smaller blocks.
Before the Swedish "cutting scheme" that was eventually realized can be examined, one last
point must be made about the process of selection itself, and the contribution of these schemes to the
codification of an international language of integrity during this "competition" period. The schemes
were cumulative: in each moved the temples further and further away from their original location,
to an increasingly less scandalous effect, and the criterion for evaluation-"integrity"-remained the
same throughout. Thus a timeline of shifting meaning can be constructed, where schemes previously
declared to lack "integrity" were adopted, and integrity itself was redefined opportunistically: from
an ideal, to a future state, then to an existing condition, and lastly, to a dutiful choice. 368
October 1959:
The sub-committee recommends the earth dam solution [C&G] as being the best from
the archaeological an aesthetic viewpoint. ... This solution more fully safeguards the
integrity of the site and the monuments, something that no proposal for raising could
do.369
367
"Ainsi, sans heurts et sans bruits, l'ile contenant le rocher se soul&vera et d&rivera avers la situation d&finitive qui est
preeue, l'operation ne durera guere que le temps n6cessaire au remplissage du reservoir." Albert Caquot, Les Temples d'Abou
Simbel: Projet d'ensemble de deplacement des temples (Paris: Simecsol, 1963), 25.
368 The first comparison was about risk. The estimate maintenance cost was so high that western consultants saw this as
an indication of naivete on the part of the UAR government. (Echoes of the World Bank debates) in both of these
comparisons-each time it was about distributing risk. Some options were on the table secretly-which options were
actually eliminated?. (brew, for instance).
369 55 EX/ 7 Annexe VI: Report of the Subcommittee to safeguard Abu Simbel, page 6
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January 1961:
The Committee of Experts considers that the Italconsult scheme is more satisfactory from
the archaeological point of view [because it] offers greater safety to the temples in the
future as well as far fewer problems of maintenance than does the C&B project.370
5-7 June 1963
The Board of Consultants fully appreciates, as in the "Lifting" project, the great
advantages in maintaining the existing integrity of the temples. It would far more
appropriate, from an archaeological viewpoint, to conserve the temples as they currently
are.
The Control Committee is immensely repulsed at the thought of accepting or
recommending a project that leads to the cutting or fragmenting of these precious
monuments in any way possible, even if they can be reconstituted in another site,
offering visitors an appearance similar to the one that these temples had when they were
built, more than 3,000 years ago. From the archaeological point of view, the project "B"
would have of course been preferable, if we had had the necessary funds to complete
it.371
10-12 June 1963
The Executive Committee declared itself in favor of cutting the temples. Although he
personally would naturally have preferred a scheme allowing the Abu Simbel temples to
be preserved intact, the Chairman considered it is his duty to back the cutting project,
which offered the only chance of saving Abu Simbel from submersion. 372
No progression could give clearer demonstration of how political and specialist realm benefited
from the circulation of a common language. . Integrity has now become the basis for what can be
called the "international style" of preservation and it is therefore important to note that it belongs to
the bureaucratic tongue of Unesco, which was used to summarize discussions where other, more
colorful vocabulary was used. For each of these utterances of the term, there exists an informal
transcript, letter, or note that features terms like "cutting," "scalping", "digging," "mutilating", etc.
More importantly, what the progression shows is that, when the integrity of the temples is no longer
mentioned it is the integrity of the speaker, (his "principle", his "appreciation," or his "duty") that
is invoked instead. This was a progression of a political discourse appropriating a term as "technical"
which has actually been coined by the experts not for the sake of precision, but for its ethical
connotations.
It is apparent from the above progression that VBB "cutting scheme" was never evaluated by
the criterion of integrity. Nor indeed was it proposed in the same framework as the other four.
Designed by request from the UAR, it was the work of engineers engaged in a direct consultancy
370 Annex III: Committee of Experts for Abu Simbel. Report, January 1 6'h, 1961, p. 21.
371 Nubia/4/Annex III, 9.
372 Nubia/4, 3.
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with the UAR, the Swedish firm VBB, which had originally been hired by as geological consultants.
As such, they had been commissioned to plan the movement of smaller rock-hewn temples, to
prepare bidding documents for the Italconsult scheme, to design the reconstruction of the site, and,
ultimately, to oversee the lifting process. By the time the UAR government asked them to propose a
"cutting" scheme, they had begun to occupy a visible position in the campaign, both by redesigning
some key features of the Italconsult scheme373 and by being asked to take a stand on the translation
of "technical operations" into a "cultural objective." 374 In some ways the prospect of a scheme for
"cutting the temples to pieces" had been looming from the start. As early as January 1961 a key
advisor to the US Committee for Abu Simbel who reviewed the C&B and Italconsult schemes
declared it "perfectly apparent that these two methods are much too expensive" and revealed his
"current thinking to cut up the facades of the 2 temples and remove them in sections.""3 The first
plan for cutting was produced-and marked "confidential"-in September 1962.376
The chain of events that led to the "choice" of this cutting scheme was set in motion in
December 1962 when the 1 2th session of Unesco's General Assembly decided not make contributions
to the Abu Simbel protection compulsory. In reaction to the lackluster results of the fund-raising
campaign, it had been suggested that member-states be forced to contribute to the campaign. This
proposal was rehected; instead a resolution was passed that "voluntary contributions" should be
sought, that a pledging conference be planned for the following March. In advance of this
conference, the price for the lifting scheme was evaluated at 60 Million (of which 3 7 in hard
currency), and the executive committee prepared as set of alternative financial scenarios. Yet none of
these scenarios allowed contributions already made to be redirected anywhere but at Egypt ["Q: Has
373 For example, in VBB's project the concrete "box" became elliptical. UNESCO/Nubia/BC 1 / 1 Board of Consultants
for th Scheme of Lifting the Abu Simbel temples, First Meeting. (9-13 Oct 1961), 3.
374 In a UNESCO Nubia/2 CE/8 "Meeting of a Group of Experts on the Consolidation of the Facades and interior of
the Abu Simbel Temples and the Reconstitution of the Site: Report of the Group." (30 Mar 1962), 6-7. In reaction to
these changes, the committee for the consolidation of facades had specifically asked them to take "a cultural position."
In a section apart titled "Exchange of views regarding technical operations conducted with the object of attaining a
cultural objective," the group specifically pleaded that the translation of "technical" to "cultural" was problem of "the
engineer": "The group was in complete agreement regarding the absolute importance of the technical operations but
felt it necessary to emphasize at the outset that these were designed with the object of effecting the solution of a
cultural problem, namely, the preservation of an ensemble of unique archaeological and artistic importance for the
benefit of future generations. ... The technical operations involved many disciplines, but primarily that of the engineer.
... It was not certain that enough details had been provided in advance on the latest views of the engineers (VBB etc)
that might have a bearing on the cultural objective. ... There was general agreement that the Board of Consultants
controlling all works carried out at Abu Simbel should have as a member someone experienced in the safeguarding of
historic monuments."
7s White to Brew, Jan 6 1961.
376 "Preliminary Report on the Project of Dismantling, Moving and Re-erecting the Abu Simbel Temples, September
1962 (VBB). As cited in Wednell Johnson's report.
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the UAR prepared alternative solutions, in case this minimum is not reached?" "A: The salvage of
Abu Simbel forms an indivisible whole and all efforts must tend towards the preservation of this
complex. "377] What emerged from the debates before the pledging conference was held is that both
the temples of Abu Simbel and the International Fund for its salvage were to be considered
"indivisible wholes."
The bidding conference of March 20 1963 only raised 7.5. Million dollars, (of which $ 6.5
Milion in hard currency). The US's reaction to this disappointing turnout was to decline to make any
pledge ("since its contributions would have been in Egyptian pounds and [the US] saw no prospect
of raising the necessary foreign currency") and to communicate a secret message to the UAR
instead, offering "the cooperation of the US toward the development of an alternative that would be
technically and financially feasible," and guaranteeing that the US would contribute to such a plan in
Egyptian pounds.378 Unesco's reaction, in turn, was to appoint a committee to propose techniques
for converting hard currency into local Egyptian pounds. These recommendations were crucial, as
they represented the ultimate criteria for "commensuration" that the UAR would have to apply to its
selection of the scheme. They were:
... that steps be taken to induce contractors to study the possibility of substantially
reducing, by appropriate technical and financial means, the proportion of expenditure in
"hard" currency...
... that negotiations be undertaken ... with the successful contractors with a view to
taking maximum possible advantage of the credit facilities that might be granted to them,
under national legislation, by virtue of the financial provisions designed to promote the
execution of large-scale undertakings abroad.
... that the UAR should study the measures it might take, in view of the scale of its
tourist resources, to cover part of the "hard" currency required (for example, by
introducing a special tourist tax or visa) 379
In other words, while the US offered to subsidize a cheaper scheme, Unesco authorized the UAR to
seek technical reductions in the price. The fix, so to speak, was in. Shortly thereafter, the State
Department sent the Chief of Engineering Division of the US Army Corps of Engineers, Wendell
Johnson, on a "fact-finding mission" to Egypt, to "learn as much as possible about the plans being
developed by the UAR." Upon his return he wrote approvingly of "the 'dismantling and re-erection"
plan of VBB, calling it "entirely feasible" and recommending it "based on engineering
considerations, and subject to appropriate considerations of the archaeological, geological, financing
377 NUBIE/1, "Rapport du comitý executif" (17-19 Dec 1962), 6.
378 Letter from McCullough to Brew, May 1, 1963.
379 NUBIA/4 Executive Committee, Paris June 28, 1963, Annex II: Resolution V, page 8.
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and policy aspects."380' Although he was instructed not to "indicate in any way the US position,"
three days after his return, the Egyptian government withdrew the Italconsult scheme, and proposed
the VBB scheme instead; at the same meeting, the US representative declared that the US would "give
sympathetic consideration" to it if "it was adopted as a practical scheme."38 '
The US and UAR therefore reached a behind-the-scenes agreement, which they presented to
other member states as a fait accompli. Yet the French delegation, having evidently heard of the cutting
alternative, proposed the Caquot scheme at this same meeting, forcing both schemes ("cutting" and
"floating") to be forwarded to various committees for evaluation. Correspondance shows that all
parties involved were aware that the Caquot proposal was far too schematic to be considered for
immediate bidding; yet the need to compare the two schemes triggered a final act of adjudication,
which served the interest of both sides. In this sense, the Caquot scheme was never really considered;
it served as a foil for the VBB scheme to appear to have been chosen as a result of a "comparative"
process. This comparative process is of interest in itself, since it reveals a progressive isolation of
"cultural" value away from "purely archaeological" and "purely technical" considerations, and
towards increasingly "financial" goals. First, the Executive Committee declared the VBB scheme
"acceptable from a technical point of view" but asked a panel of experts to judge the
"archaeological" aspects. This panel of experts, which met in Paris from 7th to 9 thof May, "found
that a decision in favor of either project could not be reached purely on archaeological or technical grounds,
and recommended that technical and economic aspects be examined by the Board of Consultants." Finally,
the Board of Consultants, which had been hired directly by the UAR, declared that while "from the
archaeological point of view" the Caquot project was preferable, in terms of funding the VBB
scheme was the only one adoptable.
Meanwhile, on the American side, the US Commission also gathered its own expert
committee to "formulate an American attitude." "Generally speaking," one participant recalled,
"nobody wanted to cut the temples up, but thought that it was not a major risk, would be
somewhere within the 36 million range, and require less than 1/2 the hard currency than the Italian
plan required."3 8 2 Indeed the cutting scheme relied overwhelmingly on local labor-the same labor
that had been brought to Nubia for the building of the dam-which could be paid for in Egyptian
pounds. The next meeting of the Executive Committee resolved the agreement: the US declared its
380 Wendell Johnson, "Report on Visit of Wendell E. Johnson to Egypt Re:Abu Simbel Temples," April 1962, Brew
Archives
s38 As summarized in UNESCO/NUBIA/CE/VIII/3, "Draft Joint Report of the Executive Commiittee and the Director
General to the Thirteenth Session of the General Conference." (Paris, 14 Oct 1964).
382 The American experts met on 10 May 1963. Letter from Wilson to Brew and Lasallale, 13 May 1963.
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intention to fund the equivalent of 30% of the scheme. Unesco recalled that it had "for four years
deployed considerable efforts in order to ensure the salvage of the Abu Simbel temples," and that
therefore, "the moment had come to take a decision that takes into consideration the financial means
of international cooperation."38 3 Effectively given no alternative, all nations agreed to channel their
contributions, originally intended for the "lifting" scheme, towards the "cutting" scheme instead.
From this circuitous process it should be evident that the decision to cut Abu Simbel into
blocks was made through a secret bilateral agreement between the US and UAR. Unesco helped to
"maintain the international character" of the decision-making process, by strong-arming nation-
states into contributing to one scheme the funds they had already pledged to another. In addition,
since conventional diplomatic channels between the two governments were strained, the deal was
worked out through an international Board of Consultants, independent of Unesco, which included
French, Italian and German engineers, the head of the US Army Corps of Engineers, and the head of
civil engineering at the World Bank, Gail Hathaway. The type of US funds impacted the
technological solution in two ways: it imposed greater reliance on local labor and encouraged
nation-states to find creative solutions for "converting" hard cash into local Egyptian pounds. The
sub-committee on converting currency recommended that contributing nations use construction
companies as semi-state-sponsored enterprises which could carry the loans be repaid over the long-
term, and that Egypt institute a tourist tax to attract dollars directly from visitors. Thus many of the
mechanisms of international development that the Aswan High Dam was supposed to have
inaugurated in Egypt were actually enacted in the campaign for Abu Simbel: the choice of a more
reasonable, "smaller" scheme based on minimizing financial risk; the involvement of international
consultants; the opening of new markets for western engineering consortia; and the liberalization of
tourism as a mechanism for converting counterpart funds into hard currency. In this sense, Abu
Simbel stands clearly as a counterpart to the Aswan High Dam.
Certainly this turn of events constitutes a triumph of "rationalization" in the sense intended
by historians of technology: an instance when process took precedence over result. But now both
process and product were "processes": the one economic and hidden; the other technological and
aestheticized by Unesco. From the financial point of view, the "hidden" salvage process of helped to
liquidate surpluses; from Unesco's point of view the public salvage process still represented the
advent of an age of "integrity"-financial and material.
383 NUBIE/4 Annexe III: "Report Executive committee of the International Campaign for the Salvage of Nubian
monuments (28 Jun 1963), 2.
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Sand as a technology: disfiguration and refiguration
What happened, then, to the integrity of the temples? The cutting plan drew violent protests
from the preservationists who had been advocating the salvage-including the group of experts
convened by Unesco in May 1963, who decried it as a "barbarous" disfiguration and a "butchery."
To cut into the human figures of the temples, they argued, was irrevocably to compromise the
integrity of the monument. (fig 4.54) But if Abu Simbel was disfigured, what is the relation between
this accusation of disfiguration of the monument and the process of abstraction that we set out to
detect at the beginning of this chapter? After all, despite the apparent compromise of their
monumental integrity, the temples are still perceived as the same monument today. Nobody-not
Gazzola, the doctrinary figurehead of the campaign, not the critical historians like Choay and not,
least of all, Unesco-dares to speak of Abu Simbel as a counterfeit. 384 Thus we should be careful not
to equate the failure of the architectural scale with a failure of integrity. Instead we should ask, what
version of integrity was validated in the end.
The answer, I will argue, lies in the use of sand as a technology. No technology played a
more spectacular role in the salvage than sand itself. The aesthetics of the performance can be seen in
the film version of The World saves Abu Simbel, which recorded the salvage process. (fig 4.55) The film
features an overwhelming display of human agency, both specialist and not: the sandstone was
sawed by hand continuously through the night so that the fissures would not grow with changes in
temperature. But everywhere there is a human hand there is also a lot of sand. Any cutting is
followed by the pouring of sand. Any whole is filled with sand. Any block is stored on a bed of
sand. Sand is ubiquitous, and its role is to mitigate the image of the temples being mutilated. In other
words, VBB replaced an architectural integrity (based on the legibility of a large "block") with an
engineered integrity based on the fluidity of sand. By inscribing monument-movement in an
intricate system of sand-displacement, VBB maintained Abu Simbel's image as a monolith while
cutting it into increasingly smaller pieces.
It is only after having described the monument geologically as an aggregate system that VBB
cut it into blocks. This descriptive work, which particularized the infrastructural scale of the
intervention, had begun when VBB were geological consultants to the Italconsult scheme. First, they
384 A replica scheme always existed as a separate option. As early as December 1960 a scheme for "constructing a
replica" of the temples based on molding and photogrammetry had been proposed. "There is also a growing feeling
that perhaps the best thing to do would be to reproduce the temples completely as replicas. From the point of view of
integrity of the monument, this solution should be a last resort. If all others prove to be either impractical or too
expensive, I believe we are already have a complete photogrammetric record which would permit duplication down to
very fine detail. This replica could be in the immediate vicinity or at some point, like Aswan, where more people
would see it." Brew to Edmund White, 22 Dec 1960. Brew 10/54b.
467
Lucia Allais
had revealed the ingenuity of the original Egyptian architects, who had incorporated the geological
variations of the mountain into their design, by using layers of hard rock as ceiling planes, and softer
rock surfaces for sculpting finer reliefs. (fig 4.56) Secondly, they had drawn detailed elevations of the
fissures in the temple front and located them precisely in history-most being very ancient. Thirdly,
they had built a descriptive model of this geological predicament, which abstracted these fissures as
intersecting planes of Plexiglas. (fig 4.57) What these models show is that, insofar as VBB turned Abu
Simbel into a building, they did so in geological terms. That VBB considered this geological
engieering as an actual building technology, rather than merely an analytical category, can be seen
in a last set of models they made for the 'reconstruction of the site,' which "molded" the Nubian
sandstone around the temple assertively in what the consultative committee alarmingly called
"definite architectural shapes.""38 (fig 4.59)
The prevalence of sand in the scheme also shows that in removing the architect the VBB
engineers had made a direct connection with archeology instead. For instance, the entire temple-
front was covered in fine sand to minimize damage to the sculpted figures while the "mountain"
behind them was being dismantled. (fig 4.60) This was a clever technological solution, but it also
reveals a distinctly archaeological sensibility that implies a strong correlation between the abstraction
of sand (as a technology) and the figuration of the statue (as a monument). The entire discourse on
the "sanctity of the stone" was redirected towards the Nubian authenticity of certain types of sand, in
a way that confused the "authentic evolution" of architectural materials with its engineering
properties as a technology. This covering of the temples in sand rehearsed the original discovery of
the monument-and the near-ritual repetition of this discovery throughout the 19th century. Indeed
the temples were first discovered by Ludwig Burckhardt in 1812, and, as Tom Little summarized,
"For almost the rest of the century, Abu Simbel was the vanishing wonder, for it was the
characteristic of the site that the sand was perpetually swept down to blanket the fagade."" 86 When
Flaubert and Du Camp visited in 1888, they spent three days "uncovering it from sand" in order to
take a photograph. (fig 4.62) Thus by the time Unesco arrived at Abu Simbel, sand had already been a
385 UNESCO/Nubia/2CE/9, p. 9.
386 Tom Little, High Dam at Aswan: Subjugation of the Nile (London: Methuen, 1965), 188. Little gives each instance of
clearing: "Belzoni [sent by the British in 1817, who first discovered the 'cavren'] did a prodigious job of clearing it,
but it is probably that no one saw the temple again until 18144 when the famous Egyptologist Lepsius cleared it once
more. In 1869 the Director of Egyptian Antiquities, Mariette, reopened the temple for the visit of the Empress Eugenie.
After another 23 years the sand was removed again and some restoration done to the fagade, but on this occasion a
British engineer, Captain Johnstone, built walls on the plateau to protect the temple from the drift of sand. Alessandro
Barsanti did some more clearing in 1909.... Since 1892, and more particularly since the Barsanti expedition, both
temples of Abu Simbel have been open to those people who ventured up the Nile into Nubia."
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crucial interface between Rameses as the face of antiquity and the modern explorer, and the Courier
willingly recalled this "Saga of a Temple Freed from a Grave of Sand." 387
It is undoubtedly the symbolism implied in this pattern of covering and uncovering that had
earned Abu Simbel a place in the offices of Sigmund Freud in Vienna, in the form of above a
reproduction of Ernst K6rner's painting, placed above the psychoanalytic couch as an invitation to
retrospection.388 (fig 4.63) Freud's office was, of course, filled with antiquities, but Abu Simbel was
was the only "antiquity" to be covered in sand, depicted in the act of discovery, recalling Freud's
statement, in The Interpretation of Dreams, that "to many people the idea of being buried alive while
appearing to be dead is the most uncanny thing of all." 389 For Freud himself the inaccessibility of
memories was precisely what allowed them to be "preserved" intact until they were uncovered.
Archaeology, in this Freudian universe, was a practice where figuration and abstraction were
intimately connected, through sand. To say that the temples were disfigured, then, is to
underestimate how much Abu Simbel was identified as a mythical archaeological object with a
famous "face." The Swedish scheme, as publicized by Unesco, capitalized on this face by inscribing
constructive tropes of digging, molding and sculpting into what was actually a cutting endeavor. To
be sure, the idea of 'sand' as a technology had been significantly updated since the days of Flaubert
and Ducamp. Steel bars were used to make connections between blocks, and epoxy was injected into
the temple blocks to consolidate them before cutting. As the commentary to The World Saves Abu Simbel
shows, Unesco described both technical usages of sand and the resulting monument in
anthropomorphic terms: the removing of the outer layer of the cliff was called "peeling of
'mountain skin,"' while Rameses "took one last look at his living likeness." (fig 4.61)
387 Louis A. Christophe, "The Saga of a Temple Freed from a Grave of Sand," in Unesco Courier: Save the Temples of Nubia Now!
(February 1960), 20-22. This became the basis for a book, Abou-Simbel et l"Epopee de sa Decouverte, (Bruxelles: Editions P.F.
Merckk, 1965).
388 Much has been made of the analogy that Freud made in Civilization and its Discontents in 1932 between Rome and the
human psyche-most resulting in a metaphoric interpretation of architecture as a container for "multiple contents."
For a view that connects Freud's theories to his life of exile, see Carl E. Schorske, "Freud: The Psychoarchaeology of
Civilizations," in The Cambridge Companion to Freud, ed. Jerome Neu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For a
disciplinary project of detecting an archaeological impulse in the basic theoretical framework of "modernity," see
Julian Thomas, Archaeology and Modernity (London: Routledge, 2004). Architectural discourse has taken Freud's
proclamation that "the same space cannot have two different contents" as a challenge, an invitation to overcome this
material impossibility with a symbolic simultaneity. See for Peter Eisenman's introduction to the American edition of
Aldo Rossi's The Architecture of the City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), titled "The Houses of Memory: the texts of
Analogue", 3-11, for a metaphorical theorization of monuments as containers of "multiple contents." By this reading,
in order to be a Freudian object architecture must be immaterial in spite, not because, of its objecthood.
389 Anthony Vidler, "The Architecture of the Uncanny," Assemblage 3 (Jul 1987), 20.
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Thus the dis-figuration of the monolith was accompanied by a re-figuring. There are three
interpretive directions that can be derived from this conclusion.'" The first is that an analysis of
preservation "processes" can be wielded more forcefully in a revision of the conventional narratives
of heritage, especially since these are often initiated by organizations like Unesco. A better awareness
of the technologies of heritage would undoubtedly begin to redefine the debate over ethically
charged terms like "integrity." Consider for instance the fundamentally architectural role played by
epoxy, as it was injected into the face of Rameses to "consolidate" it before cutting it. 391 (fig 4.61)
While it is designed to be invisible, epoxy occupies the air between stone granules, changing the
density of the material, and creating, over time, an uncanny darkening effect:
The darkening of the surface of a porous stone following treatment with an epoxy resin
solution is an optical effect. The original, diffusely scattering, high surface roughness or
high porosity surface is modified by the epoxy solution and the degree of specular, or
mirror-like, reflection increases. "
In short, the Rameses we see today is a stiffer, more "puffy" version of himself. Here then we can
return to Choay's Freudian diagnosis of a narcissism in heritage inflation, one could say that it is not
the case that all traces of technological expenditure have been erased from the monument: it is
between the stone granules of Rameses's face that they can be found, in changes of its elasticity and
increases in its degree of "specularity." Ironically, it is precisely in becoming more "reflective" that
Abu Simbel's performance as a "mirror" can be detected. Choay uses this collective interprtation to
recommend various ways to "break" the mirror; in particular, by a recovering of sensory
experience, to connect "the human body to the patrimonial body," in order to create a kinesthetic
prevention against patrimonial "fixations."3 93 But if a psycho-analytic interpretation of heritage must
be made, it is not enough to say that preservation is an act of narcissism; we have to conclude that
preservation is already a serious act of self-mutilation (in the salvage of Abu Simbel alone, we find
evidence of such neuroses as mankind cutting itself, mankind burying itself alive, and of course,
mankind getting botox injections) and that it is in the fine distinctions between preservation
390 The World Saves Abu Simbel (Paris: Unesco, 1984)
391 Epoxy has since become a controversial subject in preservation circles, and Abu Simbel was one of the earliest
examples of epoxy used to reinforce not the joints between stone blocks but the actual fabric of a monument. For
retrospective histories of the use of the material, see Lal Gauri, "Efficiency of Epoxy Resins as Stone Preservatives," in
Studies in Conservation, (May 1974), 100-101; P. Kotlik, P. Justa & J. Zelinger, "The Application of Epoxy Resins for the
Consolidation of Porous Stone," in Studies in Conservation (May1983), 75-79; and Nicholas L. Gianopulos, "Doubts about
Epoxy Article," APT Bulletin, 21/1 (1989), 2-3.
392 William S. Ginell & Richard Coffman, "Epoxy Resin-Consolidated Stone: Appearance Change on Aging," in Studies in
Conservation, 43/4 (1998), 242.
393 Choay, "Sortir du narcissisme: le miroir patrimonial conjure," L'Alllgorie du Patrimoine, 198.
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techniques that preservation's participation in any process, be it aesthetic, technological, or
psychoanalytic, can be detected and remedied.
The second field of interpretation that is opened up by a technological understanding of the
ethics of preservation is the history of tourism. In contrast to Choay's call for a new sensory
evaluation of heritage, architectural historians have come late to the study of tourism, and most have
take their cue from social sciences and cultural studies by theorizing architecture as a form of
"immaterial mediation.""'9 According to this discourse the "spectacularization" and
"commodification" of architectural environments occurs entirely in an immaterial realm that turns
unique experiences into mass-produced images. But if the Nubian Campaign teaches anything about
the impact of tourism, it is the way in which the very material composition of the monuments was
transformed to bear the projection of tourist expectation. To learn to recognize these material
modifications-to inaugurate a conoisseurial system that spoke of preservation styles in addition to
architectural ones-would undoubtedly grant more legitimacy to tourism as a properly
"architectural" field of inquiry.
But it is in the field of architectural historiography that perhaps the farthest reaching
conclusions can be drawn, especially in the light the orthodox histories that treat technology as an
unproblematically futuristic force in postwar architecture. Thus any historicist application of
technology is treated as a dialectical contradiction, a reactionary anomaly. Against this automatism,
the concept of "integrity", understood as a technological removal of boundaries, is a useful concept
that accommodates both futuristic and nostalgic interventions of technology in architecture. By the
standards of integrity, the Nubian monuments that survive from the Campaign today are not ones
that have been carefully removed from their setting and thoughtfully placed back, but rather those
that have been injected with boundaries: monuments whose "elasticity" as monuments and as
material objects has been constrained. From an architectural perspective, then, the traces of
technological expenditure are most easily found in the spaces that escaped from these constraints-
for instance, in the new dome that was built behind the Abu Simbel temples to support the new
artificial hill. Just as in Western museums it is an engineered "exterior" environment that now
39 The recent collection on Architecture and Tourism, for instance, focuses explicitly on the "mediating" role of architecture
redefining the term altogether, as "the process of reception, representation, use, spectacularization, and
commodification as meaning is mediated by the rhetorical strategies of diverse media and performance." Because
architects are largely absent as agents in the construction of tourist environments, the editors also feel compelled to
expand "the concept of the architect ... to include a greater array of 'designers'"(by which they mean such
"rhetoreticians" as "travel agents and advertisers.") and to expand architecture's materiality: "The concept of
architectural materials also needs to be broadened, to include propaganda, policy and print." Then the intro ends the
disclaimer with a explication that "photography, films and souvenirs have been deployed to help mediate and
mythologize specific sites." Architecture and Tourism: Perception, Performance and Place ed. D. Melinda Lasansky and Brian
McLaren. (New York: Berg, 2004), 10.
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performs the integrity of imported Nubian monuments, in the desert it is in the new injected
"interior" that the integrity of Abu Simbel now resides-as if a bubble of 1960s technological utopia
had been built in Nubia after all.
Epilogue: On "Hegelian monstrosities"
In this chapter I have argued that while the Nubian Campaign was launched as a
"verification of Unesco's ideals," it was achieved largely in spite of these ideals. Even as the
campaign was promoted as a precedent for future international action, a series of exceptions had to
be carved out of normative political, aesthetic, and economic patterns in order for the massive
salvage operation to be achieved. What emerged from this inaugural "case-study," I have argued, is
a "case-study" theory of history, which has become the basis for a global preservation practice. The
question of whether monuments (or now, "world heritage sites") constitute exceptional examples,
or are rather constitutive of a cumulative norm, is important because Unesco claims to be a
universalist organization devoted to the preservation of particulars. Unesco's creed that individual
"minds" aggregate into a collective "mankind" was applied to Nubia's monuments by resorting to
two contradictory processes of "abstraction". At the scale of the desert, a range of locality and
internationalism was spanned: "Nubia" was salvaged for the sake of its cultural particularity, but it
was physically redesigned into the image of a universalist "imaginary museum of monuments."
Thus monumental oases had to be depopulated in order to become emblems of mankind. At the
scale of individual monuments, the abstraction from concrete materials to immaterial aesthetic value
was progressively applied at a finer and finer grain, camouflaging social exclusions and disguising a
consolidation of value as a "dissemination." Sand was the primary agent of this spatial subterfuge:
ontologized as a concrete support for integrity and deployed as a technology for an "ethic" of
performance.
No less important than the spatial subterfuge of aggregation was the historical subterfuge of
the "major project." The Nubian campaign was intended not only to demonstrate the value of
monuments in space but also the value of monumental action in time, forcing upon disparate
historical agents a concentration of effort-and often a recalibration of ambitions. Disciplinary
histories are a case in point: hailed by Unesco as forms of "technical expertise", archaeology and
architectural preservation were forced into positivist codification based on a promise of future
autonomy. Both disciplines emerged with statements of orthodoxy that were blatantly dependent
upon exceptions. The opportunism unfolded differently in each discipline. For example, Abu Simbel
was saved not because of but in spite of the judgment of Egyptologists, but its crudeness and anonymity
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made it an ideal experimental object for emerging preservation technologies. Both archaeologists
and preservationists, however, ultimately derived a conflicted legitimacy from the campaign,
accepting conceptual compromises for the sake of scientific advances, whose consequences were not
felt until the post-modernist debates of thel1980s.
Ultimately the greatest "concentration of action" that Unesco was able to draw out was in
the realm of food-aid and economic exchange. Originally an incongruous event which had to be
promoted as a rhetorical demonstration of humanistic "disinterest," the salvage of Abu Simbel
eventually became an opportunity for the UAR and the US to minimize the risk of economic
imbalance during a moment of political instability--a solution to a problem of surplusses. The
amounts expended ($ 12 M) barely registers in the economic history of the cold war, but they still
qualify as a "concentration" of value which departs significantly from established precedent.
Ironically, this makes Abu Simbel and the other Nubian temples intentional monuments in the
traditional Rieglian sense of the term: building projects that commemorate a political event, and
whose cultural significance derives from the importance of this event. From the point of view of the
cold war, the Nubian campaign qualifies was a relatively straightforward monumentalization of
political action, akin to that of the ancient Egyptians or Napoleon-albeit within an updated cultural
sphere, where "intention" is distributed among multiple constituents (including international
institutions, its experts, and its imagined constituencies). The irony, then, is that the Campaign went
on to become the precedent for a new "unintentionality" in preservation culture, which wrested
control over history away from state actors.
For Riegl, intentional and unintentional monuments differed not only in the circumstances of
their creation but in their behavior over time: while the intentional monument denotes a historical
action by fixing it in history and space, the unintentional monument simply conveys the abstract
feeling of the passage of time. To return one last time to the theoretical lineage of Maussian
interpretations that has been threaded throughout this chapter, in terms of gift-exchange, the theme
of "time" as cultural referent is echoed by Jacques Derrida in his Counterfeit Money. Derrida offers to
replace what Mauss had called the "spirituality" with "temporality." The gift must be forgotten in
order for the counter-gift to be sent in return. Therefore the gift is only a gift of time:
The gift is not a gift, the gift only gives to the extent that it gives time. The difference
between a gift and every other operation of pure and simple exchange is that the gift
gives time. There where there is gift, there is time, What it gives, the gift, is time, but this gift is
also a demand of time. The thing must not be restituted immediately and right away. ... The
gift gives, demands, and takes time. 39s
395 Jacques Derrida, Given Time I Counterfeit Money trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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This passage aptly summarizes the ways Unesco tried to insert the archaeological campaign into
existing political timelines by arguing for the existence of a kind of cultural time-delay. For instance,
the antiquities that had "filled the coffers" of the Cairo museum in the early 20 th century only
became acceptable "gifts-in-return" after a half-century during which their value as counterpieces
slowly expired. Thus, Western archaeologists hoping for a 'revival of Egyptology' found in the
campaign a way to "buy time" during difficult years of trans-national relations. Similarly, it is as
way to secure future debt from one another that Egypt and the US engaged in the circuitous process
of salvaging Abu Simbel. But perhaps the most important way that the Nubian monuments "gave"
time was to Unesco: by allowing it to construct a redemptive theory of history: the Nubian
monuments contained a promise of historical agency, both present and future: a retrospective value
applied to the Nubian monuments and all other monuments salvaged in the future.
Unesco, as I have shown, emerged politically helpless in all its efforts to develop specifically
"cultural" modes of action independent from the conduct of international relations. Yet this political
helplessness does not absolve the organization from the consequences of its insistence on connecting
individual consciousness with collective action. In this sense Unesco is guilty of the same "Hegelian
Monstrosity" of which Maurice Merleau-Ponty accused Andre Malraux in his commentary on the
Musee Imaginaire: a reconciliation of individual perception with a transcendent telos, "a History which
reunites scattered efforts, and a Reason in history of which he [Malraux] is the instrument." 39 By
analogy we might say that the Nubian campaign allowed Unesco to abdicate its own responsibility,
as the instrument of a kind of monumental "reason," which gathered scattered "intentions" for the
sake of perpetuating a history of unintention.
An image of this "Hegelian monstrosity" is provided by a photograph of Andre Malraux's
visit the Abu Simbel salvage site in 1966. (fig 4.64) Re-enacting the classic archaeological encounter,
Malraux stared into Rameses' colossal face, undoubtedly recalling his 1960 pronouncement that "the
face of queen Nefertiti haunts our painters as Cleopatra has inspired out poets; but whereas Cleopatra
is a queen without a face, Nefertiti, for us, is a face without a kingdom."' 9 In the intervening years,
Malraux had established France's own "imaginary museum" and established himself as the saviour
of its monuments--thus it is not difficult to situate the salvage of Abu Simbel in the chronology of
396 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in Signs trans. Richard McLeary(Chicago:
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 1964), 65. Reprinted with some
revisions as "The Indirect Language," The Prose of the World (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1973).
397 Andr6 Malraux, TVA of Archaeology, 2.
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Malraux's work in France.3 98 There are enough resonances between Malraux's deeds and Unesco's
work to conclude that there were significant reciprocal influences between the two organizations.3 99
The cultural narcissism of the encounter was reinforced by the pointed questions that young
Nasserist government officials asked Malraux during his trip, about the discrepancy between the
socialist ideals Malraux had expressed in his pre-war work, La Condition Humaine, and his postwar
ministerial position in the Gaullist government.4 00 This was the same question Malraux was
everywhere confronting in France, and the fact that it was raised here only highlights the continuity
between Malraux's international work and his later institution of the "Loi Malraux" and other
heritage work in France. Yet the "monstrosity" lies precisely in this undue attention to Malraux as an
institution. If any cultural ministry is to be credited for the Nubian salvage, it is Nasser's Ministry of
Culture and National Guidance, whose first appointed minister, Sarwat Okasha, played a crucial part in
involving Nasser-who himself appears to have held little interest in Nubia and its monuments. As
the sole contact for Western experts, and a scholar himself, Okasha himself is today the public
official that Unesco commemorates in the anniversary of the Campaign.40 ' Okasha's agency in the
campaign can be understood as a reversal of Malraux's: Malraux was present to make proclamations
at the launch and the success of the salvage, Okacha had been a decisive force at most stages of the
campaign, but was absent in the 1966 photograph, having fallen out of favor and replaced by a
more closely aligned Nasserist, Abdel Hakem, who is featured in the photograph. Re-instated a few
years later, Okasha authored an official memoir of the Campaign for Egyptian history books.
There is also a third person present in the photograph, representing a third type of historical
agency: Malraux's chaperon, CEDAE director and Louvre-trained Egyptologist Christiane Noblecourt.
It is she who can claim the greatest personal investment in the campaign, having played a pivotal
role in bringing the temples to the attention of Unesco, and to the Egyptian antiquities, having
agitated for the creation of the CEDAE, and written many of the popularized accounts of the history
of Nubia, and eventually centering her entire career on this adventure, which she called "La Grande
398 For a brief overview of the birth of the French ministry of culture see Xavier Laurent, "Le Renouvellement des
Cadres," Grandeur et Misire du Patrimoine d'Andre Malraux a Jacques Duhamel (1959-1973), (Paris: M6moires et Documents de
l'Ecole des Chartes: 2003), 35-44. Malraux's trip was officially to facilitate France's participation in the King Tut
exhibition which traveled worldwide and whose proceeds were donated to the Unesco campaign-a position that was,
in the United States, filled by former first lady Jacqueline Kennedy.
399 Jean-Frangoise Lyotard sums up: "As minister of Culture, his initiatives are well known: the inventory of France's
artistic heritage; the creation of the Maisons de la Culture; the facelift of Paris; the regional support funding for the
plastic arts, museum and theater; the protection and preservation of historic monuments and urban sites; the creation of
the Ochestre de Paris; the -overhaul of the Opera and the naming of Georges Auric as its director..." Jean-Frangoise
Lyotard, Signi Malraux (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 277.
400 The episode is recounted by Christiane Laroche-Noblecourt in La Grande Nubiade (Paris: Stock/Pernod: 1992), 298.
401 Unesco's celebration of the 3 0 th anniversary of the Nubian Campaign honored Okasha and Christiane Laroche-
Noblecourt.
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Nubiade." In a sense, many of the values in whose name Noblecourt fought were deeply
anachronistic: she argued for turning Nubia into an "open-air museum" and she spearheaded the
effort to stop the VBB scheme as "barbaric." Yet her actions can also be seen as prototype of a later
channel of cultural action which acquired a higher profile in the decade after the campaign: the
profile of the grass-roots organizer operating within a non-governmental organization.
Indeed the Nubian campaign marks the end of an era of intergovemmental cultural politics
and the beginning of the rise of small-scale NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations). Many of the
figures involved in the Campaign helped in this transition: Gazzola went on to found the
International Council of Monuments and Sites in 1965 (ICOMOS), and Brew used the Campaign as
leverage to convince the US to become a member of the International Center for the Conservation of
Cultural Property in Rome (ICCROM). Further campaigns were conducted largely without the top-
tier cultural figures like Malraux and Okasha. In the West, this shift away from governments was
experienced as a political revival of preservationist activism, connected with the turn towards the
preservation of cities. Thus Christiane Noblecourt, with her nostalgic reconstruction of "Nubian life,"
is ultimately not far removed from Jane Jacobs, and her plea for the preservation of "communities"
in Western cities. But even this "constituency turn" in heritage discourse hides a Hegelian
monstrosity: the illusion that, in turning their attention to forms of urban "heritage" which were
literal containers of people, who could be politically mobilized against urban renewal, the
international preservation movement had purged monuments of all the figurative ways that heritage
was codified as a figurative container of cultural, economic and political collectivities.
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FIG. 4.01 Transmission of electricity generated by the
Aswan High Dam. UAR Information Department, 1960.
FIG. 4.02 Survey of the Nile Valley, UNESCO, 1960.
FIG. 4.03 Aswan: Symbol of Soviet-Egyptian Friendship,
1965.
FIG. 4.04 New York Times, Jan 14, 1964.
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FIG. 4.05 Aswan High Dam section. UAR Information Department, 1960.
FIG. 4.06 Suez Canal: On-site concrete factory (left) and Panorama (right). From Nouvelles Conqu6tes de la Science, 1883.
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FIG. 4.07 Abu Simbel on the cover of the Unesco Courier, 1960-1964.
FIG. 4.09 Unesco, The World Saves Abu Simbel, 1978.
FIG. 4.08 Abu Simbel on opening day, 22 September 1968.
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FIG. 4.10 Satellite photograph of the new temples.
FIG. 4.11 Satellite photograph of the temples, superimposed with plan of their original location.
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4.13
FIG. 4.12 Head of Nefertiti, exported to
Germany in 1912.
FIG. 4.13 Limestone altarpiece, left as
counterpart to the Cairo Museum.
FIG. 4.14 Map of Egypt, ending where Nubia
begins. Description de I'Egypte.
FIG. 4.15 The International Action Committee at
work on its Nubian Cruise.
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FIG. 4.16 "Gifts from the land of the Pharaohs,' in The Unesco Courier, October 1961.
FIG. 4.17 "Twenty-three temples will be moved,' in The Unesco Courier, October 1961.
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DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN EXCAVATION AND RESTORATION WORK
FIG. 4.18 Direct
participation in excavation
and restoration work,
measured in manpower.
Data from Unesco,
diagram by author.
FIG. 4.19 Resettlement
of Nubian populations.
Diagram by author.
FIG. 4.20 Archaeological
concessions by country.
Diagram by author.
4.19
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FIG. 4.21 Description de I'Egypte: Frontispiece.
FIG. 4.22 "Patrons of the International Campaign to Save Nubia's Monuments'," in The Unesco Courier, 1961.
Malraux is second from bottom in the right-most column.
FIG. 4.23 Stills form Unesco's promotional film International Campaign for Monuments, June-November 1964.
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FIG. 4.24 Map of the Unesco appeal.
FIG. 4.25 Temple relocation. Diagram by author.
FIG. 4.26 Four temples exported as "grants-in-
return" ("Surplus temples") in their new locations.
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FIG. 4.27 Temple relocation into four oases. Diagram by author.
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FIG. 4.28 Increasing technicality in Unesco's description of the Nubian temples and their type of construction, 1959-1964.
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FIG. 4.29 Gazzola's map identifying the sites of the Monuments, The Gazzola Report, 1959.
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FIG. 4.30 "The Nile from
Assuan to the Second
Cataract'," in Baedeker's Egypt,
1928.
FIG. 4.31 "Tourist High Spots
of Egypt" and "Museums
with Egyptian Materials'," in
Baedeker's Guide to Egypt,
1984.
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4. Salvaged Monuments
FIG. 4.34 "The Island of Philae"
from Description de I'Egypte.
FIG. 4.35 Victor Horeau, panorama,
"The Greatest Open-Air Museum
is about to Disappear"
FIG. 4.36 The island of Philae
submerged, 1924.
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FIG. 4.37 Cash contributions to the Abu Simbel fund. Data from Unesco, diagram by the author.
FIG. 4.38 Contributions to the Abu Simbel safeguard. From Sarwat Okasha, Memoirs, 1984.
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ABUJ SIM4SEL
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FIG. 4.39 French "Dam" Scheme: Perspective
views. Coyne & Bellier, Engineers; Albert Laprade,
Architect.
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FIG. 4.40 Coyne & Bellier: Three
dam options.
FIG. 4.41 Coyne & Bellier, Site plan
of pumping scheme
FIG. 4.42 Coyne & Bellier, Earth
dam section
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2 TEMLPS
ABo Si~MBL
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FIG. 4.43 ItalConsult Scheme: Section of Concrete "Box"
FIG. 4.43 ItalConsult Scheme: preliminary sketches by Pietro Gazzola in Gazzola Report 1959.
FIG. 4.43 ItalConsult Scheme: section.
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FIG. 4.44 Axonometric sequence of salvage
FIG. 4.45 Pietro Gazzola, drawing from the reconstruction of the Ponte
Pietra in Verona.
FIG. 4.46 Rendering of ItalConsult scheme in Unesco Courier: Abu
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FIG. 4.47 Renderings of the ItalConsult scheme, by Riccardo Morandi.
497
Lucia Allais
&kahtt
prllaI •i ollLL -±447.
panel at
SECTION THROUGH XINGS TEMPLE
FIG. 4.48 British "underwater" scheme: axonometric, plan and section.
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4. Salvaged Monuments
FIG. 4.49 British scheme: view inside the shrine.
FIG. 4.50 Jane Drew & Max Fry, "The Nile" in Architecture
and the Environment.
FIG. 4.51 Illumination of the figures at the back of the
shrine.
FIG. 4.52 British scheme: view from the tunnels in the dam.
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COUPE VERTICALE F.F
RESERVOIR D !LEVATION ET DE TRANSLATION
GRAND TEMPLE ECHELLE 1:/000
FIG. 4.53 Albert Caquot: Floating Scheme.
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FIG. 4.54 VBB: Elevation of the cutting scheme.
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FIG. 4.55 Unesco, Film Stills, from The World Saves Abu Simbel.
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FIG. 4.56 VBB: Rendering of the fissures
FIG. 4.57 VBB: Plexiglass model of the fissures in the stone
FIG. 4.58 VBB: Plan drawing of the fissures in the stone
FIG. 4.59 VBB: Proposed reconstruction of the site, 1961.
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FIG. 4.60 VBB: Facade is covered in fine sand to avoid damage to the statues
FIG. 4.61 VBB: Statues are injected with epoxy before cutting
FIG. 4.62 Maxime du Camp: Colosse d'lbsamboul, photograph taken in 1883.
FIG. 4.63 Rendering of Abu Simbel above the couch in Sigmund Freud's Vienna office.
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FIG. 4.64 Andre Malraux visits Abu Simbel, accompanied by Christiane Laroche-Noblecourt (left) and Abdel Hakem (right).
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Conclusion
That the great moments in the struggles of individuals form links in one single chain; that they
combine to form a mountain range of humankind through the millennia; that for me the highest
point of such a long-since-past moment is still alive, bright and great-this is the fundamental
thought in the belief in humanity that expresses itself in the demand for monumental history.'
-Friedrich Nietszche, 1874.
A law for the protection of monuments can only refer to non-intentional monuments,
and to intentional ones only inasmuch as they belong, at the same time, to the category
of non-intentional monuments.2
-Alois Riegl, 1903.
It is true that, in many countries, remarkable efforts have already been made and are still
being made to protect those monuments which are endangered; and there is no nation
today which is not proud of its artistic heritage and conscious of its importance in
cultural life. But Unesco, which, under its constitution, is called upon to assure the
conservation and protection of the world's heritage of works of art and monuments, had
a duty to take its own steps to bring these national efforts into a world-wide scheme, and
to show the key role that may be played in the cultural formation of contemporary man
by communion with works produced, through the centuries, in the various centers of
civilization which cover the surface of the globe like so many volcanoes of History.3
-Rene Maheu, 1964.
It will not have escaped even a distracted reader that the "will to war" and the "will to art"
advertised in the title have appeared only infrequently as a pair in the projects and debates surveyed
in the dissertation. Yet these two "wills" were pervasive in the minds of the mid-century
internationalists. Even if their relationship was never cohesively theorized, they are still the surest
anchor for a strict periodization of the material at hand: the dissertation begins when the League first
combined these two forms of volition to achieve an effect of political autonomy, and ends when
Unesco no longer felt it necessary to resort to either one in order to conjure up "the importance of
cultural life." Cultural Internationalism remains a strong political movement and the modernist
aesthetics of monuments has now become an International Style--but the Will to War and the Will
' Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Utility and Liability of History for Life," in The Nietzsche Reader (London: Blackwell,
2006), 132.
2 Alois Riegl, "A Law for Protection of Monuments," in Reform Project- Laws of Protection, 207.
3 Ren6 Maheu, "The preservation of monuments for posterity is one of the duties of mankind," in Unesco Chronicle (Aug-
Sep 1964), 265.
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to Art have largely disappeared, leaving behind the certainty that monuments give iconic weight to
cultural autonomy in a new world order. To conclude, I venture briefly into earlier and later
decades, to clarify the provenance of this autonomy and speculate on its fate in the postmodern
aftermath.
What was meant by "will to war" in mid-century international discourse was a version of
what Nietszche had, in 1874, called the "will to power" ("Die Wille zur Macht") and which
French-speakers translated as volonte. Nietszche coined the term to describe human agency in a post-
idealist world: the power of human subjectivity to act over history itself. Nietszche's Macht has of
course been connected to the political nationalisms of the 20 Century; and Niesztche's despiction of
"German cultivation as containing internally struggling chaos of all foreign lands and all prior
history"4 can certainly be heard resonating through all of intellectual cooperation. But he also
brought this theory of freedom and volition to bear on monuments directly, in his description of
"the uses and disadvantages" of three kinds of history, each kind representing the actions of modern
subjectivity onto past events. Nietszche was surprisingly specific in his description of the form of
monumental history: the way it naturalized events (monuments were "mountain chains" emerging
from "a dense earthly fog") while at the same time dematerializing the connection between
moment and monument (monumental history was but "a collection of effects in themselves.")
Monuments absorbed autonomous human volition with "iconic veracity," and anyone familiar with
Unesco's rhetoric will find a striking similarity between the language of monuments in the service of
"peace in the minds of men" and Nietzsche's description of this "iconic veracity."
What was meant by the "will to art" in mid-century art history was inspired by what Alois
Riegl had called "Kunstwollen," which the French translated with the infinitive vouloir, and which I
have already described as a formalist regulation of artworks themselves. While Nietszche's subject
made "demands" onto monumental history, Riegl's wollen was a collective volition that proceeded
from the object outward. Tt is Riegl's willingness to speak of this autonomous force in political terms
that must not be underestimated: this force was so comprehensive that it folded even the most potent
of intentions into un-intention, thus even blatantly commemorative objects could only be legislated
if they were "valued by the terms of the modern Kunstwollen." War memorials were, of course, the
paradigmatic example of an intentional monument. Riegl turned the range spanned by Nietszche
between "moments" and "monuments" into a feedback loop of "effects in themselves." In this
sense, Nietzsche's politics tended towards Riegl's formalism, and vice-versa.
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4 Nietzsche, 140.
Conclusion
Consider now Rene Maheu's speech launching "The International Campaign for
Monuments" in 1960, which used many of the formulations that Unesco had earned monuments,
including their value as "the world's heritage" and their role in the progress towards ever-more
respect between cultures. Maheu borrowed Nietzsche's allegory, naturalizing monuments as
"volcanoes of History" that "covered the surface of the globe" and offering them for "communion"
with human subjectivity. He also took on Riegl's legal analysis, describing the intentions of nations as
irrelevant to the legislation of cultural artifacts, and granting Unesco the privilege of "showing the
key role" played by unintention in "cultural formations." Where Maheu fundamentally differed
from his venerable philosophical sources was in the apolitical character of his statement: the
authority of his "worldwide scheme" was given quietly to Unesco's constitution, as if the highly
dramatized vouloir and volonte created during the turbulent mid-century had disappeared into a
bureaucratic anonymity. It is this institutional, regularized, and normalized autonomy that
monuments-or "urban sites," or indeed actual "mountainous chains"-are granted when they are
designated "world heritage sites" today.
Yet is not this liberal politics of monuments that was revived when postmodernist architects
and post-structuralist critics re-discovered "the monument" in the last quarter of the 20t Century.
When the journal Oppositions translated Riegl's Cult of Monuments into English for the first time in 1982,
the text was illustrated with images from the annals of 20f Century conservation, and introduced by
a text of Alan Coquhoun that attested to its historicist relevance despite its putative "modernity."5
Through monuments, postmodernism hoped to rediscover its historical consciousness. There was
nothing social, political or even ideological about the historicist monument: it was a disciplinary
artifact that connected architecture back to an institution that modernism had rejected. Similarly, the
"memory discourse" that followed suit in the 1990s, directing monuments towards the identity
between history and memory, completely "forgot" about the unintentional monument. Instead a
kind of theoretical solipsism developed that was conveniently suited to the interpretation of all the
intentional monuments that had just been built, written, and theorized to commemorate the
destructions of World War II. But what postmodernism called "history" and poststructuralism called
"memory," the mid-century had simply called "culture." What remains unclear, and undoubtedly a
subject of further investigation, is how the institutional ethos that had been built into these
disciplinary conceits helped postmodern theory-architectural and otherwise-reclaim this cultural
autonomy for itself.
s Alan Colquhoun, "Newness and Age-Value in Alois Riegl," in Oppositions 25 (Fall 1982).
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